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A b strac t
(1) This h i s to r i c a l  comparative p h ilo so p h ica l a n a ly s is  s tu d ie s  th e  
fu n c tio n  o f  In d ian  thought in  German m etaphysical pessimism. The 
d iscu ss io n  fo llow s a  l in e  o f prim ary focusing  p o in ts  which ensue 
co nsecu tive ly  from the  range o f changing views (p resen ted  in  p a r t  i )  
h e ld  by a s e le c t io n  o f German re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f pessimism. Each 
one o f  them i s  in troduced  througft h is  w ritin g s  and analysed  both  
w ith  regard  to  h is  pessimism and h i s  In d ian  connections, a s  f a r
as  p o ss ib le . I b i s  a n a ly t ic a l  p ro cess  i s o la te s  the  most e s s e n t ia l  
cues and concepts. Ihese  mark the  development o f  o u r understand ing  
o f the  th in k e r  h im se lf ( i . e .  h is  form of pessim ism ), and provide 
th e  sp ec ia l connection p o in ts  through which he can be lin k ed  w ith  
th e  o th e r  p e ss im is ts . In  th i s  manner an intra-G erm an s e t  o f 
h i s to r i c a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  i s  e s ta b lish e d .
(2) The i s o la te d  cues and concepts, furtherm ore, fo rm ally  provide th e  
f i r s t  1 inks w ith  th a t  a c tu a l  Ind ian  sphere o f thought (p a r t I I )  
which appears to  be re sp o n sib le  f o r  e x e r tin g  some more o r  l e s s  
s p e c if ic  in flu en ce  on the  in d iv id u a l views: o f  th e  German th in k e rs . 
I b is  h y p o th e tic a l assum ption o f a  p e s s im is t ic  German response to  
In d ian  thought i s  cen tred  on a second s e t  of h i s to r i c a l  
r e la t io n s h ip s , namely, those  between the  v a rio u s  German views
and the  sphere of In d ian  philosophy.
(3 ) The comparative c h a ra c te r  o f  th i s  s tu d y  n e c e s s i ta te s  a  s p e c ia l  
methodology i n  o rd e r  to  b rid g e  th e  n a tu ra l  gap between th e  German 
(European) and the  In d ian  t r a d i t io n  o f  thought. The g re a te r  p a r t  
o f  th e  In tro d u c tio n  has, th e re fo re , been a l lo t t e d  to  the  ex p o sitio n  
o f  a  herm eneutic approach to  th e  problem. This herm eneutic i s  
e s s e n t ia l ly  a connective device. I t  makes i t  p o ss ib le  to focus 
th e  comparative argument on the  In d ian  conceptions behind th e  
(supposedly In d ian  b u t, i n  f a c t ,  German) cues and concepts i n  
q u estion .
(4 ) Tbe combined a n a ly s is  im p lie s  a  r e d e f in i t io n  o f  the  concept o f 
m etaphysical pessimism.
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4C hapter One 
In tro d u c tio n
( l )  Searching fo r  pessimism: scope, m otivation  and o b jec tiv e
When towards th e  end o f  th e  17th  cen tury  In d ia  began to  allow  Western 
c u r io s i ty  to  look  in to  i t s  age-o ld  te x ts ,  th i s  e l ic i te d  a  chain o f  
noteworthy re a c tio n s  in  Europe. Following the  appearance o f the  f i r s t  
English  t r a n s la t io n s  from the  S an sk rit, o r i e n ta l i s t s  and p h ilo lo g is ts  in  
France and Germany eagerly  c rea ted  the academic d is c ip lin e  o f  indology. 
P hilosophers immediately caugfrt on. While th i s  new form o f access to  
the  enigmas o f Ind ian  thought was prom ising f a n ta s t i c  in s ig h ts  to  the  
European mind, philosophy in  Germany u n h e s ita tin g ly  responded w ith some 
unexpected views. Developing alongside th ese  new views was what we now
-  • ( i )c a l l  pessimism.
This sim ultaneous emergence o f ph ilo so p h ica l pessimism may 
seem mere coincidence; before  we accept th i s ,  we in tend  to  f in d  out what
ITow d esig n a tin g  the ph ilo so p h ica l d o c trin e  th a t  th is  world i s  th e  
w orst p o ss ib le , founded by A. Schopenhauer in  1819, the  expression 
Pes8imismus as  such i s  recorded a s  e a r ly  as  1776, pessim ian in  1794, 
pessimisme in  1823 (according to  H. KLuge, Etymol. Wobu., 1967).
In d ia  could have con trib u ted  to  th i s  disapproving mode o f thought. Did 
any o f  i t s  ro o ts , o r  perhaps a t  le a s t  t h e i r  t ip s ,  touch Indian  ground? 
What did the  Ind ians have th a t  could have moved the  German th in k e rs , and 
perhaps th e i r  pessimigg? Furthermore, can the  essence o f th a t  challenge 
and response re la tio n sh ip  be described? Once we have discerned th e  
c ru c ia l fe a tu re s  on both s id e s , we can begin to  s tru c tu re  an approach to  
the conditions f o r  such a d e sc rip tio n .
The problem seems to  p resen t us q u ite  n a tu ra lly  with th re e  
im portant fa c e ts !  a p h ilo so p h ica l, a c u ltu ra l  and a h is to r ic a l  one. In  
o rder to  secure an o b jec tiv e  b a s is  fo r  our a n a ly s is , we p re fe r  to  f i r s t  
e s ta b lish  the e s s e n tia l  h i s to r ic a l  evidence fo r  the  main connections 
between the d if fe re n t  standpo in ts  o f severa l se lec ted  German th in k e rs , 
inc lud ing  th e i r  d if f e r e n t  c u ltu ra l  p e rsp ec tiv e s . Thereupon we sh a ll be 
ab le  to  p resen t our in te rp re ta t io n  o f these  re le v an t ph ilosoph ical 
connections. We sh a ll  concen tra te  on th e i r  main s tru c tu ra l  elements 
w ith regard e sp e c ia lly  to  our chosen ph ilo sophers ' awareness o f t h e i r  
com patib ility  w ith In d ia . In  o th e r words, a  meaningful h is to r ic a l  
approach to  our problem must include a c ro s s -c u ltu ra l  study based on the
(2)p r in c ip le s  o f comparative philosophy.
In  the  f i r s t  p a r t  o f th i s  study we sh a ll  make the  attem pt to
provide the necessaiy  h is to r ic a l  and p h ilo soph ical evidence fo r  our
(3)opinion th a t  in  Geiman th o u ^ it we can tra c e  a concept o f m etaphysical
(2) "La philosophie  comparee" as a concept was p resen ted  by Paul 
Masson-Oursel in  1925 (English in  1926), announcing th a t  "philosophy 
cannot achieve p o s i t iv i ty  so long a s  i t s  in v e s tig a tio n s  are  r e s t r ic te d  
to the  thought o f our own c iv i l iz a t io n "  (Comp. P h i l . , p . 33)•
(3) We p re fe r  to  take th e  concept o f German thought in  a broader sense 
than th a t  of German philosophy. While our ty p ic a l philosopher (e .g . 
Schopenhauer) could be ch arac te rized  a s  p e rs o n a lis t ic  in  h is  o r ie n ta tio n  
and m otivated by h is  in d iv id u a l th o u ^ it awareness, our th in k e rs  (Spengler, 
Gebser) a re  guided more by th e  circum stances and foims which surround 
th o u ^ it. Also see our pp. 174-177.
(e th ic a l  and e x is te n t ia l)  pessimism: from the heyday o f  German Romanticism
(4)u n t i l  now. The apparent coincidence o f an evolving t r a d i t io n  o f 
pessimism with a developing in te r e s t  in  In d ia  has allowed us to  s e le c t  
a s  our p r in c ip a l rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f German pessimism a group o f 
ph ilo soph ical and c u ltu ra l th in k e rs  whose views n o t only appear re lev an t 
w ith  regard  to  a concept o f pessimism hut a lso  contain  some response to  
Ind ian  thought. Such a se le c tio n  does, o f course, no t imply the  
assumption o f  any causal ph ilosoph ical connection between these  two 
c r i t e r i a ,  although the question  o f t h e i r  re la tio n sh ip  m otivates th is  
study. P rim arily  th is  German p re d ile c tio n  w ith Indian th o u ^ it provides 
a  bridge which in v ite s  us to  a lso  search fo r  p h ilo so p h ical pessimism o r  
a t  le a s t  some kind o f equivalent in  Indian c u ltu re , where we do indeed 
encounter i t ,  bu t as  an e th ic a l  a t t i tu d e .  The in te r r e la t io n  o f th is  
a t t i tu d e  and Indian philosophy sh a ll be d iscussed in  the  second p a r t  o f 
our study. This in te r r e la t io n  i s  im portant w ith regard to  what the 
Germans th o u ^ it they saw. Having followed the German p e ss im is tic  
outlooks, we have t r i e d  to  make a rep re sen ta tiv e  se le c tio n  o f those  p a r ts  
o f  Indian philosophy which seem re lev an t fo r  our d iscu ssio n  o f th ese  
German views, i .  e . , re lev an t with regard to  the inform ation on which they 
re lie d  but a lso  re lev an t fo r  our own explanation o f the Indian a t t i tu d e  
o f pessim isn in  the  l ig h t  o f  Indian philosophy. In  sh o rt, th i s  study 
r e s t s  on two cross-connected p i l l a r s  rep resen tin g  two g rea t realm s o f 
thought: German pessimism, and re la te d  aspec ts  in  Ind ian  philosophy. To
begin w ith, we s h a ll concen tra te  (a) on th e  p e ss im is tic  element in  German 
thought, w ith sp ec ia l considera tion  fo r  (b) the recep tio n  o f Ind ian  
elem ents. The Ind ian  co n trib u tio n  should (b) e lu c id a te  the  German 
approach and (a) provide a p a r a l le l  d iscussion  o f pessim ign.
In  o rder to  i l l u s t r a t e  the s ig n ifican ce  o f d i f f e r e n t  c u ltu ra l  
persp ec tiv es  in  th is  connection, we have included a b r ie f  in te rp re ta t io n  
o f pessimign in  Greek and Roman philosophy a t  the end o f th i s  in tro d u c tio n .
^  As Rene Gerard observes (O rien t, p . 200), "Schopenhauer f in d s  h im self, 
by some ex trao rd inary  coincidence, a t  the po in t o f in te rs e c tio n  o f 
O rien ta l-O cciden ta l research  re la t in g  to the  problem of cogn ition".
7This view in to  the  European p h ilo so p h ica l p a s t, we hope, w i l l  provide 
a kind o f  s tepp ing  s tone  fo r  th e  two p a r ts  which fo llow .
(2) A comparative methodology on herm eneutic p r in c ip le s
The simple f a c t  th a t  t h i s  comparative study handles a  v a r ie ty  o f German
re a c tio n s  to  In d ian  thought lead s  us to  a q u estion  which i s  d ec is iv e  f o r
our e n t i r e  a n a ly s is :  how can p h ilo so p h ica l thought be understood o u ts id e
i t s  own t r a d i t io n ,  o r , more s p e c if ic a l ly ,  how could we f in d  a  method o r
p r in c ip le  f o r  an adequate in te rp re ta t io n  o f  In d ian  thought before  we look
(5)in to  the German responses. In  developing o u r own approach, we f i r s t  
wish to  pay a t te n t io n  to  the  c a re fu l m ethodological answer which comes 
from Hans-Georg Gadamer in  h i s  herm eneutic.
R eferring  to  the  t r a d i t io n s  o f  te x ts  bu t a lso  to  those o f
in s t i tu t io n s  and l i f e - s t y l e s ,  o r , a s  we would say, a l l  meaningful
t r a d i t io n s ,  Gadamer a ssu re s  us th a t  i t  i s  " the  b a s ic  cond ition  o f the
h i s to r i c i t y  o f human ex is ten ce  to  pass on an understand ing  o f i t s e l f  w ith  
C$)
i t s e l f " .  Eermeneutic b rid g es  the  h i s to r ic a l  and c u l tu ra l  gap between 
d i f f e r e n t  ways o f th in k in g , thus making th e  u n fa m ilia r  a c c e ss ib le . For 
Gadamer th i s  does n o t ju s t  req u ire  the  h i s to r ic a l  re co n stru c tio n  o f the  
o r ig in a l co n tex ts , bu t a lso  the f u l l  understand ing  o f  the  message beyond 
i t s  v e rb a l co n ten t. This means th a t  understand ing  must n e c e s sa r ily  take 
p lace  on two le v e ls  -  namely, w ith  regard  to  a  stepw ise understanding  o f 
the  conceptual meanings and w ith  regard  to  a homogeneous o v e ra ll 
understand ing  which exceeds the  a c tu a l expression . Having managed to  
understand th e  code one must s t i l l  be prepared  to  accept th e  message, 
because " i t  i s  im possible to  understand w ithout w anting to  understand ." 
Gadamer c a l l s  i t  an inadm issib le  a b s tra c tio n  i f  one b e lie v e s  th a t  an 
understand ing  o f the  meaning would fo llow  n a tu ra lly  from a  q uasi- 
synchron ization  o f o n e 's  own view with th a t  o f some o rig in a l au tho r by
^  H albfass ( in d ien . p . 118, 124-125) warns u s  th a t  i t  would o f course 
be f u t i l e  to  a sp ire  to  some is o la te d  Ind ian  h is to ry  seen from purely  
Ind ian  p o in ts  o f view.
^  Gadamer, KL.S c h r .I I , pp. 1-6.
8v ir tu e  o f a reconstruction , o f  h is  h is to r ic a l  background. ’’R ather, 
a c e r ta in  a n tic ip a t io n  of meaning ru le s  the  e f f o r t  f o r  understanding  
r ig h t  from th e  beg in n in g ."
According to  Gadamer, when we a n tic ip a te  meaning, we are
a c tu a lly  re ly in g  on th e  f a c t  th a t  the  p a r ts  described  by the whole do
(7)them selves, in  tu rn , d escribe  th e  whole. He adds th a t  by doing so we 
make use  o f a  c i r c u la r  in n e r r e la t io n  which, once a ru le  o f an c ien t 
rh e to r ic ,  now fe a tu re s  th e  a r t  o f understand ing . I f  we keep our 
ex p ec ta tio n  f le x ib le  according  to  the  requirem ents o f th e  te x t ,  we 
observe how, in  th e  p rocess o f understanding, we move back and fo r th
between th e  whole and the p a r t .  As a r e s u l t  o u r understand ing  o f the
(8 )
meaning in c rease s  in  concen tric  c i r c le s .  Hermeneutic, in  Gadamer's
sense, i s  n o t in te re s te d  in  t r a c in g  understanding  back to  the
s u b je c t iv i ty  of th e  au tho r, b u t wants to  exp lain  the phenomenon of
understand ing  in  terms o f sharing , o r  o f p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  some common 
(9)meaning. This form of sharing  i s  described  a s  a harmonious p lay  
between the  movement o f t r a d i t io n  and the movement o f  in te rp re ta t io n .
I t  i s  th i s  movement, th i s  connectedness, which allow s the a n tic ip a tio n  
o f  meaning. However, the  view o f a  c i r c u la r  s tru c tu re  o f understanding 
as  one which evolves w ith our own in te n tio n a l p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  
p rocess o f t r a d i t io n  i s  no t o f a form al, and no t o f a  su b jec tiv e  o r  
o b jec tiv e  n a tu re . ’’The c i r c le  o f  understanding i s  n o t a 'm eth o d ica l'
(7) Gadamer, W.u.M.. pp. 275-283.
(8 )
This p r in c ip le  o f c i r c u la r  expansion i s  to  some ex ten t exem plified 
by Gadamer's own rh e to r ic .
^  He m entions (W.u.M., pp. 276-277) th a t ,  in  th e  19th century , 
S ch leierm acher's  theory  req u ired  an a c t  o f d iv in a tio n  by which, seeing  
every th ing  through the  a u th o r 's  eyes, one was to  d isso lv e  a l l  
s trangeness o f a  te x t .  R eferring  to  Heidegger, he agrees th a t  the 
understand ing  of a  te x t  depends on the  la s t in g  e f f e c t  o f an 
a n tic ip a to ry  p re-understanding . T herefore, the c i r c le  o f  whole and 
p a r t  w il l  no t be d isso lved  by complete understanding , b u t, on the 
co n tra ry , w il l  be most n e c e ssa r ily  consummated.
c i r c le  a t  a l l ,  but d esc rib es  an o n to lo g ica l s tru c tu ra l  a sp ec t o f  
understand ing .” Gadamer assumes th a t our wish to  know a c e r ta in  
t r a d i t io n ,  in c lu d in g  th e  m a tte r d iscussed  in  i t ,  a lso  connects u s  w ith 
i t ,  although no t in  th e  foim o f an undoubted, n a tu ra l ,  u n in te rp re ted  
co n tin u a tio n . In  th i s  p rocess o f communication he observes a p o la r i ty  
o f  strangeness and f a m il ia r i ty ,  on which th e  p rocess has to  re ly .
The tru e  p lace  o f heim eneutic, a s  he d esc rib es  i t ,  i s  the  p o s itio n  
between the  h is to r ic a l ly  in te rp re te d  d is ta n t  o b jec tiv en ess  and the  
a f f i l i a t i o n  w ith a  t r a d i t io n .  This exp lain s why heim eneutic i s  
predom inantly in te re s te d  in  the  cond itions under which understand ing  
cones about.
The d if fe re n t  a n tic ip a tio n s  which fe a tu re  an in te rp re ta t io n , 
namely, the  p roductive  p re ju d ices  which promote understand ing  and those  
which p reven t i t ,  a re  u su a lly  so rted  o u t in  the  same p rocess o f 
understanding. In  t ly in g  to  f in d  out how th i s  works, Gadamer suggests 
th a t  we concen tra te  on th e  h i s to r ic a l  d is ta n ce  between the in te r p r e te r  
and th e  au tho r. Each time in  h is to ry  must r e ly  on i t s  own way o f 
in te rp re t in g  a te x tu a l t r a d i t io n ,  because o f i t s  own sp e c if ic  h i s to r ic a l  
connection w ith i t .  The a c tu a l meaning o f a  te x t  a s  i t  in te r e s t s  the 
in te r p r e te r  must r e f le c t  h is  undeniable h i s to r ic a l  d iffe re n c e  from the 
au tho r, and not the a u th o r 's  own occasional s i tu a tio n . F or Gadamer the 
meaning o f  a te x t excels i t s  au th o r, no t as  an excep tion , bu t as a ru le .  
"Therefore, understanding i s  not ju s t  a  rep roductive  kind o f behavior, 
bu t always a lso  a p roductive  k ind ."  Gadamer i s  openly opposed to  th e  
rom antic heim eneutic th eo iy  which h e ld  th a t  understand ing  meant
Gadamer f a . S c h r . I I I . pp. 255-255) n o tic e s  a  sem antic p a r a l le l  to  
th i s  heim eneutic p o la r i ty  when in  th e  flow o f speech, o r  te x t ,  each 
teim  i s  consecu tively  rep laced  not by a sem antica lly  id e n t ic a l  teim , b u t 
by a  s l ig h t ly  changed one. The o b je c t if ic a t io n  o f meaning remains 
r e s t r ic te d ,  since " the  l in g u is t ic  expression i s  n o t ju s t  in accu ra te  and 
wanting co rre c tio n , but remains always and n e c e ssa r ily , e sp e c ia lly  when 
i t  i s  what i t  i s  capable of being, behind what i t  evokes and 
communicates".
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rep roduction  o f  an o r ig in a l  production  as  w ell a s  understanding the
au th o r b e t te r  than he h im se lf d id . In  h is  opinion n e ith e r  g re a te r
o b jec tiv e  knowledge n o r g re a te r  a p p lic a tio n  o f consciousness could
produce any b e t t e r  understanding . For him " i t  i s  s u f f ic ie n t  to  say th a t
one understands d if f e r e n t ly ,  i f  one understands a t  a l l . " ^ ^  In  o th e r
«
words, th e  d is tan ce  o f  tim e should not be tre a te d  a s  a gap which must
be overcome, because i t  fu n c tio n s  as  the p r in c ip le  which causes and
c a r r ie s  the heim eneutic problem (Mder tragende Grund des Geschehens").
This view tak es  in to  account th a t  time must have separa ted  us from
a c e r ta in  t r a d i t io n  before we may hope to  understand the tru e  meaning o f
our o b je c t. We a re  reminded, a s  h i s to r ic a l  resea rch  has le a r n t ,  th a t
only from a  c e r ta in  d is tan ce  i s  o b jec tiv e  knowledge p o ss ib le . The id ea
o f  a  complete understand ing  should, th e re fo re , be v isu a liz e d  as  a
never-ending  p rocess J w hile in  o r  through the  course o f time our
p a r t ic u la r ,  negative  p re ju d ic e s , to g e th e r w ith o th e r sources o f e r ro r ,
are  be ing  d isso lv ed , new a sp ec ts  o f meaning and new sources of
understand ing  a re  sim ultaneously being  opened up. "True h is to r ic a l
th in k in g  must include in  i t s  th in k in g  i t s  own h i s to r i c i ty ” , says Gadamer.
Unis means th a t  i t  must recognize i t s  own presence in  i t s  o b jec t. The
t r u ly  h i s to r i c a l  o b je c t, then , should be considered as  a re la tio n sh ip
which r e f le c t s  the r e a l i ty  o f h is to ry  as much as th e  r e a l i ty  o f
h i s to r ic a l  understanding . R eca lling  th a t  i t  i s  a  fe a tu re  o f heim eneutic
consciousness: to  include th e  f a c t  o f i t s  own r e f le c t iv e  ex istence  in  the
a c t  o f  r e f le c t in g ,  Gadamer re f e r s  to  the  heim eneutic n a tu re  o f
philosophy: "Heimeneutic c r i t ic is m  re v e a ls  i t s  own p ro d u c tiv ity  on ly
when i t  i s  capable o f s e l f - r e f le c t io n ,  o f  r e f le c t in g  on i t s  own c r i t i c a l
a ttem p ts, i . e .  on i t s  own lim ita t io n  and dependence w ith  regard  to  th ese
a tte m p ts .” Hence he d e fin es  th a t  "philosophy, which must always,
e x p l ic i t ly  o r  n o t, be a c r i t iq u e  o f the t r a d i t io n a l  attem pts of thought,
i s  such a heim eneutic p rocess which transform s th e  s tru c tu ra l  t o t a l i t i e s
worked out by semantic a n a ly s is  in to  the  continuum o f  tr a n s la t in g  and
(l2 )understanding , in  which we e x is t  and vanish".
(11)
Gadamer, W.u.M.I. p. 180; I I ,  pp. 274, 280.
(12) Gadamer, K l.S c h r .I I I . pp. 259-260.
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Gadamer's herm eneutic con tains a powerful in tu i t iv e  element o f 
in s ig h t  in to  the na tu re  of understanding. We have seen th a t  in  h is  
d e sc rip tio n  he has adhered to the idea  o f a c i r c u la r  s tru c tu re . Based on 
a c e r ta in  a n tic ip a tio n  o f meaning, the a r t  o f understand ing  r e l i e s  on an 
a l te r n a t in g  process o f mutual exp lanation  re s u l t in g  from a stepwise 
a c q u is itio n  o f conceptual meanings, followed by an expansion of the  
o v e ra ll  meaning which, due to  the  in te r p r e te r 's  h i s to r i c a l  d is tan ce , even 
exceeds the  a c tu a l expression  (which, in  tu rn , could prompt some 
a n tic ip a tio n  o f  meaning). For Gadamer i t  i s  simply the  ro le  o f 
herm eneutic, as  determined by the  tim e-gap, which allow s p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  
some common meaning. These p r in c ip le s , which in  Gadamer's view fe a tu re  
the  cond itions o f understanding, sh a ll  support ou r fu r th e r  p u rsu it o f 
a  methodology on which we can even tu a lly  base our a c tu a l method o f 
p h ilo so p h ica l comparison.
The question  o f  a  common standard o f meaning, which has only
been touched on so f a r ,  and which must n e c e s sa r ily  p lay  an eminent ro le
in  th i s  connection, was la rg e ly  ignored by our German p ess im is ts .
However, nowadays i t  seems obvious to  u s th a t ,  in  order to  compare two
d if f e re n t  p h ilo so p h ica l outlooks o r th e o r ie s , we cannot simply i n f l i c t
the  standards o f the one theory  onto the o th e r. The predicam ent
re s u l t in g  from such an acu te  in co m p a tib ility  makes us wish f o r  some
persp ec tiv e  which, while no t being  on an id e n tic a l  le v e l  w ith  e i th e r  o f
th e  compared views, could s t i l l  inc lude  them a s  two d if f e r e n t  and
concrete  cases. Such a m eta-perspective , o r  meta-view, as  i t  could he
c a lle d , which allow s us to  determ ine th e  necessary  comparative c r i t e r i a
(l3 )h as been suggested by A. P ia tig o rsk y . At f i r s t  s ig h t t h i s  approach
adm its a su b jec tiv e  asp ec t. We a re  reminded o f Gadamer' a herm eneutic 
consciousness when we a re  made to  r e a l iz e  th a t  t h i s  s u b je c t iv i ty  im p lies  
th a t  we can th in k  about the  whole me ta r - th e o re t ic a l  s tru c tu re  a s  be ing  
o u r own product and th a t  we can r e f l e c t  on our a c t  o f  r e f le c t in g .  But 
t h i s  m e ta -s tru c tu re  would acqu ire  a n e u tra l  herm eneutic s ta tu s  as soon 
a s  we decided to  t r e a t  i t  as autonomous, o r as  an o b je c t if ie d  te x t
See A. P ia tig o rsk y , "La rion to log izzazione  de l pensiero  nel 
buddismo", and "Some remarks on o th e r stream ".
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independent o f our o r  o th e r  p e o p le 's  personal p h ilo so p h ica l
« . ( u )thought.
As we have a lread y  gathered from Gadamer, we may a n tic ip a te  
meaning which goes beyond th e  a c tu a l exp ression . P ia tig o rsk y  now 
d i r e c ts  our a t te n t io n  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  such herm eneutical tren d s  as  
a t t r ib u t in g  to  every th ing  a meaning o f  i t s  own can be im plied  in  
a concept o f  appercep tive s t ru c tu re s  (here  r e f e r r in g  to  our in te n tio n a l 
awareness and acceptance o f  new te x tu a l meanings and th e i r  in teg ra tio n , 
in to  ou r p h ilo so p h ica l knowledge). We can a v a i l  ou rse lv es  o f the  
p r in c ip le  o f o b jec tiv e  appercep tion  to g e th e r  w ith  th a t  o f  a  su b jec tiv e  
m eta-theory , making them th e  two main c o n s ti tu e n ts  of a  met a -s tru c tu re  
which would s h e l te r  the d if f e r e n t  o b je c ts  o f our proposed p h ilo so p h ica l 
comparison. These te rn s  and te x ts  can, up to  th i s  p o in t, o n ly  fo rm ally  
be considered  o f p h ilo so p h ica l in te r e s t ,  s ince  w ithout o u r intended 
in te rp re ta t io n  we should no t y e t r e f e r  to  any p h ilo so p h ica l con ten t.
As regards th e  term s, i t  i s  suggested th a t  we f i r s t  in te r p r e t  thou 
through a te x t  which draws on our own m eta-term s and r e l i e s  on a  view 
o f th e  o r ig in a l con tex t w ith in  our appercep tive  s tru c tu re ;  th i s  would 
then  allow  u s  to  re c o n s tru c t them in  some way. When i t  comes to  the  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  te x ts ,  th e  appercep tive  s tru c tu re , although 
ch a rac te rized  by the  meaning o f th e  texms, o r  concepts, would th i s  time 
emerge from our own te x tu a l in te rp re ta t io n .
Having exposed th e se  general heim eneutic a sp e c ts  o f  comparative 
philosophy, we a re  ready to  look  a t  our own sp ec ia l heim eneutic 
s i tu a t io n . "R eflec tin g  on our re f le c t io n " ,  we r e a l iz e  th e  im portant 
ro le  o f our own c u l tu ra l  se lf-aw areness ( i . e . ,  c u ltu re  becomes a term 
o f r e f le c t !  onj P r a c t ic a l ly ,  our method re q u ire s  a  c e r ta in  f a m il ia r i ty  
w ith  the  c u l tu ra l ly  d if f e r e n t  co n ten ts  to  which we want to  apply  our 
m eta^perspective. To begin  w ith , o u r methodology must remain deductive
In  agreement w ith  Gadamer, H albfass (in d ien . p . 122) argues th a t  
we cannot see independent o f ou rse lv es , lh i s  i s  c o rre c t. Our extended 
heim eneutic consciousness inc lu d es  the m eta^position : we s tay  who we
a re ,  bu t more aware o f ou rse lves.
on the  b a s is  of some axiom atic assumption. This assumption must 
fe a tu re  the meta-concept o f a  homogeneous ph ilo soph ical in te rp re ta tio n  
of a l l  ou r involved c u ltu re s  (form ally  demonstrated by the common 
m eta-philosophical b e l ie f  in  change, p. 24). Our axiology requ ires  
compatible c r i t e r i a  from these d if f e r e n t  c u ltu re s  in  o rd e r to  secure the 
e s s e n tia l  coherence o f ou r approach. Once our exp lo ra tio n s  have le d  to  
some m eta-concept, th i s  must be presented  in  the sim plest and most 
a b s tra c t  fona p o ssib le . As has been poin ted  ou t, such an im p artia l 
p o s itio n  does no t e x is t  independent o f  our mind, but fo r  the sake o f the 
mere m ethodological ro le  o f such a concept we may o r  must pose as i f  
i t  were r e a l ,  ( in c id e n ta lly , the same could be sa id  w ith regard to  our, 
personal in n er p o s it io n .)  Our m eta-concept i s  needed as  a s tru c tu ra l  
device to  make sure th a t  Ind ian  thought i s  no t forced  in to  un-Indian, 
s trange, a l ie n , i r r e le v a n t  concepts and id eas . In s tead , both German and 
Indian  thought, each stu d ied  in  i t s  own r ig h t  and on i t s  own ground and 
understood from w ith in , a re  then le d  to g e th e r by fo llow ing a common p o in t 
of o r ie n ta tio n ; i . e . ,  the d if f e r e n t  ph ilo so p h ica l p i l l a r s ,  as we had 
c a lle d  those t r a d it io n s , each having i t s  own b a s is  o r  o rig in , are  roofed 
and connected by our m eta-concept. (U iis  p r in c ip le  im plies th a t  our 
heim eneutic i s  always of a comparative n a tu re , even when we should 
attem pt a personal in te rp re ta t io n  o f ju s t  one c u ltu re .)
For a l l  p ra c t ic a l  purposes, we have to  proceed as  i f  th is
assumption were tru e , examining and te s t in g  i t  by applying i t  to  the
exposition  o f our comparison. Even i f  merely considered a sp ec ia l
" s ty le " , th i s  approach should be understood w ith regard  to  i t s  power of
guiding our thought, and thus our commitment, in  such a way th a t  we
always b ea r in  mind the d if f e r e n t  sp e c if ic  c u ltu ra l  awareness of our
compared th in k e rs  -  and our own. Apart from understanding th a t  we
ourse lves a re  a product o f our en cu ltu ra tio n , we must also- apply the
(15)idea  o f a  c o n s is te n t self-aw areness to  the  in te ip re ta t io n  o f the
From H u sse rl 's  p o in t o f view th i s  would c a l l  f o r  some " ra d ica l 
se lf-understand ing1* w ith a  new sense fo r  aim and method, f o r  philosophy 
as a ta sk , on th e  b a s is  o f a c r i t i c a l  h is to r ic a l  re c o lle c tio n  of the 
p h ilo soph ical search of European mankind (K ris is . pp. 15-17).
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c u ltu re  in  qu estio n  ( e .g . ,  by ask ing  o u rse lves, to  which ex ten t i s  
a th e o r is t  aware o f h i s  own c u ltu re  and a b le .to  o b je c t ify  i t ) .  In  t h i s  
conscious move away from an unconscious e th n o cen tric  p o s itio n  we t i y  to  
avoid o r  reduce the  a p p lic a tio n  of one-sided Western concepts o r  those 
ch a ra c te r iz in g  th e  personal views of our European au tho rs .
In  behaving a s  i f  a  t ru ly  "cosnopolitan" view were p o ssib le
our self-aw areness i s  req u ired  to  s tay  above th e  whole course o f
in v e s t ig a tio n  -  and, fo r  c r i t i c a l  ( s e l f - ) exam ination, below i t .
P rim arily , we s h a ll ,  f o r  in s ta n ce , n e i th e r  exem plify any "experience" n o r
in d u c tiv e ly  expose any "essence" b u t we can dem onstrate our p resen t
f a c tu a l  le v e l  o f in te l l e c tu a l  o r  s p ir i tu a l  a w a r e n e s s a s  perceived
and understood in  a c u ltu ra l  con tex t. We f e e l  no need to  f in d  any
sp ec ia l way o u t of ou r c u ltu ra l  commitment o r even in to  some s o r t  o f
independent consciousness. At t h i s  po in t we co n sid e r i t  s u f f ic ie n t  to
expect an in te n s i f ic a t io n  o f our c u ltu ra l  self-aw areness in  th e  course o f
(l7 )our a n a ly s is . A ll o th e r  a ttem p ts, in c lu d in g  a l l  p r a c t ic a l  and
th e o re t ic a l ,  s p i r i tu a l  and in te lle c tu a l, procedures going beyond th is ,  
would be secondary.
(5) O perational c u ltu re  p e rsp ec tiv e s
In  ta lk in g  about c u ltu re  awareness we have t a c i t l y  assumed
(18)a  h y p o th e tic a l b a s is  f o r  our c u ltu ra l  d iv is io n s . We th in k  th a t
Schumacher (Guide, pp. 26-27, 83) remarks th a t  "w ithout 
se lf-aw areness, i . e .  w ithout a  consciousness which i s  conscious o f 
i t s e l f ,  man m erely im agines th a t  he i s  in  co n tro l o f h im se lf, th a t  he 
has f r e e  w il l  and i s  ab le  to  ca rry  out h is  in te n t io n s . . . .  self-aw areness 
can d isappear while consciousness continues".
(17)
An exemplary d iscu ssio n  o f the problem atic asp ec t o f  c u ltu re  
awareness i s  included  in  Chapter 6 (a).
(18) Both Spengler and Hegel a lready  assume th a t  in  each o f t h e i r  
c u ltu re s  th e re  l i e s ,  from the  very beginning, something a x io lo g ic a lly  
d if f e r e n t  -  something th a t  i s  no t ju s t  the r e s u l t  o f t h e i r  own 
m ethodological designa tion . Spengier sees something decidedly 
e s s e n tia l  in  each c u ltu re . He considers c u ltu re s  a s  autonomous w ith 
regard to  t h e i r  c e n tr ip e ta l i ty .
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cu ltu re  may be perceived in  fundam entally d if f e r e n t  manners. H as  
s i tu a tio n  could be described  i f  .we f i r s t  hypothesize th a t  (a) th e re  must 
be cu ltu re ; (b) th e re  must be c u ltu ra l v a r ie ty ;  and (c) th e re  must be 
seme connection between th i s  c u ltu re  and c e r ta in  o th e rs . Favouring an 
o p era tional understanding of the  concept o f c u ltu re  (in s tead  of some 
more or l e s s  r e s t r i c t iv e  d e f in i t io n ) ,  we_feel th a t  b a s ic a lly  i t  
diould r e f e r  to those  fe a tu re s  of th e  world in  general which human 
beings may consider o r have considered to  be re lev an t fo r  th e i r  ac tio n s  
and a t t i tu d e s .  Man's self-aw areness, when expressed as  a  reac tio n  
ag a in s t the  confinement of consciousness n a tu ra l to  h is  human condition , 
follow s ind iv idual l in e s  o f thought shaped by c u ltu re  o r  c u ltu ra l 
circum stances; he thus r e la te s  h im self to  a  meaningful complex o f n a tu ra l 
and a r t i f i c i a l  phenomena in  support of h is  se lf-understand ing . Because 
cu ltu re  tends to  vary between d if fe re n t  groups of people o r so c ie tie s , 
th e  d if fe re n t approaches which th in k e rs  u se  in  expressing  philosophical 
thought, such as the  d e sc rip tio n  of self-aw areness, a lso  r e f le c t  th e i r  
own in n er c u ltu ra l condition .
Our m eta-perspective takes in to  account to  which ex ten t the 
perception  of cu ltu re  may comply w ith the  no tion  o f a cu ltu re  as opposed 
to  th a t o f the c u ltu re . While a modem th in k e r might look a t  h im self 
as a member of an o v e ra ll c u ltu re  of mankind and w ith in  th is  mankind as 
a member of a c e r ta in  c u ltu ra l  group and in te r r e la te d  subgroups, there  
i s  no evidence th a t  the an c ien t Indians shared th i s  pe rsp ec tiv e . We 
cannot assume even th a t  they were cu ltu re-consc ious in  terms o f having 
a d is t in c t  c u ltu re  in  the sense in  which, fo r  in s ta n ce , England, tends to  
d is tin g u ish  i t s e l f  from France. In  th i s  sense we must a lso  consider the  
Ramans, even the Greeks, as more c u ltu re -s p e c if ic  than  the Ind ians. For 
the  l a t t e r ,  the Brahmanical Weltanschauung re f le c te d  the  (n o n -d is tin e t) 
c u ltu re , which, being  pervaded and s ta b i l iz e d  by r i t u a l ,  a l l  centred 
around a man-god re la tio n sh ip . O rig in a lly  th i s  concept o f cu ltu re
We are committed to  the  concept of cu ltu re  in  i t s  w idest 
ph ilosoph ical sense, leav ing  asid e  any such norm ative standards as  could 
be s a t is f ie d ,  fo r  in s tan ce , by reducing c u ltu re  to  "a. p a r t ic u la r  c la ss  
o f  r e g u la r i t ie s  o f learned  behaviour" (Bagby, C u ltu re , pp. 88, 95).
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(reg a rd le ss  o f whether they had some, expression f o r  i t  o r  not) was no t 
understood as the cu ltu re  in  our modem European sense, and even le s s  a s  
a  c u ltu re , Ib is  s i tu a tio n  "began to  change a t  the time o f the Buddha. 
However, while our German th in k e rs ' in d iv id u a l expression o f 
self-aw areness, as we sh a ll see l a t e r ,  r e f le c ts  th a t  th e i r  own cu ltu re  
i s  only p a r t o f an o v e ra ll Western c u ltu re , the  Buddha takes an 
e x p l ic i t ly  a -c u ltu ra l p o s itio n  (compare pp. 228-230, madhyama pradipada). 
Producing considerable upheaval in  the minds o f  Ind ia  and the P ar E ast, 
the Buddha's d is t in c t  p o s itio n  con tribu ted  d i r e c t ly  to  the  form ation o f 
a sense of cu ltu re , re s u lt in g  from th e  new p o s s ib i l i ty  to  d if f e r e n t ia te  
w ith in  the prev iously  ap p licab le  version  of the  (o b jec tiv e ) cu ltu re . The 
Brahmans became aware o f themselves as having a sp e c if ic  c u ltu re , one 
idiich could be p a ra lle le d  by th a t  o f the  J a in a s , Buddhists o r  o thers , 
and which was endowed with i t s  own d is t in c t iv e  q u a l i t ie s .
(4 ) Modem European. Greek and Indian th ink ing
I t  has been claimed th a t  only th e  c u ltu re s  o f  ancien t Europe and the West
cherished  the philosophical quest r ig h t  from the onset of th e i r
(2 l)h is to r ic a l  development. M artin Heidegger reminds us th a t both what
we question and how we question a re  s t i l l  Greek in  essence, although the 
r  i  £GTZ l i>t o r  quid e s t . the  so -ca lled  q u id d ita s , i s  u su a lly  assessed
(22)d if f e r e n t ly  by d if fe re n t philosophers. From P la to  and A r is to tle
W “ ---------------Schopenhauer and h is  fo llow ers a re  la rg e ly  unaware o f the  c u ltu ra l 
s t r a ta  underlying th e i r  m etaphysical re f le c t io n s . As regards Buddhism, 
Lamotte (H is to ire , p. 2?) observes th a t  " the  t ru th  found by the Buddha -  
the o r ig in  of th ings and th e i r  d estru c tio n  -  remains e x te r io r  to  him, 
independent of the finds of which i t  can be the  o b jec t” .
(21) By Heidegger, in  Was i s t  das -  d ie  Philosophie?
(22) With m eta-philosophical i n s i s t  Schumacher (Guide, p . 52) warns o f 
self-im posed boundaries: ’’For eveiy one o f u s , only those f a c ts  and
phenomena 'e x i s t '  fo r  which we possess adaequatio . and as we a re  no t 
e n t i t le d  to  assume th a t we are n e ce ssa rily  adequate to  everything, a t  a l l  
tim es, and in  whatever condition we may fin d  ourse lves, so we a re  not 
e n t i t le d  to  in s i s t  th a t something in access ib le  to us has no ex istence  a t  
a l l  and i s  nothing but a phantom of o th e r p e o p le 's  im ag ination .”
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onwards philosophy seeks the being o f being , as Heidegger pu ts  i t .
{~CL T o jo V -  ■what i s  being?) "Philosophy i s  a  kind o f  competence 
which enab les u s  to  view the  e x is tin g , th a t  i s  to  say, w ith a  view to
(23)what i t  i s .  inasnuch a s  i t  does e x is t ."  He exp lain s th a t  through
Descartes* doubt (cog ito  ergo sum) human awareness i s  tu rned  towards an 
ego-orien ted  s u b je c t iv i ty  and th a t ,  th e re fo re , th i s  fe e l in g  o f doubt 
r e f le c ts  a  p o s it iv e  c e r ta in ty . "Henceforth c e r ta in ty  becomes the  
a u th o r i ta t iv e  form of t r u th ."  For Heidegger th i s  means th a t  the 
fundamental d isp o s it io n  o f  modem philosophy rem ains our t r u s t  in  the 
"always a t ta in a b le  abso lu te  c e r ta in ty  o f  knowledge". (For th e  Greeks 
knowledge d id  no t mean t r u th . )  But he f e e ls  th a t  th e  question  o f  what 
d isp o s it io n  towards the  being  o f being fe a tu re s  ou r p re sen t day th ink ing  
cannot be c le a r ly  answered y e t .  So f a r  he f in d s  a  d iv e rs i ty  of 
d isp o s it io n s : "Doubt and d e sp a ir  on the  one s id e , b lin d  obsession by
u n te s ted  p r in c ip le s  on the o th e r  s id e . F ea r and anguish a re  mingled 
w ith hope and t r u s t . "
Having h y p o th e tic a lly  assumed th a t  th e re  i s  c u ltu re  d iv e rs i ty  
we have a lso  assumed th a t  man r e la te s  h im se lf to  c u ltu re  in  s p e c if ic a lly  
d i f f e r e n t  ways and, consequently, a lso  p e rce iv es  h im self d if f e re n tly . 
!Qierefore, we b e liev e  th a t  (a p a rt from the  im portance o f  th e  
fundam entally Greek question  o f  philosophy f o r  th e  o v e ra ll  European 
h i s to r ic a l  s i tu a tio n )  the  an th ro p o cen tric  t r u s t  in  an abso lu te  c e r ta in ty  
o f knowledge, as re fe r re d  to  by Heidegger, i s  n o t j u s t  a  simple fe a tu re  
o f th e  c o n s ta n tly  evolving d iscourse  w ith the  a u th o r i ta t iv e  
p h ilo so p h ica l t r a d i t io n .  I t  does n o t merely in d ic a te  a  gradual s h i f t  
to  some d i f f e r e n t  assessm ent o f the  q u id d ita s , b u t i t  fe a tu re s  
a c u l tu ra l ly  d is t in c t ly ' d i f f e r e n t  mode o f  thought: p o st-C artes ian ,
modem European philosophy. While we cannot deny th a t  h is to ry  as  such 
has p rogressed , we must d ism iss the question  o f c u ltu ra l  and 
p h ilo so p h ica l p rog ress. What we can n o tic e  i s  q u a l i ta t iv e  and
(23) Heidegger, Was, p . 17. Ja sp e rs  (Gjaube. p . 124), s h i f t s  the  
emphasis from be in g  to  becoming: "The p e ren n ia l ta sk  o f  philosophy i s :
to  a c tu a lly  become human by becoming aware o f  b e in g .. .  (with) the aim o f  
ga in ing  the independence of man as an in d iv id u a l."
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q u a n tita tiv e  change. From a h is to r ic a l  p o in t of view a complex mass o f
p h ilo so p h ica l in form ation  has been acquired  from w ith in  the  European
tr a d i t io n  a s  w ell a s  from o u ts id e , a s  th e  a ttem pts  to  in te g ra te  Ind ian
thought dem onstrate. European philosophy, a s  opposed to  Greek o r
In d ian  philosophy, i s  aware o f  i t s  tran scen d en ta l con ten t a s  be in g
(24)th in k ab le , hence d esc rib ab le . Our main exponent o f  pessimism,
Schopenhauer, unconsciously  expresses th i s  ty p ic a lly  European t r a i t  
when, on th e  b a s is  o f  h is .  an th ropocen tric  se lf-aw areness, he d e c la re s  
th a t  the  ta sk  o f  philosophy i s  to  rep ea t i n  a b s tr a c t ,  g enera l and c le a r  
term s th a t  which th i s  world e s s e n t ia l ly  re p re se n ts .
When examining and d e sc rib in g  thought in  In d ia , i t  seems 
im perative to  re v ise  the  "type o f view h e ld  by such th in k e rs  as 
Schopenhauer. Comparative philosophy has l e a r n t  to  d i f f e r e n t ia te  
between p h ilo soph ies rooted  in  d i f f e r e n t  c u ltu re s . I n  o u r own approach 
we want to  m ain tain  a  balanced connection between o u r two main 
t r a d i t io n s ,  w ith the  help  o f  a  m eta-concept emerging from t h e i r  
te n ta t iv e  ju x ta p o s itio n . From a  Western standpo in t In d ian  philosophy 
seems "m ystical" in  essence (see  Chapter 6 ). The reason why Ind ian  
t r a d i t io n  develops i t s  p h ilo so p h ica l views in  a  d if f e r e n t ,  ra th e r  
opposite  d ire c tio n  a s  compared to  European philosophy may be sought in  
i t s  b a s ic  acceptance o f  what the  Occident c a l l s  "m ystical experience" 
as a d ire c t  means o f  see ing  th e  tru th .  I t  l i e s  in  th e  n a tu re  o f th is  
m y stica l see ing  th a t  i t  can only be described  in d ir e c t ly , a l le g o r ic a l ly  
o r  by paraphrase. This experience o f r e a l i t y ,  th i s  understand ing  and 
knowledge o f  tru th , c o n s titu e s  the  fundamental -  b u t in e ffa b le  -  f a c t  
f o r  th e  In d ian  th in k e r. On th e  b a s is  o f  h is  personal knowledge, o r  
b e l ie f ,  he dem onstrates how to  t a lk  about t h i s  f a c t .  He comments on 
i t  by adding to  th e  development o f  th e  deductive exposition  o f th e
(24) P ie p e r (P h ilo s .. pp. 46-47) reminds th a t  in  pre-modem ontology 
(up to  th e  20th century) a l l  be ing  was considered tru e , and "being" 
and " tru e"  were exchangeable concepts. Saying th a t  something was 
" tru e "  meant th a t  i t  was known and knowable, known through th e  
abso lu te  mind, knowable f o r  the non-absolute mind.
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o r ig in a l m ystical in s ig h t ,  which fu nc tions a s  the c e n tra l  experience,
o r  the "core event", so to  speak. The knowledge o f  i t ,  o r about i t ,
remains the unchangeable ta rg e t  towards which a l l  the system atic
explanatory  s tru c tu re s  which form the t r a d i t io n  a re  o rien ted . This
(25)idea of t r a d it io n  im plies comment. Ind ian  philosophy, in  fa c t ,
cen tres  on the formal exposition  o f comments on th e  knowledge o f tru th . 
This tru th , being  a tim eless  p r in c ip le , determ ines a tim eless re la tio n  
between th is  world and the knowledge o f i t .  The Indian philosopher 
proceeds in  the l ig h t  o f the knowledge o f t ru th , which i t s e l f  remains 
unaffected  by th i s  p rocess o f understanding. Unlike European 
metaphysics, which r e l i e s  on a stepw ise approximation o f tru th , the 
Indian approach does no t r e f le c t  any h is to r ic a l  o r ie n ta tio n . Our German 
p essim ists , a s  we s h a ll  see l a t e r ,  expand th e i r  views as th e i r  knowledge 
develops under the  impact o f the  presumable shortcomings o f th is  world. 
For the Indian th in k e r  no knowledge can be derived  from the f a c t  th a t  
th e re  i s  e v il  in  th i s  world. This problem i s  l e f t  to  the  p riv a te , 
p r a c t ic a l  concern o f the  s in g le  in d iv id u a l. A p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  in  
India may determine a man's in t e r e s t  in  l i f e ,  perhaps tu rn in g  him in to  
a p ra c tis in g  a sc e tic , w ithout a f fe c t in g  the essence o f h i s  outlook. 
Philosophy, ju s t  l ik e  a sce tic ism , appears as  a formal reac tio n  to  and 
a p ra c t ic a l  consequence o f the f a c t  th a t  knowledge e x is ted  before and 
not a f t e r  the estab lishm ent o f i t s  ph ilo so p h ical t ra d it io n . Since th e  
attainm ent o f th is  abso lu te  knowledge i s  the r e s u l t  o f a h ig h ly  personal, 
m ystical, experience, such terms as  v idva. .inana o r  nra.ina in  
Brahmanism o r  Buddhism do n o t r e f e r  to  o b jec tiv e  knowledge e i th e r  
(see pp. 220, 2T7). Yet we cannot ch a rac te riz e  th e  Indian view a s  
su b jec tiv e  j u s t  because i t  i s  based on a personal and incommunicable 
p r in c ip le . This Western p e rsp ec tiv e  proves i t s e l f  in ap p licab le  as  soon 
as we understand th a t  in  Ind ian  thought the su b jec tiv e  and o b jec tiv e  
aspects must somewhere co incide; i t  becomes i r r e le v a n t ,  since the  world,
(25) _Hadhakrishnan (B r.S u .. p . 26) w rite s : "Even th e  most o rig in a l
th inkers  do n o t claim to  expound a new system o f thought b u t w rite  
commentaries (and), even when they  advance new views, do so in  th e  name 
of an old tra d i t io n ."
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in c lu d in g  l i f e ,  as man commonly sees i t  i s  n o t considered as  re a l  th e re .
In  In d ia  r e a l i ty  remains in v is ib le  to  o rd in ary  p e rcep tio n  through
reason. I t  cannot be seen due to  the  m achinations and the  in tr ig u e s  o f
may a . the  p r in c ip le  o f  i l lu s io n ,  -which i s  one o f  th e  most general
(26)c a te g o rie s , im p lic i t  everywhere in  In d ian  thougjit. From t h i s  a sp ec t
a lso  our* in d iv id u a l th in k in g  i s  mayic. N otw ithstand ing  any p r iv a te , 
personal connection w ith  the knowledge o f  t r u th ,  o r  r e a l i t y ,  in d iv id u a l 
l i f e  i s ,  th e re fo re , seen as i l l u s iv e  and in s u b s ta n t ia l  w ith  regard  to  
the ex isten ce  o f r e a l i ty ,  whereas in  European thought, a s  mentioned, th e  
h ig h e s t p o ss ib le  knowledge i s  based on m an's p e rso n al ex is ten ce  and h is  
awareness th e reo f.
In  the given con tex t, we could a l lo c a te  some in te rm ed ia te
p o s it io n  to  the  Greeks who, t r e a t in g  t ru th  a s  a somewhat m y stica l e n t i ty ,
d is tin g u ish  i t  from p h ilo so p h ica l knowledge- In  In d ia , th e  core event
occurs in  the  beginning, b u t w ith  regard  to  th e  p h ilo so p h ica l s i tu a t io n
in  Europe i t  i s  happening now, and moving a long  w ith  the p re sen t. I f  we
were to  f in d  any p e ss im is tic  a sp ec ts  in  Ind ian  c u ltu re , th ese  would have
to  be re la ta b le  to  a  m y stica l o r ie n ta tio n  w ith a  core even t in  the
beginning. Looking a t  p e ss im is tic  forms o f modem European th o u ^ it , we
see th a t  they  fe a tu re  a  c u ltu re -c e n tre d  W eltanschauung which i s  s t i l l  on
(27)the  way to  f in d in g  i t s  core event. In  o th e r  words, h e re  pessimism
presupposes a fu tu re -o r ie n te d  self-aw areness. To d esc rib e  th e  r e la t iv e  
d iachronic  o r ie n ta tio n s  o f Ind ian  and European thought, we could compare 
In d ia  and Europe to  two t r a v e l le r s  fa c in g  each o th e r  in  the  same 
compartment o f  a  t r a in  which i s  moving in  one d ire c t io n , w hile th e  two 
tr a v e l le r s ,  who have decided to  converse w ith  each o th e r , a re  looking  
towards the  p a s t  o r  th e  fu tu re  o f t h e i r  journey re sp e c tiv e ly .
Before making th e  f in a l  step  in  o u r a ttem pt to  expose how under 
d if f e r e n t  p h ilo so p h ica l gu ise th e re  e x is ts  some common m eta-concem , we
(26) See Radhakrishnan, P h i l . I . pp. 31-36.
(27) P ie p e r ( p h i lo s . , pp. 52, 85) mentions a  concept o f p h ilo soph ical 
hope corresponding w ith the aim o f philosophy, the  understand ing  o f 
r e a l i ty  from a f in a l  p r in c ip le  of u n ity , o f which, however, the f i n i te  
human mind w il l  never be capable.
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we would l ik e  to  r e c a l l  th e  main c u ltu ra l ,  p h ilo so p h ica l and m ystica l
fe a tu re s  re fe r re d  to  so f a r :
Europe: (a) Self-aw areness i s  a  r e f le c t io n  o f o n e 's  own c u ltu re ,
e sp e c ia lly  a s  d i f f e r in g  from o th e r c u ltu re s  and a s  form ing 
a p a r t  o f  some su p ra -cu ltu re . O ne's c u ltu re  i s ,  th e re fo re , 
conceived o f  as a  c u ltu re  which d i f f e r s  from o th e rs .
Cb) Man i s  h is  own perso n al p h ilo so p h ica l o b je c t o f  s e lf -s tu d y , 
fo llow ing  an an th ro p o cen tric  o r ie n ta t io n . European 
p h ilo so p h ic a l t r a d i t io n  im plies th e  id e a  o f  tran scen d en ta l, 
th in k ab le  co n ten t.
(c) In  Europe philosophy has a  m y stica l branch , w ithou t be ing  
m y stica l i t s e l f .
Greece: (a) Greek c u ltu re  awareness r e f le c te d  th e i r s  a s  b e in g  the  c u ltu re .
(b) F or th e  Greeks and t h e i r  dependants (S o cra tes , Seneca), 
knowledge, a s  i t  o rgan izes id e a s , a lso  has some instrum en ta l 
p o te n t ia l  ( th e  knowledge o f death , and how to  go about 
knowing i t ) .  B esides, p h ilo so p h ica l e f f o r t  co n d itio n s  the  
th in k e r  f o r  th e  understand ing  o f  t r u th .  The ph ilo so p h er 
p e rso n a lly  exem plifies a  way to  "su ccess" .
(c) Greek philosophy (P la to ,-P lo tin u s )  acknowledges a  m ystical 
elem ent b u t d is tin g u ish e s  between t r u th  and knowledge.
In d ia : (a) C u ltu re  aw areness, o r ig in a lly ,  i s  " p re -c u ltu ra l" ,  i . e .  i t  i s
s t i l l  l a te n t ,  b u t l a t e r  stim u la ted  by th e  appearance o f 
d i f f e r e n t  movements, e sp e c ia lly  Buddhism.
(b) In  Ind ian  t r a d i t io n  knowledge rem ains a  h ig h ly  form al category, 
e .g . jnana . even more so darsana. This form al approach to 
t r u th  i s  n o t committed to  con ten t ( l i f e ,  a f t e r - l i f e ,  nothing, 
what i t  i s  a n  about, o r  a l l  th i s  to g e th e r) . I t  inc lu d es  
form al exem plifica tion  o f personal s p i r i tu a l ,  o r  m ystical, 
"success", e .g . p ra jn a .
(c) In  the  Upanisads knowledge means atm a-brahma-vidya, i . e .  
m y stica l experience. Knowledge and t ru th  a re  n o t 
d is tin g u ish ed . Darsana i s  the ex p o sitio n  o f  such tru th .
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(5) A m eta-ph ilosonhical b e l ie f  in  change
There appears to  be some c o rre la tio n , o r  even some causa l connection,
between in tu i t iv e  th in k in g  and d iscu rs iv e  th ink ing . I f  we may use th e
word " in tu i t io n " ,  l i t e r a l l y  meaning- i n s i g h t ,  in n e r  view, in  o rd er to
describe  an o r ig in a l kind o f sim ultaneous seeing  and understanding  as
opposed to  some gradual co n stru c tio n  o f understanding , we could a lso  r e f e r
to  i t  as the  experience o f  a  s ta te  o f knowledge which may w ell precede
any p rocess o f  viewing, o r  even inhere  in  the  c re a tio n  o f  a view. A part
from any accompanying e f fo r t s  and favourable  circum stances, the
e n lig h ten in g  impulse simply seems to  m an ifest i t s e l f  in  th e  th in k e r ' a
mind. For th e  an c ien t Ind ian  th in k e r  such d i r e c t  in s ig h t  o r  access to
knowledge must have been so convincing th a t  he would n a tu ra l ly  base h is
e n t i r e  ou tlook  on i t .  As e a r ly  as in  an c ien t Greece, b u t even more so in
modem Europe, such calm t r u s t  in  see ing  d isappears  behind a  dynamic
d e s ire  to  see , w hile a t  the same tim e a to t a l l y  d if f e r e n t  mode o f
o p era tion  i s  b e in g  adopted. P h ilo soph ica l e f f o r t ,  through d iscu rs iv e
reason ing , becomes d i r e c t ly  ap p lied  to  th e  a tta in m en t o f knowledge which
can be developed on th e  b a s is  o f p re -e x is tin g  knowledge, ad m ittin g
in tu i t io n  on ly  on a secondary o p e ra tio n a l le v e l .  *o r form al reasons we
p re fe r  to  adhere to  th i s  convenient d is t in c t io n  o f  " in tu i t iv e "  thought,
although i t  has been exposed as m erely conventional, s ince  no m a tte r  what
we c a l l  th e  sm alles t lo g ic a l  s tep s  o f knowledge, th ey  have to  be accepted 
(28)
a s  im provable. Therefore, we could say th a t  in  th e i r  axiom atic
acceptance o f  some o r ig in a l p iece  o r  step  o f  in tu i t io n  as  a b a s is  f o r  a l l
f u r th e r  th in k in g  and commenting, ou r d i f f e r e n t  p h ilo so p h ica l t r a d i t io n s
(29)re ly  on f a i t h  o r b e l ie f .
(28) , »
Bambrough I I n t u i t . . p . 202) exp lains th a t  in  try in g  to  go beyond th e
sm alles t s tep s  which can be proved, knowledge i s  commonly accounted f o r
by " in tu i t io n " .  But th i s  i s  only ano ther form o f "saying  th a t  i t  i s  n o t
by any procedure th a t we know th a t  the step  i s  sound". In c id e n ta lly ,
fo r  Kant (K r i t ik . p. 741) the  m erely su b jec tiv e  assumption o f something
being tru e  i s  what c h a rac te riz e s  b e l i e f .
( ^ )  Schumacher (Guide, pp. 55-66), supplementing Bambrough's remarks, 
reminds u s  th a t  the  c r i t i c a l  observer "a lso  depends on adequateness o f
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Ifais f a i th  fe a tu re s  n o t only the  b e l ie f  in  some o r ig in a l 
knowledge a s  such, b u t a lso  in  i t s  m eaningfulness, o r  s ig n ific a n ce , w ith 
regard  to  self-aw areness. Hie various p h ilo soph ies  r e f l e c t  d if f e r e n t  
forms o r  expressions o f  th a t  self-aw areness as  i t  follow s the  d if f e r e n t  
■types o f c u ltu re . The vario u s  p e rsp ec tiv es  o f  knowledge a l l  provide 
u ltim a te  ta rg e ts  f o r  m an's s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  and se lf-e x p lan a tio n , 
although from an in d iv id u a l p o in t o f  view p h ilo so p h ica l awareness and 
m y stica l experience a re  c e r ta in ly  d if f e r e n t  things* Each o f these  
p r in c ip le s , whether considered a s  adap ting  i t s e l f  to  the  changing 
generations of ph ilosophers, o r  ch arac te rized  as a  tim e le ss , constan t 
m y stica l p o s s ib i l i ty ,  should in te r e s t  u s  as  a  c e n tra l  c r i te r io n  o f 
c u ltu re  o r ie n ta tio n  which in  tu rn  determ ines the  form o f  in d iv id u a l 
self-aw areness. Assuming th a t  conscious w i l l  can only move in  
accordance w ith  value consciousness -  e th ic a l  values as  conceived in  
accordance w ith  en cu ltu ra tio n  organize t h e i r  own h ie ra rch y  -  we f in d  th a t  
any in te n tio n a l  value-conscious move must in d ic a te  t h a t  some change in  
o r  o f th i s  self-aw areness i s  a lso  welcome o r  d esired . Whenever the
h is  ' f a i t h '  o r , to  p u t i t  more conven tionally , o f h is  fundamental 
p re su p p o sitio n s  and b a s ic  assum ptions.. .  .F a i th  i s  n o t in  c o n f l ic t  w ith 
reason; n o r i s  i t  a  s u b s t i tu te  f o r  reason. F a ith  chooses the grade o f 
s ig n ific an ce  o r  Level o f Being a t  which the  search  f o r  knowledge and
understand ing  i s  to  aim ." Ja sp e rs  (Glaube, pp. 13-14) w rite s :
"P h ilosoph ical b e l ie f ,  the  b e l ie f  o f the th in k in g  human being , i s  
always fe a tu re d  by the f a c t  th a t  i t  e x is ts  only in  a l l ia n c e  w ith 
knowledge. P e n e tra tin g  i t s e l f  i t  wants to  know what i s  knowable." He 
adds th a t  we may d is tin g u ish  a b e l ie f  through which we b e liev e  (f id e s  
qua c re d i tu r ) and a b e l ie f  which i s  b e liev ed  ( f id e s  quae c r e d i to r ) .
But we cannot separa te  them, since they p re sen t the su b jec tiv e  and the  
o b jec tiv e  a sp ec t o f b e l ie f  a s  a  whole. "B e lie f remains undivided w ith in  
what we s p l i t  in to  su b jec t and o b je c t."  Badhakrishnan (B r.S u ., p . 116)
adds th a t  "an a c t  o f f a i th  involves a su rrender to  th e  c re a tiv e
in tu i t io n  which transcends the lim ited  awareness o f the  in te l le c tu a l  
s e l f ,  whereas " b e l ie f  should s e t  us on to  re f le c t io n , mamma, and 
contem plation, nididh.yasana, which re s u l ts  in  atm a-darsana o r  v is io n  
o f the  S e lf" .
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au th o rity  o f the  m ystical experience i s  s tro n g e r than  th a t  o f the  
general f a c t s  o f  l i f e ,  i t  can provide, o r  a u th o riz e , some p re sen ta tio n  
o f r e a l i ty  s u ita b le  as  an o r ie n ta tio n  p o in t f o r  such change. I f  the  
f a c ts  o f  l i f e  weigh more, human thought would have to  f in d  i t s  m otivation  
on th a t  le v e l .  Regardless o f  whether the  p h ilo so p h ie s  a re  o f  the  
commenting o r  the se lf-m o tiv a tin g  type, they  r e ly  on some t r u s t  in  t h e i r  
o r ig in a l i n s i s t .  Mysticism b e liev es  in  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  and re levance , 
o r  s ig n if ic a n ce , o f  i t s  experience o f  a d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e  o f  being.
Equally, p h ilo so p h ica l reason b e liev es  in  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f th e  genuine 
experience o f such f a c ts  as provide the e s s e n t ia l  elem ents f o r  i t s  f in a l  
conclusions, and fu r th e r  b e lie v es  th a t  th ese  conclusions, and th e re fo re  
a lso  the f a c ts ,  are  re le v a n t fo r  an e s s e n t ia l  s e lf -p e rc e p tio n . In  o th e r  
words, both Ind ian  and European philosophy, p re se n tin g  th e i r  
c h a r a c te r is t ic  and e s s e n t ia l  goals  in  t h e i r  own t r a d i t io n a l  c u ltu re -  
sp e c if ic  manner, b e liev e  in  u ltim a te  change. This p o in t o f g e n e ra liz a tio n  
marks a  p h ilo so p h ica l m eta-level on which th ey  could share th e  meanings 
o f terms and te x ts .
(6) The -pessim ists and th e i r  recep tio n  o f  Ind ian  thought
Our c e n tra l  problem, a h is to r ic a l  a n a ly s is  o f pessimism in  German thought, 
determ ines our choice o f German th in k e rs . T h e ir p a r t ic u la r  approaches 
to  the  problem, i . e .  the  main p r in c ip le s  which support t h e i r  views, 
determ ine the  range o f corresponding Ind ian  concepts. These concepts, 
once they a re  herm eneutically  analyzed and understood w ith in  t h e i r  
t ra d it io n a l  Ind ian  co n tex ts , can be re la te d  back to  the German views 
through m ediation on th e i r  m eta -lev el. This means th a t  the  axiom atic 
m eta-concept i s  te s te d  in  the course o f ou r com parative d e sc r ip tio n  which 
sees in  pessimism a c u l tu ra l  epiphenomenon (p a r t ly  understandable  in  term s 
o f an a t t i tu d e ,  as  in  In d ia , o r  a s  a  concept, a s  in  German though t). 
Outside o f c u ltu re  we lo se  tra c k  o f pessimism.
Beginning w ith the  Germans (in troduced  by a few thoughts on 
ancien t European pessimism) we s h a l l  e s ta b lis h  our f i r s t  evidence by 
summarizing and epitom izing those p a r ts  o f t h e i r  outlooks which support 
th e i r  pessimism, as  w ell as  th e i r  views on In d ia . These summaries imply 
the  study o f the  main conceptions, o r  m isconceptions, which they  have
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used in  s tru c tu r in g  th e i r  p e ss im is tic  opin ions. Since only c e r ta in  key 
concepts o r  se lec ted  views have been borrowed from In d ian  thought, we 
must show th e  e s s e n tia l  p h ilo so p h ica l cohesion o f what we have 
te n ta t iv e ly  termed our "German tr a d i t io n  o f  pessimism" by d isc lo s in g  
i t s  in n e r h i s to r ic a l  r e la t io n s  and connections (mainly in  the  19th and 
to  some ex ten t in  the  20th cen tu ry ). Through the ex position  o f such 
a  coherence we may be ab le  to  lend  some general re levance to  the question  
o f why and how German pessimism may have been in flu en ced  by c e r ta in  terms 
and te x ts  from the  c u ltu ra l  domain o f In d ia . We s h a l l  fo llow  the  ■typical 
conceptions o f Indian thought a s  used by our German th in k e rs , w ith due 
regard  f o r  t h e i r  h i s to r ic a l  s i tu a t io n . H ie ir  in te rp re ta t io n s  and 
a p p lic a tio n s  have to  be compared w ith  what we can now -  on the  b a s is  o f  
our herm eneutic -  expose perhaps more o b je c tiv e ly . Looking back a t  Indian 
meaning (according to  ou r own in te rp re ta tio n )  we must fo llow  i t s  
h i s to r ic a l  and p h ilo so p h ica l im pulses and connections through the  
re lev an t German p a r ts ,  in  tu rn  thus adding to  th e  meaning which th e  
Germans saw in  i t  (see  Gadamer's c i r c le  r e la t io n ) .  We consider the  
h is to ry  o f  th e  fa c tu a l  approaches t r i e d  by o u r d if f e r e n t  th in k e rs  a s  
im m aterial (even i f  i t  could ever be re tra c e d ) . In s te ad , we want to  
understand th e  p h ilo so p h ica l recep tio n , i . e .  t h e i r  th e o re t ic a l  approaches 
and how th ese  a re  h i s to r i c a l ly  connected. I t  i s  n o t the  h is to ry  o f  t h e i r  
in d o lo g ica l e r ro rs  which i s  o f  in te r e s t ,  b u t th a t  o f  t h e i r  c o n trib u tio n  
to  th e  complex o f  "meaning"! We f e e l  th a t  th i s  p o s it iv e  p roduct o f  
th e i r s  must be o f  c e n tra l  im portance f o r  th e  c re a tio n  o f  a  coherent id ea  
o f th a t  problem on which they  a l l  touched in  t h e i r  own in d iv id u a l manner. 
Quite analogously, b u t w ith in  a  w ider perim eter, Ind ian  thought -  
reg a rd le ss  o f  th e  h i s to r i c  forms o f  i t s  messages which in fluenced  o u r 
Germans -  i s  bound to  make i t s  philosophi c a lly  meaningful co n trib u tio n  
to  our ex p lic a tio n  o f  some "meta-pessimism" harbouring  th e  elem ents f o r  
a comprehensive d e f in i t io n  o f  the  p h ilo so p h ica l concept o f  pessimism.
Modem Western th in k in g  c le a r ly  d is tin g u ish e s  "theory" from 
" p ra c t ic a l  l i f e " ,  considering  the  two as  o ften  incom patible. In  In d ian  
c u ltu re  we f in d  i t  hard  to  d is tin g u ish  the two p r in c ip le s . The a n c ie n t 
Greeks, assuming a p o s itio n  somewhere in  between, were t ry in g  to
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estab lish - p h ilo so p h ic a lly  t h e i r  own p o s it io n  and considered  themselves 
a s  ex em p lifie rs  o f  t h e i r  own theory . Before lo ok ing  a t  the  d if f e r e n t  
ro le s  o f  theory  and p ra c tic e  in  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c u ltu re s  re fe r re d  to , we 
would l ik e  to  h y p o th e tic a lly  d is tin g u ish  beforehand fo u r  p r in c ip a l 
le v e l s  o f  pessimism!
(1) H is to r ic a l  le v e l :  In  Europe we can d i f f e r e n t ia te  between 
h i s to r i c a l  pessimism, im plying th e  no tio n  o f  mankind (b u t n o t v ice  
v e rsa ) , and ph ilo so p h ica l (e .g . e th ic a l ,  o r  e x is te n t ia l )  pessimism. 
H is to ry  as an o u te r  fo rce  can be very re le v a n t to  th e  philosophy 
o f pessim isn.
(2) A n th ro p o lo g ica l^ '^  le v e l :  In  Europe we a lso  fa c e  a  complex
p e ss im is tic  connection o f p ra c tic e  and th eo ry , and we encounter 
both  an e th ic a l  a t t i tu d e  and an e th ic a l  concept o f  pessimism. The 
id e a  o f mankind can a lso  be understood w ith  regard  to  i t s  
s i tu a t io n a l  connections (such a s  sh arin g  th e  p r a c t ic a l  problems o f 
good and e v i l ) .
(5) Z e ro -lev e l: The Ind ian  background allow s f o r  every th ing  to  be
tre a te d  as  p ra c t ic a l  and a s  th e o re t ic a l .
(4 ) In d iv id u a l le v e l :  The Greek t r a d i t io n  concerns i t s e l f  w ith  the
in d iv id u a l on ly  (in c lu d in g  e x is te n t ia l  pessim ism ).
I n  t h e i r  m eta-ph ilosophical b e l ie f  in  change our s ix  p r in c ip a l 
German th in k e rs  su s ta in  e i th e r  th e  an th ro p o lo g ica l o r  th e  h i s to r ic a l  
le v e l  o f pessimism, o r  bo th . Schopenhauer, who, in  op p o sitio n  to  Hegel, 
p e rso n a lly  r e je c t s  any h is to r ic a l  approach, n e v e r th e le s s  happens to  s e t  
a  h i s to r i c a l  standard  o f  pessimism w ith in  th e  framework o f  our 
comparison. He a lso  p rov ides the  main m etaphysical le v e l  o f  re fe ren ce  
f o r  our a n a ly s is  o f the  changing concept o f  pessimism. Furthermore, he 
touches o f f  the d iscu ssio n  about th e  ro le s  o f some o f  th e  fundamental 
In d ian  concepts used by our Germans. Von Hartmann, M ainlander and
(30) /P h ilo so p h ica l anthropology (as d i s t in c t  from s c ie n t i f ic  and 
th eo lo g ica l anthropology) d e riv es  a l l  c u l tu ra l  achievements from the 
fundamental e x is te n t ia l  and m etaphysical s tru c tu re s  o f human ex istence  
(see Scheler, St.d.M enschen, pp. 9, 87).
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Deussen, recombining t h e i r  Schopenhauerian im pulses w ith  t h e i r  own b e t te r
knowledge o f  Ind ian  philosophy, use an th ropo log ica l as  w ell as h is to r ic a l  
p e rsp ec tiv e s . F in a lly  we encounter h is to ry  a s  th e  main o u te r  fo rce  which 
ru le s  b o th  S p en g le r 's  v is io n  o f  segregated  c u l tu ra l  fu lf ilm e n t and 
G ebser's  w orried  hope f o r  an in te g ra tio n  o f  the  ch ao tic  c u ltu re  fo rce s . 
Both t r e a t  e th ic a l  and e x is te n t ia l  q uestions c u ltu ro lo g ic a lly .
In  Indian philosophy a l l  o r ig in a l  (m ystica l) experience, th a t  
i s  to  say  a l l  b e l i e f  in  such experience, in c lu d in g  th e  p h ilo so p h ica l 
consequences, i s  p e rso n a lly  exem plified by the  th in k e r  s  p r a c t ic a l  
a t t i tu d e  to  l i f e ,  which may include an a t t i tu d e  o f pessimism. In d ian  
th in k in g  in  connection w ith i t s  m ystica l a x is  has been d escribed  and 
c r i t i c iz e d  by Agehananda B h ara ti. I b is  Austrian-American so c ia l 
an th ro p o lo g is t and in d o lo g ica l th in k e r  i s  o f  p a r t ic u la r  in te r e s t  to  u s  
because in  h is  denuding re p o r ts , based on h is  own m ystica l experience in  
combination w ith h i s  own remarkable Ind ian  e n cu ltu ra tio n , he in v o lu n ta r ily  
a lso  o f fe rs  h im se lf a s  a  herm eneutic example o f  (d e f ic ie n t)  c u ltu re  
awareness. U sing h is  co n trib u tio n  as  a  m ethodological b a s is ,  we tra c e  
th e  m eta-ph ilosophical ro le  o f  pessimism in  response to  th e  m ystical 
impulse in  Ind ian  thought in  th e  Upanisads and the  Bhagavadgita. In  the 
fo llow ing th re e  chap ters  on Buddhisn, Vedanta and Toga we t r y  to  
epitom ize th e  e s s e n tia l  p h ilo so p h ica l con ten t o f each o f th ese  th ree  
m ajor t r a d i t io n s .  We then focus on the main concepts which have been 
borrowed (o ften  q u ite  in d isc rim in a te ly ) by our Germans, exposing how and 
why in  an Ind ian  s tru c tu ra l  co n tex t t h e i r  p e ss im is tic  im p lica tio n s  
undergo fundamental change.
(7) Pessimism in  an c ien t European thought: P la to , Seneca and P lo tin u s
The fo llow ing  p re se n ta tio n  o f p e ss im is tic  asp ec ts  in  the S o c ra tic  p u rs u it  
o f t r u th  as  knowledge o f  e te rn a l being, in  the  S to ic s ' s t r i f e  f o r  
th e o re t ic a l  and p ra c t ic a l  v ir tu e ,  and in  th e  N eo -P la to n is ts  d e s ire  f o r  
l ib e ra t io n  from m atte r through m y s tic a l- in tu it iv e  knowledge, s h a ll  
i l l u s t r a t e  the sp e c ia l c u l tu ra l  p o s itio n  o f  an c ien t European philosophy 
(reg a rd le ss  o f any seg reg a tiv e  o r  in te g ra tiv e  o u te r  h is to r ic a l  a sp e c ts) . 
Since i t  combines fe a tu re s  o f  both Indian and German thou^Lt, i t  allows
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us to  d e riv e  an e x tra  p e rsp ec tiv e  f o r  our d e sc rip tio n  o f German pessimism 
from i t .
When, a sk in g  ourse lves to  what e x te n t P la to  (472 -  547) could 
be considered  a  p e ss im is t, we fo llow  h is  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  human natu re  
in , f o r  in s tan ce , h is  Apology- and in  'Ih e a ite to s . we d isco v e r th a t  he 
assumes a  dual a t t i tu d e  towards l i f e .  On the one hand he shows h is  
concern about the world he must l iv e  in ; h is  a t t i tu d e  towards th e  f a c ts  
o f h i s  human s i tu a t io n  i s ,  a s  we s h a l l  f in d , la rg e ly  n eg a tiv e . On the  
o th e r  hand he i s  in te re s te d  in  any th ing  th a t  transcends th e  f a c ts  o f 
common l i f e ,  e sp e c ia lly  m an's a b i l i t y  to  draw conclusions on th e  tru e  
n a tu re  o f th in g s . H is firm  b e l i e f  in  th i s  p o s s ib i l i ty  may be considered 
p o s it iv e . He dem onstrates how th e  world o f  man and th e  realm s o f  thought, 
i . e .  th e  p r a c t ic a l  and th e  th e o re t ic a l ,  become lin k e d  by th e  person o f 
th e  p h ilo so p h er h im self.
In  th e  Apology we a re  p resen ted  w ith  a  d i s t in c t ly  neg a tiv e  view
(31)of th e  a c tu a l world, h ig h lig h ted  by the  execution o f S ocra tes. ihe
man who t r i e s  to  f in d  ways to  overcome the  shortcomings o f th i s  world i s  
sentenced to  death f o r  i t .  S ocrates i s  fa c in g  a system atic  propagation, 
alm ost an " in s t i tu t io n a l iz a t io n 11, o f  e v il  when he s ta t e s  th a t  "anoiqfmous 
accu sa tio n s  were a lready  taugh t to  the c h ild ren " . But then  again  he 
expresses hope, in  m entioning th a t  " the  ad o lescen ts  im ita te  him". This 
second f a c t  shows him th a t  th e re  a re  a t  l e a s t  some minds who a re  seeking 
a way out o f  u n tru th fu ln e ss . S ocra tes, who cannot change th e  world as  
such, t r i e s  to  f in d  wisdom as the  only p o ss ib le  means o f  overcoming the 
negative  s ide  o f  i t s  n a tu re . He cannot " teach  wisdom to  o th e rs  bu t he 
o ffe rs  h im se lf a s  a  model f o r  a l l  those who a re  w ill in g  to  share h is  
p e rsp ec tiv e" , ihe  su b tle  wisdom which Socra tes h as to  o f f e r ,  a s  opposed 
to  the concrete  e v i ls  o f  the  w orld, c o n s is ts  in  a w ell-balanced  a t t i tu d e  
towards ignorance r a th e r  than in  a  film  and c le a r -c u t  body o f knowledge: 
"He i s  wise w ith a  kind o f  wisdom s u itin g  man -  th e  o th e rs  a re  n o t. He 
has the  knowledge o f  h is  ignorance -  a  knowledge o th e rs  a re  la c k in g ." 
Socrates ex p la in s  th a t  "when the  god in  Delphi sa id  th a t  'o f  a l l  men
( ■art )
P la to , I I ,  pp. 191-196.
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Socrates i s  the w ises t' he only meant him to  serve  a s  an example, because 
he had re a liz e d  how sm all human wisdom was. By questio n in g  o th e rs  he 
was try in g  to  re fu te  th a t ."
In  T heaite tos Socrates s ta te s  th a t  some, a f t e r  they have been
(32)questioned by Mm, f in d  ou t th in g s  them selves. H iis  means th a t  M s
fundamental a t t i tu d e  and method could be tra n s fe r re d  onto anyone r e a l ly  
w il l in g  to  adopt i t .  According to  Socrates th i s  search  f o r  wisdom a lso  
c o n s ti tn te s  th e  only p o ss ib le  way to  happiness. We le a rn  th a t  
’’v ic to r ie s  a t  th e  Olympic Games cause people to  only  appear happy, 
whereas he makes them be happy". This happiness i s  the  r e s u l t  o f p roper 
th in k in g  which "co n s is ts  in  th e  conversation o f o n e se lf  w ith  o n e 's  so u l" . 
By l e t t i n g  u s  know th a t  "a  l i f e  w ithout q u est o f th e  s e l f  i s  n o t worth 
l iv in g " , he denies any hope f o r  r e a l  happiness to  th e  many. He expects 
safe  happiness only in  th e  realm o f wisdom which i s  beyond th e  reach  o f 
those who p re fe r  to  remain a ttach ed  to  th e  o rd in ary  world w ith  i t s  
shortcomings. S ocra tes ' p r a c t ic a l  (and e tM c a l)  optimism shows up in  
the f a c t  th a t ,  whenever he i s  awake, he i s  c o n s ta n tly  in  p u rs u it  o f  th e  
l a t e s t  v e rs io n  o f M s own p o s itiv e  outlook. This optimism b ears  on those  
in n e r  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f  man which may transcend  th e  boundaries o f  o rd in ary  
l i f e .  I t  i s  developed a g a in s t th e  background o f what i s  p resen ted  a s  
a  fa c tu a lly  bad world, a  world wMch g e n e ra lly  wants to  avoid 
understand ing  and t r i e s  to  destro y  those who seek knowledge and wisdom. 
S ocrates' view w ith regard  to  the world and l i f e  i s  summed up in  M s own 
opinion about death . He sees two p o s s ib i l i t i e s :  "Dying means th e  end
of being, o f  fe e lin g , o r :  i t  j u s t  r e s u l ts  in  a  new realm  o f  ex isten ce
f o r  the so u ls. I f  ex isten ce  continues, th e re  w i l l  be no e s s e n tia l  change. 
But i f  death  r e s u l ts  in  some sen sa tio n le ss  kind o f  s leep , i t  may be 
considered a  g a in ."  Ib is  f in a l  remark, although phrased in  a  p o s it iv e  
form, re v e a ls  S ocra tes ' fundam entally p e s s im is tic  a t t i tu d e  towards l i f e  
in  the  a c tu a l world. On the b a s is  o f M s em pirica l knowledge o f  l i f e  
he concludes "im possible th a t  the  bad w il l  van ish , because th e re  must 
n e c e s sa r ily  be something opposed to  the gpod.. .  .T herefo re , we a lso  
should seek to  f le e  from here to there  as soon a s  p o ss ib le " .
(52) P la to , I I L  PP- 221-228.
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P la to , who i s  o p tim is itc  w ith regard to  h is  own percep tion ,
emphasizes (peihaps on account o f some educational o r  e th ic a l  concern)
th a t  wisdom and happiness can be obtained. But to some ex ten t h is  view
of the  a c tu a l world i s  th a t  o f an e x is te n t ia l  p ess im is t, a s  i s
i l l u s t r a t e d  d ram atica lly  by the circum stances which lead  to  Socrates*
death. Socrates, who has liv e d  h is  l i f e ,  cannot be harmed by death.
P ra c t ic a l ly ,  because he i s  a lready  o ld , and th e o re tic a lly , because he
(33)i s  safe  in  h is  personal realm of wisdom. Hiere may be an element
of m ystica l s e lf - id e n t i f ic a t io n  in  S ocra tes ' p r iv a te  outlook, b u t n o t 
in  h is  ph ilo so p h ica l endeavour to  f in d  t ru th  ( i A  >7$  £. <-<=<-). This 
p a r t  o f  h i s  exposition  peihaps appears a s  formal because i t  i s  no t 
m ystical (q u ite  u n lik e  Indian philosophy which pursues the  formal 
ex p osition  o f the  m y stica l) . However, he r e fe r s  to  (h is) m ystical 
experience in  terms o f  h is  eudem onistic re la tio n sh ip , which i s  personal, 
as opposed to  the  o f f i c i a l  and t r a d i t io n a l  cosm ocentric view (see 
G ebser's d e sc rip tio n  o f the a x ia l period , p . 152) . Socrates' way of 
seeking v ir tu e  fc* - tj ) and ju s t ic e  ( ( f c K o c t o  GrisVTj  ) by p u ttin g  a l l  
h is  in te r e s t  in to  h is  personal eudemonism made h is  approach punishable in  
the eyes o f a  so c ie ty  f o r  which re lig io n  was a  higfoly so c ia l a f f a i r .
P la to , a s  expressed through S ocra tes ' ego-centred view, lin k s  up an 
o p tim is tic , m etaphysical, th e o re tic a l  outlook w ith a  p e ss im is tic , 
r e a l i s t i c  persp ec tiv e  which i s  based on th e  p ra c t ic a l  s ide  of l i f e .
This p o s itio n  i s  exem plified by h is ,  the  p h ilo so p h e r 's , own p e rso n a lity , 
and, in  p r in c ip le , considered tra n s fe ra b le  onto o th e rs .
(33) Ja sp e rs  (Glaube. p . l l )  exp lains the  type o f t ru th  which. Socrates 
refused  to  disavow, as  an example o f f a i th  in  the  c e r ta in ty  o f the tru th  
gained. He d is tin g u ish es : ’’Truth through which I  l iv e  can only e x is t
through s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  w ith  i t ;  i t  i s  h i s to r i c a l  in  i t s  appearance, 
n o t o f  g en era lly  o b jec tiv e  v a l id i ty ,  b u t i t  i s  ab so lu te . Truth which 
I  can prove can e x is t  w ithout me; i t  i s  g en e ra lly  v a lid , a h is to r ic a l ,  
tim e less , b u t n o t ab so lu te , r a th e r  dependent o f the p resuppositions 
and methods o f  knowledge in  connection w ith the  f i n i t e . ”
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We a lso  f in d  optim ign and pessimism in  S eneca 's  philosophy.
In  one o r  h is  l e t t e r s  to  L u c iliu s , Seneca (4 B.C. -  65 A.H.) subscribes
to  th e  dual i s  t i c  view o f  S to ic  philosophy reg a rd in g  th e  fundamental
s tru c tu re  o f  the  u n iv e rse : "Our S to ic  p h ilo sophers, a s  you know,
d ec la re  t h a t  th e re  a re  two th in g s  in  the  uni v e rse  which a re  th e  source
o f  every th ing , namely, cause and m atte r. M atter l i e s  slugg ish ,
a substance ready f o r  any u se , b u t sure to  remain unemployed i f  no one
s e ts  i t  in  motion. Cause, however, by which we mean reason, molds
m a tte r and tu m s  i t  in  w hatever d ire c t io n  i t  w i l l ,  producing thereby
(34)various concrete  r e s u l t s . ” Seneca conceives o f  th e  cosmic cause
as God o r ,  on a  sm alle r sc a le , sou l. "God's p lace  in  th e  u n iv e rse
corresponds to  the  s o u l 's  r e la t io n  to  man. W orld-m atter corresponds to
o u r m orta l body; th e re fo re  l e t  th e  low er serve  th e  h ig h e r ." The view
th a t  man i s  a  mini a ttire  r e p l ic a  o f the  u n iv e rse , i n  which m a tte r  has to
serve reason , i s  Seneca 's  key to  a f u l l  u n d erstand ing  o f  the ro le s  o f
good and e v i l .  With re fe ren ce  to  th e  l a t t e r  he su cc in c tly  s ta te s :
(35)"And y e t  l i f e ,  L u c iliu s , i s  a re a l b a t t l e .  ” E ating  p h y sica l hardship
a s  a fundamental human cond ition , he lam ents: ’’Behold th i s  clogging
* (36)
burden o f a  body, to  which n a tu re  has f e t te r e d  me! ” And more
s p e c if ic a l ly  r "'Hie e v i l  th a t  a f f l i c t s  u s  i s  n o t e x te rn a l, i t  i s  w ith in
(37)u s , s i tu a te d  in  our v i t a l s . "  F o r Seneca t h i s  s u ffe r in g  does n o t
cane a t  random. He r a th e r  sees i t  a s  a  gu id ing  fo rce  which shows th e
human soul i t s  cosmic way. The soul in  tu rn  a t t r a c t s  the  necessary
p h y sica l co n d itio n s , even though they may be p a in fu l:  " I  have been
a s s a ile d  by lo s se s , acc id en ts , t o i l ,  and fe a r ;  t h i s  i s  a  common th in g .. . .
i t  was an in e v ita b le  th in g . Such a f f a i r s  come by o rd er, and n o t by
a c c id e n t.. . .  When every th ing  seems to  go hard  and u p h i l l ,  I  have tra in e d
m yself n o t m erely to  obey God, b u t to  agree w ith  h i s  d ec is io n s . I  fo llow
(38)
him because my soul w il ls  i t ,  and n o t because I  m ast."
^  Seneca, Ep.1.65 (p. 445-457). 
^  Seneca, E p .I I I .96  (p . 107).
(56) Seneca, Ep.1.24 (p . 177).
(57) Seneca, Ep.1.50 (p. 333).
(38) Seneca, E p .I I I .96  (p* 105).
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The sou l, in  i t s  in te ra c t io n  w ith m atte r, always enjoys 
a c e r ta in  degree o f freedom, which may allow  the  in d iv id u a l to  overcome 
h is  w orldly entanglem ents and se lf-d ecep tio n s . “There aw aits  u s , i f  
ever we escape from these  low dregs to  th a t  sublime and lo f ty  h i^ i t ,  
peace o f mind and, when a l l  e r r o r  has been driven  o u t, p e r fe c t  l ib e r ty
(*zn >\
(which) means p o ssess in g  supreme power over o n e se lf ."  This
p o te n t ia l  f o r  ach iev ing  u ltim a te  freedom c o n s ti tu te s  m an's p re sen t in n e r
freedom. "For my body i s  th e  only p a r t  o f  me which can s u f f e r  in ju ry .
I n  th i s  dw elling, which i s  exposed to  p e r i l ,  my soul l iv e s  f r e e ."  ^
Seneca, reminding u s  o f  S ocra tes, in te rp re ts  death  in  terms o f  a  ga in :
" I t  i s  e i th e r  the  end, o r  a  p rocess o f  change, I  have no f e a r  o f
ceasing  to  e x is t ;  i t  i s  th e  same a s  no t hav ing  begun. Nor do I  ph-rinV
from changing in to  an o th er s ta te ,  because I  s h a l l ,  under no cond itions,
(4 l)be a s  cramped as I  am now." R ejec tin g  any lo g ic a l  approach to  the
problem of death , he suggests th a t  " the  soul must be hardened by long
p ra c tic e , so th a t  i t  may le a rn  to  endure th e  s ig h t and th e  approach o f 
(42)death” . Seneca, fa c in g  fe a r le s s ly  the h e re a f te r ,  consoles: "These
d e lays o f  m ortal ex isten ce  a re  a  prelude to  the  lo nger and b e t t e r  l i f e . . • .
th e re fo re , look forward w ithout fe a r in g  to  th a t  appointed hour, the  l a s t
(43)
hour o f  the  body bu t n o t o f  th e  so u l."  B esides, f o r  some he sees
a  chance th a t ,  " a f te r  long  and concentra ted  study", they may ev en tu a lly
(44)understand  th e  good, and consequently happiness.
F a r from recommending any d is in te re s te d  o r  a p a th e tic  behaviour
o f  in d if fe re n c e , Seneca 's S to ic  philosophy simply c a l l s  f o r  p r a c t ic a l
contentm ent, endurance and n e i th e r  love n o r h a tred  o f  l i f e ,  suggesting
" to  fo llow  th e  n a tu ra l  courses o f th is  most b e a u ti fu l  un iv erse , in to
(45)which a l l  our fu tu re  su ffe rin g s  a re  woven". Death w il l  in  any case
^  Seneca, E p .II.7 5  (p. 145). 
^  Seneca, Ep.1.65 (p. 457).
Seneca, E p .I .65 (p. 449). 
^  Seneca, E p .I I .8 2  (p. 451).
Seneca, E p .I I I .  102 (p. 1 8 l) . 
^  Seneca, E p .I I I .124 (p. 437). 
^  Seneca, E p .I I I .107 (p. 229).
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a t  l e a s t  l ib e r a te  man o f h is  p a in s. Furtherm ore, in d iv id u a ls  who have 
reached a hannonious understanding' o f l i f e  in  i t s  com pleteness may 
achieve l ib e ra t io n  of t h e i r  soul. However, we rece iv e  no sp ec ia l 
d e sc r ip tio n  o f the  a c tu a l mechanism, o r  the  und erly in g  s tru c tu re  o f t h i s  
f in a l  change.
Centred on h im self, Seneca's p r a c t ic a l  s ta tem en ts and 
suggestions r e f le c t  an even s tro n g er e x is t e n t ia l  and e th ic a l  pessimism 
than in  S o cra tes ' case . Bie eudemonistic s id e  o f h is  S to ic  p e rsp ec tiv e , 
too, i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  p e ss im is tic , conceding on a  common le v e l  no t more 
than a  r e la t iv e  gain through death . In  ad d itio n , and w ith  some moderate 
te le o lo g ic a l  optimism, he in d ic a te s  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a  s p i r i tu a l  gain  
on the  b a s is  o f a  personal in n e r r e a l i ty  which may be a cc e ss ib le  to  the  
few. Man h as l i t t l e  choice bu t to  b ea r h is  m ajor g r ie f s  a s  they a re  
a l lo t te d  to  him, h is  only trustw orthy  support c o n s is tin g  o f  h i s  fa c u lty  
o f  reason, which may help  him to  organize h is  p r a c t ic a l  p o s it io n  w hile 
the  su ffe r in g  might promote h i s  in n e r  understanding.
Our l a s t  rep re se n ta tiv e  o f an c ien t European thought,
P lo tin u s  (203 -  270), a lso  assumes two fundamental cosmic c o n s ti tu e n ts : 
soul and m atte r. I t  i s  soul in  i t s  in d iv id u a l a sp ec t which may animate 
m a tte r and thus give r i s e  to  a  l iv in g  organism. In  th i s  coupling the  
s o u l 's  o r ig in a lly  f u l l  power o f reason and a u th e n tic  in te l le c t io n  i s  
hampered by the  presence o f m atte r. This cond ition  causes e rro r , wrong 
ac tio n  and pain . "The soul appears to  be p re sen t in  th e  bodies by the 
f a c t  th a t  i t  sh ines in to  them: i t  makes them l iv in g  beings n o t by
merging in to  the body b u t by g iv in g  fo r th , w ithout any change in  i t s e l f ,  
images o r  lik e n e sse s  o f  i t s e l f  l ik e  one face  caught by marry m i r r o r s ." ^  
In  th i s  in d ir e c t  manner th e  various human f a c u l t ie s  and fu n c tio n s  a re  
produced. "That sou l, then , in  u s  w il l  in  i t s  n a tu re  stand  a p a r t  from 
a l l  th a t  can cause any o f  the  e v i ls  which man does o r  s u f fe rs ;  f o r  a l l  
such e v i l ,  as  we have seen, belongs only to  th e  anim ate, the  
couplem ent,. .  .we sometimes see f a l s e ly  because we c re d it  on ly  th e  low er 
p e rcep tio n , th a t  o f th e  couplement, w ithout apply ing  th e  t e s t s  o f th e
P lo tin n s , E n .I .1 ,8  (pp. 36-37).
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(47)reaso n in g -facu ity . " Operating- in  an in d iv id u a liz e d  m a te ria l form,
the  soul " f a l l s  under the  cond itions o f  th e  e n t i r e  l iv in g  experiences 
th i s  compound i t  i s  th a t  s in s , i t  i s  th i s ,  and n o t th e  o ther, th a t  pays 
p en a lty " . On the  le v e l of m a tte r the  soul can only re ta in  p a r t i a l  
freedom, b u t th is  i s  the freedom on which a l l  fu r th e r  conscious 
development o f  th e  in d iv id u a l depends. This development i s  determined 
by a  compromise between the in n e r  q u a lity  o f  the soul and i t s  
co in c id en ta l o u te r  conditions. "The a c tio n  o f  the  soul w ill  be in  p a r t  
guided by the  environment while in  o th e r  m a tte rs  i t  w il l  be sovereign, 
lead in g  the  way where i t  w ill .  The n o b le r soul w ill  have the g re a te r
(48)power; the  p oo rer soul the  le s s e r ."  P lo tin u s  p o in ts  o u t c a re fu lly
th a t  the  soul can never be e v i l  in  i t s e l f ,  a lthough i t  may g e t very-
entangled in  e v il .  E v il can never be in  th e  soul, b u t i t  may w ell
surround i t .  P lo tin u s  quotes and ex p la in s: "E vil i s  o f n ecess ity , fo r
th e re  must be a con trary  to  good" (compare p. 29, P la to ) . He conceives
of i t  as a cosmic n e c e ss ity  in  c o rre la tio n  w ith  the ex istence  o f  m atter,
" fo r  n e ce ssa rily  th is  a l l  (cosmos) i s  made up o f c o n tra r ie s :  i t  could
(49)not e x is t  i f  m a tte r d id  n o t" . However, in  the cond ition  o f
embodiment th e re  l i e s  the  e v il .  "The b o d ily  kind, in  th a t  i t  partakes 
o f m a tte r  i s  an e v il  th ing . What form i s  in  bodies i s  an untrue form: 
they are w ithout l i f e . . . t h e y  a re  h indrances to  the soul in  i t s  proper 
a c t ;  in  t h e i r  cease less  f lu x  they a re  always s lip p in g  away from b e in g ." 
For P lo tin u s  being i s  im possible w ithout sou l. Therefore, e v il ,  being 
th e  opposite  o f soul, i s  c la s s i f ie d  by him a s  non-being, "as  something
P lo tin u s , Ep . I . 1 .9  (pp. 37-39). Compare Schumacher (Guide, p . 154) 
who expresses h is  concern about th e  modern repercussions o f th is  kind 
of "voluntary  lim ita tio n  o f the  l im i t le s s  in te l l e c t "  to  th e  fash ionable , 
h igh ly  s e le c tiv e  s c ie n t i f ic  kind of p e rsp ec tiv e , which, o verrid ing  the 
c u lt iv a tio n  o f  self-knowledge, appears to  him as one o f  the  main 
reasons "why most people l iv e  in  a s ta te  o f continuous anx iety". 
Heidegger (G eiass .« pp. 13, 25) sees a f a t a l  tren d  in  the unquestioned 
replacement of contem plative thought by unaware computing th inking .
^  P lo tin u s , I I I . 1 .8  (p. 9 ).
^  P lo tin u s , 1 .8 .7  (p. 100).
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o f an u t t e r ly  d if fe re n t o rder from a u th en tic -b e in g " . This i s  im portant, 
because th is  view a lso  makes i t  im possible to  see man as  e s s e n tia l ly  
e v il .  "E vil was before we came to  be; the  e v i l  which ho lds men down 
binds than ag a in st th e i r  w il l ;  and f o r  those  th a t  have the  s treng th  -  
n o t found in  a l l  men, i t  i s  tru e  -  th e re  i s  a  de liverance  from the e v i ls  
th a t  have found lodgement in  the  so u l."  The u rge  to  do away w ith the  
e v i l  rooted  in  m atter seems to  fo llow  n a tu ra lly . However, a s  P lo tin u s  
exp lains, th e  answer does n o t l i e  in  h id in g  away from so c ie ty , bu t in  
overcoming the  delusions o f m a tte r  wherever they  a re  encountered, by 
"disengaging the s e l f  from the body.. .  the p recep t to  " f le e  hence" 
(Socrates) does n o t r e fe r  to  e a r th ly  l i f e " - ^ '^  P e rfec t l i f e  can be 
reached through knowledge and i t s  consequent a p p lic a tio n  in  l i f e .  Through 
f u l l  concen tration  on and withdrawal to  h is  im n a te ria l tru e  na tu re  
everybody has the chance to  experience p e r fe c t happiness, although 
o p p o rtu n itie s  may d i f f e r  according to  h is  a c tu a l circum stances.
Porphyry, in  h is  biography o f P lo tin u s , mentions th a t the  l a t t e r  
when he was s t i l l  a student o f philosophy became "eager to  in v e s t ig a te .. .  
the system adopted among the Ind ians". P lo tin u s ' view, in  f a c t ,  appears 
to  have p ro f ite d  from some e a r ly  form o f Samkhya philosophy. (The
soul-mat t e r  re la tio n  in  h is  outlook resem bles th a t  between purusa and
( 51) *p r a k r t i ; compare Toga, p. 289.) Even i f  n o t so, h is  tw o-fold a t t i tu d e
towards e v i l  on a h igher and a  lower le v e l a llow s him to  look a t  i t  a s
a very n e u tra l observer, in  f a c t  alm ost too n e u tra l .  There i s  no
c u ltu ra l  dimension to  h is  concept o f  e v i l .  Absolute e v i l ,  in  a  sense, i s
n o t even n ecessa rily  bad: whenever the  soul rem ains unaffected  by i t ,
the  two a re  as  i t  were in  a s ta te  o f  peacefu l co -ex istence . Whenever
^  P lo tin u s , 1 .8 .6  (p. 98 ).
(5 l) Hirschberger* (P h i l . . p . 501) mentions th a t  P lo tin u s  had accompanied 
Emperor Gordian I I I  in  h is  campaign a g a in s t th e  P e rs ian s  in  an 
unsuccessfu l attem pt to  fa m ilia r iz e  h im self w ith t h e i r  wisdom a s  w ell a s  
th a t  o f  the Indians. His background remained e n t i r e ly  G r ee k . Besides, 
Capelle (G r .P h il.. pp. 5-6) emphasizes s tro n g ly  th a t  o r ig in a l Greek 
philosophy was in  no way indebted to  any O rie n ta l c u ltu re .
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s o u l- l i f e  g e ts  involved witli m a tte r  i t  leads to  some experience o f  e v il
according  to  circum stances. E v il, from simple ignorance to  conscious
su ffe rin g , i s  accepted as a f a c t ,  b u t n o t p e s s im is tic a lly . I t  does n o t
c o n tra d ic t o r  destroy  human ex isten ce . In s te ad , i t  can be mastered in
an a c t  o f  de liverance . For P lo tin u s , o r  S ocrates, i t  i s  th i s  world they
a re  p rim arily  concerned about, any th ing  beyond th a t  i s  some p r iv a te
opportun ity , even though p r iv a te ly  peihaps extrem ely meaningful. The
achievement o f pure ex isten ce , o f  good, i s ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking an in n e r
r e a l i ty .  The wise have achieved a  g re a te r  awareness o f  th i s  than o th e rs ,
(52)"see ing  th ings very  d if f e r e n tly  from the  average man”. The
philosophers p e rso n a lly  exem plify t h e i r  knowledge: "Their r ig h t  a c tio n
(53)i s  the  expression o f  t h e i r  own power." In  th is  connection Porphyry
describes to  which ex ten t P lo tin u s  had re a liz e d  in n e r r e a l i ty  through h is
own power: "Good and k ind ly , s in g u la rly  g en tle  and engaging.. . ,  he
laboured strenuously  to  f r e e  h im se lf and r i s e  above the  b i t t e r  waves o f
th is  blood-drenched l i f e . . . f o r  the  term, the  one end, o f  h is  l i f e  was to
became u n ia te , to  approach to  the God over a l l :  and fo u r  tim es, during
the period  I  passed with him, he achieved th i s  term, by no mere la te n t
(54)f i tn e s s  b u t by the in e ffa b le  a c t ."
Plotinus* d isregard  f o r  the world o f  m atte r -  as Porphyry 
observes, "h is  handw riting was slovenly ; he m isjo ined words; he cared 
no th ing  about sp e llin g ; h is  one concern was only f o r  the id ea” — reminds 
u s  o f an a t t i tu d e  o f  w eariness which can be observed in  p re sen t Western 
so cie ty  (compare Spengler, taedium v i ta e ,  p . 122). The modern urban 
in d iv id u a l o ften  does n o t seem to  care  p e rso n ally  f o r  the  maintenance o f 
h is  world when i t  has become alm ost unmanageable f o r  him, due to  h is  own 
inadequate percep tion  and one-sided understanding* Some s o c ia l behaviour 
today seems to  r e f le c t  a fe e lin g  o f d e fea t by the mass o f in d iv id u a lly  
unmanageable ad m in is tra tiv e  data and techno log ica l inform ation , and,
(52) p io tin u s , 1 . 4.8  (p. 65).
P lo tin u s , I I I . 1.10 (p. l l ) .
(54) Porphyry, "On the l i f e  o f P lo tin u s  and the arrangement o f h is  work", 
sec t. 25. P lo tin u s , p . 23.
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consquently, an anomic tendency to  break away in to  personal is o la t io n , 
a s  expressed by the  re je c t io n  o f  conventional v a lues which have o ften  l o s t  
t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  meaning. Once c e r ta in  q u a l i t i e s  o f  th e  e x is t in g  c u ltu re  
and th e  so c ia l  system, have given r i s e  to  fundamental doubt, a  person can 
no lo n g e r be expected to  take  se r io u s ly  what ap p aren tly  has a lready  
stopped be in g  serio u s  in  i t s e l f .  "CounterculturaX" a ttem p ts  to  b rin g  new 
order in to  e x is t in g  weak o r  d isru p ted  c u l tu ra l  s tru c tu re s  by u sin g  
s u p e r f ic ia l ly  m odified t r a d i t io n a l  methods seem to  confirm  the o ld  ways, 
although n e g a tiv e ly , r a th e r  than to  overcome them. B ut, by being  
a n t is o c ia l  a  person does n o t n e c e s sa r ily  become a  m ystic . P lo tin u s , in  
f a c t ,  evaluated  and tre a te d  the o u te r  world v e ry  con sc ien tio u sly . He 
lu c id ly  ex p la in s  to  u s  th e  v a rio u s  reasons f o r  h is  d is reg ard  f o r  o u te r 
r e a l i ty ,  whereas, when members o f  modem so c ie ty  r e j e c t  the  o u te r  world 
t h e i r  a t t i tu d e  o ften  seems to  be based on d isapproval and abomination 
a lone. Having no conscious access to  any in n e r a l te rn a t iv e ,  t h e i r  
in d if fe re n c e  o r  anx ie ty  may be expressions o f some amorphous e x is te n t ia l  
pessimism. P lo tin u s , who i s  consciously o p e ra tin g  on d if f e r e n t  le v e ls  o f  
r e a l i ty ,  can face  h is  pe rso n al p o s s ib i l i t i e s  simply as f a c ts .
Socra tes, Seneca and P lo tin u s  p e rso n a lly  exemplify th e i r  
p h ilo so p h ica l p o s itio n s . Knowledge organizes id eas  inasmuch a s  i t  
c o n s is ts  o f  an understand ing  o f  th e i r  connections. In  S ocrates th is  
in s tru m en ta l p o te n t ia l ,  i . e .  th e  p rocess o f apply ing  knowledge, o r  
th in k in g , could -  a s  a  by-product -  have a c e r ta in  co n d itio n in g  e f fe c t  
w ith  regard  to  h i s  p r iv a te  p o s it iv e  outlook on t r u th ,  thereby improving 
h is  in n e r  awareness. There i s  a  mutual s tim u la tio n  between the 
in te l le c tu a l  and the  m y stica l p r in c ip le . In  h i s  p r iv a te  eudemonistic 
p u rsu it  we f in d  optimism, in  h is  p h ilo so p h ica l ex p o sitio n  and h is  
re a c tio n  to  c u ltu re , pessimism. Seneca favours a  form o f  in te l le c tu a l ,  
non-m ystical wisdom. H is q u ite  a n a ly t ic a l  testim ony o f  m an's su ffe rin g  
does n o t l i f t  him t r u ly  above i t .  He i s  m oderately o p tim is tic  in  th a t  
death re p re se n ts  f o r  him a  r e la t iv e  gain . But h is  e th ic a l  outlook, 
predom inantly o f  p ra c t ic a l  va lue, and h is  re a c tio n  to  h is  e x is te n t ia l  
condition  a re  p e ss im is tic , ^ o r P lo tin u s , e v i l  as a n a tu ra l  coun terpart 
to  good i s  b a s ic a lly  n e u tra l, Through wrong see in g  e v i l  becomes
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a  p r a c t ic a l  h indrance. C u ltiva ted  awareness and p h ilo so p h ica l wisdom 
a re  means o f  escape. A dm itting pessim isn only  w ith  regard  to  seme 
misunderstanding: o f  e v i l ,  P lo tin u s  i s  la rg e ly  o p tim is t ic .  In  
agreement w ith  o u r  th re e  an c ien t p h ilo sophers, and as  an i n i t i a l  
p o s tu la te , ve accep t th a t  th e re  i s  s u f fe r in g  in  a l l  a sp e c ts  o f  l i f e *  
However, as Porphyry teach es  u s , s u f fe r in g  a lone  i s  n o t s u f f ic ie n t  to  
deduce pessdm isn.
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P a r t  It G e r m a n  p e s s i m i s m
C hapter Tvo
Schopenhauer: was India r ea lly  a  starting-point?
One o f  th e f i r s t  and e o s t  en th u siastic  responses to  Indian philosophy 
came from an outsid er o f  German thought, the p r iv a te  philosopher 
Arthur Schopenhauer (l788  -  1860). His indebtedness to  the Indian 
thinkers has o ften  been rashly assessed  in  the fa ce  o f  h is  philosophical 
Indian referen ces. Ve feed that the extent to  which the romantic 
d iscover ies in  India may have provided, a sta r tin g -p o in t fo r  
Schopenhauer's unusual outlook can only be appreciated a s  lo n g  as  ve  are 
avare o f  the contemporary German cu ltu ra l element in  the h is to ry  o f  h is  
own ph ilosophical background. Hie s e lf -w il le d  branch o f  German 
pessim ism  a s  v s  have s e t  out to  study i t  here, represents more than 
a h is to r ic a l  part o f  the European philosophical fam ily  tree: cnr 
en tire  network o f  Indian correspondences i s  a lso  suspended from i t .  !Qte 
princip al segment o f  th is  branch originated  v ith  Schopenhauer' a work. 
From here ve sh a ll ex tra ct some o f  the key concepts required fo r  our 
an a ly sis  o f  both the inter-German sod the Gexman-Indian relationsh ip s.
( l )  Stim ulations and ir r ita t io n s
P h ilosop h ica lly  ve are a t  l ib e r ty  to  assume v ith  Schopenhauer that a t  
the roots o f  the world as ve perceive i t  there e x is t s  some p r in cip le  o f
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cognition which. concentrates a l l  understanding w ithin i t s e l f ,  but which 
normally eludes our own e ffo r ts  to apprehend i t .  In on to log ica l terms, 
such an exclu sive p r in c ip le  would imply th at besid es th is  innermost, 
absolute seeing , knowing, hearing and understanding th ing there e x is t s  
no other being -  "praeter id . widens, e t  s d e n s . e t  audiens, e t  
in te l l ig e n s  ehs a liu d  non est" . as he quotes in  a very revealing  
manner.  ^ Hot only the content but a lso  the form and the circumstances 
which feature th is  i l lu s t r a t in g  l in e  o f  references are most in terestin g . 
Schopenhauer ap tly  includes i t  in  h is  f i r s t  work "on -Hie fourfold  root 
o f the p r in c ip le  o f  s u ff ic ie n t  reason", o r ig in a lly  submitted as h is  
doctoral th e s is  a t  Jena in  1813, in  which he expla ins th at there cannot 
be airy "cognition o f  cognizing; because t h is  would n e c ess ita te  that the 
subject should separate from cognition  and y e t  cognize cognition, which 
i s  impossible".  ^ In accepting th is  ve fin d  ourselves faced by & very  
exclu sive object which, a t  the same tim e, represents the e sse n tia l subject 
o f everything. For Schopenhauer i t  fo llow s th at the subject o f  cognition  
can never be cognized in  terms o f  an object or a s  representative  
imagination. Moreover, sin ce  a l l  cognition n a tu ra lly  requires a  cognized 
a s w ell as a cognizing part, the cognized as such cannot he the cognizing  
but must be the w illin g , the subject o f  w illin g , the w il l .
This fundamental Schopenhauerian ten et owes i t s  pecu liar  
epistem ological i l lu s tr a t io n  to  a  second noteworthy biographical event
^  From the Oupnek'hat. v o l. I ,  p. 202; see  Schopenhauer, Vurzel.
pp. 158-160.
(2) Schopenhauer, Vurzel. p . 17. He re fer s  to the p r in c ip le  in  i t s  most 
general form: N llril e s t  sine ration s cur p otiu s s i t ,  ouam non s i t .
(ihere i s  nothing which without reason should rather be than not b e .)  
Having presented i t s  two previously  accepted asp ects, the reasons o f  
cognition and o f becoming, he adds h im self the two reasons o f  being and 
o f action . Later he s h if t s  the emphasis e n tir e ly  in  favour o f cau sa lity  
as the one fundamental p r in c ip le  o f  a l l  being, operating mainly with the 
corresponding concepts o f  w il l  and cognition . Adapted and expanded 
in to  a second ed ition  (l847) th is  book remained the introduction and 
b a s is  o f  h is  main work.
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which a lso  took p lace  in  1813: the  o r i e n ta l i s t  F ried rich  M ajer made the
young ph ilosopher read Abraham Hyacinthe A nquetil-D uperron's O u.pnek'’h a t.
id  e s t  secretum tegendum. vhich represen ted  a L atin ized  tra n s la t io n  o f
(3)a  P ers ian  version  o f  50 m ostly o rig in a l S an sk rit Upanisads. These
were to  have a l i f e - lo n g  impact on him. T heir L atin  form c e r ta in ly
su ited  Schopenhauer's romantic sense f o r  detached sch o la rly  u n iv e rs a li ty .
I t  may even have a t t r ib u te d  a q u a s i-c la s s ic a l  ph ilo soph ical s ta tu s  to
those m etaphysical In d ian  s e c re ts . Schopenhauer's In d ia  -  a  source o f
wisdom is o la te d  in  tim e -  soon became in te g ra te d  in  the  fo rm lal b a s is  o f
h is  c lassical-m ode in  world outlook a s  i t s  th ird  element, nex t to  P la to
and Kant. Remaining la rg e ly  unaware o f th e  mechanics o f the  fundam entally
d if f e r e n t  Indian  t r a d i t io n  throughout h is  l i f e ,  he e n t i r e ly  ignored the
herm eneutic question . Schopenhauer shared a g en era lly  Eurocentric  
(4)a t t i tu d e  w ith predecessors such as  Hegel o r  h is  own ea r ly  fo llow ers,
as we s h a ll  see here  and in  some o f the  follow ing chap ters. But he had
access to  an ev er-in c rea s in g  number o f tra n s la t io n s  o f Indian  te x ts  in
modem European languages as w ell as essays and rep o rts  on In d ia , o f
(5)which he made ca re fu l u se  as h is  work progressed.
/ \
S e i l l i e r e  (Scfaoph.. p. 10), Schwab (Ren. O r.. p . 65) and Gerard 
(O rien t, p . 218) in d ic a te  the  y ear 1813, von Glasenapp (in d b .. p . 68) 
makes i t  1814, in  any case a f t e r  h is  re tu rn  to Weimar, which means a f t e r  
he had accomplished h i s  d is s e r ta t io n  (c f . P isa , Schoph.. pp. 258-259).
This i s  n o t a ffe c te d  by h is  e x p l ic i t  awareness o f the  "nebulous" and 
"Europeanized” renderings o f  most o f  h is  Indian te x ts , from which he 
exempts the  Ounnek' h a t  as trustw orthy , lik ew ise  S ch leg e l's  Bhagavadgita 
and "some p lace s  in  Colebrook's tra n s la t io n s  from the Vedas” (PP. I I . 
p . 437 (§ 184)).
(5) For the general h is to ry  o f S an sk rit l i t e r a tu r e  a t  the  time see 
Schwab, e sp e c ia lly  pp. 57-63, 96-107. Schopenhauer h im self includes 
among h i s  main re fe ren ces: Isaak  Jakob Schmidt, fiber das Mahayana und
Pradschna-Param ita; I n s t i tu te s  of Hindoo Law (l794); H einrich J u liu s  
K laproth, "Bhaguat-Geeta -  Gesprache zwischen Kreeshna und Arjoon" in  
A sia tisch es  Magazin (l802 ) ; "Fragments Bouddhiques" in  Nouveau Journal
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The cen tre  p iece  o f Schopenhauer'’ s  vork, Die Welt a l s  W ille 
und V orste llung . ^  was e s s e n t ia l ly  completed in  1818. However, h is
pungent c r i t ic is m  o f human n a tu re  in  combination w ith the denuding
(7 )
c h a rac te ro lo g ica l w it, w ith which he p e n e tra te s  to  the m etaphysical
ground o f  h is  reac tio n a ry  view o f the  world, helped to  shut out f o r
the g re a te r  p a r t  o f h is  l i f e  a  much d esired  p o p u la rity  as
(8)a ph ilosopher. Another undeniable o b stac le  f o r  him consisted  in  
the domineering ph ilo so p h ica l presence o f Hegel, h is  sen io r by 
seventeen y ears . The unknown Schopenhauer had clashed  w ith the  famous 
" s t a t e 's  ph ilosopher11 a t  the  U n iv e rs ity  o f B erlin  in  1820, when he 
was a sp ir in g  to  a  p ro fesso rsh ip  th e re  h im self; th e re a f te r  he would
a s ia tiq u e  ( l8 3 l)  f Reniy Colebrooke, "Essay on the  Vedas" in  A sia tic  
Researches, vo l. VIII (18O5) ;  "Essays on the  Philosophy o f the  Hindus" 
in  M iscellaneous Essays, vo l. I  (l833)f Mad. Mari e -E lisab eth  de 
P o lie r , Mythologie des Indous (18O9 ) ;  August Wilhelm Schlegel, 
Bhagavad-Gjta (l823)f F.H.H. Wjndischmann, Sancara. s ive  de 
theologumenis Vedanticorum (l833)f Horace Wilson, Sankhya Carica 
(1838) }  Eugene Bumouf, In tro d u c tio n  a 1 'h is to i r e  du Buddhism (l844 )* 
Spence Hardy, Eastern Kona chi sm (l850 ); Manual o f Buddhign (l853)f
Jean -B ap tiste-F ran^o is  Obry, Du Nirvana Indien (1856).
^  I . e .  The World as  W ill and Im agination. For the  im p lica tions of 
V orste llung  see p. 65.
(7 ) L ips (P hysiog .. pp. 11, 20) reminding us th a t  fo r  Schopenhauer 
physiognomy i s  an expression o f th e  w il l  and, th e re fo re , a  key to  
m an's ch arac te r, s ta te s :  "Through h is  fundamental view he defined
the b a sic  law o f  modem ch arac te ro lo g y ." For ou r fu r th e r  an a ly s is  
we s h a ll  p a r a l le l  th e  notion  o f an in d iv id u a l charactero logy by th a t
o f a c u ltu ra l  characterology (as in  SpengLer and Oebser).
(8 )
Only in  1844 a second e d itio n  of Die Welt a l s  W ille und 
V orste llung  appeared, extended by a  second volume, and in  1859 
a th ird  e d itio n . F in a lly , w ith the p u b lica tio n  of Parerga und 
Paralipomena in  1851, began what w ith some amusement he c a lle d  "the  
comedy o f my fame" (P isa , Scho’p h .. p. 351).
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(g)
expose Hegel as M s ph ilosoph ical arch-enemy. When in  h is  f in a l  years 
M s own work came to  he read and accepted, a s  he n o ticed  v i th  g re a t 
g r a t i f ic a t io n ,  he had n o t only made a fundamental c o n trib u tio n  to  the  
promotion o f Indian thought in  the  Western world, b a t  he had a lso  
bequeathed to  the M sto ry  o f  philosophy a  noteworthy phenomenon: the
a sso c ia tio n  o f  Tndian thought v i th  German pessim isn . In  co u n tless  
s u p e r f ic ia l  remarks the c lich e  o f  "pessim isn” in  In d ian  thought has 
tra v e lle d  w ell beyond Schopenhanerian boundaries. Since Schopenhauer
i s  the  le ad in g  f ig u re  o f  our h is to r ic a l  com parative a n a ly s is , ve s h a ll  
t ry  to  e s ta b lis h  a rep re sen ta tiv e  view o f  the n a tu re  and development o f 
m etaphysical pessim isn in  German thought, and fo llow  the  ro o ts  of 
a s e le c tio n  o f s ig n if ic a n t Indian conceptions which a re  re f le c te d  by i t .
Schopenhauer, l ik e  o u r o th e r  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f  German pessimism,
nourishes M s  thought from some b i l a t e r a l  c u l tu ra l  in te r re la tio n s h ip ,
( l l )which was n o t e n tire ly  devoid o f  rom antic m o tiva tions. H is to r ic a l ly
speaking, he mediates between various exponents o f  German pM losophy
(which tends to  l i n k  i t s e l f  to  the  thought o f  the  an c ien t Greeks) and
(12)sec tions o f the  Indian tr a d it io n . We in ten d  to  look  a t  th is  complex
^  S e i l l ie r e  (Schoph., pp. 78, 82) exp la in s  th a t  Schopenhauer re je c te d  
such "sopM sts" as Hegel because they  d id  n o t share  M s rom antic 
s e n s i t iv i ty  f o r  "what contemporary psychology l ik e s  to  c a l l  th e  
unconscious". The eventual "discovery" o f Schopenhauer i s  h ig h lig h ted  by 
John O xenford's essay "Ico noclast in  German PMlosophy" through which 
Schopenhauer becomes widely recognized a s  th e  g re a t ch a llen g e r o f 
Hegelianism (P isa , Schoph.. p. 355)*
^  Cf. Radhakr., P h i l . I . pp. 49-50, 146-147, 365; Gerard (O rient, p. 220).
(11) W illson (Ger.Rom.. pp. v ii-x )  exp la in s  th a t  th e  ro m an tic is t was 
uniquely  equipped to  search f o r  a  common o r ig in  o f re l ig io n , language o r 
a r t  because, g en era lly , he was h is to r ic a l ly  o rien ted  and pM losopM cally  
moved to  e lab o ra te  on grand human themes. He in c lu d es  Hegel and 
Schopenhauer among the "romantic pM losophers" w ith regard  to  the  In d ie  
id e a l -  in  M s  eyes "a summaiy o f romantic a sp ira tio n s"  -  as  i t  was
perceived by them.
(12) Gerard (O rien t, p. 215) * "Schopenhauer i s  the f i r s t  O ccidental 
pM losopher who tr ie d  to  n a tu ra liz e  Indian  pM losophy in  Europe."
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in terrela tion sh ip  in  tenns o f an ob jective  h is to r ic a l process. Vith
a view to  the natural r a t if ic a t io n s  o f  th is  process i t  would be
u n r e a lis t ic  to grope fo r  any p recise  chronological order o f  philosophical
in teraction . In p r in c ip le  and to begin w ith , we simply observe that a l l
our Germans admit, p o s it iv e ly  or n ega tive ly , a strong sense o f h is to r ic a l
succession . Hie reaction s o f  Gebser and Spengler, back to N ietzsche,
Schopenhauer and h is  fo llow ers, Hegel and F ich te , and Kant, avow th e ir
predecessors a s  h is to r ic a l  antecedents. (Schopenhauer, who remains
(13)p h ilosop h ica lly  very a -h is to r ic a l, s t i l l  expresses a d is t in c t  d esire  
fo r  recognition , fo r  d is c ip le s  and fo r  fo llo w e r s .) I t  i s  th is  inner 
a ttitu d e  in  our th inkers, regardless o f  th e ir  own philosophical 
apperceptions and prejud ices, which i s  o f  o b jectiv e  s ign ifican ce fo r  u s .
Schopenhauer h im self in d ica tes  as h is  ph ilosophical masters
"the astonish ing Kant" and "the d iv ine P lato", with idiom he soon
a sso c ia te s  "the b e n e fits  o f  the Vedas", even p red ictin g  an Indian
renaissance in  Europe comparable to  the one revived ancient
Greece. Kant (l724 -  I8O4 ) ,  in  le c tu r in g  on India, had only shown
(l5 )some moderate socio-geographical in te r e s t  in  i t .  But Hegel
(l770 -  183 l) who, h is to r ic a lly  speaking, occupies a  p osition  somewhere 
between Schopenhauer and Kant, already m anifests a  d is t in c t  philosophical 
opinion about the Indians, which in  seme resp ects appears quite  
compatible with that o f  Schopenhauer, although in  rather the opposite  
sense. Here, in  Hegel, culminates the p re-h istory  o f  the cu ltu ra lly  
b ila te r a l ph ilosophical in teraction  which concerns u s .
"He ev icted  time from himself" (N ietzsche, Schoph.. p. 50) .
(14 ) Schopenhauer, V .V .I. p. 11. In 1841 Edgar Qninet esta b lish es  the 
term Renaissance o r ien ta le . as SGbvab reports (Ren.Or.. pp. 18 -2 l)  
tracin g  the concept back to  Friedrich Schlegel (l808).
(15) . 
Ignorant o f  any p articu lar  l in e  o f  Indian thought, Kant Un
an ticip ation  o f  Hegel) assumes that the Indians w il l  forever remain
incapable o f  any ph ilosophical thinking in  abstract concepts (see
von Glasenapp, Kant, p . 43; Indb. p. 9 ) .
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Hegel, h im self i n  opposition  to  the  then  fash io n ab le  rom antic
(16)In d ia  enthusiasm , i s  one o f  th e  main p h ilo so p h ica l f ig u re s  o f  
Schopenhauer's c u ltu ra l  h e r ita g e . Schopenhauer r e a c ts  to  Hegel, and 
bo th  r e a c t  to  India* This f a c t  allow s n s  to  in te n s i f y  the  contours o f  
Schopenhauer's In d ia  image by c o n tra s tin g  i t  w ith  some o f  H eg e l's  
ty p ic a l views on th e  s p i r i t  and thought o f  th e  In d ian s . Schopenhauer 
i s  c o n s is te n tly  opposed to  Hegel, although th i s  i s  nowhere expressed 
i n  any p o in t f o r  p o in t a rgument* T heir p h ilo so p h ica l approaches axe, 
i n  p r in c ip le ,  q u ite  reversed . Schopenhauer's physiogpcm ically ta le n te d
mind has, s ince  h is  adolescence, t r i e d  to  understand  th e  unknown by
(l7 )in te n s ify in g  the knowledge o f  th e  known. P roceeding from r e a l i t y
to  th e  id e a , Schopenhauer f in d s  h im se lf i n  fundam ental op p o sitio n  to  
H egel, who moves from the id e a  to  r e a l i ty .
H eg el's  tru e  o b je c t o f  h is to ry , the  s ta t e ,  in  Europe rep re sen ts  
th e  perhaps u ltim a te  achievement o f  h i s to r i c a l  r e a l i t y  which inc ludes 
th e  r e a l i t y  and re a l iz a t io n  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l, whereas in  In d ia  i t
( i s )exem plifies f o r  him only a  p re lim in ary  s tag e  i n  th i s  p rocess.
H is to r ic a l ly  committed to  a  u n i t7n e a r  concept o f  tim e, Hegel r a is e s  th e  
q u estio n  o f  I n d ia 's  ro le  i n  u n iv e rsa l h is to ry :  “Which i s  th e  p o s itio n
(16) „ „Von Glasenapp, In d b ., p . 59.
(17) P is a  (Schoph., pp. 125-128; 197) mentions h is  e a r ly  ch a rac te ro lo g ica l 
o bserv a tio n s  on p riso n e rs  and hanged people, and th e  r e s u l ta n t  
m etaphysical impulse. According to  an o ft-q u o ted  au tob iog raph ica l l in e  
(HachTal3, IV. 1, p . 96 , § 36) Schopenhauer h im self no ted : " In  my
17 th  y ea r, w ithout any learned  education , I  was so a ffe c te d  by th e  
misezy o f  l i f e  as  was the  Buddha when, i n  h is  youth, he saw i l ln e s s ,  o ld  
age, s u ffe r in g  and d e a th ."
(is) H albfass (in d ien . p . 109) reckons th a t  H eg e l's  in t e r e s t  in  In d ia  
dem onstrates -  ir re s p e c tiv e  o f  h is  " d ic ta to r ia l  se lf-co n fid en ce"  -  th a t  
th e  phenomenon o f h i s  combination o f system and h is to ry ,  the h is to r ic a l  
summing-up and the  suggestion o f  a p o ss ib le  "term ination" o f  h is to ry , i s  
no coincidence a t  a time o f "new dimensions o f  access to  the  
extra-European tra d it io n s " .
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o f  I n d ia 's  m an ifesta tio n  (G esta lt)  in  connection w ith  th e  continuous
65)development o f the  idea?" And he answers th a t ,  no tw ithstand ing
In d ia 's  geographical and l in g u is t i c  l in k s  w ith  the  r e s t  o f th e  world, 
"here i s  no room f o r  reason , n o r f o r  freedom". In  Schopenhauer's view 
both  reason  and freedom appear a s  fu n c tio n a l exp ress io n s  o f  h i s  
fundamental concept o f w il l  which, a s  we s h a ll  see in  due course, he i s  
eager to  support w ith any p o ss ib le  re fe ren ce  to  In d ian  philosophy.
From H eg e l's  p o in t o f view in  In d ia  th e  w il l  becomes 
in te rn a liz e d , g iv in g  r i s e  to  a  s p i r i tu a l  world and a  form o f idealism  
which p e rce iv es  the  world by d is so lv in g  th e  sensual elem ent in to  thought. 
He w rite s : ni2 i i s  idealism  does in  f a c t  e x i s t  in  In d ia , b u t only  in
a  co n cep tless , rea so n le ss  form, ru le d  by mere phantasy, w ithout any 
freedom, mere dreaming -  tak in g  i t s  o r ig in  and i t s  m a te r ia l from th e  
world o f  ex is ten ce , b u t only to  tu rn  every th ing  in to  phantasy; because, 
even though such phantasy may appear a s  being  pervaded by concepts and 
th e  p lay  o f thought may f in d  i t s  way in , such com bination happens only  
a t  random. M orality , reason  and s u b je c t iv i ty  a re  d ism issed  and th e  
u n in h ib ite d  power o f  im agination, v ested  in to  sensual p le asu re  on th e  
one hand and in  the  t o t a l  a b s tra c tio n  o f in te r n a l iz a t io n  on th e  o th e r
(20)hand a re  the extremes between which th e  Ind ian  jumps back and fo r th ."
In  sh o rt, w il l  evolves through a  sensual le v e l  to  an a b s tra c tio n  o f 
in te rn a l iz a t io n .  Between th is  f in a l  le v e l  and th e  m edia ting  sensual 
le v e l  a w ild  process o f thought and im agination tak es  p la ce , which i s  
resp o n sib le  f o r  the  Ind ian  s ta te  o f mind, a s  ffegel sees i t .  "For th e  
Ind ians th e  p re sen t and th e  e x is t in g  d isso lv e  in to  co lo u rfu l dreams." 
Moreover, " they  a re  com pletely unaware o f  ly in g . You can t r u s t  t h e i r
(21)w ritte n  te x ts  a s  l i t t l e  as th e i r  verba l a cco u n ts ." (This type o f
(l9 ) Hegel, V o r l .I I .  p . 543- 
Hegel, V o r l .I I .  p . 351.
(21) H albfass (Hegel, p . 121) comments th a t  Hegel "who does n o t 
recognize the fo re ig n , the heterogeneous, a s  fo re ig n , does n o t accept 
a l te rn a t iv e s  as  a l t e n a t iv e s " ,  bu t in co rp o ra te s  and comprehends 
every th ing  a s  a  co n s titu en t and p resu p p o sitio n  o f  h is  own thought;
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socio-psychological judgement has been e lu c id a ted  w ith g re a t in s ig h t by 
Jean Gebser, who f in d s  in  In d ia  a  p o la r  p a r a l le l  and equ ivalen t to  
Europe in s te ad  o f H egel's  h i s to r ic a l  p re lim inary . See Chapter F iv e .)
H egel's  main argument a g a in s t the  Indians i n s i s t s  th a t  th e i r  
thought i s  nothing but a  p lay  o f im agination o r  even dream! ike  fo l ly .
Within h is  generally  o p tim is tic  conception o f a u n iv e rsa l h is to r ic a l  
process -  a  p iece o f shameless p h ilo so p h ica l nonsense, from 
Schopenhauer's po in t o f view -  Hegel re se rv es  some space fo r  
a p ess im is tic  v e rd ic t on In d ia : n o t being  aware o f, o r  being incapable
of seeing, one 's  own ignorance i s  a f a c t  which could allow  u s , in  
accordance with Hegel and c e r ta in  fo llow ers o f  h is ,  to  deduce su ffe rin g . 
This im portant p o in t sh a ll occupy us  again  in  connection w ith Buddhign 
(Chapter Seven). Conversely, Schopenhauer, who in te g ra te s  the Indian 
concept o f im agination in  h is  own way, t r e a t s  i t  a s  one o f  h is  most 
s ig n if ic a n t and ph ilo so p h ica lly  va luab le  p r in c ip le s . Im agination (in  
terms o f  mays) p lays, o f course, a  c e n tr a l  ro le  in  Indian philosophy, one 
o f  which the Indian th in k ers  a re  h ig h ly  aware (see Chapter E ight,
Vedanta). H egel's  manner o f s p l i t t i n g  the  su b jec t and i t s  o b jec ts  
n a tu ra lly  antagonizes Schopenhauer, who very  coheren tly  unfo lds the 
countless p r in c ip le s  o f our im agination  along the l in e s  o f c au sa lity . 
Indeed, Hegel i s  try in g  to  expose a  d e fic ien cy  o f the  Indian mi nd when 
he teaches th a t  " th is  separa tion  o f th e  su b jec t from th e  o b jec t and the
(22)o b jec ts  from each o th e r  does n o t e x is t  f o r  the Indian". Consequently,
a lso , " the  divine has n o t become in d iv id u a lized  in to  the su b jec t, in to  
concrete s p i r i t . . . .  There i s  no reason  in  th ese  th in g s  and no connecting 
co n tin u ity  o f cause and e f f e c t ,  j u s t  a s  th e re  would be no firm ness o f f r e e  
in d iv id u a lity , p e rso n a lity  and freedom". As we show below in  more 
d e ta i l ,  Schopenhauer somehow senses the  e s s e n tia l  co n tin u ity  in  Indian
n ev erth e less , we should recognize th a t  "H egel's  r e f le c t io n s  on the 
re la tio n sh ip  between system and h is to ry  o f  philosophy" a re , p o s itiv e ly  
o r  negatively , re lev an t f o r  the  herm eneutic foundations o f  contemporary 
"Comparative Philosophy".
(22)v '  Eegel, V o rl.I I . pp. 353-354.
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philosophy -  and promptly e x p lic a te s  i t  through h is  own Weltanschauung. 
(The problem o f  a sse ss in g  the c r i t e r i a  o f  an Indian category o f  
in d iv id u a lity  has been given some space, too , in  connection w ith 
Gebser s in te rp re ta t io n  o f the  Ind ian  p e rso n a lity , pp. 172-174.)
Regarding the re lig io u s  elem ent in  In d ia , Hegel wonders "how
a n a tio n  so d e f ic ie n t in  s p i r i tu a l  s u b s ta n t ia l i ty  can become aware o f  th e
(23)h ig h e s t being, o f the  t r u ly  su b s ta n tia l th in g " . From h is  p o in t o f
view, "nowhere on the h in d e r p lane can t h e i r  mind reach  a f ix e d  p o in t; 
a lth o u ^ i making the  attem pt i t  s tag g ers  back in to  i t s  f in i t e n e s s . . .  .In  
th is  s ta te  o f  staggering  the o th e r  extreme, namely th a t o f the  h ig h est 
ab s trac tio n , may be found sim ultaneously. Inasmuch as the  general i s  
something a b s tr a c t  the awareness o f the  s e l f  does no t f in d  a fre e  
re la tio n sh ip  to  i t ;  because only by knowing th a t  i t  i s  r e la te d  to  God, 
does i t  know th a t I t  i s  a lso  contained in  i t ,  thus being  f re e . However 
the  Indian consciousness can only r e la te  i t s e l f  to  God n eg a tiv e ly ; the  
complete d en ia l o f i t s e l f  must appear a s  the  h ig h est th in g  to  i t . . . .  
Assuming a negative  ch arac te r a t  th i s  p o in t o f culm ination i t  rep resen ts  
a d is a s te r ."  The p r in c ip le  o f d is a s te r  c o n s is ts , according to  Hegel, in  
the  pure a b s tra c tio n  o f the  brahman through which a l l  concreteness 
d isappears, which i s  " the  knowledge i t s e l f  in  i t s  u t t e r  em ptiness". 
P ra c tic a l ly , r is in g  to  th i s  "negation o f everything" means f o r  him to  
empty o n e 's  consciousness. In  H egel's  a n a ly s is  th i s  rep re sen ts  the 
type of freedom to which the in d iv id u a l s e l f  i s  r e s t r ic te d  on the  Indian 
le v e l . He comments on th i s  in te r e s t in g  psychological observation  only 
in  teams o f an "ab s tra c tio n  o f the  pure s e lf -d e n ia l"  o r  " th e  a n n ih ila tio n  
of the r e a l  self-aw areness", w ithout in d ic a tin g  any o f the  mechanisms 
which, from an Indian p o in t o f view, may underly  such change in  
consciousness (see P a r t l l ) .  Schopenhauer, who lo g ic a lly  ru le s  out 
such an abso lu te  nothingness, n ev e rth e le ss  shows us th e  s tru c tu re s  o f 
negation. In  h is  own philosophy o f  an imagined, but in t r in s ic a l ly  
su ffe rin g  world, he permanently advocates i t s  ra d ic a l negation , 
p resen ting  th e  m etaphysical p r in c ip le s  o f th i s  a c t  in  rev erse  by
(23)v Hegel, V o r l .I I . pp. 398, 396 , 402, 404.
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re v e a lin g  the  p a th  o f  c a u s a li ty  -  in  a  manner which the  an c ien t Ind ian s  
would have ap p rec ia ted , a s  he b e liev es .
We s h a l l  now expose the  most fundamental o f  th ese  p r in c ip le s  -  
such a s  the  w i l l ,  i l lu s io n ,  su ffe rin g , o r  negation  -  in  o rd e r to  show to  
which e x ten t they  may r e a l ly  p la y  a  ro le  in  Indian  philosophy. In  
a d d itio n , they  s h a l l  a lso  serve u s  as  reference  p o in ts  when we come to  
explore the  Ind ian  views o f our o th e r  c o n trib u to rs  to  pessim isn .
(2) The world a s  w il l  and im agination
In  h is  main work Schopenhauer expounds one thought, and only  one, a s  he
emphasizes. He wants to  make h i s  read e r understand th a t  th e  essence o f
th i s  world i s  w il l  and im agination. R ejec ting  an approach which would
simply proceed from a  more b a s ic  le v e l to  a  more s p e c if ic  one, he
d ec id es  to  c e n tra l iz e  th i s  thought and to  l e t  h is  view o f the  world
evolve around i t  in  such a manner th a t  each p a r t  should support the
o th e r p a r ts  in  v i r t u a l ly  any fe a s ib le  d ire c tio n . Ib is  c i r c u la r  form o f
h is  work r e f le c ts  th a t  the  w i l l 's  cycle o f connected m an ife sta tio n s
(24)means end less  s u ffe r in g  -  u n le ss  broken by negation . Schopenhauer
s t r i c t l y  denies th a t  he derived  any o f the  fundam entals o f  h is  own thought
from th e  Upanisads. R ather, these  "fragm entary rem arks", a s  he c a l l s
them, could be read  as i f  they  were concluding sta tem en ts  from h is  own,
more thoroughly s tru c tu re d  views (compare p . 1 0 ). "But i f  my re a d e r has
been b le ssed  by a  knowledge o f the  Vedas, the access to  which, a s  opened
up by th e  Upanisads, b e in g  in  my eyes, th e  g re a te s t  p r iv i le g e  which
d is tin g u ish e s  th i s  s t i l l  joung; cen tury  from th e  p rev ious ones",
Schopenhauer a s s e r ts  eag erly , "then he i s  e x c e lle n tly  w ell equipped
(25)to  h e a r what I  have to  say ."
"The world i s  my im ag ina tion ." Schopenhauer regards t h i s  
statem ent, a t  the time n o t unknown in  Europe and In d ia , a s  re le v an t to  
a l l  understand ing  (cognizing) c rea tu res , a lthough only man in  h is
Schopenhauer ( P .P .I I . p . 112, § 69) re v o lts  a g a in s t the  end less 
su ffe r in g  in  "m illio n s  o f  l iv in g  bu t frig h ten ed  and to r tu re d  c re a tu re s , 
a l l  only e x is t in g  f o r  a  w hile by e a tin g  one ano ther".
(25) Schopenhauer, W.W.I. p. 11.
re f le c t in g , a b s tra c tin g  cap ac ity , i . e .  a s  a  p h ilo sopher, can become 
aware o f  i t :  n o t he h im se lf p e rce iv es  the  surrounding  world, b u t only
h is  senses, according to  whose p ercep tio n  he then shapes h i s  own
(26)im agination. This i s ,  f o r  Schopenhauer, th e  most b a s ic  t ru th
(27)a  p r i o r i , a discovery f o r  which he p ra is e s  Kant, I t  s t a t e s  a l l
p o ss ib le  and im aginable experience i n  th e  most g en era l form, more 
general than according to  tim e, space o r  c a u sa lity . These forms o f 
experience a re  a l l  fe a tu re d  by a  d iv is io n  in to  o b je c t and su b jec t a s  
the  p re re q u is ite  f o r  any kind o f  im agination , a b s t r a c t  o r  in tu i t iv e ,  pu re  
o r  em pirical ( in  c o n tra s t to  H eg e l's  approach). F o r th e  p r in c ip a l 
d iscu ssio n  o f the world a s  im agination he a b s tr a c ts  from h is  o th e r  
e s s e n tia l  t ru th , the  world a s  w i l l .  He considers  any th i r d  type o f 
r e a l i ty ,  such as K an t's  th in g  as such in  the  ro le  o f  an o b je c t a s  such, 
a s  absurd, ihe world a s  im agination i s  c o n s ti tu te d  o f  two in tim a te ly  
connected, y e t  c le a r ly  d i f f e r e n t ia te d  h a lv es : th e  o b je c t, th e  form o f
which i s  time and space, th e re fo re  p lu r a l i ty ,  and th e  su b je c t, which 
e x is ts  whole and undivided in  every s in g le  in d iv id u a l and o u ts id e  o f 
space and time. Due to  the  in d iv is ib le  n a tu re  o f  th e  su b je c t th e  world 
a s  im agination would cease to  e x is t  i f  on ly  one s in g le  in d iv id u a l 
diappeared. (This suggestion has  been developed f u r th e r  in  M ainlander's  
s o l ip s i s t i c  outlook; see Chapter Three. )
Schopenhauer f e e ls  th a t  " the  ag e-o ld  wisdom o f  th e  Indians" 
supports h is  view o f  r e la t iv e  ex is ten ce : " I t  i s  maya. th e  v e i l  o f
deception, which, deludes th e  eyes o f th e  m o rta ls  and l e t s  them see
(26) Schopenhauer, W.W.I. p . 30; he g ives Bishop B erkeley f u l l  c r e d i t  
f o r  th e  e x p lic i t  statem ent o f  th i s  observation ; in  a d d itio n  he re f e r s  to  
W. Jones, "On th e  Philosophy o f  th e  A s ia t ic s " , in  A s ia tic  R esearches, 
vo l. IT , p . 164: "The fundamental te n e t o f  the  Vedanta school co n sis ted
n o t in  denying the ex istence  o f m a t t e r . . . ,  b u t in  contending th a t  i t  had 
no essence independent o f m ental p e rcep tio n ; th a t  ex isten ce  and 
p e rc e p t ib i l i ty  a re  co n v ertib le  term s."
(27) Schopenhauer, W. W. I , p . 32. Compare Kant (K ii t ik , pp. 2 0 -2 l) : "We
can a p r io r i  know about th in g s  only what we ou rse lv es  put in to  them."
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a world o f which one can n e i th e r  say th a t  i t  e x is t s  n o r th a t  i t  does 
n o t e x is t :  i t  resem bles the  dream, resembles the  r e f le c t io n  on the sand
which th e  d is ta n t  t r a v e l le r  takes f o r  w ater, o r  a lso  th e  thrown-away
(28)rope which he tak es  f o r  a  snake."
Our percep tion  i s  n o t ju s t  sensual, b u t a lso  in te l le c tu a l .
Our i n t e l l e c t  d e riv es  the  understanding o f  th e  cause from th e  percep tion  
o f  th e  e f f e c t ,  a  f a c t  which presupposes the  law o f  c a u s a li ty , the  
understand ing  o f  ch Schopenhauer considers a  p re re q u is i te  f o r  any 
mode o f  viewing, hence f o r  any s o r t  o f  experience. (He thus re fu te s  the  
p rev ious opposite  view th a t  th e  understanding o f th e  law o f  c a u sa lity  
depended on experience, i .  e. Hume" s scep tic ism .) The senses can m erely 
p ick  up c e r ta in  d a ta  and only when the  i n t e l l e c t  understands the  cause 
underly ing  th e  e f f e c t  does th e  world a r is e ,  spread in  space and changing 
in  tim e, u n ite d  by th e  i n t e l l e c t .  Since t h i s  world a s  im agination 
e x is ts  only through our i n t e l l e c t ,  i t  a lso  e x is ts  on ly  f o r  o u r in te l l e c t .  
The re a l  ex istence  o f  imaginable o b je c ts , i . e .  t h e i r  em pirical r e a l i ty ,  
i s  id e n tic a l  w ith t h e i r  a c tiv e  n a tu re  (Wirken) beyond which no th ing  can 
be cognized. But, since  a l l  c a u sa lity  i s  on ly  in  and f o r  the  i n te l l e c t ,  
th i s  r e a l  (v irk lic h ) , a c tin g  (wirkend) world cannot e x is t  w ithout i t .  
This a s  w ell a s  the  f a c t  th a t  the  o b jec t cannot be imagined w ithout the  
su b jec t l e t s  Schopenhauer deny any r e a l i ty  o f  th e  e x te r io r  world 
independent o f a su b jec t. F or him the  e n t i r e  world o f  o b je c ts  i s  and 
remains im agination and, th e re fo re , depends on the  su b jec t, o r ,  in  o th e r
(29)words, has transcenden tal id e a l i ty .
Thus, w ith  regard  to  t h i s  sp ecu la tive  approach the  question  
o f r e a l i t y  lo se s  i t s  a c tu a l s ig n ifican ce . But we a re  p resen ted  w ith an 
em pirical approach. ¥e have dreams. I s  n o t perhaps o u r whole l i f e  
a dream? The sh o rt dreams in  o u r l i f e  and the  lo n g  dream, l i f e  i t s e l f ,  
might e s s e n tia l ly  be the same th ing . Schopenhauer adm its th a t ,  l ik e  
P la to  o r  the Indian th in k e rs  when they r e f e r  to  maya. he f e e ls  th a t  
th e re  i s  an in tim ate  re la tio n sh ip  between l i f e  and dream.
( 2a)
Schopenhauer, V .V.I. pp. 54-47.
Cf. Kant (K ritik . pp. 387a-400a) on tran scen d en ta l id e a l i ty .
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Looking fu r th e r  in to  the  n a tu re  o f  decep tion , Schopenhauer 
asks h im self how the in t e l l e c t  (featuring- man and anim al) o r  reason 
( fe a tu r in g  man alone) can go wrong. J u s t  a s  reason , which should allow  
us to  see th e  tru th , can be deceived by e r ro r ,  so can th e  i n t e l l e c t ,  
which should allow  man o r  animal to  see r e a l i ty ,  be deceived by i l lu s io n .  
Such i l lu s io n  cooes about when th e  same e f f e c t  can be produced by two 
e n t i r e ly  d if f e r e n t  causes. The i n t e l l e c t  when l e f t  w ithout any 
d is t in g u is h in g  d a ta  on th ese  causes, a s  a  r u le  d ecides f o r  th e  more 
coraaon one. Schopenhauer u ses  th e  p o p u la r example o f  th e  re f ra c t io n  o f  
a  s t ic k  h e ld  i n  w ater. The i n t e l l e c t  w i l l  s tubborn ly  re fu se  to  see th e  
s t ic k  s t r a ig h t ,  and only  ou r reason  knows i t  i s .
In  ex p la in ing  h is  id ea  o f  " th e  world a s  w ill"  Schopenhauer
draws on Kant who had declared  th a t  tim e, space and c a u s a li ty  were n o t
(30)fe a tu re s  o f th e  th in g  as  such, b u t on ly  o f i t s  appearance. The
world a s  im agination, on which Schopenhauer's epistem ology i s  cen tred , 
as we saw, re p re se n ts  only  one s id e  o f th e  world, th e  o u te r  s id e . The 
in n e r  s id e , th e  m etaphysical essence o f th e  world, i s  th e  th in g  as such, 
which, according  to  i t s  most d i r e c t  m an ife s ta tio n , he c a l l s  " th e  w ill" . 
This w il l  i s  th e  knowledge a  p r io r i  o f th e  body (w hile th e  body could be 
c a lle d  th e  knowledge a  p o s te r io r i  o f th e  w i l l ) . W ill and a c tio n  a re  
only d i f f e r e n t  in  o u r th ink ing , a lthough, in  f a c t  they  a re  one. This 
id e n t i ty  o f w il l  and body has to  be moved from o u r d i r e c t  awareness o f  
i t ,  i . e . ,  from i t s  concrete  understand ing  (co g n itio n ) , in to  the  
knowledge o f our reasoning, i . e . ,  in to  sane a b s tr a c t  understand ing .
This w ill-body  id e n t i ty  cannot be proved; i t  has to  be experienced
(3 l)a t  a  p o in t where we cannot y e t  c le a r ly  d isce rn  su b jec t and o b jec t.
^  Schopenhauer, W.W.I, p . 61, 137-158, 202, 218; W.W.IX, p . 376. 
Compare Kant (K ritik . pp. 70, 78, 401a-406a) on space and tim e; he a lso  
says (p. 28) th a t  th e  la v  o f  c a u s a li ty  a p p lie s  f o r  th e  o b je c t only  as  
appearance, b u t n o t as  th in g  as  such, i . e . , th e  w i l l  cannot be f r e e  
w hen i t  appears in  v is ib le  a c tio n s , b u t on ly  qua th in g  a s  such.
(3 l) Weininger (g .u .C h ar.. p . 123) g ives a  d e ta i le d  ch a rac te ro lo g ica l 
d e sc rip tio n  o f  cond itions surrounding th i s  common experience, u s in g
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T his allow s u s  to  in te r p r e t  each singLe in d iv id u a l, and th u s  th e  whole 
w orld, a s  the o b je c t i f ic a t io n  o f  the  w ill .
Ihe w il l  a s  th e  th in g  a s  such has i t s e l f  no cause; on ly  i t s  
m an ife s ta tio n s  must fo llow  th e  law o f  c a u s a li ty .  The w il l  i t s e l f  i s  a lso  
f r e e  o f  p lu r a l i ty  o r  any a b s tra c tio n  o f  i t ,  b u t i t  should be seen a s  th e  
one th in g  which e x is ts  o u ts id e  time and space which in  tu rn  c o n s t i tu te  
th e  principium  in d iv id u a tio n is , i . e . ,  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  p lu r a l i ty ,  an 
which depends, in  a  Kantean sense, th e  whole phenomenon o f  th e  world.
Due to  i t s  cau se less  n a tu re  th e  w il l  has been considered  free*  From 
t h i s  i t  has been concluded -  b u t wrongly, a s  Schopenhauer p o in ts  ou t — 
th a t  i t s  m an ife sta tio n s , inc lud ing  human a c tio n s , should a lso  be f r e e . 
However, they a re  bound to  follow  sane cause, re g a rd le ss  o f  ou r personal 
awareness o f  ou r urncanifested fre e  w il l .  This le a d s , a s  Schopenhauer 
observes, to  a  p e c u lia r  human predicam ent: th e  f a c t  th a t  everybody th in k s
a  p r io r i  th a t  he i s  f r e e  in  a l l  h is  a c tio n s  and, hence, could change 
h im se lf a t  any in s ta n t .  Yet a  •p o s te rio ri, through experience, he re a l iz e s  
th a t  he must p u t up w ith  h is  own ch a rac te r  u n t i l  th e  end o f  h i s  l i f e  and 
th a t  he i s  fo rced  to  p la y  h is  ro le  to  th e  end*
Ihe w i l l ,  though i t  may f r e e ly  m an ifest i t s e l f  in  n a tu re , i s  
e s s e n t ia l ly  b lin d . Only in  th e  case o f th e  human being , where a  b ra in  
has been developed to g e th e r w ith th e  power o f  reason ing , does th e  world 
a r i s e  as  im agination. I t  suddenly p re sen ts  i t s  second s id e , w ith  a l l  
i t s  a sp ec ts : o b je c t, su b jec t, tim e, space, p lu r a l i ty ,  and c a u s a li ty . The 
w i l l ,  so f a r  b lin d , has now k ind led  i t s e l f  a  l i ^ i t ,  a s  Schopenhauer p u ts  
i t .  I b is  i s  why the cognizing su b jec t can -  and must — see th e  world 
a s  im agination. Hence, we a re  advised to  understand  th a t  th e  world 
throughout i s  w il l  and im agination to g e th e r. T his im agination, 
presupposing the o b jec t and th e  su b jec t, i s  th e re fo re  r e l a t iv e .  A fte r  
to t a l  a b s tra c tio n  from a l l  th ese  forms, only  th e  w il l ,  th e  th in g  a s  such, 
remains, ihe  w i l l  i t s e l f  does no t want any th ing , s in ce  causes and ends 
only e x is t  in  the  o b je c t if ie d  v o rld . F o r Schopenhauer man h im self i s
h is  concept o f the "henid" (d ie  Henide) to  d esig n a te  th e  sim plest 
psych ica l datum immediately before mental a n a ly s is  s e ts  in .
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e s s e n tia l ly  noth ing  b u t w ill  which s t r iv e s  en d less ly  and w ithout any 
aim. The in d iv id u a l w ill  may see a  purpose w ith  regard  to  here  and now, 
but never in  general. Ihe t o t a l i t y  o f w il l  i s  pu rposeless. Ihe  only 
self-knowledge o f the w ill  as a  whole i s  the im agination as a  whole, 
i . e . ,  the e n tire  o b je c tif ie d  world which m irro rs  and re v e a ls  i t .
This allow s u s  to  q u a lify  Schopenhauer's maya as a  p r in c ip le  
o f ind iv idua tion  which has a r e la t iv e ly  su b jec tiv e  fu n c tio n  w ith in  th e  
sphere o f c a u sa lity , as compared to  Vedantic maya which, sharin g  the 
u n iv e rsa l na tu re  o f the  brahman o r, a t  l e a s t ,  being  in tim a te ly  r e la te d  
w ith i t ,  appears as a  f a r  more o b jec tiv e  p r in c ip le  (compare pp. 271-274). 
Schopenhauer'’ s  maya stands between the  su b jec t and th e  o b je c t. Without 
maya there  i s  no such d iv is io n . I t  allow s, and even fo rce s , the  su b jec t 
to  see ihe o b jec t. On a u n iv e rsa l sca le  the  t o t a l i t y  o f Schopenhauer's 
world o f im agination m irrors the w il l ,  enables the w il l  to  see i t s e l f ,  
i . e .  to  produce i t s  own u n iv e rsa l self-know ledge. However, th i s  i s  n o t 
the w i l l 's  n a tu ra l immanent seeing  o f  i t s e l f  (which does n o t e x is t ) ,  b u t 
only a re la t iv e  and r e s t r ic te d  see ing  w ith in  the world o f o b je c t if ic a t io n s , 
something which happens on the le v e l which marks the  su b jec t-o b jec t 
d iv is io n .
Whenever i t  happens th a t  a  person i s  so engrossed in  h is
contem plation o f a c e r ta in  o b je c t th a t  he a c tu a lly  fo rg e ts  h im self (h is
own in d iv id u a l w il l) ,  and th a t  he only remains aware o f the  o b je c t, then
the  two have, so to speak, merged in to  one, says Schopenhauer. Through
such an experience the th in k e r r e a l iz e s  th a t  the world and a l l  o b jec tiv e
ex istence  r e s t  on him alone and completely depend on him. He draws
n a tu re  in to  h im self a s  i f  i t  were an accessory  o f h i s  own being.
Schopenhauer fin d s  th is  f a c t  ap p ro p ria te ly  expressed in  th e  Oupnek'hat
where i t  says: Hae omnes c rea tu rae  in  to turn ego sum, e t  p ra e te r  me
a liu d  ens non e s t .  (A ll these c re a tu re s  to g e th e r am I ,  and b e s id e s  me
th e re  i s  no o th e r  b e in g .) Asking us to  look a t  o u r own s u ffe r in g  a s
a c tu a lly  rep re sen ta tiv e  o f the f a te  o f  mankind, he adds a  s im ila r
quota tion , now ra th e r  popular, which, he draws d i r e c t ly  from the
(32)Upanisads: Tat tvam a s i . (That a r t  thou .)m
(32)' Schopenhauer, W.W.I. pp. 232-235, 265, 280 , 442.
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Wherever th e re  occurs s u ffe r in g  in  th i s  world, reach ing  i t s
most t e r r i b l e  stage in  the s u ffe r in g  o f  humanity, we w itness the
m an ife sta tio n  and in n e r c o n f l ic t  o f  one s in g le  b lin d  w il l .  In  th e  case
o f some ra re  in d iv id u a ls  th is  su ffe r in g  may he lp  to  reach a  p o in t o f
i n s i s t  where the  mere appearance o f  the  world, the v e i l  o f  maya. a s
Schopenhauer l ik e s  to  r e f e r  to  i t ,  lo se s  i t s  deceptive power. With
th e i r  understanding o f the principium  in d iv id u a tio n is  t h e i r  egoism 
(3 3 )
d ie s . This achievement in  tu rn  has a q u ie tin g  e f f e c t  on the w il l .
I t  b rin g s  about res ig n a tio n , i . e . ,  th e  r e je c t io n  o f l i f e ,  and e sp e c ia lly
th e  re je c t io n  o f the e n tire  w il l  to  l iv e .  Schopenhauer b e liev es  th a t  in
th e  case o f  most people the  d e lib e ra te  d e s tru c tio n  o f  the  w il l  could
only be promoted through su ffe r in g  (fu n c tio n in g  so to  speak as  some
epistem ological fo rce ). S im ila rly , someone who may have a lread y
accomplished the negation o f  the  w il l  would most l ik e ly  r e s o r t  to
asce tic ism  in  o rder to  m aintain the  achieved s ta t e ,  s ince  negation  does
n o t n e c e s sa r ily  coincide w ith death . Schopenhauer i l l u s t r a t e s  th i s  view
by using the famous analogy o f the p otters wheel which continues spinning
(35)f o r  a w hile a f t e r  the completion o f the  product. Again, the
Oupnek'hat appears to  sum i t  a l l  up in  one lin e s  Tempore q u o  cogn itio  
simul ad ven it. amor e medio su p e rsu rrex it. (At the  time when knowledge 
a rr iv e d , d e s ire  sim ultaneously l e f t  th e  body.) Schopenhauer u ses  th is  
quo ta tion  to  in troduce the fo u r th  and l a s t  p a r t  o f h is  main work, in  
which he draws the e th ic a l consequences.
W ill a s  m irrored by l i f e  cannot be separated  from i t .  As long  
a s  th e re  i s  any w il l  to  l iv e  in  u s , we may be assured  o f our ex istence 
reg a rd le ss  o f  death. Hence su ic id e  b rin g s  no s a lv a tio n : everyone must
(33) Schopenhauer's awareness o f th is  egoisn which su ffe r in g  purges 
(w .v .i. pp. 318-319) and death  punishes (W.W.II, p . 594) i s  ab so lu te ly  
m etaphysical.
^  Schopenhauer, W.V.I. pp. 484-485.
(35) Schopenhauer, W.W.I. p. 473; h is  sources are Colebrooke, "On the 
philosophy o f the Hindus", and the "Sankhya Carica by Horace Wilson".
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e x is t  in  accordance with h is  innerm ost w ill .  The in d iv id u a l can be
destroyed, however, h is  w ill  to  l iv e  cannot. Schopenhauer sees th i s
s u ita b ly  symbolized by the  Indian tr im u r ti  Siva, Visnu and Brahma, which
•  •
he in te rp re ts  a s  the d e s tru c tiv e , p re se rv a tiv e , and c re a tiv e  asp ec ts
o f the  same w ill in  man. We may ju s t  a s  w ell say th a t n a tu re  c o u ln 't
care  le s s  fo r  the  l i f e  and death o f the in d iv id u a l. Schopenhauer f e e ls
th a t th is  i s  the message which he shares w ith the Bhagavadgita, a s
phrased in  the dialogue between Krsna and Arjuna. Moreover, a  naive and
# • •
simple man l ik e  Arjuna, someone who o r ig in a lly  has a p o s it iv e  outlook 
on the  world, who has not fu l ly  re a liz e d  th a t  the  predominant s ide  o f 
l i f e  i s  su ffe rin g  and who has no t y e t been de terred  by i t ,  may be 
comforted by lea rn in g  th a t any f e a r  o f death i s  paradoxical. He could 
calmly face  death once he has le a rn t  th a t  i t  can never a f f e c t  l i f e ,  the  
very form of the w il l  to l iv e . He then knows th a t the p resen t always i s  
and th a t death i s  only a  product o f maya.
Ihe opposite , the negation  o f the w ill ,  must fo llow  when
understanding begins to  q u ie t the  w il l  u n t i l  even tually  th e  w il l  negates
i t s e l f .  The in d iv id u a l, him self only a  m anifestation  o f  the  w il l ,  cannot
determine such a development. However, a  c e r ta in  su b jec tiv e  approach as
he n o tic e s  in  the case o f the yogin (compare pp. 290-291) would be
(57)accep tab le . Ihe se lf-n eg a tio n  o f th e  w ill depends on an in n e r
understanding which comes about a r b i t r a r i ly .  I t  cannot be d i r e c t ly  
enforced, although i t  can be obviously in fluenced  because i t  r e f le c t s  the  
inneim ost re la tio n  between a p e rso n 's  understanding and h i s  w ill .  No 
m ethodical egoism, a  response to  motives, could ever r e s u l t  in  th i s  
understanding. Schopenhauer here p re sen ts  the  only d i r e c t  expression o f 
the freedom o f  w ill ,  which he l ib e r a l ly  equates w ith what th e  C h ris tia n  
m ystics c a l l  the  s ta te  of grace (compare p. 168(19) ) .  He suggests th a t  
we may av a il ourselves o f the p h ilo soph ical approach a s  the  b e s t  p o ss ib le  
way to  understand a t  le a s t  the p o s itio n  o f  someone who in  the  most d ire c t  
and in tim a te  form re a l iz e s  th a t a l l  l i f e  i s  su ffe rin g . I t  i s  th e  way o f 
the  s a in t  and a sc e tic  which i s  s ig n if ic a n tly  determined by an inner,
^  J Schopenhauer, V.V.I. pp. 547-560 (§ 54), 495, 555. 
w  '  Schopenhauer, P .P .K . pp. 441-442 (§ 189).
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d ir e c t  and in tu i t iv e  k ind  o f  understanding; But on a very general
le v e l , everybody has an in tu i t iv e ,  in  o th e r  words concrete , manner in
which he  i s  aware o f  a l l  ph ilo so p h ica l t ru th . This i s  why Schopenhauer
d ec la re s  i t  the sp ec ia l (and e s s e n t ia l ly  the  only) ta sk  o f  the
ph ilosopher to  tu rn  u n d if fe re n tia te d  and p o te n t ia l ly  m ystica l in s ig h ts
(38)in to  the  a b s tr a c t  knowledge o f  reasoning.
Schopenhauer, who compares h im self to  P la to  who attem pted to
understand "the  one in  th e  may and the  many in  the one", describes h is
own p h ilo so p h ica l ta sk  a s  a  s t r i c t l y  th e o re tic a l  one: a s  a  profound
m irro ring , in  a b s tr a c t  concepts, o f  the  world, th a t  i s ,  every th ing  th a t
e x is ts  i n  m an's consciousness. Without any h is to r ic a l  concern o r
c u ltu ra l  d if f e r e n t ia t io n ,  he c o n tra s ts  h is  own th e o re tic a l  approach,
which proceeds by a b s tra c tin g  fro *  l i f e ,  w ith  th a t  o f (se lf-exem plify ing)
p ra c t ic a l  reason ing  a s  he finds i t  dem onstrated, in  i t s  h ig h e s t form, by
the S to ic  sage: the  S to ic  e th ic  p rim arily  aims a t  happiness through
equanim ity and m ental peace ( oCTc< uoc) which allow s a person to
remain p ra c t ic a l ly  detached from joy and p a in . However, v ir tu e  i s  only
tre a te d  as  a  means and n o t as an end in  i t s e l f .  Schopenhauer accep ts
the  S to ic  e th ic  as an honourable, perhaps r e la t iv e ly  successfu l, attem pt
to  use reasoning  in  o rd er to  l i f t  man above the  su ffe r in g  which pervades
a l l  l i f e .  But u ltim a te ly  he f in d s  the  eudem onistic am bition o f wanting
to  l iv e  w ithout su ffe rin g  s e lf -c o n s tra d ic to ry . He sees th e  S to ic  in
a ph ilo so p h ical cu l-d e -sac  and, in  c o n tra s t w ith  the Indian  th in k e rs , in
ignorance o f the deeper meaning o f  su ffe rin g . In  h is  opinion Stoicism
i s  fundam entally opposed to  th e  teach ings o f the  Vedas, P la to ,
C h ris tia n ity  and Kant. He f e e ls  much more im pressed by the  s a in t ly
a sc e tic  world conqueror as he fe a tu re s  in  Indian  o r  C h ris tia n  th o u ^ it,
because here h ig h est v ir tu e  and s a in t l in e s s  appear in  the  s ta te  o f
(39)h ig h est su ffe rin g .
G ranting u s , a t  b e s t ,  no more than a  choice between physica l 
and m ental su ffe rin g , Schopenhauer w rite s : "Thus, i t  i s  obvious th a t ,
^  Schopenhauer, W.W.I. pp. 519, 385-389, 470-474, 499-502.
Schopenhauer, W.W.I. pp. 124, 128-134.
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f a l l i n g ,  the  l i v in g  o f  ou r hody i s  only  a  c o n tin u a lly  p rev en ted  dying,
a co n stan tly  postponed death : and, f in a l ly ,  in  the  same manner the
(40)a c t iv i ty  o f our mind ±s  a  co n tin u a lly  delayed boredom." The world,
in  h is  eyes a  g rea t tragedy and comedy, i s  staged  by the  w il l  a t  i t s
own expense, and the w ill  i s  a lso  i t s  own sp ec ta to r . J u s t ly ,  the  w il l ,
in  response to  which a l l  su ffe rin g  e x is t s ,  has a lso  to  b ea r th i s  suffering:
u ltim a te ly . Hence, p ra c t ic a l ly , the to r tu r e r  who to r tu re s  o th e rs
(4 l)a c tu a lly  to r tu re s  h im self.
Schopenhauer considers h is  v o lu n ta r is t  conception o f u ltim a te  
in n e r id e n t i ty  in  p e rfe c t agreement w ith  " th e  f r u i t  o f th e  h ig h est human
knowledge and wisdom” which he f e e ls  h i s  cen tu ry  has given to  him in  the
(42)form o f th e  Upanisads* But he adm its th a t  only  the  few who can tru ly , 
no t ju s t  th e o re tic a lly , r e la te  them selves to  o th e r  beings in  the sense 
of the  word t a t  tvam a s i  a re  on th e i r  way to  l ib e ra t io n .  ? o r  the common 
minds in  Ind ia , th is  e n tire  knowledge had to  be vested in  m ythical form 
a s  metempsychosis, o r transm igration  o f  so u ls. He understands th a t  the 
p r in c ip le  o f reward according to  th is  d o c trin e  o f re in carn a tio n  can only 
be expressed in  negative term s: Hon adsumes iterum  existen tiam  
gpparentem. (You w ill  no t assume any apparent ex istence  again . Compare 
Chandogya Upanisad 8 .15, p. 199.) Although Schopenhauer's le v e l o f  
in do log ica l inform ation i s  r e la t iv e ly  higfr, he i s  n o t y e t in  a  p o s itio n  
to  make a p r in c ip a l d is t in c t io n  between Brahmaniga and Buddhism.
Accepting th a t  l ib e ra tio n , in  p o s itiv e  term s, may be described  a s  
a  reunion with Brahma, he tak es  th e  same conception when re fe rre d  to  
n eg a tiv e ly  f o r  n irvana , i . e .  "a s ta te  where fo u r  th in g s  do n o t e x is t :  
b i r th ,  o ld  age, d isease  and death". C arefu lly , he e x p lic a te s  the  
lo g ic a l in a c c e s s ib i l i ty  o f th i s  Indian conception o f  "nothingness"
(ag a in st which Hegel had inveighed so d r a s t ic a l ly ) .  No abso lu te  no th ing  
(n ih i l  negativum). he says, could ever be imagined; w ith in  a  broader 
view i t  must remain a  r e la t iv e  no th ing  ( n ih i l  p rivativum ). So-called  
nothingness, he consoles u s , only looks f r ig h te n in g  in  re sp ec t to  our
(40) Schopenhauer, W.W.I. pp. 389-390.
(41) Schopenhauer, W.W.I. pp. 413, 445 , 487.
(42) Schopenhauer, W.W.I. pp. 442-443.
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h a b itu a l s ta te  o f being d is t in c t ly  surrounded by something, and a s  long
as  we a re  n o t " th e re ” . Schopenhauer considers h is  own view to  be
no tab ly  in  accordance with "the  e so te r ic  d oc trine"  o f Buddhign " teach ing
not metempsychosis bu t some p e c u lia r  p a lin g en es is  ( re -o r ig in a tio n )  on 
(45)a moral b a s is " . he d escribes i t  a s  " d is in te g ra tio n  and new form ation
o f the ind iv idua l w ith  only h is  w ill p e rs is t in g , which, in  assuming th e
shape o f  a new c rea tu re , rece ives a  new in te l l e c t " .  U iis  i s  th e  id ea ,
he f e e ls ,  when t r a d i t io n  l e t s  the  Buddha say: "My d is c ip le s  r e je c t  th e
thought th a t  I  am th is  and th i s  i s  mine" (compare p. 2 3 l ) . ^ ^  He
argues th a t  o u r em pirical consciousness ten d s  to  be overooncemed w ith
(45)the lo s s  o f in d iv id u a lity , which i s  no tru e  lo s s .  We a re  merely
deceived by too narrow a  pe rsp ec tiv e . From a  m etaphysical p o in t o f  view 
we may see th a t  th e  fo llow ing  two sentences mean b a s ic a lly  th e  same 
th ing : " I d isappear, bu t the world goes on" and " th e  world d isappears,
b u t I  go on". Death provides the  g re a t o p p ortun ity  to  r i d  ou rse lves
o f ou r "ego", o u r in d iv id u a lity . During o u r l i f e  th e  w il l  i s  un free , 
s ince i t  has to  fo llow  our e s ta b lish e d  c h a rac te r  accord ing  to  a  sp e c if ic  
chain o f  m otives. This r e s t r ic t io n  ends when death  comes: th e  w il l
becomes f r e e  again . Freedom i s  in  being (e sse ) , n o t in  doing (o p e ra ri). 
I t  i s  to  th is  e f fe c t  th a t  Schopenhauer f e e ls  advised by Windischmann's 
L a tin  speaking Sankara: "F in d itu r  nodus co rd is , d isso lv u n tu r omnes
d u b ita tio n es . e.iusque opera evanescunt. v iso  supremo i l l o . " (Having 
seen th a t  h ig h est th ing , the knot o f  h is  h e a r t  i s  d isen tang led , a l l  h i s
^  Schopenhauer, W.W.II. pp. 589-590* P .P .I I ,  pp. 299-300. 
Metempsychosis and pa lin g en esis  re sp ec tiv e ly  a re  Schopenhauer* e c r i t e r i a  
fo r  "exo teric"  gnd "eso te ric "  Buddhism: the concept o f " e s o te r ic
Buddhism" l a t e r  p lay s  a decisive  ro le  in  Mai n lander (c f . pp. 94, 96).
(44) Schopenhauer, W.W.II, p. 718.
(45) When an Tnri-ian th in k e r such as Badhakrishnan g en era lly  a s s e r ts  th a t  
" i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  i t  i s  the f a ls e  in d iv id u a li ty  th a t  d isappears w hile th e  
tru e  one rem ains", he u ltim a te ly  u ses  a  non-European category of 
id e n ti ty  ( p h i l . I .  p. 449).
Schopenhauer, W.W.II, pp. 594-596.
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doubts a re  d isso lved , and h is  works vanish . Compare pp. 265-266.}
(5 ) The cfaaracterological ro o ts  o f Schopenhauer's meta-physical p e ss iad a i
We have now to  decide whether In d ia  served Schopenhauer as a  general 
ground o f departu re , o r  whether he received  c e r ta in  i n i t i a l  impulses from 
th e re , o r  i f ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  he only  used Indian philosophy as  an instrum ent 
f o r  streng then ing  and "proving" h is  own te n e ts . Our exposition  has, so 
f a r ,  shown th a t h is  p re d ile c tio n  f o r  Indian concepts and ideas func tions 
as  a  d i s t in c t  in te g ra l  fo rce  o f h is  v iv id , ap o d ic tic  s ty le . But the  
deceptive ease w ith which he arranges h is  support by Ind ian  th in k ers  
proves l i t t l e  regarding the e s s e n tia l  s ta r t in g -p o in t o f h is  pessimism. 
A fte r a l l ,  had no t Hegel, sh o rtly  b e fo re  him, dem onstrated an e n tir e ly  
reversed approach? H egel's  u n i l in e a r  o p tim is tic  h is to r ic a l  outlook 
wanted and requ ired  In d ia  as a  neg a tiv e  p re re q u is ite . Now, Schopenhauer' e 
p ess im is tic  enthusiasm ex to ls  Ind ian  thought a s  a  p o s itiv e  confirm ation, 
i f  no t source, o f tru th  detached from time.
I f  we c la s s ify  our th in k e rs  in  th ree  ca te g o rie s , we could say 
th a t  f o r  some, such as Kant, h i s to r i c i ty  does n o t f ig u re  as  a  d ec is iv e  
p a r t  o f th e i r  philosophizing , while o th e rs , l ik e  Hegel, rep resen t the 
type o f the  h i s to r i c i s t  o a r  exce llence . F ich te , too , i s  veiy
h i s t o r i c a l , b u t  no t a ph ilosopher o f  h is to ry , u n lik e  Hegel (and Marx),
the  c u l tu r i s t  Spengler, and, in  a c u l tu ra l ly  even more "applied" manner, 
Gebser. Unlike a l l  o f  them, Schopenhauer p re sen ts  h im self a s  the  
p ro to type o f the a n t i - h i s to r i c i s t .  His re je c tio n  o f h is to ry  may have 
been one o f  the  fa c to rs  which le d  him to  h is  Tndian m a te ria l. Like o th e r
European philosophers, e sp e c ia lly  Hegel, he fo rg e ts  th a t  In d ia  rep resen ts
a t r a d i t io n  o f  i t s  own. But while Hegel s tr in g s  In d ia  up in  h is  
d ia le c t ic a l  p ro jec tio n  o f p rogress l ik e  some homogeneous i r r a t io n a l  
event, Schopenhauer t r e a t s  i t  as  is o la te d  in  time and a s  a  p ra c t ic a l  
source o f knowledge, f r e e  to become an a l ly  in  h is  an ti-H egelian , 
n o n -h is to r ic a l view o f  tim e, where time i s  a  physiognomical asp ec t o f
(47)
Schopenhauer, W.W.II. p. 711.
(48) Cf. ,  e .g . ,  F ich te , C o tt. pp. 28-32, "On our b e l ie f  in  an e te rn a l 
con tinua tion".
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tlie v i l l .  (ih e  question o f th e  s t ru c tu ra l  form o f  tim e never moves 
Hegel much; he ra th e r  ranks time as  some n a tu ra l  cond ition  comparable, 
perhaps, to  the  given geographical connectedness o f Europe and In d ia .)  
Schopenhauer op ts  p r in c ip a lly  f o r  a  more ta n g ib le  approach to 
m etaphysics, by opera ting  as a c h a rac te ro lo g is t and physiognomist. 
S ub jec tive ly , Hegel tak es  the time f a c to r  in  h is to ry  f o r  g ranted , while 
o b je c tiv e ly , Schopenhauer a lso  i s  h is to r ic a l ly  o rie n te d , as h is  reac tio n s  
to  h is  predecessors and h is  a n tic ip a tio n  o f  h is  own fo llow ers in d ica te . 
S ub jec tive ly , Schopenhauer t r e a ts  time as an i l lu s io n ,  i . e . ,  as 
an em pirical segment in  the ramified, m an ife sta tio n  o f  the v i l l .  He 
u ses  no d e ta i le d  s tra teg y  ag a in s t Hegel, b u t he c o n s is te n tly  accuses 
h i s  p o pu lar colleague o f ph ilo soph ical m eaninglessness o r  em ptiness.
Again we recognize a  re v e rsa l. Schopenhauer re a c ts , perhaps 
d e lib e ra te ly , to  Hegel" s  conception o f an Ind ian  w il l  which 
p re c ip i ta te s  phantasy and im agination in to  th e  d is a s te r  o f  " u t te r  
emptiness" whereas Europe has been p r iv ile g e d  to  enjoy the stage o f 
ordered reason.
F or Schopenhauer th e re  can be only one w ill ,  a b lin d  w il l  which
f r e e ly  m an ifests  i t s e l f  in  the em pirical world. But th e re  i t  b inds
i t s e l f  in  p e rp e tu a l s e l f - c o n f l ic t  and su ffe rin g , in  n a tu re , in  socie ty ,
in  in d iv id u a ls . Everything th a t  man, su ffe rin g , sees and f e e ls  -  from
(49)sexual de lusion  to  in te l le c tu a l  deception -  marks the  physiognomy 
o f  our world, th a t  i s  to  say, the world as  Schopenhauer sees i t ,  the 
sp ec tac le  which involves him and to which he i s  so ra d ic a l ly  and so
Schopenhauer (P .P .I I . p. 673, § 369) says th a t  a l l  female beauty -  
sh o rtliv e d , and designed by natu re  as  some decep tive  coup de th e a tre  -  
e x is ts  only  in  the male sexual d riv e ; i . e . ,  he e th ic a l ly  disapproves o f 
the  su b jec t-o b jec t dichotomy u nderly ing  im agination (c f. pp. 233-234, the 
Buddha" s warning o f  h is  monks to  co n tro l t h e i r  psychological responses 
to  th e  appearance o f the  courtesan). Otto W eininger (G .u.C har.. p. 298) 
observes a  complementary re la tio n sh ip  between the ch ild -denying  
courtesan and the genius, determined by the  p r in c ip le  o f  negation  (a lso  
see below, p. 92( l l ) ) .
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perso n ally  opposed, h is  se lf-de term ined  d e s tin y  from, which only negation 
can absolve him.
In  p r in c ip le  Schopenhauer makes no d iffe ren ce  between 
Brahmani gq and Buddhign. However, on account of th e  Oupnek' h a t he 
begins to  p re sen t h is  own fundamental conception o f  the w ill  in  the 
l i ^ i t  o f the  brahman. U nfortunate ly , th e re  i s  no Indian  equ ivalen t.
We s h a ll  dhow th a t  th is  c e n tra l U panisadie id e a  d id  n o t in fluence  the 
essence o f  h is  philosophy a t  a l l .  B esides, the  U panisadic abso lu te  
would never have f i t t e d  in to  h is  outlook. H is m isapprehension, which
(50)eluded in d o lo g ica l s c ru tin y  a t  th e  time and which he passed on to  
h is  fo llow ers, o u ^ it to  appear understandab le  from a modem comparative 
p o in t o f view such as our own m eta-position .
Both the brahman, o r  atman. and th e  w il l  func tion  as the 
fundamental p r in c ip le  o f a l l  and every being . But, Schopenhauer's w ill  
i s  b lin d , whereas the brahman i s  th e  only th in g  which i s  no t b lin d . 
(Brahma vidya o r  .inana means abso lu te  and undeluded seein g. Compare 
p. 264*) The brahman and the w il l  a re  r e a l  and they  a re  f r e e , (ihe  
•’freedom o f w ill" , u su a lly  p resen ted  as a  p e rs o n a lis t ic  problem, i s  
d is t in c t ly  European; i t  i s  in h e ren t and considered obvious in  Indian 
ph ilosophy .) Each, th e  brahman-atman and th e  w il l ,  c o n s ti tu te s  
a prim ord ial category around which, no t w ith in  which, everything happens. 
Hegel, whose id e a l i s  fe a tu re le s s ,  would have despised and re jec ted  such 
"dualism ". Schopenhauer, in  tu rn , opposes h i s  w ill  as an e n tire ly  
co n ten tle ss  power (im ag ination!) ag a in s t e x a c tly  th a t  aspect o f cu ltu re  
which, accep ts and j u s t i f i e s  the r e a l i t y  o f su ffe r in g  on the assumption 
o f some id e a l content, which p h ilo so p h ica lly  Hegel (but a lso  F ich te^ * ^
Max M uller (Ved.. p. 69) :  "These id eas  a re  p e r fe c t ly  fa m ilia r  to
the au thors o f the  Upani sh ad s ." L a te r  th in k e rs  such as Spengler and 
Gebser use t h e i r  own equations and p a ra lle lism s .
( 51) Cf. F ich te  (S e l . . p. 6l ) :  "The reason f o r  a l l  the su ffe rin g  o f
human beings i s  th e i r  d is t r a c t io n  by what i s  m u ltifa r io u s  and changeable; 
the so le  and abso lu te  cond ition  o f the l i f e  o f  b l i s s  i s  the re a liz a tio n  
of the  One and E te rn a l."
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and the o th e r previous German id e a l i s t s )  rep re sen ts  to  him. Gebser, 
in  comparison, re a c ts  very gen tly  to  Hegel (d isparag ing  h is  dualism) 
by c a ll in g  fo r  an " in teg ra tio n "  o f o ld e r  (in c lu d in g  Indian) le v e ls  o f
(52)consciousness (compare pp. 151, 158, 170). Schopenhauer's v i l l ,
combining d if fe re n t "outer" fe a tu re s , f ig u re s  as  h is  e s s e n tia l  
e n ti ty  w ith some kind o f negative condition . Ihe source o f i t s  
n e g a tiv ity  sh a ll be explained below, in  connection w ith the  p r in c ip le  
o f ind iv iduation . Besides, o n to lo g ic a lly , the  w ill  and the  negation  o f 
the w ill  do no t c o n s ti tu te  any p o la r i ty .  To Gebser th is  conception o f 
negation s ig n a ls  a  " lev e l o f d e fic ien cy " . But he sees a  s ig n if ic a n t 
p o la r ity  between the  fre e  w ill  and the  in d iv id u a l w ill  (compare h is  
"death pole", p. 164). The w il l  in  Schopenhauer i s  — r e la t iv e ly  -  bad, 
but fundamental. As compared, to  the  atman i t  may be seen as  some 
a n t i - e n t i ty  which a lso  im plies e n ti ty . I f  we designate  the  atman a s  
p o s itiv e , the w ill would rank a s  neg ativ e , o r , more p ragm atically , a s  
an e n ti ty  which e x is ts  but has to  be negated.
Regarding the second aspec t o f th e  w il l ,  i . e . ,  the need to  
negate i t ,  we make the im portant observation  th a t  in  Buddhism th ere  
e x is ts  a sub tle  undertone of negation  p a ra l le l in g  in  some way th a t  in  
Schopenhauer' 3 thought. Namely, the Buddhist a t t i tu d e  towards the  idea  
o f th e  atman i s  somewhat ambiguous: b a s ic a lly  Buddhism does no t
recognize any such e n ti ty . But then, a noteworthy ad d itio n  to  th is  
statem ent i s  made which says th a t  the id ea  of the  atman i s  bad (compare 
pp. 59, 229(36), 231, 240, 254(73)). In  the  Upanisads i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  d is tin g u ish  what i s  a  pu re ly  m etaphysical e n t i ty  (atman) 
from what i s  only an id ea  th e reo f; in  o th e r  words, id ea  and th in g  a re  
the  same. In  Buddhism, however, the  th in g  and th e  thought o f  the  th in g  
a re  separated.
This allow s u s  to  compare the  w i l l  and th e  atman (a) in  t h e i r  
semantic function  and (b) in  th e i r  pragm atic func tion . Schopenhauer 
says: (a) the w ill  i s  re a l  and (b) i t  h as  to  be denied. Buddhism says:
(a) the atnan does n o t e x is t  b u t (b) th e  id ea  th e reo f i s  bad. Buddhign
(52)J Gebser, U.G.. p . 50.
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reftLses to  d isc u ss  an atman: th e re  i s  no such s ta t e  o f consciousness
a s  "I”. F or Schopenhauer the w il l  i s  r e a l .  Hence we may say th a t  in  
p r in c ip le  the pragm atic a t t i tu d e s  in  Buddhism (w ith regard  to  the  atman) 
and in  Schopenhauer's thought (w ith regard  to  the  v i l l )  a re  veiy  s im ila r. 
We could go fu r th e r  and say th a t  h is  thought i s  p a ra l le le d  hy th e  an c ien t 
Ind ian  ph ilo so p h ica l a t t i tu d e  in  general. More p re c ise ly , on the  
pragm atic le v e l  the  w ill i s  tre a te d  in  a  negative  sense, the atman in  
a p o s it iv e  sense, ( in te n tio n a li ty  may be im plied in  Buddhisn, b u t n o t 
a  negative  on to log ica l category. Compare pp. 237; 238-245.) This 
shows th a t  here metaphysics and ph ilo soph ical pragmatism meet, an 
approach Hegel would have re je c te d . Only i f  we remain an the 
m etaphysical le v e l  can we say th a t  one can be v i l l .  P h ilo soph ica l 
pragmatism, however, must ab o lish  th i s  view. Ihe e s s e n t ia l  element o f 
Schopenhauer's thought happens to  r e f l e c t  the  Indian manner o f  pass in g  
from the le v e l  o f metaphysics to  the le v e l  o f pragmatism and v ice  versa.
Schopenhauer s pragmatism stands on ch a rac te ro lo g ica l grounds.
Ihe p l a s t i c i t y  o f  h is  m etaphysical expression r e f le c ts  the physiognomy o f
(53)h i s  n a tu ra l  and c u ltu ra l environment. In  a  sense, Schopenhauer
"decided1* to  become p essim istic , re a c tin g  d e lib e ra te ly  to  c u ltu re  the 
way he d id , n o t a s  an im perative p h ilo soph ical conclusion. In  o th e r  
words, h is  characterology opera tes (m orally and a e s th e t ic a l ly )  w ith 
c u ltu ra l  va lues. -And the p r in c ip a l ax io lo g ica l s t a b i l i z e r  f o r  h is  
c u l tu ra l  re a c tio n  and outlook i s  h is  conception o f  the w il l  (w hile h is  
c h a rac te ro lo g ica l s ta b i l iz e r ,  as we s h a ll  see below, i s  maya) .  The 
em pirica l pragma tig n  o f  Buddhism generates an a -c u ltu ra l  psychology w ith  
the  Buddha a s  i t s  main exem plifier. Schopenhauer's c u l tu ra l  re a c tio n , 
h i s  pragmatism, feeds h is  m etaphysical pessimism; i t  c a l l s  f o r  change 
on th e  b a s is  o f  on to log ica l negation . He advocates negation  as  some 
s o r t  o f m etaphysical therapy (to  do away w ith the  p reposterous e v il  th a t  
ensues from the  s tru c tu re  o f th is  w orld), n o t as an o r ie n ta t io n  po in t
( 53) S tem  (s tu d ie s , pp. 159-166) s t re s s e s  the fu n c tio n a l ro le  o f the 
a e s th e t ic  mode in  Schopenhauer who uses  h is  p h ilo so p h ica lly  " tra n sf ix e d  
experience" o f  th is  world as an o p era tio n a l p a r a l le l  to  the  s a i n t 's  
exem plifica tion  o f a pess im istic  answer to  l i f e .
f o r  some propaedeutic  psychology a s  in  Buddhism (which p ro fesses  an 
a t t i tu d e  of change w ithout any such m etaphysical grudge). He wants to  
solve a l l  problems by negating  the  w il l ,  whereas Buddhisn simply wants 
to e f fe c t  a stop in  the  production o f such cond itions as lead  to  
su ffe rin g  (see pp. 226-227). Sankara 's Advaita Vedanta advocates 
a  psycho log ica lly  s im ila r  a t t i tu d e  by assuming th a t  transparence, through 
the  r ig h t kind o f knowledge (vidya. .jnana) , must lead  to  some kind of 
immunity ag a in s t the  delu sions o f the  world. Schopenhauer's 
unpsycho lo g ic a l r e s t r ic t io n  to  a  m etaphysical so lu tio n  i s  p a r t  o f the 
c u ltu ra l  pessimism im plied in  h is  e th ic a l  pessimism. ‘Ihe o th e r p a r t  i s  
rooted in  h is  r e s t r ic te d  c u ltu re  awareness. U ieie i s  a  d is t in c t  element 
o f  c u ltu ra l  in fluence  in  Schopenhauer's re a c tio n , b u t since  he i s  no t 
aware o f h is  c u ltu ra l  involvement, th a t  i s ,  o f the ro le  which cu ltu re  
p lay s  in  h is  re a c tio n , he d isreg ard s  any p ra c t ic a l  way o f coping w ith 
h i s  c u ltu ra l  problem. He merely makes the  b e s t  o f  i t  a s  a  c iv i l iz e d  
person and as a  man o f c u ltu re , in  the id iom atic  sense o f the  word*
Rephrasing Schopenhauer's m etaphysical question , we could asks 
i f  everything i s  bad, i s  i t  because i t  i s  an i l lu s io n  (maya)? Or, i s  
th e re  some prim ordial e v il  which p reco n d itio n s  i l lu s io n  as i t s  output?
In sh o rt, i s  the e v il  in  the i l lu s io n  o r in  the  w ill?  When Schopenhauer 
says maya. he th inks o f i l lu s io n  as a  key p r in c ip le  in  h is  conception 
o f  V orstellung . This German term may be tra n s la te d  a s  "im agination" o r  
" rep re sen ta tiv e  im agination". I t  can a lso  mean an in d iv id u a l asp ec t of 
im agination. A V orstellung  does no t n e c e s sa r ily  have to  rep resen t 
an o th er th ing ; i t  may a lso  imply something l ik e  a  perhaps f u t i l e  
im aginatory c rea tio n  which one perform s alm ost by mistake* S ig n if ic an tly , 
th e  Schopenhauerian concept o f im agination r e f le c t s  an element o f 
de lu sive  transform ation  o r  transform ative wrong seeing , o r , in  sh o rt, 
de lu sion . Maya, o r  the  v e i l  o f maya. i s  th e  deluding p r in c ip le  which 
l e t s  u s  have, and even lu re s  us in to  having, our coun tless  Vorstellungen 
in s te ad  of perce iv ing  the th in g  as such. With a  view to th i s  t i ^ i t  
re la tio n sh ip  Schopenhauer o ften  re fe rs  to  the  V orstellungen d ire c t ly  as 
maya o r  i l lu s io n  (Schein) . But fo r  Schopenhauer th is  i l lu s o ry  
im agination i s  r e la t iv e ly  re a l , although always wrong on some le v e l o r  
o th e r, throughout the d if fe re n t  types o f e r ro rs  and i l lu s io n s  as
66
c la s s i f ie d  by him. Maya makes us see wrong’, b u t in  some coherent, 
organized manner. I t  s ta b i l iz e s  our physiognom ical connection w ith th e  
w i l l .  I t  i s  the  p r in c ip le  which o rgan izes th e  w i l l 's  b lin d  w illin g , which 
p u ts  a  v e i l  o f coherency over i t s  innumerable in d iv id u a l o b je c t if ic a t io n s . 
Schopenhauer s maya i s  h is  orincipium  in d lv id u a tio n is  (and K an t's  
phenomenon). Since i t  i s  secondary to  the  w i l l  i t  b e a rs  some o f  i t s  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s .  In  gen era l, i t  conforms w ith  th e  Ind ian  maya. b u t in  i t s  
Ind ian  conception i t  extends a lso  towards o th e r  human id e a s  and i s  n o t j u s t  
red u c ib le  to  Schopenhauer's p r in c ip le  o f  in d iv id u a tio n .
Only one darsana. one Ind ian  p h ilo so p h ica l system, namely
Vedanta, has produced a  s im ila r  case o f  in d iv id u a tio n . Ihe  Upanisads, in
comparison, dwell on some atman-brahman ontology which was never questioned
b efo re  th e  f i r s t  Vedantins a rr iv e d . In d iv id u a li ty  appears a s  a  problem
f i r s t  in  Vedanta. Buddhism, on th e  o th e r  hand, t r e a t s  th e  s e l f  as
a  problem (th e  atman i s  described  a s  a  bad id e a ) . In d iv id u a lity , in
Buddhian, i s  o n to lo g ic a lly  m arginal, t u t  i t  ranks a s  one o f  the  main
c a te g o rie s  o f  em pirica l consciousness. That i s ,  i t  poses a  p ra c t ic a l  r a th e r
than  a  th e o re tic a l  problem. But in  Vedanta th e  s e l f ,  th e  atman. i s  taken
f o r  g ran ted , and in d iv id u a li ty  p re sen ts  the  c h ie f  th e o re t ic a l  problem.
A ll Vedantic th in k e rs  knew th a t  in d iv id u a tio n  was cau sa lly  connected w ith
i l lu s io n  (maya) o r  ignorance (avidva) . But i n  th e  beginning  th e  problem
was n o t solved n eg a tiv e ly . Rather, in d iv id u a tio n  would be a  u n iv e rsa l
category  even when denied; i . e . ,  t a t  tvam a s i . a s  Schopenhauer h im self
-  (54)quotes. At th i s  p o in t he may have been deeply in flu en ced  by Vedanta.
(54)
Schopenhauer may p o ssib ly  have n o ticed  th e  unique convergence o f 
Vedanta and the  B r i t i s h  e m p iric is t school o f  philosophy. B erkeley 
(Hu.Knowl*. pp. 181, 212) says i t  i s  im possib le to  know th e  r e a l  ex is ten ce  
and n a tu re  o f  th in g s , t h e i r  q u a l i t ie s  be ing  on ly  id e as  o f th e  mind; Hume 
(H u.N at., p . 584) e lab o ra te s  th a t  o u r id e as  a re  derived  from correspondent 
im pressions, which a re  no re p re se n ta tio n s  o f  any ab sen t o b je c ts , b u t r e a l  
p e rcep tio n s  in  th e  mind, which tr a n s fe r s  the  q u a l i t i e s  onto  th e  r e la te d  
o b je c ts . Schopenhauer, fin d in g  th a t  e m p i r i c ! i g n o r e s  th e  law o f 
c a u s a li ty  a s  a  p resupposition , seeks m etaphysical ju s t i f i c a t io n  in  Vedanta.
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In  Yedantic thought, i l lu s io n  i s  necessary  and. p o s it iv e . I t  
i s  precluded from any fundam entally n eg a tiv e  in te rp re ta t io n .  Sankara 
and o th e r  Vedan t in s  t r e a t  maya as  a  necessa ry  p re re q u is i te  and system 
o f  t ru th ,  -which accompanies a l l  ex isten ce  o f  m a tte r  and l i f e .  There i s  no 
a p p a ll in g  o r  d isg u s tin g  a sp ec t a tta ch ed  to  i t .  I t  i s  d iv in e  p la y  and i t  
can be overcome in  some p o s it iv e  manner. He l ik e s  to  show how every th ing  
i s  open to  o n e 's  d riv e  to  th e  h ig h e s t happiness* Hence, r e la t iv e ly  and 
a s  compared to  Europe, where happiness i s  considered  a s  some excep tional 
break  in  the  unhappy course  o f  even ts, Sankara appears very  "o p tim is tic ” . 
But a c tu a lly  th e  Y e d in tis ts , e sp e c ia lly  Sankara, have no p la ce  f o r  
optimism o r  pessimism! (See Chapter E ig h t .)
Schopenhauer s id e a  o f  maya -was transform ed from Vedan t i c  to  
o v e rtly  negative . As in  Vedanta, i t  re p re se n ts  a  decep tiv e  fo rce  which 
v e i ls  the essence o f  the  world. But, w hile in  Vedanta th e  su ffe r in g  too 
i s  p a r t  o f  the  p la y fu l, even s tim u la tin g  de lu sio n  through maya* in  
Schopenhauer su ffe r in g  m ediated by the  p r in c ip le  o f  in d iv id u a tio n , i s  
p a r t  o f  the  o b je c t i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  w il l .  Schopenhauer's w il l  i s  n o t 
w ithout r e a l i ty ,  d e sp ite  i t s  connection w ith  i l lu s io n .  However, the  
Ind ian  co u n terp arts  o f  " w ill” and " in d iv id u a lity "  a re  a l l  w ithout any 
r e a l i ty ,  by d e f in it io n .
For In d ia  the  problem o f  su ffe r in g  i s  a  psycho log ica l one, and 
the  In d ian  p h ilo so p h e r 's  ta sk , which he exem plifies p e rso n a lly , c o n s is ts  
in  exposing what a  c lea re d  mind should be a b le  to  see once th e  p r in c ip le  
behind a l l  the em pirica l im pulses has been unmasked* But Schopenhauer 
determ ines -  m etaphysically , and unaware o f  h is  personal ro le  in  
c o lle c t in g  h is  evidence from c u ltu re  -  th a t  s u f fe r in g  must le ad  to  th e  
e x is te n t ia l  negation  o f  an in t r in s i c a l ly  bad world which should n o t have 
ex is ted  to  begin w ith . In d ia  seeks l ib e r a t io n  from some m odifica tion  o f  
ex isten ce , n o t from the  r e a l i t y  o f  ex istence  a s  such. In  the  case o f 
Vedanta we n o tice  a  p o s it iv e  o r ie n ta tio n  towards some ab so lu te  r e a l i t y
/ <w—
in  terms o f the  atman s u ltim a te  id e n t i ty  w ith  the  brahman Linana a s  
opposed to  any brahman-atanan p o s tu la tio n ) . Hence, Schopenhauer's 
re fe ren ces  to  Vedantic id e n t i ty  f a l l  sh o rt o f  h is  idea  o f negation .
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Buddhism, in  comparison, responds n eg a tiv e ly  by trying* to  
sh o rtcu t the  consequences o f m an's fundamental ignorance (av idva).
Buddhism wants some so r t of e th ic a l  balance between body and s p i r i t .
Our p h y sica l ex istence i s  no t n e c e ssa r ily  considered bad, b u t ra th e r  
a  nuisance. From a  Buddhist p o in t o f view, the world e x is ts  as  maya. 
bu t maya does not produce any wrong; only the  c lin g in g  to  the delusion  
o f our own mind does so (see p. 241 (55 )). I t  i s  th i s  em pirical aspec t 
o f negation  which i s  re f le c te d  in  the  concept of n irvana , bu t Buddhism 
recognizes no such fundamental o n to lo g ica l p r in c ip le  as  would conform 
to  Schopenhauer's concept o f w ill .
For Schopenhauer maya i s  n o t an e f f ic ie n t  cause f o r  some 
u ltim a te ly  ir re le v a n t and un rea l de lusion ; n o r can he ap p rec ia te  i t  a s  
a  m otivating  obstac le  in  fin d in g  a  psycho log ica lly  balanced s ta te  o f 
consciousness such as one might a sso c ia te  w ith  the conceptions o f 
brahma vidya o r  n irvana . He r a th e r  t r e a t s  i t  as  a  f in a l  cause o f the 
p e rp e tu a l s e lf -c o n tra d ic tio n  and su ffe r in g  inheren t in  a l l  l i f e  and 
e s s e n tia l ly  in  any ind iv iduated  m an ifesta tio n  o f the  w il l .  L ife  w ithout 
su ffe rin g  would be paradoxical, says Schopenhauer. Hence, we could 
r e f e r  to  maya as the  p r in c ip le  o f both  in d iv id u a tio n  and su ffe rin g . The 
germ o f su ffe rin g  may l i e  dormant in  the  w il l ,  bu t through maya i t  becomes 
re a l .  Ih is  su ffe rin g  i s ,  in  a  way, the w i l l 's  u ltim a te  achievement, 
which only  could be excelled  by some to ta l  de-m anifesta tion  (which would
mean negation). Both su ffe rin g  and s u f fe re r  have to  go.
Schopenhauer's w ill  i s  u s e le s s  as  an abode o f abso lu te  
knowledge o r  balance. I t  i s  ch a rac te rized  by a  com pletely negative  
p o te n tia l  which, however, needs a  le v e l  o f maya fo r  i t s  a c tu a liz a tio n . 
Schopenhauer may w ell have p ro f ite d  from some Vedantic sponsorship, when 
through some deductive process he a rr iv e d  a t  h is  concept o f maya. I f  we
b e liev e  him, maya has to  be negative  in  accordance w ith the w i l l .  But
th is  proves only what he wants to  believe him self, a c tu a l n e g a tiv ity  
which he im plants in  the w ill  -  thereby consciously  o r  unconsciously 
rev e rs in g  the p r in c ip le  of in d iv id u a tio n  -  i s  induced from h is  own 
personal encounter w ith c u ltu re . His poignant ch arac te ro lo g ica l and 
physiognomical remarks about l i f e  c r i t i c i z e ,  o f course, forms o f l i f e
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as  they appeared under the then p re v a ilin g  c u l tu ra l  circum stances.
What we axe saying i s  th a t  Schopenhauer" s  p r in c ip le  o f 
in d iv id u a tio n  works in  two d ire c tio n s . M etaphysically , a s  he e x p lic a te s , 
i t  makes su ffe r in g  p o ssib le  in  making the in d iv id u a l s e l f  p o ss ib le . But 
c u ltu ro lo g ic a lly  -  and in  a  manner o f  which he may n o t have been too 
aware -  i t  p rovides a  mechanisn through which observations made by o r  
about the  individual, s e l f  can be channelled in to  the c i r c u la r  ontology o f  
the  w il l  (p . 49) ? W ill stands fo r  Schopenhauer's one g re a t -  and very 
personal -  in tu i t iv e  conception, the one p o in t on which r e s t s  h is  
undivided ph ilosoph ical b e lie f .
The m etaphysical form o f  th i s  b e l ie f  must be considered as 
a product o f h is  personal reac tio n  to  c u ltu re . Schopenhauer's 
m etaphysical transform ation o f c u ltu re  d esc rib es  d i f f e r e n t  degrees o f 
deception b u t, in  co n tra s t to  Indian th ink ing , i t  avo ids considering  
maya a s  such on d if f e r e n t  le v e ls . Thus, he does n o t d i f f e r e n t ia te  
between su b jec tiv e  and ob jec tive  forms o f  b e l i e f  o r  im agination. Ind ia , 
on the  o th e r  hand, i s  p ragm atically  very  s e n s i t iv e  to  th e  problem o f 
handling maya. From o u r m eta-position  we can th e re fo re  d isco v er a  p u re ly  
ex te rn a l, i . e .  conceptless, Indian a t t i tu d e  o f pessim isn toward any low 
le v e l o f  percep tion , b u t w ith complete d is reg a rd  f o r  th e  phenomenon o f 
cu ltu re . Schopenhauer does re a c t to  c u ltu re , t u t  w ithout consciously  
tak ing  the  c u ltu re  fa c to r  in to  account, s in ce  he i s  too  preoccupied w ith  
h is  n o tion  o f  the s e lf .  Ee concen tra tes h is  e n t i r e  c u l tu ra l  experience, 
which im plies h is  ph ilosophical experience (H egel!), on h is  own
p e rso n a lity . He i s  egocentric , b u t, m etaphysically  a t  l e a s t ,  n o t
(55) *e g o is tic . Schopenhauer's outlook re q u ire s  a  re a c tio n  a g a in s t Hegel,
but w ith in  th is  reac tio n  he remains o b je c tiv e  w ithout b e tra y in g  h is
m etaphysical standards. Europe i s  p e rso n a lis  t i c  in  i t s  ou tlook , as
portended by such ancien t th in k ers  a s  S ocra tes. This a sp ec t l a t e r  reaches
ethnocen tric  dimensions: when Schopenhauer ta lk s  about "man's
(55) t \ *Hence, F rauenstadt (B riefe . p . 41) can look upon Schopenhauer's
d o c trine  o f  world contempt as a  compassionate r e f le c t io n  n o t o f  h is  own 
e x is te n t ia l  m isery b u t o f  th a t o f a l l  beings.
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imagination." he d is t in c t ly  models i t ,  w ith  cosm opolitan devotion , a f t e r  
h i s  own. German outlook.
In  ad d itio n , philosophy, in  the  European sense o f  th e  word, 
re q u ire s  some a lie n a te d , s p l i t  a t t i tu d e .  The p h ilo so p h er must see
(56}
people  a s  being' so provocative a s  to  cause h i s  a l ie n a t io n  from them.
A flow  o f  negative  im pulses i s  necessary . (S o cra tes , f i r s t  loved by the
people, achieved th a t  a lie n a tio n  and was subsequently  condemned.) In
Schopenhauer s  case the  a l ie n  element i s  in troduced  through h is  c u ltu ra l
re a c tio n  which, while causing h i s  in n e r  detachment from th e  o rd inary  flow
o f even ts, asks a t  the  same tim e f o r  some form o f  m ediation between th e
s p l i t  p a r ts ,  between h is  personal s e l f  and th e  w orld o f  in d iv id u a tio n ,
(57)
between the  su ffe rin g , in c lu d in g  death , and th e  w i l l  to  l i v e .  But
(58)th i s  m ediation remains alm ost e n t i r e ly  m etaphysical. Schopenhauer
looks a t  the  r a t io n a l ,  th e o re t ic a l  ex p o sitio n  o f the  m etaphysical p a r t  
a s  the  consummation o f h i s  p h ilo so p h ica l ta sk . This ends where i t  
touches upon the  pragm atic le v e l  mentioned above (p . 64) .  Any p ra c t ic a l
(56) As S tem  p o in ts  ou t (S tu d ies , p . 189), f o r  Schopenhauer th e  
ph ilosopher ( l ik e  th e  a r t i s t  and th e  s a in t)  cannot be a t  home in  a world 
considered a s  w orth less except "as th e  su b jec t-m a tte r o f  h is  detached 
w i l l - le s s  contem plation” .
(57) Z in t (dopp.Bew.. pp. 26-45) analyzes th e  m otivating  d u a lisn  o f 
Schopenhauer's e a r ly  concepts o f an "em pirical consciousness", which 
u n d e rlie s  h is  p e ss im is tic  view o f  everyday l i f e ,  and an (u ltim a te ly  
negating) " b e t te r  consciousness", which i s  re f le c te d  by a e s th e t ic a l— 
e th ic a l  and re lig io u s-m y stica l in s ig h ts , whose necessary  ph ilo so p h ica l 
in te rp re ta t io n  cen tres  on the "w ill"  a s  a  connective p r in c ip le .
Copleston (P h il.V II . pp. 274-275)* "Schopenhauer's pessim ian i s  
thus m etaphysical in  th e  sense th a t  i t  i s  p resen ted  as a  consequence 
o f the  n a tu re  o f the  m etaphysical W ill. Ihe ph ilo sopher i s  n o t simply 
engaged in  drawing a t te n tio n  to  the  em pirical f a c t  th a t  th e re  i s  much 
e v il  and su ffe rin g  in  th e  world. He i s  a lso  in d ic a tin g  what he 
b e liev es  to be the cause o f  th is  em pirical f a c t ."
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negation  would come about in  su ffe rin g , o r  even as a  co ro lla ry  o f
(59)su ffe rin g , e sp e c ia lly  when emphasized by renuncia tion  and asce tic ism , 
Schopenhauer, who i s  m otivated by h is  personal re la tio n sh ip
/ (60)Xw ith destiny  (death i s  h is  in sp ir in g  guide and genius of philosophy ; ,  
p ro te s ts  e th ic a lly  ag a in st th is  o r, more p re c ise ly , h is  world. His 
m etaphysical m ediation, which conveys th i s  p ro te s t ,  i s  based on some 
p e rs o n a lis t ic  cu ltu re  transform ation. He i s  egocen tric , bu t f r e e  o f 
m etaphysical egoism. E is m etaphysical awareness -  he u n d erlin es  the 
f u t i l i t y  of any system atic egoism -  assu res  h is  m etaphysical o b je c t iv ity , 
a s  we have noticed  in  h is  Hegel re a c tio n . But, d is illu s io n e d  w ith any 
p o s itiv e  philosophy, he t r i e s  w ith naive eagerness to  reform, on the 
b a s is  of h is  personal metaphysical p o te n tia l .  I b is  vocational
Gerard (O rien t, p . 232) compares su cc in c tly : "For the  Hindu, a t
le a s t  fo r  the Vedantin, asce ticism  perm its to  know the  th in g  as  such.
For Schopenhauer, on the o th e r hand, who knows i t  d ir e c t ly ,  a s c e tic isn  
only helps to  do away w ith i t . "
Schopenhauer, V. V. I I . p . 542. Ja sp e rs  (Way, p* 36) exp lain s th a t  
b a sic  to a l l  tru e  ph ilosoph ical thought i s  ou r changing consciousness o f 
being, and he adds (pp. 23, 26) th a t  "wonder, doubt, fo rsa k en e ss .. .and 
experience o f u ltim a te  s itu a tio n s  a re  sources o f philosophy". Compare 
S peng ler's  and G ebser's experiences o f fe a r ,  pp. 139(56); 168(48).
(6l) The c r i t i c a l  side o f h is  m etaphysics i s  n o t a n t i - c u l tu r a l  b u t 
a -c u ltu ra l . On the an thropolog ical le v e l he a n tic ip a te s  N ietzsche who in  
re je c t in g  C h ristian  c u ltu re  ("G ott i s t  to t" ,  Z a r.. pp. 15, 92; "redemption 
from the redeemers", p . 95) a c tu a lly  r e a c ts  ag a in s t h is  own immediate 
German p ro te s tan t c u ltu re , d ism issing  t r a d i t io n a l  philosophy in  favour o f 
an exclusive "own way" (p. 195, Schouh.. pp. 20-22). De Lubac (boudd.. 
pp. 275, 279) ,  in  commenting on th i s  5chopenhauerian-Nietzschean c u ltu re  
re je c tio n , observes th a t N ietzsche who c a l l s  h is  Z ara thustra  the  "Awakened" 
(c f . Z a r.. p . 12) a c tu a lly  makes him antipodean to th e  Buddha. Wagner 
ju s t  p resen ts  a c u ltu ra l exaggeration, e .g . ,  in  h is  fragm ents o f a 
Buddhistic opera, conceived under the  in flu en ce  o f Schopenhauer: music
rep resen ting  the " tw ilig h t o f the  Brahma world", leads from sansara . the  
"day", to  n irvana , the n ig h t, the " tru th "  (br.Buch. pp. 176-178).
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impulse makes him b lin d  to  h is  h i s to r ic a l  c u l tu ra l  indebtedness, i . e . ,  
to  the h is to r ic a l  mechanism o f  h is  c u ltu re  transform ation . He proves 
h im self a s  a -h is to r ic a l ly  minded: observ ing  c u ltu re  c h a rac te ro lo g ica lly ,
he does n o t n o tic e  th a t h is  own psychological re a c tio n s , h is  s e n s i t iv i ty  
and eagerness, do n o t ju s t  come from h is  own b are  s e l f  b u t a lso  r e f le c t  
ax io lo g ica l p r in c ip le s  in h e r ite d  from h is  c u ltu re . His m etaphysical 
in te g r i ty ,  h is  m etaphysical non-egoism and o b je c t iv i ty , o f  which he i s  
aware, takes h is  a t te n tio n  away, however, from h is  own c u ltu ra l  egoism.
This se lf -c e n tre d  eagerness ( la te  urban egoism, from S peng ler's  
po in t o f view, and a  symptom o f  c u ltu ra l  defic iency , according to  Gebser), 
which p ro te c ts  Schopenhauer's p h ilo so p h ica l independence and o r ig in a l i ty ,  
a lso  causes him to  bend Indian thought towards h is  own id eas , o r  simply 
to  misunderstand i t  on various le v e ls . Bewitched by h is  own m etaphysical 
achievements, he i s  not aware th a t  In d ia , o b je c tiv e ly  speaking, behaves 
c u ltu ra lly  in  seme incom patible manner and th a t ,  su b jec tiv e ly , i t  does 
not even re a c t to  c u ltu re  a t  a l l .  Schopenhauer, though, im plies such 
a reac tio n  when, in  h is  attem pt to  reform tr a d i t io n a l  German thought, 
he claim s the an cien t au tho rs  o f th e  Upani sad s as  h is  ph ilo so p h ical 
antecedents. In h is  naive enthusiaan and perseverance, which were 
c e r ta in ly  p re re q u is ite s  fo r  h is  own in d iv id u a l is t ic  c r e a t iv i ty ,  he does 
not n o tic e  the r e la t iv e  casualness w ith  which those r s i s  (to  him "hard ly  
imaginable as being m erely human") ju s t  is su e  comments, from the  he igh t 
of th e i r  presumed s ta te  o f l ib e ra t io n ,  in  the course o f communication 
w ith s im ila r  th in k e rs . Behaving as ex em plifie rs  o f some m ystical 
le v e l of in s ig h t, they l i t e r a l l y  seem to  hand segments o f t h e i r  wisdom 
"down", whereas Schopenhauer i s  working h is  way up! He in d ic a te s  l i t t l e  
awareness o f the non-personal o r ie n ta tio n  o f the  Upanisads (o r  o f the  
id e a l o f ac tio n  w ithout in te r e s t ,  as in  the Bhagavadguta) . His 
co n trib u tio n  to  philosophy combines h is  a b i l i t y  to  see c u ltu re  
physiognomically w ith h is  p o te n tia l  to  c o n s is te n tly  do i t  on the b a s is  
o f in d iv id u a l su ffe rin g . In h is  egocen tric  cu ltu re  transfo rm ation  he
(62)tu rn s , l ik e  o th e r German romantic au th o rs  to  In d ia  f o r  f re sh  im pulses.
(62) Q'eTaT£  (O rien t, pp. 256-257) concludes th a t romanticism, sensing the  
lo s s  of i t s  c u ltu ra l  p a s t and dreading an in e v ita b le  ( s c ie n t i f ic )  
tomorrow, seeks to a tta c h  i t s e l f  to O rien ta l sources.
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In  h is  encounter w ith Ind ia , he t r e a ts  i t  as i f  i t  were some o th e r  
European philosopher, i . e . ,  as  a  source o f  knowledge a cc e ss ib le  on h is  
own le v e l and by h is  own standards -  bu t w ithout any herm eneutic. Ib is  
makes Schopenhauer, who n a tu ra lly  rep resen ts  our "cen tre  o f coordination", 
a lso  our main exem plifier o f German ethnocen trign . His course o f 
egocentric  o r ig in a l i ty  combines w ith  a  l in e  o f  e th n o ce n tric a lly  received 
Indian impulses.
The ex ten t to  which Schopenhauer develops new in s ig h ts  and new 
thought in  response to  Indian philosophy may be assessed  according to  
various le v e ls . P rim arily , and on a ve iy  general le v e l ,  he was c le a r ly  
m otivated and influenced  by Indian thought. We can accep t h is  response 
(much ex to lled  by h is  fo llow er Paul Deussen) inasmuch a s  i t  r e f le c ts  
h is  in sp ira tio n  by the formal and a e s th e t ic a l  fe a tu re s . But 
herm eneutically  Schopenhauer's ap p ro p ria tio n  o f Indian con ten t, in  an 
attem pt to  support, ju s t i f y  and prove h is  own p h ilo so p h ica l stance, 
remains problem atic. Only c e r ta in  is o la te d  a sp ec ts  a s  in  the case of 
Vedantic maya a re  exchangeable and th e re fo re  v a lid  as  p o te n tia l  impulses 
(p. 66) . In  connection with such concepts as su ffe rin g  o r  v i l l ,  
Schopenhauer f e e ls  strong ly  supported by Buddhism (e sp ec ia lly  in  h is  
l a t e r  work), bu t, ignoring  th a t  Buddhism i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  non-on to lo g ic a l, 
he draws the wrong conclusions f o r  h is  own o n to lo g ica l outlook (compare 
pp. 68, 237). N e ith er i s  he aware th a t  in  In d ia  renunciation , 
a s c e tic isn  o r  any break with so c ie ty  r e f le c t  m erely an e th ic a l  so c ia l 
a t t i tu d e  w ithout any transform ation in to  some e th ic a l  concept o f 
pessimism. Ind ia  was no departure  p o in t f o r  Schopenhauer, n o r  could i t  
strengthen  the conceptual content o f  h is  philosophy, although i t  
obviously had a very s tim u la tin g  in fluence  on i t s  form. In  see ing  
h im self a s  a p ro tag o n is t o f  Indian  philosophy, Schopenhauer was r ig h t  
only  in  terms o f  h is  c u ltu ra l se lf-cen tred n ess  from which o rig in a te d  
a lso  h is  main innovation: h is  r e d e f in i t io n  o f the  in d iv id u a l in  terms
o f  su ffe rin g .
On the b a s is  o f h is  charactero logy o f  su ffe rin g , Schopenhauer 
transform s h is  personal so c io -c u ltu ra l p e rcep tion  o f  l i f e  in to  
a  m etaphysical conception o f  pessimism. (He thereby c le a rs  a  p latform
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f o r  von Hartmann's eudemonological pessimism and M ainlander s
s o l ip s i s t i c  conclu sio n s .) Of course, from an on to lo g ica l p r in c ip le  o f
suffering- alone we cannot deduce any pessimism (compare p. 245). But
f o r  Schopenhauer ex istence  i s  g e t t in g  worse; i f  n o t in  a  h is to r ic a l  
(65)sense, then w ith every new e x is te n t ia l  a ffirm atio n . O rig in a lly  we 
may look upon h i s  pessimism a s  a  symptom o f  h is  in n e r  a t t i tu d e  and 
a re f le c tio n  o f  h is  own id eas , both in  an e x is te n t ia l  and in  an e th ic a l  
sense, although w ithout any c u ltu re  awareness* Once th i s  personal 
pessim ign -  comforted and confirmed by Indian forms -  has received  an 
impersonal m etaphysical s tru c tu re , Schopenhauer sees h is  own re f le c t io n  
from a d istance . His m etaphysical awareness, which keeps him 
susp icious about op tim istic  outlooks, makes him o b je c tiv e ly  p e ss im is tic  
o f h is  own percep tion  (unlike P la to , p . 3 0 ) . ^ ^  At th is  stage , 
pessimism -  e s s e n tia l ly  a c u ltu ra l  epiphenomenon -  emerges as  a purely  
m etaphysical concept. But we do n o tic e  a te le o lo g ic a l s id e - lin e  in  i t  
( to ta l ly  undeveloped, bu t l a t e r  o f  c e n tra l  in te r e s t  in  von Hartmann's 
ou tlook): we receive no h in t  a t  a l l  o f  any sign  o f p rogression , o r
even progress, in  h is  conception o f  pessimism ( a f t e r  a l l ,  the Buddha 
re tu rn ed  l ib e ra te d ! ) .  Here pessimism p re sen ts  i t s e l f  as emancipated 
from cu ltu re . In  support o f our th e s is  th a t  m etaphysical pessimism 
rep resen ts  a transformed ch a rac te ro lo g ica l re ac tio n  to  c u ltu re , we 
sh a ll  now follow  the  Schopenhauerian impulse in  th ree  In d ia -o rien ted  
German th inkers .
He i s  not a h is to r ic a l  p ess im is t, bu t ra th e r  serves as  some landmark 
in  l a t e r  p ess im is tic  views o f c u ltu ra l  movement (Spengler, Gebser).
Spengler (U .d.A .. p . 475) determ ines m orphologically:
Schopenhauer's "dismay a t  becoming aware o f  h is  own (e x is te n t ia l)  
knowledge -  th is  i s  the roo t o f h is  pessimism".
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Chapter Three
Ih ree  Schopenhauerian th inkers? von Hartmann. Ma in lan d e r. and Deussen
(a) Eduard von Eartmam: pessimism a s  a •poet-Indian way to  sa lv a tio n
By the  time o f Schopenhauer's death in  1860 h is  conception o f pessimism 
had begun to  make i t s  way in to  German thought, a ttra c tin g -  responses from 
a variegated  community of fo llow ers and opponents. One o f the  most 
noteworthy and ca re fu l studen ts  o f  Schopenhauer du rin g  th a t  e ra  was 
Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (l842 -  1906). Having judged th a t  c r i t i c s  
o f pessim isn had so f a r  la rg e ly  followed ra th e r  s o f t  and in c o n s is te n t 
m etaphysical coordinates, von Hartmann appeared in  1880 w ith  
a comprehensive and system atic co n trib u tio n  nto  th e  h is to ry  and 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  pessimism" (Zur Geschichte und Begrtindung des 
Pessimiemus). ^  We s h a ll  shov how he maps th e  p e ss im is tic  mainstream, 
before  ve follow  h is  w ell-prepared search  f o r  Ind ian  t r ib u ta r ie s .
( l)  Eudemonological pessimism: a  s c ie n t i f ic  d e sc r ip tio n
D eclaring Kant, no t Schopenhauer, as the  " fa th e r  o f  pessimism", he 
announces an o b jec tiv e , s c ie n t i f ic  d e sc r ip tio n  which would rev ea l
^  U iis work rep resen ts  a summary and expansion o f  h is  e a r l i e r  re a c tio n s  
to  the  pessimism discussion in  and around Germany a t  h is  time.
76
pessimism a s  " th e  in d isp en sab le  firm  b a s is  f o r  genuine moral philosophy 
(2)and re lig io n " . According to  von Hartmann, Kant, in  c re a tin g  an 
autonomous moral philosophy, had to  be opposed to  any e g o is t ic  
pseudomoral, o r  eudemonism, which in  h i s  eyes i s  the same th ing .
R ejec tin g  any s e l f i s h  s e l f - in te r e s t ,  Kant wants a  moral s e l f - in te r e s t .
Von Hartmann f e e ls  th a t  th i s  u n se lf ish n e ss  o f  m o ra lity  would have to 
inc lude  th e  complete renunciation  o f  any p o s i t iv e  happiness f o r  th i s  
world and th e  h e re a f te r . M orality  and happ iness, he p o in ts  o u t, a re  
n e i th e r  id e n tic a l  n o r can they  be a n a ly t ic a l ly  deriv ed  from one an o th er.
Hence, th e re  e x is ts  an antinomy between th e  two, which cannot be reso lved  
w ith reg a rd  to  the  sphere o f  th e  world o f  appearances ( in  term s o f  space, 
time and c a u s a li ty ) . From von Hartm ann's p o in t  o f  view, pessimism i s  th e  
ind ispensab le  p re re q u is ite  which the  moral consciousness needs a s  
a  p resu p p o sitio n  f o r  i t s  s e lf-d e fen c e . K a n t 's  e th ic a l  id ea lism  re v e a ls  
to  von Hartmann th a t  pessdmisn -  re g a rd le ss  o f  w hether i t  may be th e  
outcome o f  an in v e s tig a tio n  o f  th e  e m p iric a lly  given w orld o r  n o t -  in  
any case  claim s abso lu te  a  -p rio ri v a l id i ty  a s  a  necessa ry  e th ic a l  
p o s tu la te . He adds th a t  t r e a t in g  pessimism a  p r i o r i  a s  a  p o s tu la te  o f  
pure reason, Kant, who a c tu a lly  avoids th e  term  "pessim isii", ab sta in ed  
from any ex tensive  coherent th e o re tic a l  d isc u ss io n  o f  i t  on th e  b a s is  
o f  experience.
Having ex trac ted  K a n t's  observations on th e  su b jec t, von 
Hartmann exposes them a s  th e  h i s to r i c a l  b a s is  o f  t h a t  "pessimism" o f  
in d igna tion" (Entrllstungspessimism us) which l in k s  Schopenhauer w ith  h i s
(3)fo llo w ers . Von Hartmann shows h is  aw areness o f  Schopenhaue r ' s  
p e rso n al e th ic a l  p ro te s t  when he l e t s  h i s  pessimism be ro o ted  in  h is
(2) Von Hartmann, Pegyimlsmus. PP1* VX-XV, 1—19. At some o th e r  occasion 
(Fragen, p . 34) he c a re fu l ly  draws a  l in e  between Schopenhauer and 
h im self. However, w hile in d ic a tin g  em pirica l pessimism in  Kant and th e  
C h ris tia n  view, he f in d s  m etaphysical pessimism, except in  In d ia , on ly  
rep resen ted  in  Schopenhauer (unseparated from em pirica l pessim ism ), 
some o f  th e  l a t t e r ' s  d is c ip le s  and h im self.
(3) Von Hartmann, Fessim .. p. 27.
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“in d ig n a tio n  about the inadequacy o f  em pirical r e a l i t y  w ith  regard  to  
the  demands o f  e th ic a l  idealism ". This a sp ec t g ives von Hartmann 
a  c e r ta in  r ig h t  to  id e n tify  Schopenhauer' s  pessimism a s  a  p ra c t ic a l  
a t t i tu d e  a s  d i s t in c t  from ph ilo soph ical theory  ( i t  i s  o f  course bo th , 
a s  we have shown). This a t t i tu d e ,  he says, cannot re p la ce  p h ilo so p h ica l 
pessimism.- Ute ph ilo soph ical th e o r is t  in  tu rn  i s  n o t in te re s te d  in  
moral ind igna tion , b u t in  causal and te le o lo g ic a l  comprehension. From 
von Hartmann's p o in t o f  view Schopenhauer has committed th e  fundamental 
m istake o f  d e riv in g  proofs fo r  the  e v i l  n a tu re  o f  th i s  world from 
pessimism. Von Hartmann h im self propounds a  te le o lo g ic a l v is io n  o f 
some k ind  o f  endless, "asym ptotical" reform o f  man's understand ing  o f  
th i s  e v il ,  lhe  reason why von Hartmann does n o t, a s  we have done, see 
and accep t Schopenhauer as d e riv in g  pessimism from th e  e v i l  n a tu re  o f  
the  world might be found in  h is  in s is te n c e  on some " s c ie n t i f i c ” approach. 
As i t  happens, h is  method ignores com pletely th e  ro le  o f those 
ch arac te ro lo g ica l data which, a c tu a liz e d  by the c u ltu re  f a c to r ,  
Schopenhauer channels in to  the  m etaphysical s tru c tu re  o f h is  pessimism.
In  the  in te r e s t  o f h is  own approach, von Hartmann e x tra c ts
from Kant a  te le o lo g ic a l, non-eudemonological evolutionism . On th i s
he comments th a t  "K ant's p o in t o f view then i s  an e v o lu tio n !s tic
optimism which does no t exclude b u t inc lude  eudesnonological pessimism,
although i t  leav es  the  moral pessim isa o f  in d ig n a tio n , which i t  has
(4)overcome, behind". Hie im p lica tions o f th i s  eudemonological pessimism 
a re  sa id  to  be, b r ie f ly ,  the follow ing. Contentment, whether the  
eudemonological (what Kant c a l l s  the a e s th e t ic  o r  pragm atic) o r  th e  
moral k ind, i s  negative by n a tu re . Remaining e s s e n t ia l ly  u n a tta in ab le , 
i t  would only  amount to  a  negative  s ta te  o f  freedom from a l l  p h y sica l 
and moral su ffe rin g , o r , in  o th e r words, a  le v e l o f  in d if fe re n c e  w ith 
regard to  p leasure  and pain . Since t h i s  contentment would, a t  b e s t, 
only n eg a tiv e ly  b rin g  ease o f mind, i t  would no t produce any p o s it iv e  
happiness. Having found th a t in  the e n t i r e  realm o f  the  world o f 
appearance l i f e  has a  negative eudemonological value, von Hartmann 
l ik e s  to  add, as a p ra c tic a l  ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f pessimism, " th a t a t
77)
Von Hartmann, Pessim .t pp. 36, 42-43, 46.
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le a s t  in  the l i f e  o f a l l  in d iv id u a ls  w ith a  p o te n tia l  f o r  m o ra lity  
happiness may be obtained n e ith e r  ou tside  m ora lity  n o r through i t " .
Because a s  the senses become more re fin e d  they  a lso  become
more su scep tib le  to  pain , von Hartmann reasons th a t  happiness cannot
(5)re s u l t  from any e labo ra te  a c t i v i t i e s .  On an in d iv id u a l le v e l th i s  
i s  re f le c te d  by an inc reasin g  personal d isco n ten t. Analogously we le a rn  
th a t on.a so c ia l le v e l d iscon ten t in c reases  w ith c u ltu ra l  p ro g ress  
(a lso  see Spengler, scep tic ian , p . 124). Hie more complicated and 
complex the s tru c tu re s  of our ways o f l i f e  become the  more they give 
r i s e  to  unhappiness. Hie growing so c ia l refinem ent o f  our c u ltu ra l  
development in c reasin g ly  tends to  burden the  in d iv id u a l. Von Hartmann 
b e liev es  th a t  h is to r ic a l ly  speaking the  balance t ip s  more and more in  
favour of pessimign. ^  Drawing the  consequences on an e th ic a l  le v e l , 
von Hartmann concludes th a t th is  pessimism destroys a l l  o p tim is tic  
i l lu s io n s . Furthermore, th is  e th ic a l  pessimism teaches (notw ithstanding 
the high esteem we should have f o r  the  purpose o f l i f e )  th a t  l i f e  as
such should be met w ith contempt, thus a lso  destroy ing  the  naive f e a r
(7)of death.
According to von Hartmann, Kant f e l t  th a t mankind could only 
accept pessimism when i t  was embedded in  transcendent optimism. When 
Schopenhauer in  h is  outspoken manner revealed  the  e s s e n tia l  pessimism 
of K ant's  teaching, he was gen era lly  re je c te d . N evertheless, von 
Hartmann him self frank ly  adds th a t  m ora lity  o r  b l i s s  a re  n o t p o ss ib le  
in  a transcendent sphere e ith e r . Hie r e f  o re , he sees no reason to  b e liev e  
in  a  transcendent optimism, which would be co n trad ic to ry  in  i t s e l f  (and 
would c o n s ti tu te  an even s tro n g er p ess im is t than th a t  o f th e  phenomenal 
k ind). In  th is  connection von Hartmann observes th a t  Kant (q u ite  
knowingly) could n o t solve the  problem o f  a  theodicy: no reason can 
ju s t i f y  th a t  a  personal, se lf-consc ious, om niscient and omnipotent God 
has c reated  c rea tu res  who would have b e t te r  n o t been created . But, asks 
von Hartmann, why must the question  be based on an u n tru e , o p tim is tic
(5) Von Hartmann, Pessim .. pp. 42, 46-47.
^  Von Hartmann, Pessim .. pp. 75-76.
(7) Von Hartmann, Pessim .. p. 50.
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assumption? O ffering  h is  own p e ss im is tic  approach, he suggests th a t  
we should ash  ou rse lv es  how the  abso lu te  purpose o r  f in a l  cause o f  th e
world could p o ss ib ly  be imagined to  le ad  w ithout s e lf -c o n tra d ic tio n  to
(8)such a  world.
R eferring  to  the  pro b leu  o f  the  theodicy  -  "why d id  the  c re a to r  
not ab s ta in  from a c re a tio n  o f  which he knew th a t  i t  had to  tu rn  ou t
ev il"  -  von Hartmann exp la in s th a t  monotheism i s  paradoxical and
(9)preposterous, in  f a c t  synonymous w ith  "monosatani an". However, 
according to  h is  own m onistic  view, e v il  -  a s  an in te g ra l  p a r t  o f  von 
Hartmann' 3 cu ltu re  p e rcep tio n  -  may be shared between the  in d iv id u a l 
aspec ts  and the ab so lu te  asp ec t o f  one su b jec t. Pessimism, as  we n o tic e  
here, responds to  the  same deep in n e r  cosm ological paradox which the 
theodicy, having f a i l e d  to  solve i t ,  in d ir e c t ly  adm its and su s ta in s .
I f  the transcendency problem p re v a ils , the tendency toward pessim iaa 
develops. (Hie id ea  o f  a  theodicy would be ab so lu te ly  un-Indian .
(.8 ) Von Hartmann, Pessim .» pp. 52-63.
(q )
Yon Hartmann, R eI.d .G .. pp. 260—262.
H. Heimsoeth a ffo rd s  a b r i e f  h is to r ic a l  synopsis o f  th is  o cc id en ta l 
paradox (Metaphvsik. pp. 55-56): P la to , in  defending the  u n ity  o f  the  
world, conceived o f  e v i l  only a s  a  mere lack  o f good, as  a  r e la t iv e  
non-being, bu t n o t a s  a positive being and fo rc e . Hie " theod ic ies" o f  the  
S to ics and o f  P lo tin u s  en large on th i s ,  and a l l  l a t e r  attem pts, in c lu d in g  
those prompted ty  th eo lo g ica l determ ini an, u se  t h e i r  arguments. F in a lly  
Kant accep ts the opposition  o f  good and e v i l  a s  fundamental in  any f i n i t e  
being (whereas N ietzsche denies the  ex isten ce  o f  th i s  m o ra l-re lig io u s  
opposition  a lto g e th e r ) .
(■H) When Wendy 0 'F la h e rty  (E v il) a p p lie s  the  term "theodicy" to  Indian  
th o u ^ it, she uses i t ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking, a s  a meta-term. Ihe "charac ters"  
(man, fa te ,  d e v ils , and gods, p . 13) which Indian  mythology employs in  
i t s  p o rtray a l o f e v il  a re  c u ltu ro lo g ic a lly  fundam entally d if f e r e n t  from 
any o f the o b jec ts  o f genuine Schopenhauerian p e ss im is tic  charactero logy. 
Moreover, th e i r  ro le  does not r e f le c t  any such o n to lo g ica l soul-God 
dichotomy as L e ibn itz  faced, o p tim is tic a lly  and on a personolog ical b a s is .
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S im ilarly , from an Indian p o in t o f view, i t  would be im possible to  
deduce pessimian from a man-God r e la t io n s h ip .) In  some form o r  o th e r, 
pessimism rep resen ts  a p r in c ip le  needed to  understand  Schopenhauer,
(12)a s  demonstrated in  von Hartmann's thorough-going- response.
Ton Hartmann considers p h ilo so p h ica l o r  th e o re tic a l pessimism,
by which he means the te n e t o f the  negative  sum t o t a l  o f happiness,
as  an induc tive ly  gained tru e  in s ig h t on s t r i c t l y  psycholog ical, n o t
m etaphysical grounds. Ee t r i e s  to  base th e  s c ie n t i f i c  treatm ent o f the
problem on the  in d iv id u a l's  personal in n e r experience o f consciousness
(a s  in  a l l  those ph ilosoph ical d is c ip lin e s  which concern themselves
w ith sub jec tive  phenomena), which needs a s  i t s  a x io lo g ic a l complement
the  analogous in d ire c t experience in  o rd e r to  e s ta b lis h  an ob jec tiv e
and complete p ic tu re . In  o th e r  words, von Hartmann consciously t r i e s
to  match h is  p riv a te  thought w ith th a t  p re sen t in  h is  own c u ltu ra l
environment and ph ilosophical t ra d i t io n .  His manner o f inc lud ing
in d ire c t  experience i s  c ru c ia l f o r  the  development o f  h is  e n tire
p ess im is tic  perspective , because he does n o t in d ic a te  any awareness
o f  the d if fe re n t c u ltu re -sp e c if ic  ways o f a tta c h in g  meaning to  experience
and o f conveying i t .  This i s  o f fundamental importance when, in  support
(13)
o f  pessim ian, he t r i e s  to  extend h is  in d ir e c t  experience to  such 
independent realms o f Indian philosophy, a s  we s h a l l  see below* The 
combined in n er (d irec t)  and o u te r  ( in d ire c t)  experience (compare p . 14 
and I4 ( l6 )  ) suggests to  von Hartmann an in d u c tiv e  understanding o f the 
causes o f  the general phenomenon th a t  unhappiness (su ffe rin g ) outweighs 
happiness* I t  i s  the  s a t is fa c t io n  o r  n o n -sa tis fa c tio n  o f  the  w il l ,  the 
b a s is  o f l i f e ,  in  accordance w ith i t s  psycholog ical n a tu re  which prov ides 
the  causes fo r  the prevalence o f unhappiness. These causes a re  seen a s  
psychological, not m etaphysical, i . e . ,  they  a re  found in d u c tiv e ly  through
(12) ✓Replacing Schopenhauer's u n d if fe re n tia te d  ch arac te ro lo g ica l
p ersp ec tiv e , von Hartmann's in d u c tiv e  view grades th e  "negative 
eudemonological balance o f  be ing  a s  such" from em pirica l pessimism 
to  metaphysical and abso lu te  pessim ian (Fragen. pp. 78-120).
(13)
Ton Hartmann, Pessim.. p* 73.
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in n e r  experience. (Von Hartmann claim s the  same v a l id i ty  fo r
h is  in d u c tiv e ly  estab lish ed  pessim ian a s  i s  accepted f o r  the  fundamental
(l5 )laws o f p h y s ic s .)
Suffering , a p a rt from i t s  c e n tra l fu n c tio n  in  von Hartmann's
pessimism, i s  a lso  s a id  to  have a  b e n e f ic ia l  in flu en ce  on humanity
inasmuch a s  i t  provides an opportun ity  f o r  man to  re f in e  h is  moral
p o te n tia l  and expand h is  moral consciousness. Hie general preponderance
o f su ffe r in g  c o n s ti tu te s  a  conditio  s ine  qua non f o r  the  developmental
course o f  humanity which otherw ise could no t reach i t s  e th ic a l
destina tion*  S u ffe rin g  c o n s ti tu te s  a  te le o lo g ic a l ly  ind ispensab le
l in k  in  the cosmic system. Hie conscious acceptance o f  su ffe r in g
a s  an indispensable  in te g ra l  p a r t  o f  l i f e  may appear p radox ical. This
seeming paradox i s  reso lved  when we r e a l iz e  th a t  through our s tru g g le
(w ithin our c u ltu ra l development) the  form o f  ou r su ffe rin g , although
n o t i t s  quan tity , i s  changed towards an e th ic a l ly  more valuable one.
This p rocess, which gradually  removes th e  o b jec tiv e  sources o f
su ffe rin g , destroys the i l lu s io n  th a t  su ffe r in g  comes e s s e n t ia l ly  from
o u ts id e  and proves em p irica lly  th a t  i t  comes as  a  consequence o f the
psychological element which forms p a r t  o f  the b asic  p r in c ip le  o f
l i f e .  Thus, having re tra c te d  the in v in c ib le  source o f  su ffe r in g  to
our innermost s e lf ,  von Hartmann f e e ls  th a t  he has p u t us in  the
optim al p o s itio n  to  understand the  p ra c t ic a l  e th ic a l  s ig n ifican ce  o f
su ffe rin g . He c la s s i f ie s  a l l  o u te r  sources o f  su ffe rin g  (which
should be destroyed) a s  only propaedeutic stages f o r  th is  h ig h est and 
(l7 )f in a l  aim.
Z ieg le r (Hartm., pp. 113-114) r e je c t s  von Hartmann's inductive  
approach, arguing th a t  philosophy cannot (m etaphysically) accept 
a consciousness in  teims o f  a psychological o r p h y sica l phenomenon, 
since these  two concepts themselves depend on consciousness.
v J' Von Hartmann, Pessim .. pp. 80-82.
(16) Von Hartmann, Pessim .. pp. 126-127.
(17) Von Hartmann, Pessim .. p. 140.
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(2) M ystic ias. the unconscious and philosophy
Von Hartmann's s c ie n t i f ic ,  in d uctive  method, which lead s  u s, through 
a psychological stage, to  the le v e l o f  the innermost s e lf ,  u ltim a te ly  
touches upon a conception o f  the  abso lu te  f o r  which he p re fe rs  to  use
(is)the  term "the unconscious" o r  das UnbewuHte. H iis unconscious i s  a t
the  base o f a l l  d i r e c t  o r  m ystical knowledge (which, f o r  von Hartmann 
te c h n ic a lly  means the  same th in g ) . This m ystical knowledge, as  he
sees i t ,  appears a s  spontaneous experience in  our a c tu a l consciousness.
Svaa those in tu i t iv e  thoughts and fe e lin g s  a s  they occur in  the most 
o rd inary  psychological processes a re  in  p r in c ip le  considered as  m ystica l, 
because they are  brought about by a d ire c t  in te rv e n tio n  o f the  unconscious 
(regard ing  in tu i t io n  see p. 22). "Since th e  consciousness knows th a t  i t  
has no t received, e i th e r  d i r e c t ly  o r  in d ir e c t ly ,  i t s  knowledge from some 
percep tion  o f the  senses, t h i s  being the reason why i t  appears as  d ire c t  
knowledge, i t  can only have o rig in a ted  as in sp ira tio n  from the unconscious, 
thus we have understood the essence o f  the m y stica l: the  f i l l i n g  o f th e
consciousness with a  content ( fe e lin g , thought, d e s ire )  by an unexpected 
appearance o f the l a t t e r  from the  unconscious."
For von Hartmann eveiy  o r ig in a l ph ilosopher (who does no t 
merely th riv e  on inductive con stru c tio n s) i s  a  m ystic inasmuch as  he 
understands i n i t i a l l y  through an ingenious apperception which he then 
develops in te l le c tu a l ly  (whereas Schopenhauer draws a  c le a r  l in e  between 
the m ystical knowledge and i t s  p h ilo so p h ica l re n d itio n ; see p. 70). As 
von Hartmann says, the  m ystical a s  such has no form. Like anything 
which apperta in s  to  the  unconscious, i t  becomes a con ten t f o r  our 
consciou&iess only when i t  h as gone through a  psychological p rocess.
Von Hartmann (Ph.d.H .. pp. 3, I 3 - 2 l ) , in sp ire d  by Schellin g ' s  
unconscious, H egel's absolu te  idea , and Schopenhauer's m etaphysical 
p r in c ip le  o f the w ill, in troduces h is  own concept o f "the unconscious" 
f o r  the  unknown p o s itiv e  su b jec t, and e sp e c ia lly  to  u n ite  "unconscious 
w ill  and unconscious im agination".
(l9 ) For the n y s tic a l  aspect o f the  unconscious see P h .d .H .. pp. 289- 
305 (Chapter IX).
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In  h is  opinion, philosophy t r i e s  to  prove r a t io n a lly  what i t  has 
received m y stica lly , thereby try in g  to  make th e  p r iv a te  p roperty  o f 
the m ystic the general p ro p erty  of the th in k in g  p a r t  o f mankind. Ihe 
ra tio n a l p roofs, having to  draw on a m ystica l b a s is , may o ften  be 
unsuccessfu l. They a re  most e a s ily  accepted by those who a re  capable 
o f reproducing w ithin them selves the a u th o r 's  p resuppositions, such a s
Schopenhauer's conception o f w i l l ,  which, von Hartmann accep ts, adapts
(20)and in te g ra te s  in to  h is  own c e n tra l conception o f th e  unconscious.
Philosophy as von Hartmann understands i t  e s s e n tia l ly  concerns 
i t s e l f  w ith one sub jec t, namely, the re la tio n sh ip  o f  the  in d iv id u a l
(21)to  the abso lu te . As we le a rn , the union o f  the abso lu te  and the
ego (the  in d iv id u a lity  o f which i s  e ffe c ted  by the consciousness), in  
o th e r words, the union o f the  unconscious and the conscious, e x is ts  
in separab ly  and in d e s tru c t ib ly  as  long a s  th e  in d iv id u a l e x is ts . Hence 
the h is to r ic a l ly  so commonly attem pted way o f destroy ing  the 
consciousness by l e t t i n g  the  in d iv id u a l be absorbed in  the abso lu te  
i s  erroneous (compare Gebser, p . 147). Erroneous, because i t s  fo llow ers 
behave as i f  once t h e i r  aim o f  the a n n ih ila tio n  o f consciousness (00 
which in d iv id u a lity  i s  based) i s  reached, the  in d iv id u a l would s t i l l  
p e r s is t :  i t  i s  paradoxical th a t  the  ego may want to  destroy  i t s e l f  and
a t  the  same time want to  remain in  o rd er to  enjoy th i s  d e s tru c tio n . As 
i s  the case w ith Schopenhauer, von Hartmann's fundamental m etaphysical 
commitment to  the  negative ontology o f h is  own conception o f  w il l  (which 
a c ts  from w ithin  the  unconscious) p reven ts him from approaching the  
problem o f experience, o r  su ffe rin g , a s  o n to lo g ic a lly  and c u ltu ra l ly  
n e u tra l. Being  preoccupied with, h is  sp ecu la tions about the m etaphysical
Yon Hartmann, P h .d .H .. pp. 298, ^ 5 - 504.
(21) /•C haractero log ica lly , von Hartmann only  im plies Schopenhauer s 
re a c tio n  to  c u ltu ra l physiognomy, proceeding d i r e c t ly  from the w il l  to  
the  in d iv id u a l (Ph.d.TJ.. pp. 213-214): "W ill never appears w ithout 
airy motive. * .which always assumes the form o f  im ag ination .. .  .Hence, 
knowing how a person re a c ts  to  a l l  s o r ts  o f  m otives, one knows th e  
th ings which ch arac te rize  him, and thus h is  c h a ra c te r ."
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ro o ts  o f  h is  psychological observations, von Hartmann pays l i t t l e  
a t te n tio n  to  the  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f a s t ru c tu ra l ly  and fu n c tio n a lly  
psychological b a s is  o f  in d iv id u a li ty  and su ffe rin g . H iis  i s  o f sp ec ia l
(22)in te r e s t  w ith regard to h is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Ind ian  thought.
(5) Indian philosophy and re lig io n
Von Hartmann, subscrib ing  to a  n o ticeab ly  Hegelian p e rsp ec tiv e , makes 
the  d ec is iv e  assumption th a t  h i s to r ic a l ly  in  In d ia  re l ig io u s  awareness 
awakens before the s in g le  d e i t ie s ,  be in g  contem plated h e n o th e is tic a lly , 
e n te r  any noteworthy process o f  s p ir i tu a l iz a t io n .  However, due to  " the  
need f o r  concreteness o f such a low le v e l  o f  cu ltu re"  as th a t  o f  the 
Ind ians, the move attem pted in  Brahmanism towards an a b s tra c t  
m onotheistic absolute p r in c ip le  remains unsuccessfu l. The m onistic 
u n ity  o f th i s  a b s tra c t s p i r i t  (which in  h is  eyes i s  the  s tren g th  o f 
Indian re lig io n ) , which p resen ts  as i t s  su b jec tiv e  asp ec t the brahman 
and as  i t s  ob jective  aspec t the  mahan atman. i s  pa id  f o r  by the 
abandonment of the tru th  o f the  r e a l i ty  o f the  many. Von Hartmann, who 
him self a sp ire s  to  a concrete monism which, in c lu d in g  and no t excluding 
the r e a l i ty  of the  many, must go through the ign  and a b s tra c t  monism,
(23)exp lain s what, in  h is  opinion, happened in  In d ia .
Maya, o r ig in a lly  the d rive o f th e  p u re ly  id e a l th in g  towards 
se lf-m an ife s ta tio n , th a t i s  as  an o b jec tiv e  element w ith in  von 
Hartmann's abso lu te, l a t e r  changes i t s  r o le :  no longer d e s ire  i t s e l f ,  
maya becomes the o u te r motive which evokes th e  d e s ire . But th is  motive 
i s  "m isleading, oppressive and causes one to  leave  th e  tru e  being in  
favour o f the  untrue one". Due to  the paradoxical ro le s  which mava as 
an ob jec t played (e i th e r  co n trad ic tin g  from w ith in  o r  overrid in g  from 
ou ts id e  the absolu teness o f the brahman, o r  the abso lu te  unconscious 
w i l l ) ,  i t  was removed from i t s  re la tio n sh ip  w ith the  brahman and 
presented  as a merely su b jec tiv e  p r in c ip le  o f human th in k in g . H iis 
was f a c i l i t a te d  by the view th a t  the em pirica l world i t s e l f  was only
(22) Von Hartmann, P h .d .H .. pp. 299-300*
(23) Von Hartmann, Rel. Bew.. pp. 271-272, 277.
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an i l lu s io n  without any t ro th  in  i t ,  owing i t s  experience only  to  
maya. and being  in  opposition  to  the  tru e  and undivided q u a li ty - le s s  
brahman. I f  maya was a  su b jec tive  p r in c ip le , man mi^ot hope -  w ith  
th e  help  o f the  brahman w ithin  h im self -  to  understand more e a s i ly  the  
in d iv id u a l aspect and, by overcoming maya. understand h is  oneness w ith 
the  brahman. This means th a t  maya moves in  the  course o f the  h i s to r ic a l
development o f Brahmanism from the  o b jec tiv e  s id e  to  the  su b jec tiv e
, (24)side.
A bstract monism, a s  von Hartmann p o in ts  ou t, does n o t t ru ly
explain  where the  in d iv id u a ls  o r  the in d iv id u a l p o in ts  o f  view o f  the
world come from, since the unexplained d u a lity  o f the  maya-f re e  o r
maya-involved brahman ranks before any s u b je c tiv ity . He f e e ls  th a t  i f
Ind ian  thought had consequently gene beyond th i s  p o in t, i t  should have
denied the  p lu ra l i ty  o f these viewpoints and declared  s o l ip s im  in s tead
(compare Mainlander s s o l ip s i s t ic  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Buddhism, pp. 94,
99)* For von Hartmann the a b s tra c t  monism o f Brahmanism in  which the
(25)em pirical world i s  i l lu s io n  amounts to  acoanism.
Marking the beginning o f a  refoim  movement, a s  von Hartmann
sees i t ,  the Buddha en te rs  the Brahmanical scene: emphasizing the
negative  side of acosmian, he draws the necessary  consequences, lead in g
Ind ia  h is to r ic a l ly  to  the next stage, bu t p h ilo so p h ica lly  f u r th e r  away 
(26)from tru th . Von Hartmann, a n tic ip a tin g  a s ig n if ic a n t  a sp ec t o f
SpengLer s idea  o f  a  " S o c ia lis t  n irvana” (p. 131), con jec tu res th a t  
Buddhism emphasizes the general m isery o f  ex istence  (b ir th , o ld  age, 
d isease , death; p. 225) in  o rd e r to  stim u la te  the  need f o r  s a lv a tio n  in  
a l l  men. "For ihe f i r s t  time the d o c trin e  o f  the  eudemonological 
w orth lessness o f  l i f e  rep resen tin g  a  general p r in c ip le  o f  t ru th ,  i .  e. 
pessimism, appears as  the  cornerstone o f  re l ig io n ."  Brahmanism had n o t 
gone beyond a  p ra c t ic a l  a t t i tu d e  o f sadness about th e  vainness o f  
a d iv ided  being. Buddhism removed th i s  co n trad ic tio n , decid ing  th a t  th e
(24) Von Hartmann, Rel.Bew.. pp. 281-284.
(25) Von Hartmann, Rel.Bew.. pp. 286-287.
(26) Von Hartmann, Rel.Bew.. pp. 319-327.
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brahman and maya could n o t p o ssib ly  e x is t  to g e th er. Furthem ore, once 
th e  i l lu s io n  o f  a concrete ex istence  was overcome, only nothingness 
would remain. Consequently, f o r  von Hartmann, sa lv a tio n  comes from 
the negation  o f  the misery o f  ex istence, although n o t in  
a Schopenhauerian manner, bu t simply a s  a  re f le c t io n  o f  the c o n tra s t 
between ex tin c tio n  (nirvana) and su ffe rin g . We le a rn  th a t  in  Buddhism 
the  tru e  background o f  ex istence  (o r, r e la t iv e ly  speaking, th e  negative  
abso lu te) i s  nothingness; the  p o s itiv e  ground o f u n rea l ex istence  i s  
i l lu s io n ,  o r  maya ( i .e .  the p o s itiv e  ab so lu te ), bu t only  from the p o in t 
o f  view o f the y e t unredeemed in d iv id u a l. According to  von Hartmann, 
in  Buddhism nothingness and i l lu s io n  re p re se n t the o b jec tiv e  and the 
su b jec tiv e  aspects o f the same th ing : i l lu s io n  i s  nothingness a s  i t
appears to  us, o r , more p re c ise ly , as i t  wants to  m anifest i t s e l f .
"In  i t s  psychological ro o t, i l lu s io n  in  Buddhism (un like  in  our 
th inking) i s  no t considered a s  something p o s it iv e , b u t merely as 
avidva. ignorance, o r  negation  o f knowledge." While, supposedly, 
Brahmanism sees the fundamental problem in  man's having, o r  wanting 
to  have, a spec ia l ego, Buddhism sees i t  in  man's d e s ire  to  p a r t ic ip a te  
in  ex istence  in  co n trad ic tio n  with the exclusive t ru th  o f nothingness. 
This i s  why von Hartmann considers pessimism as the p h ilo so p h ical 
b a s is  of Buddhign, whereas in  h is  opinion, Brahmanism, as evidenced 
by i t s  p ra c t ic a l  use o f  Toga, pursues the p o s itiv e  aim o f a  reunion 
w ith  the brahman. In  Buddhism, as he sees i t ,  the in te n tio n  o f 
d estroy ing  ex istence and i t s  in heren t su ffe r in g  becomes ir r e le v a n t  a s  
soon as  su ffe rin g , taken as  a  psychological fo rce  o r  condition , i s  no 
longer conceived of as an e f f ic ie n t  r e a l i t y  b u t, in s te ad , a s  
no n -ex is ten t (nirvana) . In a n tic ip a tio n  o f S peng ler's  view o f a  "S to ic" 
tendency in  Buddhign (p. 131) von Hartmann d escribes th i s  "abso lu te  
ind ifferen tism " a s  the  h ig h est and l a s t  p ra c t ic a l  consequence o f 
Indian illu s io n ism .
7575-----------
De Lubac mentions th a t ,  as  e a r ly  as  in  1874, von Hartmann's
p e ss im is tic  view o f Buddhiss was c r i t ic iz e d  as "a dep lorab le
ph ilosophical parody" (by Renouvier, C r i t . . p . 292); he a lso  th inks
th a t  most lovers o f Buddhism in  Elurope have more o r le s s  been fo llow ers
o f  Schopenhauer (see rencon tre , pp. 282(l45), 280).
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(4 ) Pessimism induced from Indian thought
Von Hartmann c r i t i c i z e s  Brahmanign and Buddhign f o r  "reducing* the  
o b je c tiv e  phenomenality o f em pirical r e a l i t y  to  i l lu s io n " y i . e .  f o r  
dep riv in g  mankind o f re a lity *  H is own approach, aspiring* to  what he 
b e lie v e s  to  be the su p erio r le v e l o f concrete  monign, presupposes the  
h i s to r ic a l  r e a l i t y  o f the  world process* E pistem ologica lly , von 
Hartmann* s  transcenden tal rea lism  subordinates th e  r e a l  ex is ten ce  o f 
th in g s  to  th e  fo m s  o f  our cognition . Following Schopenhauer, he d e riv e s  
th e  ex istence  o f  th i s  world from an i r r a t io n a l  w il l  which, in  h i s  case , 
works from w ith in  the unconscious. S usta in ing  ( in  K a n t's  name) an
(28)e v o lu tio n is tic  optimism on the b a s is  o f h is  eudemonological pessim isii,
von Hartmann r e je c ts  what he considers as  Schopenhauer* s  p r a c t ic a l
a t t i tu d e  o f pessim ian, d isreg ard in g  com pletely such c h a rac te ro lo g ic a l and
(29)
c u ltu ro lo g ic a l connections as  we have shown. N evertheless, h is  own 
argument, based on the  assumption o f  an in c re a s in g  s o c io -c u ltu ra l  
d isco n ten t and c a re fu lly  arranged in  a  " s c ie n t i f i c  ind u c tiv e"  manner, 
e s s e n t ia l ly  rep resen ts  ano ther personal reform ative re a c tio n  to  c u ltu re , 
i . e .  to  h is  own c u ltu ra l condition , and no t simply a  m etaphysical 
n e ce ss ity . What von Hartmann considers h is  psycholog ica l approach to  
pessimism appears to  u s  as an ax io lo g ica l a spec t o f h is  own c u ltu re  
re a c tio n : he l i t e r a l l y  wants to  weigh unhappiness ag a in s t happiness. In
accordance w ith h is  h is to r ic a l  p e rsp ec tiv e , su ffe rin g , in e x tr ic a b ly  
connected w ith each in d iv id u a l s e l f ,  fu n c tions a s  an e th ic a l  p re re q u is i te  
f o r  human progress in  general (c u ltu ra l  refinem ent augments su ffe r in g ) .
For von Hartmann any m ystical content i s  made conscious by a  psycholog ical 
process, which a lso  im plies su ffe rin g . Based on the  eminent te le o lo g ic a l
Z ieg le r (Hartm.. p . 192(l7 )) comments th a t  th e  presence o f  
" e v o lu tio n is tic  optimism" deprives pessimism n o t only o f  i t s  venom and 
danger, b u t o f  i t s  ch arac te r, too.
(29) Drews (Lebensweik. p* 4 l)  s ta te s  p la in ly  th a t  " fo r  von Hartmann 
pessimism was a  pure ly  th e o re tic a l , d isp ass io n a te  understand ing  o f  the  
preponderance o f  su ffe rin g  in  l i f e " .  He a lso  accep ts  (System, p. 351) 
th a t  von Hartmann has cleaned pessimism o f  such " u n s c ie n tif ic  and 
d etrim en ta l admixtures a s  a re  found, f o r  in s tan ce , in  Schopenhauer".
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ro le  o f su ffe rin g  in  th i s  p rocess, he in d u c tiv e ly  e s ta b lis h e s  h is  
eudemonological pessimian.
In  o rder to  support h is  inductive  approach, which a lso  needs 
o u te r views, he tu rn s  to  Ind ia . Unaware o f th e  c u ltu re  fa c to r , he 
p re sen ts  a h is to r ic a l  p ro jec tio n  o f Indian philosophy in c lud ing  su ffe rin g , 
which makes the d if fe re n t t r a d it io n s  appear a s  n a tu ra l ly  lead in g  up to  the  
le v e l o f h is  own outlook. In  h is  opinion, the  appearance o f  Buddhism in  
Ind ia  marks the  tra n s it io n  from a  Brahmanical p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  to  
a  proper eudemonological p r in c ip le  of pessimism, which, in  h i s  eyes, foims 
the  v e r ita b le  b a s is  o f Buddhism. Obviously, he does n o t take in to  account 
th a t  Buddhism may be considered a s  m etaphysically  n eg a tiv e , bu t no t 
c u ltu ra l ly ,  which should preclude the d e riv a tio n  o f  any form o f pessimian
(50)from i t .  He assumes th a t both  Brahmanism and Buddhism work through
system atic psychological in d iffe ren ce . But w hile the Toga o f  Brahmanism 
supposedly cen tres  on the reversion  o f th i s  in n e r o r  c o rre la te d  fo rce  o f 
the  w il l  which appears as the mayic d riv e , o r  motive f o r  th i s  d riv e , 
towards ind iv iduation , Buddhism i s  said  to  aim d i r e c t ly  a t  the  d e s tru c tio n  
o f su ffe r in g  by psychologically  s h if t in g  th e  i l lu s o iy  and su b jec tiv e  d e s ire  
f o r  p a r tic ip a tio n  in  ex istence towards the  o b je c tiv e  knowledge o f 
nothingness, which von Hartmann considers as n irv an a . He d is reg a rd s  th a t  
Buddhism, desp ite  i t s  seemingly p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  i s  n o t in te re s te d  in  
the  problem o f su ffe rin g  as  such, but in  i t s  causal connections (compare 
p. 226, th e  pratityasam utpada) . Ind ia , he b e lie v es , recognizes the  w ill , 
b u t s t i l l  denies i t  the  r e a l i ty  which i s  fundamental to  h is  own 
m etaphysical pessimism. From a  m eta-philo soph ica l p o in t o f  view we observe 
th a t ,  in  analogy w ith h is  personal b e l ie f  in  an asym pto tica l te le o lo g ic a l 
p r in c ip le  o f  psychological change, he in te r p r e ts  th e  Indian  comments on the 
p rocess o f  consciousness change a s  psychological re a c tio n s  to  c e r ta in  
incomplete o r  immature m etaphysical conceptions. He does n o t r e a l iz e  th a t ,  
d esp ite  h is  so p h is tica ted  psychological in d u c tio n , h i s  s c ie n t i f i c  a t t i tu d e  
e s s e n tia l ly  rep resen ts  a negative  c u ltu re  re a c tio n  which, m eta- 
p h ilo soph ically , i s  opposed to  the  Indian n e u tra l  "psychological11 approach.
(-XT) )
N either von Hartmann n o r Schopenhauer p re se n ts , as Radhakrishnan 
wrongly assumes, "a rev ised  version  o f  Buddhism" ( c f . P h i l . I ,  p . 542).
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(B) P h ilip p  Mainlander: In d ia  s ta b i l iz e s
(1) The world as w il l  to  d ie
Equally in sp ire d  by Schopenhauer, and bom  only one y e a r  befo re  von 
Hartmann, was Ph ilipp  M ainlander (Ph.il ipp  B&tz, 1841 -  1876). He not 
only developed bu t p ra c t ic a l ly  t r ie d  to  l iv e  up to  an uncompromising- 
m etaphysical pessimism of to ta l  d is so lu tio n  and a n n ih ila tio n . His 
"philosophy o f salvation" (Die Philosophie d e r  Erlosung) , p resen ted  by 
him as a  con tinuation  o f Kant* s and Schopenhauer* s thought, culm inates 
in  h is  ph ilo soph ical confirm ation of what he considers " e so te r ic  
Buddhisn" and "pure C h ris tia n ity " , " the  two most advanced systems so 
fa r" .  ^  Mainlander*s Weltanschauung, which consciously  inc lu d es  
a se lec tio n  o f C h ris tian  and Indian id eas , h ig h lig h ted  by h is  own very 
in d iv id u a l in te rp re ta tio n  o f Buddhism, evolves around h is  "improvement" 
o f Schopenhauer*s idea of a "w ill to l iv e " , i . e .  i t s  transfo rm ation  in to
(2)h is  own idea  of a  "w ill to  d ie".
He begins h is  p resen ta tio n  w ith the assumption th a t  in  a l l  g rea t 
c u ltu re s  the philosophical development o f the  human mind tends to  proceed
^  Mainlander* s main work, vo l. I  o f Die Philosonhie d e r  Brio sung, 
w ritten  in  1875, appeared in  1876, i . e .  seven years  a f t e r  von Hartmann's 
German p u b lica tio n  of Ihe Philosophy o f the Unconscious (see H ubinstein, 
T rias . 5 l) .  Vol. I ,  p . 366, he d ec la res  th a t "K ant's  sep a ra tio n  o f 
space and time from the  world has been the g re a te s t  deed in  the f i e l d  of 
c r i t i c a l  philosophy and w ill  never be exceeded by any o th e r" . P. 487, 
accepting , bu t a lso  try in g  to  improve Schopenhauer* s idea  o f  w i l l ,  he adds 
th a t  "space i s  a  p o in t, and time an a p o s te r io r i  connection o f reason".
(2) His philosophy th riv e s  on the impulse received  from Schopenhauer. 
Gebhard (Mainl. . p* 220) comments: "The problem o f  the  negation  o f the
w il l  to  l iv e ,  the s tr iv in g  from being towards non-being, can tu rn  in to  an 
independent l iv in g  fo rce  and reach the dimension o f a Weltanschauung 
which sees death a s  the aim and purpose of each ex isten ce ; th i s  way 
went P h ilip p  Hainllander."
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in  th ree  g rea t s tep s , which a re :  (a) polytheism , (b) monotheia*-
pan theiaa  and (c) atheism. He o f fe rs  h is  own thought as th e  d e f in i t iv e  
co n trib u tio n  to  the th ird  and f in a l  stage. While, a s  he b e lie v e s , most 
o f h is  occiden ta l contem poraries -  behaving " l ik e  th e  re fin ed  Indians o f 
the  age o f Vedanta philosophy” — take th e i r  o r ie n ta tio n  from p h ilo so p h ica l 
pantheism (which, according to  h is  view, cen tres  around such supposedly 
equ ivalen t concepts a s  w ill ,  idea , abso lu te  o r  m a tte r) , he f e e ls  ready 
to  announce h is  own breakthrough. Finding th a t the p h ilo soph ical 
expression o f the innermost essence o f both the C h ris tian  and the Buddhist 
d o c trin es  amounts to  genuine a theign , he denies th a t a  personal God
e x is ts  p a r a l le l  w ith th i s  world, whereas he accepts an a ll-p e rv ad in g
(3)impulse o f a God who died p r io r  to  the ex istence of th is  world.
Mainlander holds th a t  genuine philosophy must be com pletely
immanent, i . e . ,  no t tran sg ress in g  the content and boundaries o f th is
world, furtherm ore, i t  must be id e a l i s t i c ;  i . e . ,  bearing  the cognizing
su b jec t in  mind, the philosopher cannot expect t hings  to  be ex ac tly  as
they a re  perceived through the senses. Yet the s e ise s  and s e l f -
awareness a re  the only two sources o f experience and knowledge which he
(4)accep ts. Claiming the completion o f what he considers fundamental bu t
onesided views, notably  K ant's  and Schopenhauer's, he t r i e s  to  assume
” the h ig h est immanent viewpoint" in  h is  metaphysics. M ainlander c a l l s
him self an immanent philosopher, as compared to  Schopenhauer to  whom he
re fe r s  a s  a  transcendent philosopher. ** Developing M s own transcenden tal
re a lig n , he specu la tes th a t the world o rig in a te d  from a  God, t u t  adds th a t
(6)no human mind can ever tru ly  grasp th i s  o rig in . A ll knowledge must
(7)re ly  on p a r t i a l  analog ies w ith what can be s tud ied  in  th i s  world. From
(3) M ainlander, P h i l . I . pp. v - v i i i .
(4) Mainlander, P M 1.I. p . 3-4.
(5) M ainlander, P h i l . I .  p . 603.
(6) M ainlander, P h i l . I .  p . 449.
(7) We n o tice  a common ch arac te ro lo g ica l le v e l o f in te r e s t  in  M ainlander 
and Schopenhauer. In  the words o f  Rauschenberger (M ainl.. p . 235), " th e
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h is  observations be draws the  fo llow ing  m etaphysical conclusions:
(a) God wanted non-being;
(b) h is  own na tu re  prevented immediate non-being;
(c) h is  n a tu re  required a s p li t-u p  in to  a world o f  p lu r a l i ty  in  which 
a l l  p a r t ic ip a n ts  s t r iv e  f o r  non-being in d iv id u a lly ;
(d) in  th is  s t r i f e  they impede one ano ther, they f ig h t  a g a in s t one 
another, and thus they weaken th e i r  energy;
(e) God" s e n tire  essence was transform ed in to  the world as  a sum o f energy;
( f ) the e n tire  world, the un iverse , has one aim, non-being, which i t  
reaches through continual weakening o f  i t s  t o t a l  energy;
(g) each in d iv id u a l reaches, through th e  weakening o f  h is  energy, a p o in t 
in  h is  development where h i s  s t r iv in g  f o r  a n n ih ila tio n  can be
( o )
f u l f i l l e d .  '
For M ainlander the inorganic cosmos contains no th ing  b u t
(9)in d iv id u a l, b lin d  w ill , which follow s the impulse obtained from, the  
decomposition^1^  o f  the oneness in to  p lu ra l i ty .  T e leo lo g ica lly
contem plation o f  the world was the nourish ing  ground o f  t h e i r  philosophy, 
n o t i t s  conceptual a b s trac tio n s , in  which German philosophy had moved 
fo r  a  long time11.
Mainlander, P h i l . I .  pp. 319-326.
^  As Susanna Rubinstein (T ria s , p . 53) p o in ts  o u t, M ainlander s  w il l  
derives from a p re -e x is tin g  u n i t ,  u n lik e  Schopenhauer's w il l  which i s  
a s e i t i c  ( i . e .  i t  e x is ts  "a se"), and m onistic  in s te ad  o f  in d iv id u a lis t ic .
Mainlander (P h i l . I I .  p . 489), in s is t in g  on h is  view o f  a s t r a ig h t  
and ir r e v e rs ib le  decomposition o f the  world, "fin d s  no excuse" f o r  
Schopenhauer seeing  the  c ir c le  as the tru e  symbol f o r  n a tu re . As 
Susanna R ubinstein (T ria s , pp. 60-61) p u ts  i t  q u ite  c le a r ly , M ainlander 
wants to  use h is  observation o f  the physica l world to  prove h is  fundamental 
p ro p o sitio n : h is  "law o f the  weakening o f u n iv e rsa l energy", which, 
applying i t  to  mankind, he a lso  c a l l s  the  "law o f su ffe rin g " , i t s  extreme 
consequence being absolu te  a n n ih ila tio n . Ranschenberger (M ainl.. pp. 232 
and 236) re fe rs  to  M ainlander's "d isso lu tio n  o f the d e ity "  as  "the  most 
consequent testimony o f  pessimism in  the  e n tire  h is to ry  o f  philosophy11.
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M ainlander in te rp re ts  th is  Schopenhauer!an w il l  to  l iv e  a s , a c tu a lly , 
pure w il l  to  d ie : f o r  him l i f e  i t s e l f  i s  m erely a  m an ifesta tio n  o f  the
w il l  to  d ie . Mankind marks only a  t r a n s i to ry  stage in  the world process 
in  which God changes from a form of o v er-ex is ten ce , in to  ex isten ce  (o r 
becoming) and then in to  non-existence* When, a f t e r  the  a n n ih ila tio n  o f 
the  transcendent realm, the immanent p a r t  o f th e  world d isappears we 
have completed our ta sk  and have a tta in e d  the  n ih i l  negativum (compare 
Schopenhauer, p* 58). In  M ainlander's eyes only  an undeniable o p tim is t, 
i .e *  "one whose w il l  i s  no t y e t mature f o r  death" , could r e je c t  th i s  
view. Eowever, a s  he adds a s tu te ly , a l l  supposed antagonism between th e  
o p tim is t and the pessim ist re s u l ts  merely from some m isunderstanding, s in ce  
e s s e n tia l ly  andN u ltim a te ly  both want, must want, th e  same th in g , which 
i s  death and an n ih ila tio n . This abso lu te  a n n ih ila tio n  to  which he
a sp ire s , he b e liev es  to  have rediscovered in  the  Buddhist concept o f 
n irvana . Prophesizing th a t fo u r p e rs o n a li t ie s  would stand out u n t i l  
humanity vanished, he names the Buddha before  Kant, C h ris t and
Schopenhauer, thus c le a r ly  in d ic a tin g  how im pressed he was by what he
(12)had gleaned from the Buddhist doc trine .
See Mainlander (P h il. I . pp. 348-349), where he a lso  teaches th a t  
the tru e  and consequent pessim ist tu rn s  axsy  from l i f e  and " r ig h t ly  
regards the  beg e ttin g  of ch ild ren  a s  a  crim e". At an e a r l i e r  occasion 
(P h i l . I .  p . 83) he declares th a t  the id ea  on which a  s in g le  ex istence  
depends becomes destroyed i f  the in d iv id u a l does n o t "re juvenate  by 
b eg e ttin g  o ffsp ring". Thirty  years l a t e r  a  p a r a l le l  to  Mainlander1' s 
v irg in i ty  id e a l i s  created  by Otto Weininger (l880 — 1903, su ic id e) who 
in  h is  mirin work (G .u.Char.. p* 298) blames th e  c h ild -b ea rin g  "mother 
type" f o r  p u llin g  humanity permanently back in to  the  p a in fu l re p e ti t io n s  
of l i f e ,  only the child-denying "cou rtisan e  type", through and to g e th e r 
w ith the man, has the p o te n tia l to  overcome th ese .
(l2 )
Mainlander, P h il .I . pp. 329-349, 618-620.
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(2) The Buddha, a s  a  s o l in s is t ic  pro to~pessim ist
Setting- a  noteworthy in te rn a tio n a l standard fo r  philosophy, Mainlander
announces th a t ,  beyond any doubt, c e r ta in  Buddhist te x ts  a re  "on the
same le v e l  a s  the New Testament, the C ritiq u e  o f  Pure Reason and th e
World as  W ill and Imagination and a re  unequaled by any o th e r  work o f  the  
(13)human mind". Confident in  h is  own competence as  an in te r p r e te r  of
Buddhign, he complains th a t in  Europe Buddhist id eas  a re  in d isc rim in a te ly  
claim ed and inapp rop ria te ly  used by m a te r ia l is ts ,  r e a l i s t s ,  i d e a l i s t s  
and even p an th e is ts . However, Buddhign and pantheism a re  to  be seen a s  
p o la r  opposites. "The magic b lue flow er must no t be touched, must only 
be admired11, he d ec la res , u sing  the rom anticists* symbol o f t h e i r  
yearn ing  f o r  the in f in i te .
In  h is  an a ly s is  o f Buddhism M ainlander fin d s  th a t  the  Buddha's 
teach ing  shares many id ea l fe a tu re s  w ith the pan theisa  o f the  ancien t 
Brahmans. Both a re  p ess im is tic , i . e .  "permeated by the t r u th  th a t  l i f e  
i s  an e v il" .  For both  the o u te r  world i s  u n rea l, a  mere i l lu s io n .  Both 
a sp ire  to  sa lva tion . And y e t, as he ex p la in s , th e re  e x is ts  no g re a te r  
d iffe ren c e  than th a t between Brahmanian and Buddhign. In  h is  opinion, 
Brahmanism considers the o u te r  world and in d iv id u a l p e rso n a lity  a s  
im agination, a s  nothing, and the incomprehensible world sou l, th e  
brahman, as the only re a l th ing . Buddhism, however, considering  merely 
the  o u te r world a s  phenomenal, accepts only the Buddha a s  re a l .
M ainlander ignores th a t  Buddhism does no t d iv ide the  world in to  an inner, 
non-phenosenological, and an o u te r, phenomenological, sphere*
Phenomenal!ty, in  Buddhign, r e f e r s  to  the  world a s  a  whole. ( ih e  very  
te rn  "phenomenal" excludes such b in a ry  and dicotom izing term inology a s  
used  by M ainlander.) He confiden tly  claim s th a t  he can support h is  view 
on the  b a s is  o f Buddhist te x ts  (while try in g  to see through the p h a n ta s tic  
d is to r t io n s  o f the Buddha's le s s  en ligh tened  fo llo w e rs ) . He then
(l3 ) He in d ic a te s  as h is  main re fe ren ces  Spence Hardy, Manual o f 
Buddhism (i860) and Eastern Mena chi gn (i860 ); c f . o u r p . 42(5). For h i s  
own view o f  "e so te ric  Buddhism" see P h i l . I I . pp. 73-94, a lso  compare 
Schopenhauer, our p. 59(43).
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proceeds to  expose "the  e so te r ic  and e s s e n tia l  p a r t” o f  Buddhiai a s  
follows*
Hie Buddha based h is  view on the e n tir e ty  o f  h is  p e rso n a lity , 
the cognizing and the wanting- ego. Mainlander c a l l s  Mat a  ’’pure 
id e a l is t" ,  claiming- th a t he had been pushed in to  th i s  by Samkhya 
philosophy through which, f o r  the  f i r s t  t in e ,  Brahmanism encountered 
some opposition . "Namely, the  philosopher Sankhya ( s ic ) ,  the Buddha's 
p redecessor, was ju s t  as extravagant as  the  ancien t Brahmans." Sam khya 
in  over- empha s i  zing- the p r in c ip le  o f  re a l s in g le  in d iv id u a li ty  fo rg o t 
the a ll-co n n ec tin g  p r in c ip le , thus rem aining ju s t  a s  f a r  away from, t r u th  
a s  the  idea  o f a  simple one-ness in  and above the world does. Hie 
Buddha's viewpoint, which according to  Mainlander i s  th a t  o f  th e  
in d iv id u a l, a lso  supposedly i s  the only c o rre c t one in  philosophy* I t  
im plies th a t  the genuine s ta r t in g  p o in t must be sought in  our own 
p e rso n a lity . Everything th a t r e s u l ts  from sense percep tion  stems e i th e r  
from ou tside  o r  from in s id e  ourse lves. He c a l l s  th is  cond ition  the 
im portant problem o f c r i t i c a l  idealism  and the  g rea t o b s tac le  in  
th ink ing . Reminding us th a t Kant has explained the o u te r  world as  an 
id e a l a f f in i t y  o f th ings with reason, Mainlander agrees th a t  th e  world 
i s  phenomenal and i t s  appearances depend on a sub jec tive  nexus.
On the b a s is  o f these  preceding references M ainlander exp lains 
what he considers the "eso te ric "  p a r t  o f Buddhism, f i r s t  we must 
imagine th a t the  ind iv idua l p e rso n a lity  o f each one o f u s  i s  the  only 
re a l  th in g  in  the world, p ro v is io n a lly  assuming th a t we a re  th e  Buddha 
ourselves. "In  no o th e r way can the m iraculous b lue flow er o f In d ia  be 
c reated  o r  understood ." Hie only re a l  th in g  the Buddha could f in d  in  
him self was upadana (more p re c ise ly , the upadanas; pp. 227, 229) which fo r  
Mainlander means c leaving  to  ex istence  and e x is t in g  o b je c ts , o r  th e  w ill  
to  l iv e .  He re fe rs  to  the upadanas as  w ill  in  a  conventional ( le s s  than 
formal) manner, which, on th i s  le v e l , may be regarded as  herm eneu tica lly  
acceptable. B iis  form of general w il l  rece ives i t s  s p e c if ic  c h a ra c te r  
through karma, which he in te rp re ts  as  ac tio n  o r  supreme power. He 
concludes th a t a t  f i r s t  s ig h t Buddhism seems based on two p r in c ip le s , 
but a c tu a lly  i s  based only on one, since karma and the  upadanas a re  the
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gflms. One in e v ita b le  e x is ts  w ith  the o th e r. Karma i s  the  essence*
(14)th e  upadanas a re  the form, the general. With th e  in d iv id u a l w ill
to  l iv e  (as determined by the p r in c ip le s  o f karma and the  upadanas) i s  
a lso  in e x tric a b ly  connected the  p r in c ip le  of re in carn a tio n . He explains 
th i s  fu r th e r  by quoting Spence Hardy: "through upadana a new ex istence
i s  caused, bu t the way and manner in  which th is  new c rea tu re  a c ts  
depends on h is  karma, h is  c h a ra c te r ." “Karma i t s e l f  only depends on 
i t s e l f ,  on i t s  sp e c if ic , in d iv id u a l c h a ra c te r .” Then he p o in ts  ou t how, 
in  h is  opinion, the Buddha him self determ ines the  prim eval essence o f 
h is  n a tu re : “Karma i s  achinteyya ( s ic ) ,  i . e .  w ithout consciousness.
N e ith er karma nor upadana has self-aw areness" (ac in tav a : to  th in k  no t,
to  r e f le c t  n o t) .
At th is  elementary stage o f h is  view o f Buddhism Mainlander 
a lso  in troduces the fundamental p r in c ip le  o f Schopenhauer's philosophy, 
th e  unconscious w il l  to  l iv e . He i s  convinced th a t  i t  was, more than 
anything e lse , Buddhist w ritings which must have influenced  Schopenhauer' 3 
thought: " In d ia 's  age-old  wisdom found, a f t e r  alm ost th ree  and a  h a lf
thousand years ( s ic ) ,  the  descendant o f an em igrated son o f  the 
wonderland." Tracing fo r  us the development o f  th e  Buddha's thought, 
M ainlander says th a t  the next th in g  the Buddha found was th a t  which 
m irrored karma and the upadanas: the mind o r  self-aw areness. He
emphasizes th a t  th is  m irro r i s  no t p a r t  o f  the essence o f  the w ill ,  b u t 
th a t  i t  i s  only phenomenal, i . e .  essenceless  i l lu s io n . From th i s  fo llow s 
the  phenomenal n a tu re  o f the body and the  o u te r  world, according to  the 
Buddha, the i l lu s io n  o f an i l lu s io n . M ainlander then  p o in ts  ou t an
As von Glasenapp (indb. * p . 92) no tes, Schopenhauer, in  a  l e t t e r  
w ritte n  in  1856 and re fe r r in g  to  H ardy's works on Buddhign, had a lso  
equated upadana and karma. S. R ubinstein, m issing  the  images which 
should shape the w ill  a  la  Schopenhauer, in s te ad  observes a  c o n tra s t 
(T ria s* p . 55): "According to  Schopenhauer the idea  i s  a transcenden ta l
type which perpetuates  i t s e l f  in  the phenomena.. . .  According to  Mainlander 
the  idea i s  the epitomy o f a l l  fe a tu re s  of an in d iv id u a l."
Cl *5) Hardy, Manual (i860), pp. 394-596.
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im portant d iffe ren ce  between Kant and the  Buddha. Hie body i s ,  
according to  Kant, appearance, f o r  which Kant f in d s  a  cause. F o r the  
"m agnificent Indian", however, the body i s  i l lu s io n ,  i s  e ssence less , i s  
nothing. Ib is  i s  s u f f ic ie n t  f o r  M ainlander to  c a l l  the  Buddhist d o c trin e  
despo tic  o r  summary c r i t i c a l  id e a l i  a i .  "Here the  Bn<?<rh» and Kant jo in  
hands l ik e  b ro th e rs ." Hie Buddha d ec la re s , by v ir tu e  o f  h is  own 
p e rso n a lity  (th e  only r e a l i ty )  and w ithout any reasons, th a t  body, mind 
and world a re  nothing. Kant, on the  o th e r  hand, analyses the  human mind 
and proves th a t  no t only the  o u te r  world b u t a lso  we ourse lves a re  
appearance. We a re  the mirroring: o f  o u r s e l f  by o u r consciousness. Kant 
had no knowledge o f  the  Buddha's teaching , b u t both  he and the  Buddha 
had th is  id e a l is e  " in  th e i r  Indo-European blood", a s  we a re  to ld . 
Mainlander apparently  looks a t  the  Buddha p rim arily  as  a  th in k e r  
concerned with r e a l i ty ,  l in k in g  up, and even equating to  some ex ten t, th e  
Kantean view with " e so te r ic  Buddhign" (the  expression was in  f a c t ,  w ith
(xt)some re serv a tio n , used by Schopenhauer ) .  From a  Buddhist view point 
e so te r ic , i . e .  yogic. methods might allow  one to  see th in g s  a s  they 
re a l ly  a re ; however, we a re  n o t dealin g  w ith transcenden tal c a te g o rie s  
(a lso  see Buddhign, p. 242).
On the b a s is  o f  th i s  comparative d e sc rip tio n , M ainlander
announces th a t  the th in g  which i s  re a l  i s  no lo n g er the  Buddha's own
p e rso n a lity , whence he had s ta r te d ,  b u t the  unconscious karma, th e
m indless ind iv idual w ill  to  l iv e .  The Buddha thus decla red  th a t  karma
(l8)i s  ind iv idua l, b u t, s in ce  he d id  n o t fu rn ish  any reasons, M ainlander 
h im self wants to  show how th i s  statem ent can be derived  from the  
p r in c ip le s  o f Buddhign i t s e l f .  Before l e t t i n g  him proceed, we must 
mention th a t M ainlander's assumption o f karma as b e in g  s t r i c t l y  in d iv id u a l 
i s  not Buddhistic. Although, in  Buddhign, every th ing  may be regarded a s  
ind iv id u a l, e .g . ,  in  the sense o f what d is tin g u ish es  two persons, i t  
never appears in  the sense o f a  m etaphysical category. I t  would be more
appropria te  to  assume th a t where the Buddha i s ,  karma does n o t work (and,
Mainlander, P h i l . I I , p . 79. Cf. K an t's  own opinion, our p . 4 4 (l5 ) .
(l7 ) Schopenhauer, W.W.II. p . 589.
Hardy, Manual (i860), p . 446.
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th e re fo re , n o t a f fe c t  him). Hie Buddhist may, from an in d iv id u a l 
p o in t o f  view, consider h is  body as in d iv id u a l, b u t no t n e ce ssa rily  
karma o r  "his" karma.
As Mainlander sees i t ,  the  Buddha found w ith in  him self the
strong- but no t a lm ig h ty  drive  f o r  ex istence, the  w il l  to l iv e .  He a lso
found a hidden, unconscious power emerging in  the fonn o f thoughts and
fe e lin g s . 'Hds power became the b a s is  o f h is  thought, since i t  was here
th a t  he discovered the  p r in c ip le  o f omnipotence. "Kama i s  supreme
(19)
power'1, as Mainlander quotes. Prom th is  alm ighty, unconscious,
in d iv id u a l karma he wants to  derive  a l l  the o th e r  p r in c ip le s  mentioned 
so f a r :  our conscious fre e  w il l  i s  an i l lu s io n ,  because i t  im plies
a  r e s t r ic t io n  which would he con trary  to  omnipotence; th e  e n t i r e  human 
mind, inc lud ing  i t s  sen s itiv en ess , i s  an i l lu s io n ,  because i t  cannot 
r e f le c t  the re a l  karma; i f  we consider the mind a s  an i l lu s io n ,  we must 
n e c e ssa rily  accept th a t  a lso  our body and the  o u te r  world a re  an i l lu s io n  
since  th e i r  ex istence depends upon the re f le c t io n  by th i s  i l lu s o ry  
m irro r. Mainlander now explains why, a p a r t from the  f a c t  th a t  no second 
th in g  can e x is t  besides the one which i s  alm ighty, karma must be 
in d iv id u a l. Ju s t as  the concept o f  in f in i ty  depends on the id eas  of 
space and time which due to  t h e i r  id e a l na tu re  cannot be more r e a l  than 
the mind, which its e lf  i s  an i l lu s io n ,  so th e re  can only remain some 
in d iv id u a l th ing  which i s  no t in f in i te .  We should conceive o f th e  l a t t e r  
in  terms o f  pure and unimaginable in d iv id u a lity . Prom here he proceeds 
to  h is  main question concerning the  innermost essence o f th i s  omnipotent, 
unconscious karma. His answer r e s t s  on fo u r  negative  p re d ic a te s : 
unconscious (because we cannot be aware o f  our unconsciousness), 
omnipotent (because i t  negates the n a tu ra l l im ita t io n  o f  the world as we 
can experience i t ) ,  spaceless, and tim eless  (both ensuing from, the  
above-mentioned idealism  seen in  the Buddhist d o c tr in e ). AH these 
negations in d ic a te  to  him th a t  karma transcends the  human mind. He 
quotes: "Ihe wonder-working karma i s  a mere a b s tr a c t io n .. .  .One o f th e
fo u r  th ings which only a  Buddha can comprehend i s :  karmavisva. i . e .  in
which manner karma causes e f fe c t '1 (vesaya: to  cause to  e n te r  in to ) .
Mainlander, P h il .I I . p. 81.
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He th ere fo re  d esc rib es  Buddhign a s  transcendent d o g u a ti^ . He a lso  
r e f e r s  to  i t  as " th ing-as-such  id e a lia a "  because, on the  b a s is  o f  Inner 
experience, only the  ego possesses r e a l i ty .
Hie only thing- which i s  p o s it iv e  in  M ainlander's  view o f 
" e s o te r ic  Buddhism" i s  the p ro p o sitio n  th a t  karma i s  in d iv id u a l and th a t  
i t  e x is ts .  He adds th a t  the  Buddha d id  n o t t e l l  u s  how t h i s  could be 
explained, because he could n o t. We should l ik e  to  p o in t ou t th a t  karma 
in  Buddhism has no th e o re tic a l  meaning. I t  i s  M ainlander who changes i t  
in to  a  th e o re tic a l  category. In  h is  opin ion , the  Buddha d id  n o t d e riv e  
the in d iv id u a l cause o f  l i f e  from sane transcendent prim eval cause which 
was lo s t  in  time, b u t from some transcendent prim eval cause which was 
always p resen t and e te rn a l. However, by p u ttin g  the transcendent, 
inexp lo rab le  cause o f  the world before the world ( in  such a  manner th a t  
f i r s t  the cause e x is ts  on i t s  own b u t i s  then rep laced  by the world 
i t s e l f )  M ainlander co n triv es  a  c le a r ly  ordered world whose appearances 
he considers in  no way enigm atic, a p a r t from th a t  one m irac le  which i s  
the o r ig in  o f  the world i t s e l f .  On the b a s is  o f th i s  hyp o th e tica l 
assumption o r  b e l ie f ,  u s in g  karma a s  the  e s s e n tia l  f a c to r  to  secure 
s tead iness in  time, he e s ta b lish e s  a form o f h is to r ic a l, o rd e r in  h is  
outlook. (M ainlander s need f o r  l in e a r  development r e f le c ts  the s tro n g ly  
h is to r ic a l  na tu re  o f the German conception o f  c u ltu re . In  In d ia  time i s  
never a fo m  o f u n ity  b u t, r a th e r ,  d isco n tin u ity  i s  seme c o -e ffe c t o f  
time. Compare p. 146(2 ).) only problem rem aining enigm atic f o r  him
i s  th a t  o f  how th e re  can have ex is ted  such a oneness befo re  the world.
As we le a rn , the Buddha, by assuming th a t  only he h im self was r e a l ,  made 
i t  fe a s ib le  th a t  th e  prim eval cause ex is ted  w ith him sim ultaneously. In  
a l l  o th e r cases where such a  r e a l i ty  i s  supposed to  comprise more than  
one in d iv id u a l, M ainlander th in k s  i t  confusing and paradoxical th a t  th e
(20) Hie two kinds o f  idealism  which Mainlander d is tin g u ish es  a re :
(a) C r i t ic a l  idealism  = transcenden tal idealism : Kant i s  th e  "messiah
o f c r i t i c a l  idealism "; (b) abso lu te  idealism  = *thi.ng-as-such
id ea l ig n " : only in  the teach ing  o f  the  Buddha (a lso  th e o re tic a l  
egoisn = so lip sism ). See Mainlander, P h i l . I I . pp. 39 > 51, 55.
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transcendent prim eval cause, which i s  oneness (he a lso  c a l l s  i t  God),
should be p resen t sim ultaneously. R eferring  back to  the  Oupnek' h a t —
thus, honouring ex ac tly  the same source as Schopenhauer had used more
than h a lf  a century before him -  he ventures to  dem onstrate how the
c o rrec t conclusions should be drawn, e sp e c ia lly  w ith  re sp ec t to  von
Hartmann's supposedly erroneous in te rp re ta t io n  shown below. M ainlander
w rite s : "Inasmuch as , according to  patheism , we a re  expected to  th ink
th a t  God, the simple oneness, could, fo r  example, e x is t  whole and
undivided in  Jack and a t  the same time whole and undivided in  J i l l ,  we
f e e l  c le a r ly  in  our mind th a t something i s  being  covered up, because such
(21)a  connection, although e a s ily  phrased, cannot be imagined o r  though t."
He th inks th a t the Buddha should have f e l t  th a t  he, b u t only he h im self
as one sing le  in d iv id u a l, was God. Ihe Buddha c a rr ie d  w ith in  h im self
God and the world, and o th er than him self th e re  was nothing. Quoting from
the Oupnek'hat. "hae omnes c rea tu rae  in  to turn ego sum e t  p ra e te r  me a liu d
ens non est"  (see p. 54), M ainlander f in d s  the an c ien t Upanisadic t ru th  a t
l e a s t  as su itab le  fo r  Euddhism as  f o r  pantheism (Brahmanism). He th in k s
th a t  th is  problem of id e n tif ic a t io n , when misunderstood, accounts fo r  the
confusion between Buddhign and pantheism. As an example o f what he
considers "a most su p e rf ic ia l in v e s tig a tio n  in to  the g rea t system" he
quotes von Hartmann: "Hie only e n t i ty  which corresponds to  the id ea  o f
the inner cause o f my ac tio n  i s  something non -in d iv id u al. the a ll-o n e
Unconscious, which th e re fo re  corresponds as equally  w ell to  P e te r 's  id ea
h is  ego as  to  P a u l 's  idea of h is  ego. On th i s  deepest o f a l l  grounds
(22)i s  based only the e so te r ic  Buddhist e th ic , n o t th e  C h ris tian  one."
Mainlande r, P h i l . I I ,  p* 84; a lso  c f . Schopenhauer, P .P .I I . § 69, 
a g a in s t pantheism.
(22) Von Hartmann, P h .d .U .. p. 648 (= p. 718 in  M ainlander's re fe ren ce  
which corresponds w ith the 1871/72 e d itio n s ) . In  Phanom.. p. 689, he 
calmly re a sse r ts  h is  own view of a h is to r ic a l  development o f mankind:
" Ih is ,  however, presupposes to ta l  renunciation  o f the  demand f o r  in d iv id u a l 
sa lv a tio n  and the replacement o f e g o is tic  pseudomoral by the moral 
p r in c ip le  o f c u ltu ra l development, which means g iv ing  up th a t  which makes 
the sp ec ific  d ifferen ce  between M ainlander's standpoin t and m ine."
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Again, Main.1and.ej wants to  g ive  u s  th e  im pression th a t  only he can 
p roperly  handle " th e  m iraculous b lue  flow er” . In  h is  view pan theiaa  
i s  f u l l  o f co n trad ic tio n s  b u t Buddhism i s  n o t. Hie only  m iracle he asks 
u s  to  accept i s  the e te rn a l transcenden t cause from which everything1 
e ls e  fo llow s c le a r ly  and lo g ic a lly . This m iracle  he a lso  describes 
as the unconscious, tim e le ss , spaceless  and in d iv id u a l karma. He 
explains th a t i t  f i r s t  c re a te s  f o r  i t s e l f  body and mind (including' 
senses, in t e l l e c t ,  power o f  judgement, phantasy, and reason ). Hiere 
i s  no co n trad ic tio n , s in ce  karma i s  omnipotent. Next, feeling- and 
im agination are  developed. According- to  e s o te r ic  Buddhism the e n tir e  
world i s  a lso  phenomenal. The l im ita t io n  o f  the Buddha's personal w il l  
i s  a lso  phenomenal. The only r e a l  th in g  i s  the  omnipotent karma 
w ith in  him.
Mainlander now comes to  what he considers the c ru c ia l question  
o f  e so te r ic  Buddhism, which i s  the question  o f  why the Buddha could be 
the  alm ighty God when he was i n  f a c t  r e s t r i c te d  in  h is  a c tio n s . He 
accep ts  th a t  th is  s i tu a t io n  must have re s u lte d  in  a  r e a l  c o n f l ic t  w ith in  
the  Buddha. Hie obvious answer which he g ives u s  i s  th a t  karma, the 
"w ill" , wanted th i s  c o n f l ic t .  I t  used i t s  omnipotence to  c re a te  i t s e l f  
some semi-independent body to g e th e r w ith  a l l  the c o n stitu en ts  o f  
a powerful world o f  i l lu s io n .  But why d id  i t  want th i s  re a l  c o n flic t?  
A rriv ing  a t  the cen tre -p iece  o f h is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  Buddhism,
Kainlander rev ea ls  the  ro le  o f karma through what remains fo r  him th e  
on ly  p o ssib le  answer: "Hirough th i s  in ca rn a tio n  i n  a  world o f  i l lu s io n
i t  wanted a n n ih ila tio n , the change from being: to  non-being." He 
e lab o ra te s , "the c o n f l ic t  i s  the  in d iv id u a l f a te  which karma d i r e c ts  
w ith in sc ru tab le  wisdom and omnipotence. Predom inantly karma connects 
su ffe r in g  w ith  ex isten ce  and through knowledge shows how the  Buddha 
can l ib e r a te  h im self from e x is te n c e ." Karma works only fo r  i t s  own 
aim. I t  develops the m otives in  the o u te r  world and the  d e s ire s  w ith in  
u s , because i t  needs th e  re s u l t in g  c o n f l ic t  s i tu a t io n s  in  o rd er to  
a t t a in  non-existence. I-Iainlander adds th a t  the  alm ighty karma could 
n o t, as one would perhaps have expected, l ib e ra te  i t s e l f  from ex isten ce  
immediately, simply because i t s  omnipotence i s  no omnipotence when i t
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Taces i t s e l f .  Hie r e f  o re , the a tta inm ent o f  non -ex istence  can only  r e s u l t
(23)from a  gradual process o f  c o n f lic t.
M ainlander s tre s s e s  th a t  the  e s s e n tia l  d iffe ren ce  between 
pantheig* and Buddhism r e s ts  on the fundamental Buddhist assumption th a t  
karma never in ca rn a te s  in  more than in  one in d iv id u a l. Karma, he 
exp la in s, never s tay s  in  ju s t  one body u n t i l  i t  has reached i t s  aim, b u t 
i t  changes i t s  form continuously* On the b a s is  o f  what he has termed 
th ing-as-such  idealism  he in tends to  give such a  c le a r  dem onstration o f 
th e  irre lev an ce  o f re in carn a tio n  th a t  h is  read er i s  taken to  the 
boundaries o f reason* He openly confesses? " I  f e e l  c le a r ly  th a t  only 
a  narrow s t r i p  separa tes  me from the  realm o f m adness.11 Only h is  own 
ex isten ce , inc lud ing  h is  own p a s t back to  h is  childhood i s  r e a l  f o r  him 
and, o f  course, h is  own omnipotent karma which, through him, u ltim a te ly  
works fo r  i t s  own end. He assu res  us th a t nobody has ever stood o r  w ill  
ever stand more firm ly  on the ground o f the abso lu te  ego than he h im self, 
b u t th a t  he has l e f t  th a t ground a f t e r  thorough contem plation, f in d in g  
th a t  the  s o l ip s i s t i c  view o f the omnipotent w il l  could have had i t s  
u n re s tr ic te d  v a l id i ty  only before  the  world came in to  ex istence . He 
expects u s  to  admit th a t  the assumption o f  an ab so lu te ly  phenomenal world 
could make a s  much sense a s  th a t  o f a  re a l  world. He d isposes o f the 
seeming co n trad ic tio n  in  th is  view by reminding u s  th a t  the  abso lu te  
t ru th  l i e s  in  the  fa c t  th a t  God i s  in  a  s ta te  o f change from being  in to  
non-being. Since we never know where we ourse lves f i t  in  between the 
f i r s t  and the l a s t  in carn a tio n  o f  God, M ainlander q u a l i f ie s  the  e n tire  
question  of re in ca rn a tio n  a s  m arginal. But he p o in ts  out th a t  what he 
c a l l s  God, o r  in  Buddhist language karma, could never, a s  long a s  i t  
remained pure and omnipotent karma, reach non-being. Incarn a tio n  
remains a  cond itio  s in e  qua non f o r  non-being. I t  appears as 
i r r e le v a n t  fo r  him whether God (the  omnipotent karma) should be looked 
a t  a s  e x is t in g  in  the  divided world o r  as  being  in  ju s t  one s in g le
(23) Olga Plumacher ( in d iv .. p . 22) n o tic e s  a  double movement in  th is  
process? a  development o f form which i s  accompanied by the exhaustion 
o f  w il l  (promoted by each in d iv id u a l d eath ).
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(24)person. Each person mast decide p r iv a te ly  i f  i t  i s  he through whoa
God changes in to  non-ex istence. As long a s  the  incarn ated  God i s  no t 
freed , the world must continue; as soon as  i t  i s  ready f o r  non-being 
i t  w ill  cease to  e x is t .
M ainlander i s  convinced th a t h is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f e so te r ic  
Buddhisa does complete ju s t ic e  to  i t .  Ee ex to ls  i t  as  " th e  only d o c tr in e  
which d isso lves a l l  a b su rd itie s  o f l i f e ,  i t s  gruesome, d readfu l c h a rac te r  
and every th in g  agonizing and enigm atic in  our s c ie n t i f i c  ou tlook". Hie 
repu lsiveness o f the h o rr ib le  th in g s  w ith which we must p u t up in  l i f e  
lo se s  i t s  absurd power once we come to  r e a l iz e  th a t  th e  alm ighty karma 
u ses  th i s  un rea l i l lu s io n  in  o rder to  develop the  necessary  d isg u s t in  
us . The gruesome s tru g g le  f o r  ex istence  in  such a  co ld , bloody, p a in fu l 
world, and the  m iraculous phenomenon o f  ou r e n t i r e  em pirical world, i s  
only  a  means f o r  the karma to  l ib e ra te  i t s e l f .
C r it ic iz in g  K an t's  "grandiose c r i t i c a l  idealism " M ainlander 
o f f e rs  to  make i t  "consequent and invulnerable" by connecting i t  w ith  
h is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  Buddha's " th ing-as-such  (o r  abso lu te) 
id ea lig n " . He suggests th a t  our sense im pressions a re  caused by th e  
unconscious w ill, and th a t  th e  assumption o f  a  m u lt ip l ic i ty  o f " th in g s  
as  such" i s  i r r e le v a n t. With th i s  l i t t l e  ( f a i r ly  Schopenhauer!an) 
improvement o f  h is ,  K an t's  view should surmount even th a t  o f  th e  Buddha, 
since Kant had demonstrated p h ilo so p h ica lly  how th e  world a r i s e s  in  
accordance w ith o u r mental im pressions, while the Buddha had only  
decreed th a t  i t  i s  i l lu s io n .  M ainlander exp lains th a t  only now, w ith  
h i s  co rrec tio n s , would K an t's  ingenious d is t in c t io n  between in t e l l i g ib l e  
and em pirical ch a rac te r deserve Schopenhauer's ex trao rd in a ry  p ra is e , 
because now we could see th a t  behind ju s t  one em pirica l c h a ra c te r  th e re  
l i e s  only one s in g le  in te l l ig ib l e  charac te r. He a ssu re s  u s  th a t  a s  
soon a s  we r e f e r  back to  one s in g le  ind iv idual w i l l ,  the Buddha's karma.
W Olga Plumacher ( in d iv .. p . 25), in  c r i t i c iz in g  M ainlander's  
in d iv id u a lise , p o in ts  o u t th a t Schopenhauer could assume a tim e le ss  
id e n t i ty  o f in d iv id u a ls  "not because he was a m onist, bu t because he 
was a sub jec tive  id e a l i s t" ,  and because fo r  him "every th ing  physica l i s  
something m etaphysical ( f o r  which Mainlander, the immanent ph ilosopher, 
reproaches him)".
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even, the  most daring' and premature o f  Schopenhauer' s statem ents become
ju s t i f ia b le ,  f o r  in s tan ce  h is  "obscure” remarks “One can a lso  say: th e
w ill  to  l iv e  m anifests i t s e l f  in  countless phenomena which a lto g e th e r
r e s u l t  in  no th ing. This nothingness w ith  a l l  i t s  m an ife s ta tio n s  remains,
(25)however, w ith in  the w il l  to  l iv e  and l i e s  a t  i t s  bottom".
3Jie d if f e r e n t  ways which may le ad  to  sa lv a tio n  s t r ik e  
M ainlander as a  secondary problem, h is  p r in c ip a l in te r e s t  be ing  d ire c ted
(26)towards sa lv a tio n  i t s e l f .  His own fe e l in g  o f  Lehengmiidigkeit
(weariness o f l i f e ;  compare the c u ltu ra l  taedium v i ta e  in  Spengler, 
p. 122) i s  p a th e t ic a l ly  expressed in  h is  words: "A ll by m yself am I  in
th is  world, and I  am t i r e d ,  very t i r e d .  I  and the  world, we want to  
d ie .”
(5) P essim ist deduced from Indian thought
M ainlander's manner o f deducing pessimism from Indian thought re v e a ls  -  
analogous to  N ie tzsch e 's  Z ara thustra  -  h is  a lie n a tio n  from C h ris t ia n ity  
( i . e . ,  the C h ris tian  element in  h is  cu ltu re ) inasmuch a s  i t  re v e a ls  how 
u rg en tly  he needed a d if f e r e n t  standpo in t, namely, one which, a t  le a s t  
m etaphysically , allowed him to operate  independent o f  any European 
m etaphorical attachm ent. Ind ia  (as  the  o r ia n t in  g en era l) , in  
f u l f i l l i n g  a m etaphorical fu n c tio n , a lso  provides the  requ ired  
"alienness" (see p h ilo soph ical a lie n a tio n , p . 70).
M ainlander, P h i l . I I .  p . 94; Schopenhauer, P .P .I I  (§ 147a), p . 514.
(26) S. Rubinstein (T ria s , pp. 68-77) judges th a t  M ainlander, in  h is  own 
eudemonistic pessimism, did no t achieve as  w ell-ordered  a  te leo lo g y  a s  von 
Hartmann: h is  conception of an e x is te n tia  of a  (dead) God and e sse n tia  o f
a (proceeding) God in d ic a te s  to  h e r a  c e r ta in  awareness o f th a t  "palpable  
con trad iction" underly ing  i t .  Rauschenbezger (M ainl.. pp. 257-245) l i s t s  
th a t  Mainlander, developing Schopenhauer's c r i t i c a l  id e a lig a  in to  c r i t i c a l  
re a lig n  (w ith the exception o f m atter) and transcenden ta l re a lig n , 
rep laces Schopenhauer's inner-w orld ly  process o f ( r e la t iv e )  negation  by 
h is  own (absolu te) a n n ih ila tio n  through the time process.
104
The in t r i c a te  philosophy o f Mainlander combines h is
in te rp re ta t io n s  o f h is  p r in c ip a l German forerunners w ith a  c lev e rly
adapted view o f what he tak es  f o r  the essence o f Euddhism. In a  manner
rem inding us o f h is  m aster Schopenhauer, M ainlander assu res  us of th e
supremacy o f h is  ra d ic a l ind iv idualism . We e a s ily  fo llow  h is  overt
co rrec tio n s  o f those German views incorporated  by him. But h is  re la t io n
w ith  Buddhism s tr ik e s  u s  no t only  a s  f a r  more complex b u t a lso  a s  q u ite
w ilfu l  in  severa l re sp ec ts  ( e .g . ,  h is  equation o f th e  Kantean view w ith
e s o te r ic , i . e .  yogic. Euddhism). The manner in  which he in co rpo ra tes
Buddhist elements in  h is  own view r e f le c ts  h is  n a tu ra lly  lim ited  standard
o f  info im ation , which he h im se lf, however, seems to  have considered
exhaustive. Buddhologically, he d id  not have enough m a te ria l to
ap p rec ia te  the problem of "w ill"  in  Buddhign; c e r ta in ly , n e i th e r  karma
(27)
n o r upadana i s  w ill (see p. 245). Herm eneutically, h is  in te rp re ta tio n  
o f Buddhign may well have o rig in a te d  in  the  follow ing c irc u la r  manner.
On the b a s is  o f c e r ta in  p re ju d ices  (obtained through Kant, Schopenhauer, 
and perhaps von Hartmann) M ainlander may have looked only f o r  c e r ta in  
messages in  Buddhist l i t e r a tu r e .  The meaning which then a rose  between 
the messages he found and the thought he had brought along seems to  have 
re su lte d  in  the complete ad ap ta tio n  o f h is  view o f Buddhign to h is  own 
eudemonistic pessimign, inc lud ing  some p a r t ia l  equation o f  the two views. 
Through h is  metaphysical p e ss im is tic  h e rita g e  he im p lic i t ly  p a r t ic ip a te s  
in  Schopenhauer's c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n , while skipping h is  ch arac te ro lo g ica l 
approach. Hie s tru c tu re  o f  h is  won m etaphysical outlook touches, 
te le o lo g ic a lly , upon a  h is to r ic a l  and, eudem onistically , an an th ropo log ica l 
( e th ic a l ,  e x is te n tia l)  le v e l o f  pessimism, b u t he in d ic a te s  no c u ltu ra l  
awareness w ith in  h is  own re a c tio n . In s tead , he t r e a t s  pessimism as 
a  u n iv e rsa l m etaphysical concept and a  genuine l in k  w ith Buddhign.
In  h is  p e ss im is tic  re a c tio n  to  the  world, M ainlander proceeds 
in  p r in c ip le  from su ffe rin g  to  understanding and fu r th e r  to  the  wish f o r  
non-being. His p r in c ip a l ph ilo so p h ical b e l ie f  i s  expressed in  h is
(27) Hadhakrishnan ( p h i l . I . p . 571) a lso  s t i l l  equates Schopenhauer's 
"w ill"  w ith the Bhddha's karma.
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statem ent th a t  a l l  philosophy r e s t s  on transcendent foundations. By
putting- h is  version  o f  a  transcendent prim eval cause before  th e  -world
(a s tep  which he considers a d ecis iv e  improvement on what he tak es  to  be
the  genuine Bhddhist outlook) he t r i e s  to  explain  the  ind ispensab le
c o n f l ic t  (the su ffe rin g ) experienced in  an a id le s s  l in e  o f  persons, o r
in d iv id u a l m anifestations o f the  w il l  to  l iv e .  Although M ainlander's
p r in c ip le  o f in d iv idua tion  provides, a s  in  Schopenhauer, the m etaphysical
connecting po in t f o r  h is  own p e ss im is tic  c u ltu re  re a c tio n , i t  opera tes
on a  d if fe re n t le v e l  o f  r e a l i ty .  D iscarding K an t's  view o f a  m u lt ip l ic i ty
o f  " th ings-as-such", he t r i e s  to  develop an "immanent philosophy" which,
inco rp o ra tin g  a  change from su b jec tiv e  c r i t i c a l  id e a l is n  to  transcenden ta l
realism —idealism , allow s him to  d isco v er th a t  w i l l  in  i t s  in d iv id u a l form
aims a t  se lf -a n n ih ila tio n . On the c u ltu ra l  le v e l  i t  i s  the  ever p resen t
p a in fu l e x is te n tia l  c o n f l ic t  through which M ainlander re a l iz e s  th a t  the
w ill  to  l iv e  i s  e s s e n tia l ly  a w il l  to  d ie  which, upon m atu rity  (having
used i t s e l f  up), tu rns every th ing  in to  non-being, which he id e n t i f ie s
w ith  n irvana, (a c u ltu ro lo g ic a l connection o f n irvana  and the  w i l l 's
dynamic momentum towards form w ithout con ten t occurs in  Spengler; see
pp. 131-132.) He d iverges from the a c tu a l Buddhist view which assumes
th a t  su ffe rin g  (duhkfaa) i s  (a) one o f the  th re e  fundamental "marks o f the
universe" and (b) o b je c tiv e ly  derivab le  from avidya. the only b a s ic  form
o f  r e a l i ty  (see Buddhism, p. 246). He ignores th a t  i t  a lso  i s  the
establishm ent of the causal connection between avidya and duhkha. not the
su ffe rin g  as such, which l i e s  a t  th e  core o f Buddhism. The Buddhist aim
i s  to  stop the flow o f consequences stemming from avidya. S uffering  does
no t cause but simply co incides w ith  f in a l  understanding . Likewise, i t
p lays no causal ro le  regard ing  n irvana . M ainlander i s  a  p e ss im is t because
•
he personally  sees no way to  escape from su ffe r in g  o th e r than through
to ta l  re je c tio n  of the  world. Through h is  m etaphysical exp lo ra tio n s  o f
the  w ill  he fo rces h im self to b e liev e  th a t su ffe r in g  i s  even fundam entally
necessary  in  order to  term inate, in  a  h is to r ic a l  sense, the ex istence  o f
(28)the world and w ith i t  th a t  of mankind.
f pQ \
S. Rubinstein (T rias, pp. 52, 78), m entioning M ainlander's su ic id e  
on 31 March 1876, the day a f t e r  h is  main work was published, emphasizes
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(c) Paul Dens sen: a  p e ss im is tic  p e rfe c tio n  o f Indian  philosophy
Paul Deussen (l845 -  1919) was e n th u s ia s t ic a l ly  introduced to
Schopenhauer s thought by h is  form er schoolmate F ried rich  Nietzsche
(l844 -  1 9 0 0 ) .^  But, while N ietzsche in  h is  search f o r  the  superman
l e f t  the l im ita tio n s  of Schopenhauerian m etaphysical pessimism behind,
an tic ipating- in  a sense S peng ler's  and G ebser's  p red ic tio n s  o f th e  ©id
o f tra d it io n a l philosophy, Deussen remained a  l i f e - lo n g  fo llow er and
(2 )
proponent o f Schopenhauer's teachings.
Ve a re  in troducing  him as the l a s t  member o f our small group o f 
genuine philosophers. Technically  speaking, Deussen i s  a  re p re se n ta tiv e  
philosopher, although h is  e s s e n tia l  p h ilo soph ical co n trib u tio n  co n s is ts , 
a p a r t from various short w ritin g s , in  only one small work, Die Elemente 
der Metapbysik (notw ithstanding h is  voluminous Allgemeine Geschichte 
d e r Philosophie. in  which he t r i e s  to  p resen t the major ph ilosoph ical 
t r a d it io n s  of the world as p a r ts  o f a General H isto ry  o f the World; and 
ir re sp e c tiv e  of h is  g rea t in d o lo g ica l work). Our two c u ltu ra l  th in k e rs , 
whom we p resen t a f t e r  Deussen, t r e a t  m etaphysical pessimism, as  we s h a ll  
see , la rg e ly  as a problem of the p a s t, Spengler by formal transform ation
how uncompromisingly, as compared to  Schopenhauer, h is  l i f e  and d o c trin e  
were connected. Gebhard f e a in l . . pp. 225-226), re je c tin g  the p o s s ib i l i ty  
o f ph ilosoph ical exem plification  in  th is  p o in t, comments th a t " in  h is  
main work Mainlander never recommended su ic id e , b u t, l ik e  Schopenhauer, 
on ly  offered  h is  moral support in  case o f  the  a c tu a l in c id en t" ; id e a l ly  
he wanted to  pass on h is  knowledge o f sa lv a tio n  to  everybody. 
Eauschenberger (M ainl.. p . 256) considers M ainlander as the only 
philosopher, so f a r ,  who connects pessimism w ith so c ia lisn  (a lso  compare 
Spengler, our p. 152).
^  Deussen (Wie ich  zu Schoph. kam. p . 14) begins to  read and 
contemplate Schopenhauer in  1868; a lso  c f . N ietzsche, p . 58.
(2)
Mockrauer (Deussen, p . 78) remarks th a t  th i s  "consciously 
d is c ip le - l ik e  serving re la tio n sh ip  to  Schopenhauer" has d is tra c te d  
people from h is  own ph ilosoph ical s ig n ifican ce .
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b u t w ithout achieving the necessary  in n e r detachment, Gebser by 
fo resee in g  a fundamental change in  man's approach to  thought a s  such.
In  Deussen's outlook pessimism s t i l l  rep re sen ts  a  m etaphysical summit.
( l )  D eussen's a lleg ian ce  to  Schopenhauer
Deussen rece iv es  h is  p r in c ip a l m etaphysical o r ie n ta tio n  through
Schopenhauer, to  whom, as he b e lie v es , the world owes the p e rfe c tio n
(3)o f  K an t's  thought. ’"Hiere i s  noth ing  b u t w il l ;  i t s  proper s ta te  i s
negation; an ab erra tio n  o f  the  w il l  i s  a ffirm atio n , the m an ifesta tion
(4)and p u r if ic a to ry  process o f which i s  th i s  e n tir e  w orld .” In  these  
words th e re  l i e s  f o r  him "the m etaphysical t ru th  which f o r  a l l  co u n tries  
and tim es i s  one and the same". U nlike von Hartmann, M ainlander, o r  
o th e r  c r i t i c s ,  he has l i t t l e  to  add o r  to  a l t e r  which would amount to 
an e s s e n tia l  change o f Schopenhauer's view. In s tead , Deussen's accura te  
and system atic p e rso n a lity  f in d s  i t  g ra tify in g  to  comment on m etaphysical 
s id e -asp ec ts  which he fin d s  s tr ik in g , l ib e r a l ly  inc lud ing  Indian concepts 
in to  h is  ph ilosoph ical e lab o ra tio n s  and equations.
Unaware o f the c u ltu ra l ch arac te ro lo g ica l u n d ers tru c tu re  o f
Schopenhauer's metaphysics, which we have exposed a s  the fundamental
le v e l  o f  in sp ira tio n  f o r  h is  concept o f w ill ,  Deussen t r i e s  to  c o rrec t
Schopenhauer's, and K an t's , m etaphysical concept o f the human charac te r,
which according to  them p re sen ts  both  an em pirical, un free , and an
(5)
in t e l l ig ib l e ,  f r e e , aspect. Deussen considers i t  as in ap p ro p ria te  
to  regard  th i s  in te l l ig ib l e  ch a rac te r, being  non-em pirical and f re e , as 
c h arac te r a t  a l l .  He argues th a t  an in d iv id u a l having a c e r ta in  
c h a rac te r  has c e r ta in  q u a l i t ie s  which, according to  the law o f  c au sa lity , 
d e tem in e  h is  a c tio n s , and consequently he i s  no longer f r e e . Should th e  
i n t e l l ig ib l e  character, as  Kant and Schopenhauer want i t ,  be something 
f re e , then i t  cannot r e a l ly  be a  type o f ch a rac te r because as  such i t  
would contain q u a l i t ie s ,  which n e c e s sa r ily  l im it .  Having ra ised  the 
problem in  th is  manner, Deussen re -d e fin e s  the in te l l ig ib l e  ch a rac te r a s
(3) Deussen, Kant u.Schoph.« p . 9*
(4) Deussen, Elemente d .H e t., pp. 112-113-
(5) Deussen, Kant u.Schoph.. pp. 11-14.
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a  God-like e n t i ty  which., s in ce  i t  con tain s the t o t a l i t y  o f q u a l i t ie s ,  i s  
de fa c to  q u a li ty - le s s . R eferring  to  i t  as a  non-conmitted p o s s ib i l i ty  
o f  good and e v i l ,  f re e  to  fo llow  one d ire c tio n  of q u a l i t ie s  o r  another, 
he e x p l ic i t ly  s h i f ts  the emphasis from th is  conception o f God to  th a t 
o f  a  soul which i s  s im ila r ly  f re e  to  choose i t s  own d ire c tio n . ^
Obviously, Deussen i s  wary o f any breach between the  em pirical
and the in te l l ig ib le  ch arac te r. In d ica tin g  th is  by h is  own modified
Schopenhauerian approach ap p aren tly  r e s u l ts  f o r  Hm in  a  t a c t ic a l
m etaphysical advantage: he improves h is  b a s is  o f in d iv id u a l freedom.
"This p o s s ib i l i ty  c o n s is ts  in  being  ab le , a t  any moment in  our l i f e ,  to
renounce th is  e n tire  v o rld -o rd e r based on egoism and ru led  by
(7)
c a u s a l i ty .1* Hie essence o f th i s  view, he f e e ls ,  i s  b e s t expressed 
by the  id eas  o f  the C h ris tian  s e lf -d e n ia l  and Schopenhauer's d o c trin e  of 
the  negation  o f the w ill  to  l iv e .  But th is  negation, as Deussen 
emphasizes, does no t aim a t  a  to ta l  a n n ih ila tio n  o f the world qua w il l ;  
i t  i s  so le ly  d irec ted  ag a in s t th a t  em pirical w orld-order which i s  ru led  
by egoism. He p ic tu re s  i t  as  a  slow and steady process. "As a  ru le , 
negation  i s  n o t, as some (o f Schopenhauer's) l a t e r  remarks may seem to  
suggest, a suddenly consumed process bu t a gradual p u r if ic a tio n  through 
the  whole d is c ip lin in g  e f f e c t  o f l i f e ,  u n t i l  there  happens what the  
Bhagavadgita says: aneka .ianma samsiddhas ta to  v a ti  oaram gatim
(p e rfec tin g  him self through many l iv e s ,  he then a t ta in s  to  the  h ig h est 
g o a l; 6 .4 5 ) .”
This does no t amount to  a  change o f the em pirical ch arac te r, 
a s  Deussen exp lains fu r th e r ,  b u t to  an emancipation o f  the w il l  from 
the  e n t i r e  em pirical ch a rac te r and i t s  p h y sica l f ix a tio n  "as the  Ind ians 
have come to  re a liz e , teaching th a t  one who I s  l ib e ra te d  during h is  
l ife tim e  (.1 ivan-mukta) does no lo nger consider the body as th e  s e l f
^  He en larges fu r th e r  on the m ystica l aspect of the freedom o f w ill  
in  h is  Jakob Bohme. pp. 34-37.
(7) Deussen, Kant u .Schoph.t p . 13.
(8 )
Deussen, A .G .P h il.I I .2. p . 553; Kant u.Schoph.. p . 14; t r .  Radhakr.
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and even no lo nger the su ffe rin g s  o f h is  body a s  h is  own”.
Kant, as we a re  reminded, has approached the th in g  as  such 
only by proceeding through space, time and c a u sa lity ; bu t Schopenhauer, 
bearing  in  mind th a t ,  besides appearance, we a re  a lso  th ing  as  such, 
recognized i t  as the  w ill  in  ourse lves (undoubtedly the atman), h is  main 
improvement being the d iv is io n  o f the  psyche, o r  soul, in to  w ill  and 
in te l l e c t .
(2 ) Schopenhauer and Sankara as reform ers o f  Indian  thought
Having le a rn t  in  which regard  Schopenhauer, w ith a  l i t t l e  improvement
by Deussen h im self, has no t only safegarded b u t a c tu a lly  p e rfec ted
K an t's  teach ing , we a lso  le a rn  th a t  he p lay s  a  supposedly s im ila r  ro le
(9)w ith  re sp ec t to  h is  Indian an teceden ts. In  o rd e r to  convince us th a t
Ind ian  philosophy i s  centred on one fundamental idea  which, prepared by 
Kant, reoccurs in  Schopenhauer, Deussen takes two p e c u lia r  s tep s . He 
d ec la re s  (a) th a t  the o rig in a l "idealism " o f  the  Hpanisads d e te r io ra te d  
in  th e  course o f  a  d is to r t in g  t r a d i t io n  and th e re fo re  had to  be 
re in s ta te d  by Sankara, and (b) th a t  i t s  u ltim a te  e lu c id a tio n  andf \
development i s  found in  Schopenhauer. The "daring  and rugged
idealism " o f the o ld e s t Upanisadic te x ts ,  as spread, f o r  in s tan ce , by
th e  sage Yajnavalkya in  the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (compare p. 200),
• «
"passes s tep  by step in to  pantheism, cosmogony, theign , and f in a l ly  in to  
the atheism  o f  the Saiikhya system and the  apsychign of the  Buddhists, 
u n t i l  in  the end the  g re a t reform er Sankara (bom  788 A.D., ex ac tly  
a thousand years before  Schopenhauer h is  m ental and s p i r i tu a l  kinsman,
and 1215 years  a f t e r  P la to  who advocated in  Greek garb the same 
fundamental m etaphysical views) re s to re s  th a t  o r ig in a l idealism ", 
(ihese  analog ies and synchronisms, which Deussen cen tres  somewhat
(9) Deussen, Ved.Pl.Kant, pp. 16-24.
Quite generally , Max M uller (l823 -  1900) a lready  accep ts  th a t  the 
w ill ,  o r  sub jec t o f the phenomenal world, corresponds w ith the brahman 
in  both  Sankara and the Hpanisads (Vedanta. p. 69).
( l l ) Deussen, Ved.Pl.Kant, p. 17.
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amorphously on h is  concept o r  pessimism, appear again w ith c le a r ly  
s tru c tu red , im portant ro le s  in  Spengler and in  G ebser.)
Hie o rig in a l idealism  of Yajnavalkya i s  based, according to 
Deussen, on th ree  p ro p o sitio n s , (a) Hie so le  r e a l i ty  in  the world i s  
th e  atman. the s e l f :  i . e . ,  the world, being phenomenon, according to  
Kant, o r  rep resen ta tiv e  im agination, according to  Schopenhauer, only 
e x is ts  in  my conscious s e l f  ( in  th e  in t e l l e c t  which evolves from the 
w i l l ) ,  (b) As one o f two s ig n if ic a n t  c o ro lla r ie s  o f th is  fundamental 
p ro p o sitio n  the atman i s  looked upon as  the "see r o f seeing, the  h ea re r 
o f hearing, the knower o f knowing", which i s  the su b jec t o f  knowledge 
w ith in  us. F a ith fu lly  Schopenhauerian in  s p i r i t ,  Deussen exp lain s th a t  
" th is  knowing sub jec t i s  s t i l l  no t the  u ltim a te ; i t  i s  hom e by the 
su b jec t o f w illin g , which, as  w illin g , extends to  the whole world, bu t 
which as n o t-w illin g  may appear in  an o th er d iv ine  world unknown to  us 
b u t v is ib le  and comprehensible to  u s  in  the phenomenon o f moral conduct.
This thought o f  the Hpanisads has been developed to  i t s  u ltim a te
* ( I 2 )p ro fund ity  only by the genius o f  Schopenhauer." (c) Hie o th e r
co ro lla ry  i s  the p ro p o sitio n  th a t  " the  atman as  su b jec t o f  knowledge i s
and remains e te rn a lly  unknowable (and) i s  no t a tta in a b le  through
knowledge, b u t only by becoming immediately absorbed in  our own s e l f n.
(Here Deussen re fe rs  to  yoga as  "the a r t  o f  withdrawing in to  o n e s e lf . . .
and o f there becoming immediately aware o f the u ltim a te  m ystery o f  a l l
being".)
Next, the p rocess o f  ph ilo so p h ical d e te r io ra tio n , a s  seen by 
Deussen, reaches some p a n th e is tic  s tag e  (e sp ec ia lly  in  the  Chandogya 
Upanisad; compare p. 198) a t  which the  one atman becomes id e n tic a l  w ith 
the  em pirical world. Perhaps a s  a  re a c tio n  ag a in s t the  o b scu rity  o f 
t h i s  equation, as he f e e ls ,  the atman comes to  be regarded from a  more 
causal, cosmogonic p e rsp ec tiv e  according to  which he f i r s t  c re a te s  the  
world and then en te rs  in to  i t .  Hie subsequent d i s t in c t  d iv is io n  in to  
a w orld-creating  atman and an in d iv id u a l atman marks a  new le v e l  in  
the  decline of the o r ig in a l  thought "which has become the  s ta r t in g  
p o in t fo r  modem philosophy, namely theism". Once separated  in  th is
(l2) Deussen, Ved.Pl.Kant. p. 20.
I l l
manner, the  w orld -creating  atman becomes o b li te ra te d  by an ever growing
realism , "so th a t  th e re  were l e f t  over only a r e a l  world (p r a k r t i ) and th e
in d iv id u a l souls (purusa) entangled in  i t " .  This s tep  takes Deussen to
the  Samkhya System (as he f in d s  i t  in  both  the Kahabharata and the
Karika) "which can be regarded only as  the u ltim a te  product of th a t
g radually  p rogressive degeneration, b u t n o t, as one imagined, as an
(13)o rig in a l c rea tio n  o f the  mind based on n a tu ra l percep tion". He
considers the  ph ilosoph ical a spec t o f  Yoga as a  p a ra l le l  to  Samkhya's 
a lle g ed ly  d u a lis t ic  response to  the impulse of su ffe rin g  (compare p. 280).
On th is  u ltim ate  le v e l o f estrangement from the o r ig in a l 
Upanisadic doctrine , Deussen f in d s  an opportun ity  to  connect, w ithout 
jeo p ard iz in g  the coherency o f h is  view, the Brahmanical l in e  of 
development w ith the Buddhist t ra d i t io n ,  namely, inagnuch as  i t  "combines 
apsychiga with the atheism of Samkhya". Now a change o f supposedly 
Schopenhauerian proportion  happens. "In to  th is  s p i r i tu a l  and mental 
confusion th e re  appears the g rea t re lig io u s  and ph ilosophical reform er 
Sankara." Ihe l a t t e r ,  by developing a method which allow s him to  look a t  
h is  ph ilo soph ical h e ritag e  from both  a le v e l o f lower knowledge (aoara 
v idya) and o f h igher knowledge (vara  v idva). re s to re s , as Deussen 
b e liev es , Y ajnavalkya's o rig in a l th ree  te n e ts , the Upanisadic p r in c ip le s  
of the unknowableness of God, o f h is  id e n ti ty  w ith the soul, and o f the 
n o n -re a lity  o f the w orld-creation  and metempsychosis. "Through Sankara 
th i s  d o c trin e  found i t s  c u ltiv a tio n , p reva len t in  In d ia  even a t  the 
p re sen t tim e, and in  the Kantian Schopenhauerian ph i l osophy i t  found th a t 
system atic  foundation which i t  i t s e l f  lacked ."  This smooth decline
o f the Indian ph ilosoph ical t r a d i t io n  and i t s  e f fe c tu a l re su rre c tio n s , 
one Ind ian , one German, sh a ll be a t  the cen tre  of our heim eneutic 
a tte n tio n  d irec ted  to  the nature  of Deussen's ch a rac te ro lo g ica l, c u ltu ra l  
and h is to r ic a l  awareness which allow s him to  p lace  h is  enormous 
indo log ica l work on a p e ss im is tic  m etaphysical base. But f i r s t  we must 
see how he connects pessimism and su ffe rin g .
(13) Deussen, Ved.Pl.Kant. p. 22.
(14)
Deussen, Ved.Pl.Kant. p. 24.
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(*5) Pessimism evolves w ith  the quest o f de liverance  from su ffe rin g
Deussen assumes a  fundamental u n iv e rsa l connection between pessimism and 
the doctrine  of de liverance . "The th ree  g re a t re lig io n s  o f mankind, 
th e re fo re , Brahmanism, Buddhism, and C h r is tia n ity , and no t l e s s  the 
philosophy o f Schopenhauer, which rep re sen ts  C h r is tia n ity  in  i t s  p u res t 
fo rm ,. . .  assume th a t th is  e a r th ly  ex istence  i s  a co n d itio n .. .  the
(15)conception of which has been b r ie f ly  and w ell described  as  pessimism. “
In d ica tin g  pessimism as  " the  la te n t  underly ing  o f  the Upanisad teaching",
Deussen includes i t  r ig h t  from the beginning in  the described  process o f
ph ilo soph ical d e te r io ra tio n  (compare p. 198). "Monism i s  the  n a tu ra l
s tandpoin t o f philosophy, and wherever dualism has appeared in  i t s
h is to ry  i t  has always been the consequence o f antecedent s tre s s  and
d if f ic u l ty ,  and as  i t  were the symptom o f th e  wane o f  the  ph ilosoph iz ing  
(l6)s p i r i t . " He then draws a p a r a l le l  between the  dualism o f  D escartes
"which began w ith P la to  and A ris to tle "  and the  dualism of Samkhya.
Mentioning th a t the o r ig in a l concern o f  the Hpanisads was " th e  deliverance
from avidva by the knowledge o f  the atman". and deliverance  from su ffe r in g
e s s e n tia l ly  a  by-product, Deussen dec la res  th a t  " th e  cl imaT o f  th is
p e ss im is tic  movement i s  reached in  the Samkhya system", which s t r ik e s  him
(17)as be ing  predominantly concerned w ith a v e r tin g  su ffe rin g . "Such
a standpoin t, where i t  makes i t s  appearance in  philosophy, i s  everywhere 
a symptom of exhaustion." Having l o s t  the pure d e s ire  f o r  knowledge and 
tru th , "philosophy becomes a means to  an end, a  remedium f o r  the  su ffe r in g  
o f  ex istence". Such i s  the tren d  which Deussen observes in  p o s t-  
A ris to te lia n  thought and analogously in  Samkhya. and Buddhism. (H iis  
German s e n s i t iv i ty  to  the phenomenon o f d ec lin e , as we a lready  see i t  here  
in  Deussen, i s  to  reach  peak p o s itio n s  in  the thought o f bo th  Spengler and 
G ebser.) The common m istake o f d eriv ing  pessimism from su ffe rin g  in  
Indian  thought, e sp e c ia lly  from Buddhism, i s  a lso  repeated  by Deussen. 
"Buddhism was the  f i r s t  to transform  th a t which was a mere consequence
Deussen, P h il.U p s .. p. 140 ( i . e .  A .G .P h il .I I .5. p . 563).
Deussen, P h il.U p s .. p. 244 ( i . e .  A .G .P h il .I I .5. p. 220).
( yj )
Deussen, P h il.U ps.. pp. 254-255 ( i . e .  A .G .Phil.II.5t pp. 229-230).
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in to  a  motive, and by conceiving emancipation as  an escape from th e  
su ffe rin g s  o f ex istence , to make se lf ish n e ss  the  u ltim a te  m ainspring 
of re lig io n . Hie ac tu a l ro le  o f the p r in c ip le  o f su ffe rin g  in
Buddhist th o u ^ it, b r ie f ly  re fe rre d  to  a t  the  end of our exposition  of 
Plain lander, i s  tre a te d  in  more d e ta i l  in  our chap ter on Buddhism, -while 
Deussen's hermeneutic, i . e .  h is  c u ltu ra l  and h is to r ic a l  awareness, here 
remains our immediate concern.
(4) Deussen c o lle c ts  pessimign
Our in e v ita b le  in te r e s t  in  Deussen a s  a philosopher may have tem porarily  
obscured the  f a c t  th a t  he a c tu a lly  rev erses  the fa m ilia r  functional! ro le  
o f the Indian and German t r ib u ta r ie s  to  m etaphysical pessimism: h is
o v e ra ll  ph ilo soph ical argument, although no t w ithout o r ig in a l i ty  and 
s ig n ifican ce , i s  sh o rt, whereas h is  indo log ica l work, which has to  be 
seen e n tire ly  in  the l ig h t  of h is  Schopenhauerian outlook, i s  v a s t. 
M etaphysically he m odifies and mellows Schopenhauer's p e ss im is tic  view 
o f  in d iv idua l freedom (ignoring , however, h is  v iv id  ch arac te ro lo g ica l 
cu ltu re  re a c tio n ) , while emphasizing th a t  negation  i s  d ire c ted  ag a in s t 
em pirical egoign, not a g a is t th e  essence o f  the world qua w ill .  Deussen's 
e x p lic i t ly  m onistic stance does no t question  the spec tacu lar bu t 
inadm issible equation of w ill  and atman. S im ilarly , he follow s the 
e s tab lish ed  p erspec tive  which t r e a t s  pessimism as  a u n iv e rsa l response 
to  su ffe ring .
Ihe "reformed V edantist" o r ie n ta tio n  which Deussen d isp lay s
on the b a s is  o f a very smooth p ro je c tio n  o f European-Indian ph ilo so p h ica l
declin e  makes him as  l i t t l e  a s  h is  fo rerunners  a  tru e  p h ilo so p h ical
h is to r ia n . Deussen i s  a ph ilo so p h ica l c o lle c to r . Schopenhauer's
o r ig in a l cu ltu re  reac tio n  e s s e n t ia l ly  a lso  s a t i s f i e s  Deussen's
refo im ative s p i r i t .  Deussen re tro s p e c tiv e ly  rewards him by fo r t i fy in g
h is  much wanted m etaphysical ou ts id e  p o s itio n , dec la rin g  th a t " in  In d ia
(l9 )metaphysics can be traced  almost to  i t s  o rig in " . Deussen, the
Deussen, P h il.U p s ., p. 341 ( i . e .  A .G .P h il .I I .3. p. 307).
(l9) Deussen, Elemente d .H e t., p . 113.
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in d o lo g is t, goes th e re  -  a s  a  Schopenhauerian.
Herm eneutically speaking-, Deussen" s  w orld-unifying approach 
to  the  h is to ry  o f philosophy (preposterous from a  Spenglerian p o in t o f 
view and simply "d e fic ien t"  in  a Gebserian sense) rep resen ts  a form o f 
ra t io n a l ly  immoderate ph ilosoph ical annexation in  which Indian ideas 
a re  a ss im ila ted  out o f context. Vfe f in d  Indian philosophy presen ted , 
in  p r in c ip le , a s  a  m etaphysical ex tension  o f  German thought. I t  a lso  
appears again  as  an is o la te d  event and n o t a s  a  complex flow o f d if f e re n t 
t r a d i t io n s ,  which in  Deussen" s case seems e sp e c ia lly  remarkable.
His developmental p ro jec tio n  serves a  (predeterm ined) m etaphysical 
need. One obvious reason why he d id  n o t overcome h is  in h e rite d  
herm eneutic l im ita tio n s  seems to  l i e  in  the  f a c t  th a t  he d id  no t see 
h i s  own tra d i t io n .  In  ad d itio n , the Schopenhauerians t r e a t  pessimism 
from an exclusive ly  m etaphysical ang le, overlooking e n tir e ly  the  
fundamental c u ltu ra l  reac tio n  in  i t  (which Schopenhauer p re sen ts  most 
v iv id ly  o f a l l ) .  M eta-philosophically , Deussen d id  n o t ap p rec ia te  
India" s e n t i r e ly  d if fe re n t  c u ltu ra l s itu a tio n . Ihe rev erse  problem, 
namely an attem pt to  firm ly  a l l o t  thought to  c u ltu re , sh a ll  be d iscussed  
in  o u r next chapter.
D isregard ing  the independent h is to r ic a l  backgrounds o f the 
in d iv id u a l Indian  t r a d it io n s  (accu ra te ly  described in  h is  work), he 
t r e a t s  then a l l ,  r ig h t from the beginning (A.G.Phil. 1 .1 , p . l ) ,  a s  
u n iv e rsa lly  cen tred  on "the  th in g  as such".
115
C hapter Four
Spengler: the Indian p a ra l le l  -  fu lf ilm en t o r  pessimism?
Oswald Arnold G o ttfried  Spengler (i860 -  193&), in  unfo ld ing  h is  hold  
and g ig an tic  view of "cu ltu re"  — culm inating in  h is  v is io n  o f  th e  
"decline of the West" (Per Untergang des Ahendlandes) -  f i r s t  l e t s  us 
know, q u ite  modestly, th a t  the t ru th  as  he sees i t  w il l  fo rev e r r e f l e c t  
the lim ita tio n s  o f h is  own p e rso n a lity . ^  Representing an aspec t o f 
c u ltu ra l  fa te ,  th i s  t ru th  as  Spengler pursues i t  s h a ll  lead  us to  some 
in t r ic a te  forms o f pessimism. As a good observer he expressed h im self 
w ell. I t  i s  the p e ss im is tic  n a tu re  o f h is  se lf-ex p ress io n  in  connection 
w ith h is  c u ltu ra l observations we a re  in te re s te d  in ,  w hile we r e f r a in  
front judging h is  h is to rio g rap h ic  co rrectness.
His p rin c ip a l o b jec tiv e  i s  the c re a tio n  o f  a  "new p ersp ec tiv e  
completely r e s tr ic te d  to  h is to ry , a  philosophy o f f a te  and, moreover,
O )
"A th inker i s  a  person destined  to produce a  s y m b o l i c a l  
rep resen ta tio n  of time through h is  own seeing and understanding. He has 
no choice. He th inks as he must th ink , and he sees h is  u ltim a te  t r u th  
in  the p ic tu re  o f h is  world as  i t  was bom  w ith him" (Spengler,
U.d. A., p. vLi),
!
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(2)the  f i r s t  one of i t s  kind". Although he seeks to  base h is  philosophy
on the hardness o f l i f e  and th e  endurance necessary  f o r  i t ,  r a th e r  than
on some se lf-d ecep tiv e  id e a l i s t i c  concept o f  l i f e ,  he sees no need to
deduce pessimism from th is  f a c t .  As p a r t  o f h is  approach he consciously
c u lt iv a te s  a lu c id , l iv e ly , almost sensual and somewhat p a th e tic  s ty le
of w ritin g  in  o rder to  convey h is  r a th e r  p la s t i c  v is io n s  of the
(3)phenomenon o f cu ltu re .
I t  i s  through the t i t l e  o f h is  main work th a t Spengler exposes 
a  neg a tiv e , bu t not n e ce ssa rily  p e ss im is tic , aspect o f  h is  e s s e n tia l 
message and th e s is . A ll complete c u ltu re s  have a f in a l  declin ing  phase 
a f t e r  which they end. He i s  convinced th a t  h is  view rep resen ts  the 
philosophy of h is  tim e, which he f e e ls  i s  only dimly sensed by h is  
contem poraries. On the fo llow ing pages we attem pt to  p resen t the 
fundamentals of Spengler" s thought w ith sp ec ia l regard to h is  method of 
in te rp re ta tio n , h is  response to  Indian c u ltu re  (c iv il iz a tio n )  and thought, 
h i s  p ra c t ic a l  conclusions, and the p o ss ib le  forms o f pessimism which 
might fe a tu re  h is  outlook.
(1) The general approach
S peng ler's  main theme i s  the f a te  o f the European o r Western c u ltu re ,
(2 ) Spengler, U .d.A .. pp. v i i i - x .  S im ilarly , h is  contemporary Berdyaev 
(H isto ry , p . 16) fe e ls :  "I must have a sense of h is to ry  as  something
th a t  i s  deeply mine, th a t  i s  deeply my h is to ry , th a t  i s  deeply my 
d e s tin y ." This personal (h is to r ic a l  o r an thropolog ical) re la tio n sh ip  
w ith f a te ,  o r d estin y , i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  s tro n g  in  our pessim ists .
(3)
Spengler" s powerful and o ften  persuasive  s ty le  seems to  sp ring  from 
h is  c e n tra l in te r e s t  and fe e l in g  f o r  ch arac te ro lo g ica l connections. (This 
q u a lity  a lso  flavou rs the language of Schopenhauer and N ietzsche, b u t i s  
ra th e r  absent in  the jejune and unsensual expression o f Kant, Hegel o r 
F ich te , a  phenomenon already  commented upon by Weininger (G .u.C har.. 
p. 317). Koktanek (oneng., pp. 53-54) re fe rs  to  Spengler"s unusual 
tendency towards exchange and fu sion  o f the  senses, e .g . perce iv ing  
co lours through music (c f .  U .d.A ., pp. 282-285), as "romantic 
synaesthesia" .
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which, in  h is  opinion, i s  th e  only  c u ltu re  p re se n tly  in  th e  process
o f  completion. In  th i s  connection he hypothesizes th a t  a l l  th in g s
h is to r ic a l  contain c e r ta in  fundamental b io g rap h ica l forms. Consequently,
he in troduces in to  h is  h is to r ic a l  philosophy such concepts as  the cycle
o f  b i r t h  and death, youth, age, and l i f e tim e . Likewise, he compares
th e  d if fe re n t  s tag es  o f  a  c u ltu re  to  the fo u r  seasons as they a re
(4)known in  Europe. His method o f  in te rp re t in g  cu ltu re s  as e s s e n tia l ly
l iv in g  forms is  based on what he c a l l s  morphological analogy (as opposed
to  mathematical law which explains dead form s). ^ He explains th a t  h is
approach i s  in sp ire d  by the  b io lo g ic a l concepts o f homology, where
organs are  m orphologically equ ivalen t, and analogy, where t h e i r  fu n c tio n s
a re  equivalent. ^  On th a t  b a s is  he d esc rib es  a l l  m ajor c u ltu ra l  events
as follow ing qua si-sim ultaneous cycles o f  r i s e ,  completion and d eclin e .
In  th is  sense he would, fo r  in s tan ce , consider l a t e  Buddhism and Roman
Stoicism  as sim ultaneous, homologous phenomena (whereas Buddhism and
C h ris tia n ity  would no t even be analogous). Seeing in  the appearance o f
the various forms o f  h is to ry  the expression , the signs, o f  a  "m an ifesta tion
o f soul", Spengler v isu a liz e s  a  morphology o f world h is to ry , i . e . ,  o f
world as h is to ry . In  h is  proposed l a s t  view o f  the world he wants to
c re a te  an u ltim ate  p ic tu re  not o f what has become bu t o f what i s  becoming
and liv in g . Spengler r e fe r s  to  h is  approach a s  a  th e o re tic a lly  in sp ire d
(7)
a r t  o f h is to r ic a l  study and contem plation. In  fa c t ,  he wants to  
demonstrate th a t in  modem thought h is to ry  should rep lace  nature  as the  
t r a d it io n a l  o b jec t o f  philosophy. (He re fe r s  to  K an t's  m athematical 
o r ie n ta tio n  o f knowledge and Schopenhauer's contempt o f h is to r y .)
^ As h is  source o f in s p ira t io n  Spengler (U .d.A .. p. 598(l)) in d ic a te s  
a sh o rt essay, "G eistesepochen", by Goethe.
(5) Spengler, U .d.A ., pp. 7-9; 149-151.
^  He s tr iv e s  f o r  an a l te rn a t iv e  to  m etaphysics. Hence Schrdter (M et.. 
p . 220) emphasizes th a t  Speng ler's  "comparison does no t want to  be o f  the  
b io lo g ic a l- s c ie n tif ic  kind" (c f . our p. 154(39)); s im ila rly , B alzer 
(Speng.. p. 46) r e je c ts  " the  accusation  o f Spengler having b io log ized  
h is to ry " .
(7 ) S im ilarly , Trevor-Roper (P a s t) explains th a t h is to ry  i s  no science.
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(2 ) Awareness o f h is to ry  and c u ltu re : h is to r ic a l  and a h is to r ic a l  views
Regarding h im self a s  a  ty p ic a l rep re sen ta tiv e  o f Western c u ltu re ,
Spengler i s  h ighly  conscious o f the p o ssib le  ro le  o f h istoxy  in  o n e 's  
(8)c u ltu re  awareness. Di gods s in g  nature  as  the form (G e s ta lt) u su a lly
used by man a t  a high c u ltu ra l  le v e l to a t t r ib u te  meaning to  h is  d ire c t
sense im pressions, he pu ts the main emphasis on h is to ry : he understands
i t  as a form through which man can in te n s ify  h is  awareness o f  the
connection between h is  own l i f e  and the l iv in g  ex isten ce  of th is  world;
(9)t h i s  r e s u l t s  in  the development o f a strong sense o f r e a l i ty .  Spengler 
r e f e r s  to m an's awareness o f these  two forms, n a tu re  on the one hand 
and h is to ry  on the o th e r, a s  a prim eval question  o f a l l  human ex istence.
He looks a t  these  two forms as  two p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f viewing the world 
(although no t n e c e ssa r ily  tru th ) .  Apart from man's general p a r t ic ip a t io n  
in  h is to ry , Spengler says th a t  in  p r in c ip le  a person may be constan tly  
aware o f h is  l i f e  as an element w ith in  a f a r  g re a te r  l i f e -c y c le  of 
hundreds and thousands o f y ears , o r  th a t he may experience i t  simply as  
a r a th e r  se lf-co n ta in ed  phenomenon, i . e . ,  w ithout any room f o r  a  world a s  
h is to ry . Quite u n lik e  our Schopenhauerians, Spengler now poses the 
question  o f how r e a l i t y  might be conceived o f in  the cu ltu re  awareness 
o f an a h is to r ic a l  c u ltu re , such as the c u ltu re  of Ancient Greece o r 
In d ia . The ro le  which time played in  those c u ltu re s , e sp ec ia lly  w ith 
regard  to  t h e i r  a t t i tu d e s  toward the p a s t, was, in  S peng ler's  terminology, 
o f a  p o la r, n on -period ica l s tru c tu re , ( i l lu s t r a t i n g  th is ,  he adds th a t 
the cosmos o f the Greeks, as  compared to the European view o f the world,
Spengler, U .d.A .. pp. 10-54. He d is tin g u ish es  e ig h t main 
c iv i l iz a t io n s  to  which he g en era lly  re fe rs  as  " c u ltu re s” , o f which the  
Western (o r F au stian ), the ancien t Greco-Roraan, and the  Indian one are  
o f p a r t ic u la r  in te r e s t  to  us.
(9) He re jec ts  s u p e r f ic ia l  pragma tig n  im ita tin g  the methods o f physica l 
science while suppressing  and confusing any sense f o r  h is to r ic a l  form 
(U .d.A .. p . 59) . Cf. o u r p . 54(47), on Schumacher's concern about 
"voluntary  lim ita tio n "  through science, and p. 154(20), on H u sse rl 's  
" p o s i t iv is t ic  reduction".
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i s  something which never becomes, b u t always w as.) Ho m a tte r how 
s k i l f u l ly  an ancien t w r ite r  may have recorded h i s to r ic a l  events in  h is  
own manner, Spengler observes th a t th is  was done w ithout any perspec tive  
v is io n  which he considers an ind ispensab le  fe a tu re  o f  a  Western 
h is to r ia n  (compare G ebser's aperspective  view, pp. 165, 165(45) ) .
Spengler f e e ls  th a t  no th ing  could ever express the  a h is to r ic a l  
Indian "soul" o r  c u ltu ra l  o r ie n ta tio n  more p e r fe c t ly  than the  concept 
o f  n irvana . He f in d s  th is  a h is to r ic a l  o r ie n ta tio n  re f le c te d  in  the 
whole c o lle c tio n  o f  Indian te x ts ,  where he does no t f in d  any mark o f 
in d iv id u a l in te l le c tu a l  p roperty  o r  any development o f  sp e c if ic  personal 
thought, l e t  alone any p re c ise  d a tes  f o r  th e  appearance o f works whose 
au th o rs  might be known. Spengler c o n tra s ts  th i s  anonymous form o f  a l l  
Ind ian  h is to ry , which o f course a lso  c h a rac te riz es  Trtdian philosophy, 
w ith the Western (O ccidental) h is to iy  o f  philosophy d is t in c t ly  fea tu red  
by books and in d iv id u a ls . P o in ting  to  a  s im ila r  fundamental d iffe ren ce  
in  Greek cu ltu re  and thought, he deplores th a t  no g re a t Greek, n o t 
even Socrates, revealed a s ig n if ic a n t in n e r  a t t i tu d e  to  h is to ry ; P la to , 
f o r  him, lacks any awareness o f a  h is to r ic a l  development o f h is  
p h ilo  sophy.
As regards h is  own ph ilo soph ical ta sk , Spengler sees i t  as 
n e ce ss ita te d  by h is  sp ec if ic  Western h is to r ic a l  c u ltu re  awareness. "We 
people of Western European cu ltu re  w ith our sense f o r  h is to ry  a re  the  
exception, and no t the ru le : "w orld -h isto ry” i s  our view o f the  world,
n o t th a t  o f "humanity". For the man o f In d ia  o r  Ancient Greece th e re  
n ever ex isted  the  view o f a  developing world, and some day, when the 
c iv i l iz a t io n  o f the  Occident w il l  have d ied , there  may perhaps never 
again  e x is t a cu ltu re  in c lu d in g  a  type o f  man fo r  whom "w orld-history" 
means such a  powerful form o f aw areness." He c a l l s  fo r  scepticism
w ith  regard to  the t r a d it io n a l  Eurocentric  p e rspec tive  o f the  world, 
e sp e c ia lly  the view in  which h is to r ic a l  events lo se  s ig n ifican ce  in  
p roportion  to  th e i r  d is tance  from European "modernity" (the  modem 
European c u ltu ra l  scene). He in ten d s to  overthrow th i s  "Ptolemaic
Spengler, U .d .A ., pp. 20-21. M eta-philosophically , the concept 
o f "w orld-history" (or W eltgeschichte) does not make any sense.
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system” o f a  u n iv e rsa l h is to ry  by h is  own "Copemican discovery" which.
in  h i s  h is to r ic a l  outlook. Spengler, who considers th ese  cu ltu re s  as  
organisms which have n a tu ra l, qua s i-b io lo g ic a l l i f e -c y c le s ,  i s  s t r i c t l y  
opposed to  any c u ltu ra l optim isa which d isreg ard s  a l l  h is to r ic a l  and
’ '  ~ p ro je c ts  " th a t  d eso la te  p ic tu re  o f a  l in e a r
cen te rin g  around i t s  own idea, a s  having' i t s  own form, w il l ,  l i f e ,  passion  
and death . These cu ltu re s  f lo u r ish  and age, to g e th e r w ith th e i r  peoples, 
languages, t ru th s , gods o r landscapes, l ik e  p la n ts ; however, fo r  Spengler 
th e re  e x is ts  no aging "humanity” as  such. What he t r i e s  to  make us 
aware o f  in s tead  a re  such fundamentally d if fe re n t ,  completely c u ltu re -  
sp e c if ic  forms as  those o f the f in e  a r t s ,  mathematics o r physics -  each 
one follow ing i t s  own c u ltu ra lly  determined o r ie n ta tio n  w ith in  
a determined life -sp a n . "'M ankind', however, has as  l i t t l e  aim, idea, 
p lan , a s  has a species o f b u t te r f l ie s  o r  o rch ids. 'Mankind' i s  
a zoological concept o r an empty word."
the a t t i tu d e  o f those Western h is to r ia n s  o r  th in k ers  who tend to  claim
unconditional un iversa l v a l id i ty  f o r  t h e i r  views, although th e i r  c u ltu ra l
p ersp ec tiv es  may not reach beyond th e i r  lim ited  Western European
horizons. P a ra lle lin g  P la to  w ith  Kant, Spengler explains th a t  the
Greek philosopher was p e rfe c t ly  a l l  r ig h t  -  w ith in  the  scope o f h is
an c ien t cu ltu re  -  when by re fe r r in g  to  mankind he meant Greeks, and
not barbarians; however, he exposes a  s ig n if ic a n t inadequacy in  K an t's
c u ltu re  awareness by reminding u s  th a t in  K an t's  ph ilosoph ical views,
e .g . those on e th ic a l  id e a ls , he (naively) im plied t h e i r  v a l id i ty  fo r
men of a l l  kinds and tim es. In  S pengler's  opinion such an assumption
i s  completely un feasib le , ju s t  as the fundamental, prim eval concepts
o f Ancient Greek o r Indian thought (such as A o y-o  5  , atman, brahman)
( l2 )w il l  fo rev e r remain in accessib le  to  the  Western mind. He holds
wants to  give each o f i t s  e ig h t world c u ltu re s  i t s  own autonomous p lace
Instead  he sees each o f  h is  c u ltu re s  as
With hermeneutic in te r e s t ,  we n o tic e  th a t Spengler c r i t i c i z e s
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th a t  an u ltim a te  philosophy o f  th e  fu tu re  could and should be 
completed (inasmuch as the  m etaphysically  exhausted Western c u ltu re  
can s t i l l  y ie ld  one); bu t no t u n t i l  the  O ccidental th in k e r  has 
developed a  su ff ic ie n t understanding f o r  the h is to r ic a l  r e l a t i v i t y  o f  
h is  r e s u l ts ,  as he emphasizes.
Spengler s awareness o f  c u ltu re  -  e sp e c ia lly  w ith  regard  to  
th e  l im ita tio n  and autonomy o f  independent t r a d i t io n s  -  allow s him to  
s ta t e  in  c le a r  and simple terms what f o r  any kind o f  in te r 6-c u ltu ra l  
comparison should be fundam entally understood (and what none o f ou r 
e a r l i e r  th inkers  has ever seen o r  accepted so e x p l ic i t ly ) :  "The foxm o f
a  d if f e r e n t  c u ltu re  speaks ano ther language. For o th e r  people th e re
(13)e x is t  d if f e re n t  tru th s . For the th in k e r, a l l  a re  v a lid  o r  none." 
A n tic ip a tin g  CEadamer s concern w ith o n e 's  own h is to ry  (see p. 10), 
he considers i t  c ru c ia l fo r  th e  h is to r ic a l  ph ilosopher to  he aware th a t  
each thought l iv e s  in  a h is to r ic a l  world and thereby shares th e  f a te  
o f  being  tra n s ito ry . From S peng ler's  p o in t o f view i t  i s  a  fa l la c y  to
b e lie v e  th a t the g rea t ph ilosoph ical questions have always been the
(14)same and th a t  even tually  they  w il l  rece iv e  some d e f in i te  answers.
This "morphological" view i s  a  d ire c t  re f le c t io n  o f h is  cu ltu re  
awareness and o f h is  sense f o r  c u ltu re -sp e c if ic  meaning. Along w ith 
h is  huge system o f  in tu i t io n  and analogy, Spengler o f fe rs  us a k ind  o f 
pre-herm eneutic, i . e . ,  a  fundamental bu t s e lf - l im ite d  approach to  
c u ltu ra l  comparison. He r e a l iz e s  th a t  i t  l i e s  w ith in  the  natu re  o f 
h i s  view th a t i t  could only be c reated  w ith in  a  c u ltu re  where th e  idea  
o f  a  w orld -h isto ry  (un iversa l h is to ry ) could be an is su e  and where 
the  c u ltu ra l  development had reached some re tro sp e c tiv e  s tag e . (Only 
a  com paratively small p a r t  o f S peng ler's  outlook has a  p re d ic tiv e
(l3 ) Spengler, U .d.A .. p. 34. Equally v a lid  does n o t imply 
herm eneutically  equally  access ib le .
Spengler, U.d.A., p . 57. Koktanek (Speng.« p . 328(2)) p o in ts  
to  S peng ler's  Urfragen, p . 69 : "F inal questions have no answers,
they a re  the answers themselves. Metaphysics i s  the  ask ing  o f 
'e te r n a l  questions' w ithout an answer."
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c h a ra c te r .) His v is io n  o f the  d ec lin e  o f the  Occident renders the  
problem o f  c iv i l iz a t io n  as  i t  supposedly c h a rac te riz es  any world c u ltu re  
in  i t s  n a tu ra l f in a l  phase, "as i t s  in e v ita b le  f a te " .  He d efin es  
c iv i l iz a t io n s  as "the most a r t i f i c i a l  and extreme s ta te s  o f which
-----------------------  ------------------- (IjjT  ------------a  h igher form o f  man i s  capable". Hiey mark a fin ish ing- stage,
a phase o f having become, which follow s upon the phase o f becoming, a s  
dea th  fo llow s l i f e .
(5) H e  physiognomic expression o f " c iv il iz a tio n "
The s p i r i tu a l  and m ateria l f a te  o f a  c u l tu re 's  l a t e  phase i s  determined
by a  h igh ly  in te l le c tu a l ,  e n t i r e ly  unmetaphysical type o f man. Such
movements a s  Buddhism, Stoicism  o r  Socialism  receive  th e i r  f in a l  co&nic
"attunement" in  response to  seme f in a l  mood (endgUltige Veltstimmung)
accompanying the dem olition and decomposition o f  the now p e tr i f i e d  forms 
(16)o f c iv i l iz a t io n . Ideal p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  those movements remains
a  p re ro g a tiv e  o f some r ic h  people, l ik e  Seneca in  Ancient Rome. In  any
c iv i l iz a t io n ,  the rank and f i l e  in  the b ig  c i t i e s  remains condemned to
a  l i f e  o f  panem e t  c ircenses* we can see th i s  now reo ccu rrin g  in  b a t t l e s
f o r  h ig h er wages complemented by modem mass en tertainm ents. Hie type
o f  urban dw ellers w ith a tra in ed  sense f o r  cold f a c ts  b u t no tru e  fe e l in g
f o r  o rg an ica lly  grown cu ltu re  and t r a d i t io n  i s  inescapably  t ie d  to  the
l i f e  s ty le  o f the b ig  c i ty  -  reg a rd le ss  o f any taedium v ita e , any
(l7)w eariness o f such a l i f e .  R ootless, the  in te l le c tu a l  nomads o f a l l
c iv i l iz a t io n s  -  ub i bene ib i  -pa tria . a s  Spengler sees them -  a re  a t  
home in  any b ig  c i ty  (P a ta lip u tra  as  much a s  London), whereas they  f e e l  
d esp e ra te ly  a lien a ted  in  the  n e a re s t v il la g e . In  f a c t ,  even the w ise, 
when seeking the so litude  o f n a tu re , in e v ita b ly  take a long  the  s p i r i t  
o f  c iv i l iz a t io n .
(l5 ) Spengler, U .d.A .. p . 43. According to  a source in  S ch rb te r 
f e e t . . p# 88 ), th is  genetic  d if f e r e n t ia t io n  between c u ltu re  and 
c iv i l iz a t io n  was already  used by F. Tonnies (l887).
Spengler, U .d.A ., pp. 44-6J.
(l7 ) Spengler, U.d.A., p. 677.
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P o l i t ic a l ly  th i s  f in a l  phase always cu lm inates in  some fozm 
o f  im perialism , charac te rized  Try p e t r i f i e d  empires which, simply through 
th e i r  unchallenged c u ltu ra l and b io lo g ic a l momentum ra th e r  than any 
c re a tiv e  resources, may perp e tu ate  them selves f o r  co u n tle ss  cen tu ries . 
What Spengler describes as common to  Rome, In d ia  and th e  o th e r  ancien t 
c iv i l iz a t io n s ,  he does not h e s i ta te  to  p re d ic t  a ls o  f o r  th e  West: "In
th i s  form the f a te  o f the  Occident w il l  irrev o cab ly  m anifest i ts e lf .®
He l im i t s  the cen tra l p a r t  o f  th e  coming phase in  Western h is to ry  to  
a  few cen tu ries . For him there  i s  no p rospect o f an "end less going up 
and on in  the d ire c tio n  o f  our p re sen t id e a ls  and w ith  f a n ta s t i c  time 
spans®. He sees no choice bu t to  accep t c iv i l iz a t io n  a s  i t  happens, w ith 
a l l  the  concomitant lim ita tio n s  in e v ita b ly  imposed on u s , although he 
expects th a t  some w il l  re g re t th i s  f a c t  and respond by "p essim istic  
ph ilosophies and ly r ic s ”.
Regarding philosophy, Spengler says th a t  the  beginning o f 
c iv i l iz a t io n  o r the  w in te r of Western c u ltu re  can be observed when " th e  
emphasis o f philosophy s h i f t s  from the  a b s tra c t-sy s te m a tic a l side  to  the 
p ra c t ic a l  e th ic a l  one, and the ep istem ological problem o f knowledge 
becomes replaced by the problem o f  l i f e  (th e  w i l l  to  l iv e ,  the w il l  f o r  
power o r  a c tio n )" . Systematic philosophy, a s  Spengler sees i t ,  was 
e s s e n tia l ly  completed w ith Kant. T hereafte r we encounter, ju s t  a s  a f t e r  
P la to  and A ris to tle , "a ty p ic a lly  m etropolitan  form o f philosophy which 
i s  no longer specu la tive , bu t p ra c t ic a l ,  i r r e l ig io u s  and o f an e th ic a l-  
so c ia l o rie n ta tio n "  (compare Gebser and th e  " a x ia l p e riod” , p. 152).
This foim begins in  the West w ith  Schopenhauer, who makes the  w il l  to  
l iv e ,  in te rp re te d  by Spengler a s  the  c re a tiv e  power o f  l i f e ,  the cen tre  
o f h is  thought. Quite p o ssib ly  Spengler was in sp ire d  by th e  
Schopenhauerian concept o f "w ill" ; y e t , the  core o f  h is  sp e c if ic  form(l0 J
o f pessimism i s  probably to  be sought in  h is  own ch arac te r.
(l8) According to Lehmann (D t.P h il . . p . 340), th e  core  o f S peng ler's  
"organological cu ltu re  conception o f th e  d ec lin e  (Untergang)11 goes 
back to  the ea rly  N ie tzsche 's  m etaphysics. However, Koktanek (Speng.. 
pp. 43-44), quoting Spengler a t  the  age o f  eighteen -  "an endless
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(4 ) The methodology of S peng ler's  sceptic ism  and " l a s t  philosophy"
Spengler, considering  system atic ph ilo sop ty  and e th ic a l  philosophy a s  
th in g s  o f the p a s t, emphasizes a th ird  and l a s t  chance f o r  Western 
thought to  unfo ld  i t s e l f  once more, in  a manner analogous to  Ancient 
Greco-Roman scep tic ian . Such a  f in a l  philosophy would have to  suspend 
a l l  phenomena by in te rp re tin g  them as  r e la t iv e  and h is to r ic a l .  This 
l a s t  chance i s  no o th er than h is  own "so f a r  unknown method of 
comparative h is to r ic a l  mophology.. .a  p o s s ib i l i ty ,  nay, a  n ecess ity " .
But in  opposition  to  a h is to r ic a l  H e lle n is tic  scepticism , which, a s  we 
le a rn , amounts to  the negation  o f philosophy, Spengler wants to  accept 
th e  h is to ry  o f  philosophy a s  the  l a s t  se rio u s  theme o f  philosophy, vhich 
in  the  case o f  Western philosophy would have to  concentra te  on thought 
and c u ltu re  as  rep resen ting  some organism. Scepticism , a s  i t  appears 
in  Spengler' a sketch o f a  f in a l  European philosophy, n o t only r e f le c ts  
th e  e s s e n tia l  s p i r i t  o f i t s  stage o f c iv i l iz a t io n  b u t a lso  d isso lv es  
th e  world outlook o f the preceding c u ltu ra l phase. He bases world a s  
a r e a l i t y  on something h is to r ic a l ,  namely the  ego, which i s  seen a s  
a  p o s s ib i l i ty  followed by i t s  re a l iz a t io n  ( in  some p o s i t iv i s t i c ,  to ta l ly  
unm etaphysical sense). From h is  view th a t everything th a t  i s  has a lso  
become, he concludes th a t every th ing  must be the expression  o f  s o m e t h in g  
l iv in g . Considering as outdated the id ea  th a t  o u te r  r e a l i t y  (th e  world) 
i s  a  product o f knowledge and an impulse (a  cause) f o r  e th ic a l  
ev a lu a tio n s , he wants to  c re a te  a  ph ilosoph ical morphology which t r e a t s  
o u te r  r e a l i ty  as "p rim arily  expression and symbol". He i s  w ell aware 
th a t  through such a  morphological approach the t r a d i t io n a l  s t r iv in g  f o r  
g en era l and e te rn a l t ru th s  -  a s  i t  s t i l l  e x is ts  in  o u r Schopenhauer!ans -  
becomes superseded. He d ec la re s , w ith  a  view to  th e  thougjit-determ ining 
fo rce  o f  c u ltu re , th a t  " tru th s  e x is t  only w ith regard  to  a  sp e c if ic  
foim  o f  mankind". Unlike o u r previous philosophers, Spengler i s  very  
aware th a t  h is  thought "only expresses and r e f le c ts  th e  O ccidental
w il l in g  goes through every th ing  th a t  n a tu re  made.. .  e t e r n i ty . . .you spare 
me in s ig h t in to  some ex istence  f u l l  o f hope" -  adds th a t  "he c e r ta in ly  
has n o t got th is  fundamental b e l ie f  from Schopenhauer, Wagner o r  
N ietzsche."
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sou l as  compared, perhaps, to  th e  Greco-Roman o r  Indian  one, and, th a t
(l9 )i s  to  say, only, in  i t s  p resen t stage".
SpengLer i s  m otivated by a b e l ie f  in  change. H is philosophy 
o f  h is to ry  focuses on independent "cu ltu res"  a s  having t h e i r  own 
in d iv id u a l b iographical character. But, w hile Gadamer, in  whose words
(20)"h is to ry  means h is to ry  o f  decay", considers change in  h is to ry  
through some r i s e ,  climax and decay a s  something which makes u s  aware 
o f  the  change in  our fa te , re s u lt in g  in  a  search f o r  meaning in  l i f e ,  
Spengler op ts f o r  some h i s to r i c i s t i c  p o s i t iv is n  by which he, perhaps
I 2 1 )in v o lu n ta r ily , s t i f l e s  h is  p o te n tia l  f o r  m etaphysical development.
In s tead , Spengler develops an unprecedented in s ig h t in to  what he c a l l s
" c u ltu ra l  morphology". This in s ig h t i s  based, r ig h t ly  o r  wrongly, on
some very c le a r  ideas about the  in d iv id u a l id e n t i t i e s  o f  c u ltu re s .
Comparing European and Ancient Greco-Roman h is to ry  he d isco v ers  c u ltu ra l
analog ies which prompt him to  look f o r  s im ila r  correspondences w ith
o th e r  cu ltu re s . One of the fundamental d isco v eries  claimed by Mm i s
th a t  each ind iv idual c u ltu re  cen tres  around some s p i r i t a u l  essence, i . e .
some kind o f cu ltu re  soul, which, f a r  from having any cau sa l fu n c tio n
w ith  regard  to  the form and h is to ry  o f an in d iv id u a l c u ltu re , le av es  i t s
unm istakable mark in  a l l  c u ltu ra l  phenomena. "Appearance i s  n o t ju s t
a  f a c t  f o r  the in te l le c t  (Verstand) bu t i s  a lso  expression  o f the soul
(des Seelischen) . i . e . ,  not only ob jec t but a lso  symbol — th is  i s  new, 
(22)ph ilo so p h ica lly ."  In  co n tra s t to  Schopenhauer, Spengler develops 
(19)
Spengler, U .d.A .. pp. 34, 63- 64.
Gadamer, EL .Schr.I. pp. 2-3.
(21) Lehmann (D t.P h il.. p. 335) w rite s : "He would l ik e  to  be
a metaphysical philosopher. But h is  m etaphysical d riv e  i s  hindered by 
th e  idea  th a t  metaphysics i s  an anachronism today" (l943) • Schroter 
f e e t . . p . 10) mentions S pengler's  m etaphysical am bition: " T i l l  th e  end
Spengler talked about i t  as  h is  main and favoured p la n ."  Only h in te d  
a t  by Spengler (U.d.A.. p . 557), the m etaphysical rudim ents o f h is  
Urfragen were l a t e r  ed ited  by Koktanek.
(22) Spengler, U.d.A.. pp. 69-70.
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h is  id e a  o f f a te  by p ro jec tin g  h is  ch a rac te ro lo g ica l experiences,
d i r e c t ly  and w ithout any m etaphysical su b stru c tu re , onto a  h is to r ic a l
b a s is . But he i s  opposed to  any s c ie n t i f ic  te le o lo g ic a l attem pts o f
exp lain ing  th e  phenomenon o f  l i f e  through "the  m echanistic p r in c ip le  o f
a reversed  cau sa lity ” (note von Hartmann, M ainlander). In  h is  judgement
(23)’’te leo logy  i s  the  ca r ic a tu re  o f  the id ea  o f f a te ” .
Spengler id e n t i f ie s  each of h is  world c u ltu re s  in  terms o f i t s  
symbolic expression and by i t s  sp e c if ic  h is to r ic a l  p o s itio n . This i s  
o f fundamental hermeneutic in te r e s t ,  s ince , a s  he emphasizes, each o f 
these c u ltu re s  develops i t s  own founs o f  meaning which cannot be 
su b s titu te d  by those of o th e r c u ltu re s  (see  our hypothesis, p* 15). From 
th is  abso lu te  connection between meaning and i t s  c u ltu ra l  m atrix  Spengler 
d e riv es  the h is to r ic a l  r e la t iv i ty  o f a l l  meaning* In  o th e r  words, f o r  
him each cu ltu re  has i t s  ty p ic a l se ts  o f  b e l ie f s  on which a re  based 
i t s  sp e c if ic  tra d it io n s  o f thought corresponding w ith  i t s  own fo m  o f 
tru th . Since meaning cannot be d ire c t ly  pen etra ted  from o u ts id e  i t s  
o rig in a l c u ltu re , there remains only the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  seeking  access 
to i t  from w ith in . Spengler uses h is  "physiognomical t a c t ” , a fo m  
o f  in tu i t io n ,  to  assess th i s  p o s itio n  adequately ; i . e . ,  he t r i e s  to  
determine the h is to r ic a l  function  of a  c e r ta in  meaning on the b a s is  o f 
i t s  concomitants which, n a tu ra lly  f o r  him, b ear the  c h a ra c te r is t ic
(24)tra c e s  o f th e i r  cu ltu re  phase. He then s tep s  com fortably across
the c u ltu re  gap by follow ing the p r in c ip le  o f  h is  m orphological analogy: 
the  cycle  o f  r i s e  and decline  follow s th e  same fundamental p a t te rn  in  
a l l  h is  c u ltu re s . I t  i s  exactly  th is  quasi-synchron iza tion  o f  S peng ler's  
c u ltu ra l  comparison which Gadamer would consider an inadm issib le  
a b s tra c tio n  (p. 7 ) . Based on sane a n tic ip a tio n  o f meaning, Gadamer 
develops meaning from a heimeneutic movement between d i f f e r e n t  c u ltu ra l  
t ra d it io n s , whereas Spengler tra n s fe rs  h is  complete s e t  o f  c u ltu ra l
(23)K Spengler, IJ.d.A., p . 157.
(24) He may have received some impulse from the physiognomical and 
ch arac te ro lo g ica l stud ies o f  Ludwig KLages (l872 -  1919) b u t r e je c ts  
h is  p r in c ip a l opinions (B riefe , p. 605, a lso  pp. 347, 537).
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s ta t io n s  and phases through which any meaning i s  supposed to  pass 
when taken in  i t s  e n tire ty . This means th a t  f o r  him the  movement i s  
contained in  the p a tte rn , in stead  o f the p a t te rn  b e in g  su b jec t to  some 
" f re e ” movement. Spengler describes th e  m orphological re la tio n s h ip s  
underly ing  h is  cu ltu re  p a tte rn  a s  " s t r i c t l y  symmetrical in  s tru c tu re "  
and they r e f le c t  fo r  him the " tru e  s ty le  o f h is to ry "  ( in  accordance 
w ith  h i s  adm ittedly Western p e rsp ec tiv e ). U nlike Gadamer, who pursues 
an inductive  evolvement o f meaning, Spengler a c tu a lly  s e ts  ou t w ith 
a  complete p ic tu re  o f the form and s ty le  o f  h is  h i s to r i c a l  t ru th . His 
ou tlook  i s ,  in  f a c t ,  conceived deductively , i . e . ,  h is  v is io n  of 
a  h is to r ic a l  morphology stands a t  the beginning o f  h is  thought:
"F in a lly  I  saw the so lu tion  c le a r ly  befo re  me, in  v a s t  contours, w ith 
complete in n er necessity , a so lu tio n  which goes back to  one s in g le  
p r in c ip le , which had to be found bu t had n o t been found so f a r ,  something 
which had followed me and a ttra c te d  me from my e a r l i e s t  y ea rs , and which
had vexed me because I  knew th a t i t  was w a itin g  to  be understood, bu t
(25)could n o t grasp i t . "
(5) Three morphological analogies o f scep tic ism : in  Western. Greek
and Indian thought
Spengler i l lu s t r a t e s  the p rin c ip le s  o f th e  suggested f in a l  philosophy
by drawing h is  morphological p a ra l le l s  between d if f e r e n t  c u ltu re s . We
sh a ll follow  a se lec tio n  o f modem European, Ancient Greco-Roman and
A ncient Indian analogies which fe a tu re  the  connections which he sees
between the c u ltu ra l s p i r i t  o f S oc ia l!sn , o f  Stoicism  and o f  Buddhism.
E sse n tia lly  th i s  f in a l  philosophy should b ea r testim ony to  the  f in a l
general outlook and a t t i tu d e  in  Western c iv i l iz a t io n .  He observes
a  ty p ic a l Western tendency to  "pursue o n e 's  personal opinion in  the  name
(26)o f a l l " ,  and describes i t  a s  " e th ic a l  so c ia lis e " . R eferring  to
(2*5) Spengler, U .d.A., p. 70. Koktanek (Speng.. ch. 2) g ives an 
im pressive account of the young S peng ler's  urge to  express the  
in cessan t flow of h is  v isionary  h is to r ic a l  p h an tas ie s .
( 26) Spengler, U.d.A.. pp. 435-481. On p. 442 he w r ites  "eth ical
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N ietzsche as an example o f th i s  u ltim a te  s o c ia l i s t  Western o r ie n ta tio n , 
he p o in ts  out th a t , d e sp ite  h is  " a n ti- s o c ia l"  bearing-, N ietzsche was 
a c tu a l ly  incapable o f fo llow ing something l ik e  the  Ancient id e a l o f  
apathy  ( q67Toc^ £  c < ^ ) , i . e . ,  se lf-c o n  ten tedness and d is in te r e s t  in  
th o se  w orldly a f f a i r s  the dominance o f  which appears to  Spengler a s  th e  
v e ry  aim o f  a l l  Faustian  ( i . e .  ty p ic a l ly  Western) a c t i v i t i e s .  "But th e  
whole Zara thus t r a , supposedly stand ing  beyond gpod and e v i l ,  b rea th es  th e  
p a in  o f  having to  see people how one does n o t l ik e  to  have these , 
to g e th e r  w ith  the  deep, so u t t e r ly  un-Ancient passion  o f  devoting o n e 's  
l i f e  to  th e i r  change, in  accordance, o f  course, w ith  o n e 's  own and only 
p o ss ib le  id e a ls . That general transfo rm ation , ex ac tly  th a t ,  i s  e th ic a l  
monotheiga. which means -  i f  we may use the word in  a  new deeper 
sense  -  s o c ia lig n ."
Both von Hartmann and K ainlander pursue, a s  we have seen, th e i r
pe rso n al p e ss im is tic  id e a l o f  such a  general transform ation . But,
Spengler considers a l l  reform ers s o c ia l i s t s  and, th e re fo re , ty p ic a lly
Western. In  which manner th is  may inc lude  Spengler h im self, we gh^tl
see  below (pp. 134-137). As regards th i s  common p r in c ip le , he f in d s  I t
i r r e le v a n t  whether a p a r t ic u la r  ph ilosopher den ies the  w il l  to  l iv e ,
l ik e  Schopenhauer, o r  affirm s i t ,  l i k e  N ietzsche. "The e s s e n tia l  th in g
i s  th a t  Schopenhauer f e e ls  th e  e n t i r e  world a s  w il l ,  a s  movement, energy,
( 27)
d ire c tio n ; in  th is  he i s  the  an ce s to r o f  a l l  e th ic a l  m odernity."
socia lism : th i s  i s  the  s p i r i t  o f  a c tio n  -  rang ing  in to  th e  d is tan ce  o f 
space, the  moral pathos o f the th i r d  dimension, a s  i t  i s  fe a tu re d  by 
a  prim eval fe e lin g  o f care f o r  o n e 's  contem poraries a s  w ell a s  f o r  those 
to  come -  which pervades th is  e n t i r e  c u ltu re ."  On p . 463* "E th ica l 
s o c ia l is a  i s  the  ever a tta in a b le  maximum, o f  a sense o f  l i f e  seen from the 
a sp ec t o f  purposes" and, desp ite  the so c ia l p re ten se s  he sees in  i t ,  i t  
re p re se n ts  f o r  him "the w il l  to  power". For the p o l i t i c a l  and 
n a t io n a l is t ic  background o f S p en g le r's  p reference  o f  the  term "so c ia lia a"  
(probably a re f le c t io n  o f the  Z e itg e is t) see Koktanek (Speng.. 
pp. 166-186) on "Spengler and the  id eas  o f 1914".
(27) Spengler, U.d.A.. p. 436.
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Spengler f ig u re s  th a t  the  Western v i l l  to  power does n o t allow  f o r  any 
to le ran ce  (which he considers a  ty p ic a lly  Ancient id e a l ) .  In  th e  Vest 
th i s  phenomenon can only be in te rp re te d  a s  a fa l la c y  o r  a  symptom o f 
decline* In  f a c t ,  i t  i s  in  the  na tu re  o f  any Western "movement0 th a t  
i t  seeks v ic to ry ; th is  inc ludes the  tendency to  reform , which i s  
something he considers equally  a l ie n  to  both  the Ancient Greek and the 
Ancient Indian equivalent " a t t i tu d e " . As compared to  th e  V estem  mind, 
Greek and Tndian charac te r appear to  him much more c lo se ly  re la te d  to  
one another* *or in stance , in  Indian Buddha s ta tu e s  he n o tic e s  an 
expression of " s t a t i c  iso la tio n "  th a t  reminds him s tro n g ly  o f  Zenon's 
a ta ra x ia  ^  t o e ; compare Schopenhauer's d if f e r e n t ia t io n ,  p . 57),
included in  the id e a l  of Stoicism : "Bie s ta tu e lik e  re s tfu ln e s s , the
w il l - le s s  ethos* And furtherm ore, th e re  i s  th a t  Buddhist id e a l  o f 
nirvana* a  very la te  formula, b u t to ta l ly  Indian and re  tra c ea b le  back to 
Vedic tim es: i s  th a t  not c lo se ly  re la te d  to  k a th a rs is ? * * * In  f a c t ,
S ocrates, Epicurus and e sp ec ia lly  Diogenes by the R iver Ganges -  th a t 
would be q u ite  imaginable. Diogenes in  some Western European m etropolis 
would be an in s ig n if ic a n t fo o l." ^ 2^  We fe e l  reminded o f  Hegel (p* 46) 
when Spengler describes n irvana as  the  epitcmy of the  a h is to r ic a l  Indian
9
m en ta lity : "The Indians, whose n irvana a lso  appears in  t h e i r  la ck  of
any sense fo r  tim e, had no clocks and consequently no h is to ry , no 
b iograph ical memories, no concern about the  fu tu re . What we em inently 
h is to r ic a lly -o r ie n te d  people c a l l  Indian h is to ry , has come about w ithout 
the  s l ig h te s t  awareness o f i t s e l f .  The millennium o f  Tndian c u ltu re  
from the Vedas r ig h t  down to  the  Buddha a f fe c ts  us l ik e  the movementes 
o f a sleep ing  person. Here l i f e  r e a l ly  was a  dream. Nothing i s  more 
remote from th is  Indianness than the  millennium o f Western c u l tu r e . . . .
The h is to ry  o f Western Europe i s  a  wanted, th a t  o f  In d ia  a  su ffe red  
fate."^ 29^
Notwithstanding the  in te rn a l in d iv id u a l c u ltu re  d iffe re n c e s  
and resemblances, the g re a t o v e ra ll  tendencies in  Buddhism, Stoicism
(or)
Spengler, IJ.d.A .. p. 445.
(29} Spengler, U.d.A.. p. 174.
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and Sociali.gR reveal to Spengler that they tire morphologically
equ ivalen t phenomena vhich in  each case mark the  beginning o f  th e
stage  o f c iv i l iz a t io n . He a ssu res  u s  th a t  we can always observe th e
same tren d : from Socrates and the Buddha onwards, and in  connection
w ith  such names a s  Schopenhauer, Wagner, N ietzsche, "c u ltu re  becomes
d ia ie c t ic a l ly  an n ih ila ted " . A fte r  N ietzsche n ih ilism  r i s e s :  "Socrates
was a  n i h i l i s t ,  so was the  Buddha." While th e  man o f  c u ltu re  liv e d ,
w ithout being aware o f i t ,  e s s e n tia l ly  f o r  in n e r  values, the  c iv i l iz e d
person goes, qu ite  consciously, by th e  f a c ts  o f th e  o u te r  world. What
was once f e l t  as f a te  Spengler sees a s  now being  in te rp re te d  in  texms
o f  cause and e ffe c t . "From now on people a re  m a te r ia l is ts ,  in
a manner c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f t h e i r  s p e c if ic  c iv i l iz a t io n ,  reg a rd le ss
o f  whether they want i t  o r  n o t, and whether Buddhist, S to ic  and
(30)S o c ia l is t  d o c trines assume re lig io u s  forms o r  n o t."  Regarding 
c iv il iz e d  philosophy, he observes th a t ,  w ith  l i f e  be ing  tre a te d  a s  
an o b jec t o f  study, morals, a lso , become c la s s i f ie d  a s  a  problem:
"For a  cu ltu red  person morals means the  m orals he has g o t; f o r  
a  c iv i l iz e d  person they a re  the  ones he i s  seek ing ." look ing  back 
a t  K ant's  and P la to 's  p re sen ta tio n s  o f e th ic s , Spengler exp lains th a t 
they  a re  e s s e n tia l ly  s t i l l  " d ia le c t ic a l  p lay  w ith concepts, ju s t  
rounding o f f  th e i r  m etaphysical systems -  in  f a c t ,  q u ite  d ispensab le.
From Zenon and Schopenhauer onwards th i s  i s  changed." Spengler 
explains th a t the phase of c iv i l iz e d  e th ic s  i s  fea tu red  by contrived  
systems vhich lack  the g rea tn ess  o f  the p rev ious s ty le  o f  in tu i t iv e  
metaphysics. (n.B. , P lo tin u s ' m etaphysics, a s  we a re  to ld , a c tu a lly
^T| ]
r e f le c t s  th e  s p i r i t  o f the  younger A rabic c u ltu re . ) In  o th e r 
words, c iv iliz e d  l i f e ,  having l o s t  i t s  p o te n tia l  o f  spontaneous in n er 
s e lf - re g u la tio n , requ ires p ra c t ic a l  moral systems which provide some 
o u te r  o rie n ta tio n  in stead . Analogously, before  the r i s e  o f Buddhism 
" th e  d o c trines o f Yoga and Vedanta a lso  had l i t t l e  room fo r  form al 
e th ic s" . Only afterw ards d id  moral philosophy develop whereas 
metaphysics became p a r t of th e  background. In  o rder to  su b s ta n tia te
(30) Spengler, U .d.A ., p . 451.
Spengler, U.d.A.. p. 491.
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h ip  claim  o f the merely c iv il iz e d , unm etaphysical c h a rac te r  o f
Buddhign, Spengler re fe rs  to  th e  Buddha's sermon o f  th e  Four Noble
Truths (see pp. 225, 229). B eliev ing  th a t  " i t  i s  roo ted  in  th e
r a t io n a l i s t  a th e is t  Samkhya philosophy", he assumes th a t  the  o r ig in a l
foim  o f  Buddhism must have been devoid o f  any re l ig io u s  elem ents in  terms
o f m etaphysical b e l ie f s .  He imagines th a t  th e re  i s  a lso  in  Buddhign
considerab le  m a te ria li ga, analogous, bu t by no means id e n tic a l  w ith th a t
o f  o th e r c u ltu re s . Reminding us o f M ainlander, he in tim a tes  th a t Buddhign
d isp la y s  a  ra th e r  "mechanical" approach in  i t s  u se  o f  th e  "Brahmanical
concept o f kaiman which i s  fo r  ou r thought an almost unimaginable id ea
o f being  which p e rfe c ts  i t s e l f  through a c tio n , and which we fin d
freq u e n tly  enough tre a te d  qu ite  m a te r ia l is t ic a l ly  l ik e  some u n iv e rsa l
substance in  the process o f change". Such m a te ria lig n , a s  Spengler
exp lains, i s  only the  o u te r counterpart o f the  e s s e n tia l  f in a l  n ih ilism
which each c iv i l iz a t io n  expresses in  i t s  own manner. Hie F austian
n i h i l i s t  destroys h is  former id e a ls  dynam ically, the  Ancient n i h i l i s t
s c e p tic a l ly  l e t s  them crumble, and the Indian abandons them by
withdrawing in to  him self (compare G ebser's time-ocean and wo rid -cav e ,
pp. 145-150 )• Spengler se ise s  th a t  the phenomenon o f  Buddhism cannot
e a s i ly  be rendered in  Western term inology. But s t i l l  he tak es  th e
l ib e r ty  o f ta lk in g  o f  a "S toic n irvana"; he goes on to  say th a t "a lso ,
the  concept o f a  S o c ia lis t nirvana can be ju s t i f i e d  i f  we look a t  the
withdrawal from the  struggle fo r  ex istence  which European tired n e ss
l ik e s  to  conceal under such catchwords as  world-peace, hum anitarian! gn,
o r  b ro th e r lin e s s  o f  a l l  people. But no th ing  o f  th a t  g e ts  anywhere n ear
(3 2 )
the s tra n g e ly  deep concept o f th e  Buddhist n irvana. " What he means
i s  th a t  each c iv i l iz a t io n  has i t s  own way o f  exem plifying th e  common
m orphological p rin c ip le . Hence he f e e ls  no co n trad ic tio n  in  assuming
something qua s i-S to ic  in  Buddhism, something quasi-B uddhistic  in
(33)S to ic is* . This has a t  times been misunderstood.
Spengler, IJ.d .A .. p. 45T. S t i l l  in  1947, Jennings (Ved.Buddh., 
p. Xxxxi) r ig o ro u sly  p a ra lle l in g  Buddhiga and Stoicism  on the  b a s is  o f  
an im pressive synopsis o f physiognomical resem blances, p re fe rs  to  assume 
" s im ila r i ty  o f i n i t i a l  premises".
(33) E. g . , no te  th e  manner in  vhich von Glasenapp ( in d b .. pp. 129-131)
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I t  i s  n o t the meanings a s  such yhi r~h Spengler would exchange 
in  h is  comparisons; in s tead , he would equate h is  c u ltu ra l  p a tte rn s  ar|d 
mechanisms. Thus the  popular expression o f  each c iv i l iz a t io n ' a l a t e  
outlook i s  always e s s e n tia l ly  the same. I t  recu rs  a s  the  d ia t r ib e  — 
the  sermon in  Buddhist In d ia , Ancient rh e to r ic ,  o r  Western jo u rn a l!g a . 
This, as  we le a rn , i s  geared to  s a t i s f y  n o t "humanity" as  such, b u t 
the  "masses" a s  they  appear in  a l l  c iv i l i s a t io n s .  S ince, in  th e  case 
o f  th e  West, they follow  only the  s u p e r f ic ia l  a sp ec ts  o f " e th ic a l  
socia lign" (which promises thou seme ca re free  happiness) these  masses 
a re  n a tu ra lly  incapable o f  understanding " th e  m agnificent id e a l iz a t io n  
o f  i t s  -purpose and, th e re fo re , a lso  th a t o f  work" . Spengler p re d ic ts  
th a t  th i s  e th ic a l  id e a l , which may p re se n tly  m anifest i t s e l f  in  th e  
r ig h t  to  work, w il l  " in  the f in a l ,  most t e r r ib l e  s ta g e s .. .  culm inate 
in  the duty to  work". This i s  the p o in t a t  which th e  fu lf ilm e n t o f 
Socialism  -  " in  opposition  to  S toicign and Buddhign -  becomes t r a g ic " .  
S peng ler's  v e rd ic t i s  th a t the Nordic, the  Western soul has 
ir r e tr ie v a b ly  used up i t s  in n e r p o te n tia l .  "This sou l was w i l l ,  and 
noth ing  e l s e ." But a l l  th a t  remains o f  th is  o r ig in a lly  c re a tiv e  w i l l  
i s  i t s  dynamic momentum, an aim less d riv e  and passion  f o r  c re a tio n , 
a  form w ithout con ten t. The id eas  a re  borrowed which h e re a f te r  
support the now common l i e  o f resu rgen t co n tin u ity . Indeed,
M ainlander's in d iv id u a lis t ic  double movement o f form ation combined 
w ith  a n n ih ila tio n  may serve as  an acu te  i l l u s t r a t i o n  f o r  th a t  p o in t 
in  c iv i l iz a t io n .
Hie f in a l  e th ic a l  outlook in to  the  void  i s  f o r  Spengler th e  
n a tu ra l  r e s u l t  of a  declin e  o f  m etaphysics, as he observes i t  in  a l l  
ag ing  c u ltu re s . As he exp lains, in  the  course o f  th is  change from 
a  cu ltu red  to  a c iv i l iz e d  mode of thought, pure th in k in g  i s  rep laced  
by moral philosophy which focuses on the p ra c t ic a l  s id e  o f l i f e .  
M etaphysics, a f t e r  being pushed in to  an a n c il la ry  ro le ,  becomes 
even tually  alm ost superfluous. In  S peng ler's  op in ion , K an t's  thought
re fu se s  to  reco n c ile  S peng ler's  negative  hermeneutic awareness o f 
Buddhist nirvana w ith  h is  own pure ly  p h ilo lo g ic a l p e rsp ec tiv e .
s t i l l  cen tred  on pure reason, n o t on p r a c t ic a l  reason* But from then
on the  s i tu a t io n  becomes reversed: Schopenhauer e f i r s t  th re e  hooks*
as  we le a rn , a re  only there  to  support h is  fo u rth  (on th e  a ffirm a tio n
and negation  o f the v i l l  to  l iv e ) .  As Spengler c o r re c t ly  p o in ts  ou t,
Schopenhauer d id  n o t (as von Hartmann sees i t )  d e riv e  h is  pessimism
from h is  m etaphysics, hu t h is  m etaphysics from h is  pessimiaft (see p. 64) ,
while N ietzsche going even fu r th e r ,  d id  n o t h e s i ta te  to  11 s a t i s f y  h is
need f o r  m etaphysics, quickly  and o f te n  q u ite  inadequately , w ith  the
help  o f  some hooks”. From Spengler" s p o in t o f view th e re  a re  no
" e te rn a l questions" in  philosophy; each c u ltu re  has i t s  own inheren t
s e t  o f prim eval questions which from i t s  very  beginning determ ine i t s
course. Thus, ho th  Hegel and Schopenhauer expressed the  v i l l  to  power
in  t h e i r  personal manner h u t in  accordance w ith  th e  theme o f  t h e i r  tim e.
Hence, Spengler considers any philosophy o r ig in a tin g  from Hegel and
Schopenhauer and v i r tu a l ly  a l l  " re p re se n ta tiv e  philosophy o f  the  19th
century  as  only e th ic a l  and a s  only  so c ia l  c r i t ic is m  in  a  p roductive
(54)sense and no th ing  e lse " . Spengler exp la in s  th a t  in  h is  own
v o lu n ta r is t  outlook he consciously  p u ts  tim e, d ire c tio n  and f a te  befo re
(3 5 )
a more ra tio n a l a p p lic a tio n  o f  the  id e a s  o f  space and c a u sa lity .
He f e e ls  th a t  Schopenhauer m isunderstood K an t's  "m agnificent, no t 
e a s i ly  a cce ss ib le  in tu itio n "  o f  th e  "world a s  appearance" when he 
tran sfo m ed  i t  in to  the  "world as a b ra in  phenomenon" w hile th e  w il l ,  
the  tru e  essence o f  man, had to  remain b lin d . Spengler, e x p l ic i t ly  
d esp is in g  th i s  view and r e je c t in g  any m etaphysical sp ecu la tio n , 
d esc rib es  man" s awakening from a  s ta te  o f  p r im it iv i ty  in to  some 
c u ltu ra l  consciousness as  a  dual psychological phenomenon: "The b i r t h
o f  th e  ego and th a t  o f the  f e a r  o f  ex is ten ce  (V eltangst) a re  one and 
the  same th in g ." Schopenhauer, a s  he judges, was only 
f o r e s ta l l in g  some o f  the  m ateria lism  which was a lread y  looming on th e  
horizon  o f  Western thought: "His system i s  a n tic ip a te d  Darwinism which
only  u ses  Kant" s language and th e  concepts o f  the  Ind ian s  a s
(34) Spengler, U .d.A .. p . 472.
(35) Spengler, U .d.A .. p . 393*
Spengler, U .d.A.. p. 815. Cf. p. 139(56).
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(37)a  d isg u ise ." Moreover, Schopenhauer was the  f i r s t  cue in  h is
l in e  who re a liz e d  w ith  h o rro r the  tru e  n a tu re  o f  h is  own outlook -
" th is  i s  the ro o t o f  h is  pessimism" -  w hile th e  l a t e r  ones, e sp e c ia lly
N ietzsche, t r i e d  to  g e t enthused by th e  k ind  o f pragm atic optimism
which u n d e rlie s  " th e  strugg le  f o r  ex istence" . F eeling  th a t  th e
e th ic a l  dynamism (the  "thou s h a lt" )  o f  the European outlook has
reached i t s  peak, Spengler opens up h is  f in a l  view on th e  h is to r ic a l
fu lf ilm e n t of Western c iv i l iz a t io n :  " In  o rd e r to  impose onto the
(38)world the  form of h is  w il l ,  Faustian  man s a c r if ic e s  h im se lf ."
(6) Spengler" s p ra c tic a l  se lf-ex em p lific a tio n  and e thnocen trign
Spengler never created  a  genuine m etaphysical complement f o r  h is  
(39)morphology. In stead  he t r i e d  to  exemplify h is  thought p r a c t ic a l ly
by p lay ing  an ac tiv e  advisory p a r t  in  the fu lf ilm e n t o f  Germany" s 
p o l i t i c a l  ro le  in  the world, in  s t r i c t  accordance w ith  h is  
morphological th eo rie s . Spengler must have thought th a t  h is
outlook contained some spec ia l human value ( ir re sp e c tiv e  o f any 
s c ie n t i f ic ,  o b jec tiv e  value), some form of " tru th " . He sees h is  t r u th  -  
consciously, from h is  r e l a t i v i s t i c  Western c iv i l iz e d  h is to r ic a l  p o in t 
o f view -  in  terms o f " fa te " . By th i s  he means the consummation o f
(37 )
Spengler, U .d.A .. pp. 473-474.
(38) Spengler, U .d.A .. p . 477.
Schxdter (M et.. pp. 189-198) argues th a t  Spengler concen trated  too 
much on what i s  p a s t (das Vergangene) r a th e r  than on th e  p ass in g  (das 
Vergehen): th a t  he neglected  th e  m etaphysical p o te n tia l  o f  h is  own 
analogy o f a  child" s awakening ego-consciousness (in c lu d in g  th e  ro le  o f  
fe a r)  w ith  the r i s e  o f h is  c u ltu re s  (U.d.A. p . 107); and th a t ,  thus, he 
s lipped  m etaphysically , ep istem ologica lly  and e th ic a l ly  onto the  le v e l s  
o f na tura lism , sce p tic isn  and b io lo g isa .
He d eclares  (U .d.A .. pp. 58,60) th a t  "the  f i r s t - c l a s s  ph ilo sopher 
always exem plifies", l ik e  the P re so c ra tic s  o r  P la to , dep lo rin g  th a t  
the philosophers o f h is  own age lack  th i s  sense f o r  a  need f o r  p ra c t ic a l  
involvement in  such tasks as a re  p resen ted  by p o l i t i c s  o r  commerce.
c u ltu re  through, th e  fu lf ilm e n t o f  I t s  o r ig in a l im pulse and i t s  
inheren t form, w ill  and soulr Like Schopenhauer and N ietzsche, 
Spengler ap p aren tly  t r i e s  to  reform something in  human thought vhich 
could no t be reformed p h ilo so p h ica lly  (perhaps th e  a b i l i t y  to  see th e  
t r u th  -  h is  t r u th ! ) . However, w hile Schopenhauer s t i l l  aims a t  some 
m etaphysical "co rrection" o f  the  human outlook, Spengler th in k s  i t  
necessary  to  separa te  "p ra c tic a l"  thought from "u n p rac tica l"  
m etaphysics. This allow s him to  connect h is  v is io n  o f " tru th "  w ith  
the  so c ia l " r e a l i ty ” o f  man's c u ltu ra l  f a te .  I n  th e  case o f Western 
c iv i l iz a t io n  the  ph ilo soph ical expression o f th i s  f a t e  cen tre s  around 
h is  e th ic a l  socialism .
From Spengler s  p o in t o f  view i t  would be im possible to
separa te  o n e 's  consciousness o r  o n e 's  self-aw areness from o n e 's
c u ltu re . In  the  case o f the  s trong ly  ego- and p e rso n a lity -o rie n te d
O ccidental c u ltu re , Spengler f e e ls  th a t ,  having en tered  the  phase o f
scep tic ian , "we la t e  people o f  th e  W est.. .  do n o t want any more
(4 l)ph rases, we want ourselves". S e lf-cen tred ly , " th e  th re e  l a t e s t
peoples o f  the  West (England, France, Germany) have s tr iv e n  f o r  th re e
(42)id e a l  forms o f  e x is te n c e .. . l ib e r ty ,  e q u a lity , s o l id a r i ty " .
Epitom izing the  d if fe re n t n a tio n a l ch arac te rs , th ese  th re e  id e a ls  
a re  d if fe re n t  forms o f  response to  the same b a s ic  question  o f  power: 
does the  in d iv id u a l w il l  have to  succumb to  th e  c o lle c t iv e  w i l l ,  o r  
i s  i t  th e  o th e r  way around? As Spengler sees i t ,  th e  E nglish  n a tu re  
decides f o r  in d iv id u a l power, l ib e r a l i s e ,  in e q u a lity . The French 
na tu re  den ies power to  a l l ;  no subordination, no o rd e r, eq u a lity , in  
o th e r  words id e a l anarchy. Two forms o f  democracy. Hie German, o r  
more p re c ise ly  P russian , n a tu re  decides, q u ite  th e o re t ic a l ly ,  th a t  
power belongs to  the whole, which has to  be served by th e  in d iv id u a l 
(inc lud ing  the  k ing). This a t t i tu d e ,  i l l i b e r a l ,  an ti-d em o cratic  and 
a n ti-re v o lu tio n a ry , produces a  kind o f " a u th o r ita tiv e  so c ia li& i" , a s  
opposed to  Engl -i ah ind iv idualism , which aims a t  c a p ita l ia n  (w ith
(41) Spengler, P o l . . p . 4.
(42) Spengler, P o l., p . 14.
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a  p o te n tia l  f o r  some fo m  o f  "p riv a te  so c ia lism "). Both th e
English  and the  P ru ssian  id e a l -  remaining m utually  incom prehensible —
rep re sen t competing’ forms o f the same modem (e th ic a l)  so c ia l!an . This
f in a l  view o f the  world and a t t i tu d e  towards i t ,  be ing  devoid o f any
m etaphysical c u ltu re , m anifests i t s e l f  in  a  common Western d riv e  f o r
u ltim a te  m ate ria l dominance o f the " e n t ire  p lan e t"  -  im perial tan  as th e
(44)ty p ic a l f in a l  s tag e  o f  a l l  c iv i l iz a t io n s . These p o l i t i c a l  asp ec ts
o f  S peng ler's  morphological views apparen tly  fu rn ish  the  th e o re tic a l
b a s is  o f h is  p e c u lia r  n a tio n a l! an: stunned and pertu rb ed  by th e
fa i lu r e  o f th e  German Revolution and the  outcome o f  th e  war, he begins
(45)to  rea sse ss  the  immediate p o l i t i c a l  s itu a tio n . He d iscovers  th a t
i t  was the  f a t a l  impact o f  English  so c ia l ideas which had been p resen t
since  the time o f Napoleon. U nsuitable and d e trim en ta l f o r  th e  German
m en ta lity , they  aroused a kind o f would-be socia lism  in  th e  heads o f
the  s e m i- in te lle c tu a ls  (followed by the  "u p ris in g  o f  th e  M arxist
p r o le ta r ia t  in  1918") while tru e  s o c ia l i s t  was u s e le s s ly  dying in  the  
(46)trenches.
Spengler who, as  f a r  as  h is  in s ig h t goes, u su a lly  a ttem pts
to  p o rtray  a  balanced p ic tu re  o f the in t r in s ic  v a lues o f any c u ltu re
o r  n a tio n , apparen tly  t r i e s  to  account fo r  h is  e thnocen triaas  "Only
England possesses today what one could c a l l  so c ia l c u ltu re  -  ano ther
k ind , a  more ph ilo soph ical one, i t  has n o t go t — i t  h as deepness in
i t s  s u p e r f ic ia l i ty ;  the  n a tio n  o f  philosophers and p o e ts  (Germany), so
(47)
o f te n , only proves some s u p e r f ic ia l i ty  in  dep th ." A fte r  t h i s  l i t t l e
encouraging statem ent on the  remaining p h ilo so p h ica l p o te n tia l  o f the  
d ec lin in g  West, Spengler admits h is  conviction  th a t ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  the 
P ru ssian  ch a rac te r harbours some le s s  u t i l i t a r i a n  values some deep
Spengler, P o l . ,  pp. 15» 32, 46-47.
(44) Spengler, P o l . , p . 24.
(45) Spengler, B rie fe , pp. 111-115.
to) Spengler, P o l . . pp. 5-9.
(47) Spengler, P o l . . pp. 37.
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in n e r  independence vh ich  i s  in a cc e ss ib le  to  i t s  only worthy (th e
English) opponent. In  h is  n a t io n a l i s t ic  commitment Spengler
b e tray s  a  s e c re t yearn ing  f o r  some m etaphysical id e a l  -  some fo m  o f
freedom from th is  world as  he d esc rib es  i t  -  and which h is  outlook i s
no t allowed to  y ield*  S peng ler's  p o l i t i c a l  id e a s , re g a rd le ss  o f  how
im portant they  may have appeared to  anyone in c lu d in g  h im self, a re  on ly
a by-product o f h is  c u ltu re  morphology which inc lu d es  a  personal,
(49)unphilosophical need f o r  exem plification . Spengler knows o f  h is
e th nocen trisn , b u t f in d s  no way ou t o f  i t ,  n e i th e r  he im eneu tica lly  nor 
m etaphysically . Having declared  th a t  h is to r ic a l ly  he i s  in  a  p o s t­
m etaphysical p o s itio n , he now seems — bewitched by th e  magic o f h is  
c u ltu re  cycle  -  incapab le  of developing h is  own o r ig in a l ly  intended 
m etaphysical outlook which might have d isso lv ed  h is  m orphological f a te .
(7) S oeng ler's  •physiognomical nessim iga: th e  p e t r i f i c a t io n  o f meaning
S p eng ler's  s k i l f u l  in c lu s io n  o f h im self a s  a  m orphological fe a tu re  
w ith in  h is  outlook, complemented by h is  a p o d ic tic  s ty le ,  may 
occasio n a lly  make h is  readers  fo rg e t th a t ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  h is  account o f 
th i s  world renders a  very  personal view. But, h is  p h ilo so p h ica l 
p o s itio n  i s  marked by h is  time, by the  Z e itg e is t  which no longer 
su sta in s  a  fe e lin g  o f  u n stra in ed  European c u ltu ra l  id e n t i ty  (so n a tu ra l  
to  Schopenhauer, so d ispensable to  G e b s e r ) .^ ^  Spengler re a c ts  to  
h is  so c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a tio n  by re tu rn in g  to  so c ie ty
(48)
Spengler, P o l . . pp. 32, 39.
(49) By rev e rs in g  th e  ro le s  o f thought and expression in  Spengler h i s  
in te n tio n  has been m is in te rp re ted  and reduced to  a  " p o l i t i c a l  
m otivation  o f h is  thought" ( e .g . ,  c f . Kurjahn, Speng.. pp. 233; 
209—210) which supposedly had the  so le  aim o f "founding some 
a c t i v i s t i c  Lebengphiiosophie and o f  se rv in g  h is  na tion" (p. 220).
According to  Lubbe's p e rfe c tly  v a l id  g e n e ra liz a tio n  ( in  Speng. 
heu te . p. x) S p en g le r's  work "dem onstrates the in c re as in g  problem o f 
id e n t i ty  which, in  complex and dynamic c iv i l iz a t io n s ,  a f f e c t s  u s 
in d iv id u a lly  and c u ltu ra l ly 11.
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a  "c la r if ie d "  and s tru c tu red  version  o f  i t s  own dim fe e lin g  o f
(51)
c r i s i s  o r uncerta in ty .
Apart from h is  tendency to  e x e r t some reform ative, educative
(52)in fluence, he b e liev es  in  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f some o u te r  change, some
(53)p ra c tic a l  change, in  connection w ith h is  thought. This in  tu rn  i s
rooted in  some in ev itab le  inner change which he observes in  a l l  
c u ltu re s , namely, man's transform ation from a (p o te n tia lly )  
m etaphysically minded being of in f in i te  hopes in to  a  sc e p tic  o r  n i h i l i s t  
l e f t  w ith such prospects as a  S to ic  a ta ra x ia . a  Buddhist n irvana  o r  
a  S o c ia lis t s e lf - s a c r if ic e .  Metaphysics, u n lik e  h is  own 
charac te ro log ical morphological view o f h is to ry , has in  h is  eyes never 
provided any firm  and re lia b le  so lu tion . For Spengler any sp ecu la tiv e  
tru th  -  and th a t includes metaphysical pessimisn. -  can never be more 
than ju s t  m orphologically and h is to r ic a l ly  re la t iv e .  (M etaphysics, in  
f a c t ,  i s  a n t iM s to r ic a l . ) In h is  " f in a l"  answer he wants to  be 
p ra c tic a l . Denying th a t humanity a s  such has any u ltim a te  aim ( in  th i s
(54) \he does admit te le o lo g ic a l pessimism ) f he sees a  d is t in c t  aim f o r  
man in  the d ig n if ied  consummation o f h is  sp e c if ic  c u ltu re  cycle.
Popper (Od.So c .I I . p. 76): "An element o f blank d e sp a ir  i s
unmistakable in  the 'g rim ' ac tiv ig n  th a t  i s  l e f t  to  those who fo resee  
the  fu tu re  and f e e l  instrum ental in  i t s  a r r iv a l ."
(52) Spengler (Aufsatze. p. 73) announces th a t  understanding the  
ch arac te r and d ire c tio n  o f one 's  c u ltu re  in  combination w ith  our 
p o te n tia l f o r  f re e  ind iv idual decisions allow s us " fo r  th e  f i r s t  time 
education in  a  v a st sense".
(53) Popper (H is t . . p. l6 l ) ,  suggesting th a t  attem pts to  e s ta b lis h  the  
p re d ic ta b i l i ty  o f  h is to r ic a l  change may w ell be m otivated by some 
personal f e a r  o f  change, concludes2 " I t  alm ost looks as  i f  th e  
h i s to r ic i s t s  were try in g  to  compensate themselves f o r  th e  lo s s  o f  an 
unchanging world by c ling ing  to  the f a i t h  th a t  change can be fo reseen  
because i t  i s  ru le d  by an unchanging law ."
(54) Spengler, Aufsatze. pp. 73-74.
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Spengler sees  no h igher a l te rn a t iv e ;  however in  the  case o f  f a i lu r e ,  
man would have to  face  a  c u ltu ra l void. Before, a f t e r  and ou tside  
c u ltu re  -  i . e .  w ithout h is to ry  -  humanity i s  on ly  a  "zoo log ica l concept" 
and ex isten ce  i s  sense less . That means th a t w ith in  the  boundaries o f 
h is  own d e f in i t io n s  o f cu ltu re  and h is to ry  Spengler v is u a liz e s  a very 
n a tu ra l  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f fu lf ilm en t. (Hence, here he e x p l ic i t ly  re fu ses
(55)to  be c a lle d  a  p ess im ist. And he i s  c e r ta in ly  no t a  d e f e a t i s t . )
Beyond those boundaries man i s  a lso  e s s e n tia l ly  beyond any (c u ltu ra l)  
comment from Spengler. (This, too, precludes pessim ism .)
S p en g le r 's  method i s  original'Ey deductive, although he g e ts  
around to  dem onstrating how h is  observations must r e s u l t  in  one 
"system ", which te c h n ic a lly  rep resen ts  the  o r ig in a lly  conceived id ea  
w ith  a l l  i t s  ph ilo soph ical consequences. S t r ic t ly  speaking, h is  
herm eneutic, opera ting  w ith morphological a n a ly s is  and physiognomical 
t a c t ,  demands to t a l  commitment to  the idea o f c u ltu ra l  fu lf ilm e n t (as 
opposed to  e x is te n t ia l  senselessness). I t  seems c ru c ia l to  our o v e ra ll 
study  th a t  w ith in  h is  closed c u ltu re  u n it  he does n o t provide f o r  any 
r e la t iv e  commitment, i . e . ,  one which would use c u ltu re  i t s e l f  m erely 
a s  a  b a s is  f o r  some m eta-philosophical breakthrough. R ather, he 
t ra n s fe rs  meaning d ire c t ly  from one o f h is  c u ltu re s  to  another; he does 
n o t allow  f o r  any meaning to  o rig in a te  between and beyond the  c u ltu re s  
from some in te rp re ta t iv e  movement. Consequently, he has to  opera te  
w ith in  some kind o f monadological c a p tiv ity . ^  Imprisoned w ith  the
Spengler (Aufsatze. p. 63) : "One could say fu lf ilm e n t in s tead  
o f  d e c lin e .. .w ithou t changing the a c tu a l meaning o f the concept."
(P. 75 :) "Pessimism means seeing no more ta sk s . I  see so many s t i l l  
unaccom plished.. . "
(56) Having d e lib e ra te ly  excluded any psychological d e sc r ip tio n s  o f 
S peng ler's  ch a rac te r, we fe e l  th a t  re tro sp e c tiv e ly  two autobiographic 
statem ents which emphasize h is  sense o f c a p tiv ity  may be o f in te r e s t  
(quoted a f t e r  Koktanek, Speng.. pp. 13 and 16, E is heauton. in e d ., 
78b; and 105, a lso  94). From a s  f a r  back as h is  s ix th  y ea r Spengler 
r e c a l l s :  "When I  look a t  my l i f e ,  th e re  has been one fe e lin g  which
has r e a l ly  dominated everything: fe a r . Fear o f th e  fu tu re , f e a r  o f
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"w ill"  which s p e c if ic a l ly  fe a tu re s  h ia  own c u ltu re , th e  w il l  to  l iv e ,  
to  d ie , to  power (Schopenhauer, M ainlander, N ietzsche), he can only  
fo llow  th a t  w il l  in to  tra g ic  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  f o r  the sake o f  th e  whole.
His own physiognomical scepticism , a s  he c a l l s  i t ,  i s  in sp ire d  by th e  
id ea  o f  a  S o c ia l is t  n irvana cum Stoic exem plification . I t  seems obvious 
th a t  Spengler expects h is  readers  to  take th is  kind o f equation  w ith  
a g ra in  o f  s a l t .  He h im self has announced the uniqueness and u ltim a te  
in s c r u ta b i l i ty  o f a l l  c u ltu re -sp e c if ic  meaning ( ju s t ly  r e fe r r in g  to  
Schopenhauer's Indian app rop ria tions as a d isg u ise ) . He a lso  knows 
th a t  he has achieved h is  morphological analog ies ( i . e . ,  n o t con ten t 
eq u a tio n s!) from a  Western p o in t o f view. But beyond h is  physiognomical 
t a c t ,  which has adm itted ly  le d  him to  the  d iscovery  o f  c e r ta in  most 
in te r e s t in g  c u ltu ra l  analog ies, he has apparen tly  never wandered about 
the  h is to r ic a l  s tru c tu re s  o f the self-u n d erstan d in g  o f  o th e r  c u ltu re s .
Spengler, l ik e  N ietzsche, claim s e x p l ic i t ly  what a lread y  Hegel 
had expressed im p lic it ly :  th a t  the  t r a d i t io n  o f in s tru c t io n , i . e .  o f
p h ilo so p h ica l th ink ing , i s  always c u ltu ra lly , n a tu ra l ly ,  given. He 
ignores th e  f a c t  th a t  Buddhism i t s e l f  does no t assume a t  a l l  th a t  th e re  
i s  c u ltu re  and the  f a c t  th a t  i t s  t r a d i t io n  o f  in s tru c t io n  i s  no Dr-cultural 
(see p. 217). Any change o f  mode o f in s tru c tio n  in  In d ia  was c u ltu ra l  
only inasmuch a s  our p o in t o f view i s  c u ltu ra l . On th e  o th e r  hand, in  
Socrates, c u ltu re  was always p resen t, b u t he t r i e d  to  r id  him s e l f  o f  
i t s  in flu en ce  in  the  in te r e s t  o f h is  p h ilo soph ical th ink ing . S im ila rly , 
b u t again only  from o u r m eta-philosophical p o in t o f  view, Buddhism in  
s t r iv in g  f o r  th e  to ta l  l ib e ra t io n  o f  th ink ing , im plies f i r s t  o f  a l l  
l ib e ra t io n  from c u ltu re . I t  ch a rac te rizes  Spengler, who ( l ik e  Hegel) 
de riv es  an ax io lo g ica l func tion  from h is  category o f  c u ltu re , th a t  he 
seeks r ig id  analog ies in s tead  o f some herm eneutically  aware "meta­
r e la t iv e s ,  f e a r  o f  people, f e a r  o f sleep , o f the a u th o r i t ie s ,  o f 
thunderstorm s, o f  war, fe a r ,  fe a r .*  At the  age o f  eleven he experiences 
f o r  th e  f i r s t  time h is  ego as locked in to  a  cave, and furtherm ore:
"Since my f i f te e n th  year I  have a lw ays...had  the fe e l in g  th a t  ray ego 
s i t s  deeply locked in to  my body, being connected w ith  the world on ly  
through the eyes." (For h is  cave awareness a lso  see p. 150( l l ) . )
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c u ltu ra l11 form of self-expansion  o r  l ib e r a t io n  from e x is t in g  c u ltu re
p a tte rn s . Whenever he t r i e s  to  convey con ten t he does i t  in  s t r i c t
connection w ith  physiognomical form which i t s e l f  determ ines th e  ro le ,
th e  degree and the  re la t iv e  value o f the " re a l i ty "  o r  " tru th "  o f  any
such content -  and s t i f l e s  h is  own m etaphysical thought ( fo r  example,
on "w ill" , "sou l", " fa te " ) . Hence, f o r  Spengler a l l  p h ilo so p h ica l
so lu tio n s  must somehow he m anifested on a  p ra c t ic a l  so c io -c u ltu ra l le v e l
(as exem plified through h is  own n a tio n a l!a n ) , i . e . ,  he cannot agree to
(57)
any f in a l  so lu tio n  on the awareness le v e l a s  such.
To Spengler, a s  to  Schopenhauer, Ind ia  e s s e n tia l ly  appears 
a s  an a e s th e t ic a l ,  moral fe a tu re , i . e . ,  i t  p lays a formal ro le , in  which 
i t  a lso  p rovides some ax io lo g ica l c a lib ra t io n . Regarding c u ltu re , we 
remember th a t  Schopenhauer simply im plied i t  in  h is  search f o r  
an teceden ts: he was c le a r ly  m otivated by the  Upanisads inagnuch a s  he
derived from them a c e r ta in  ph ilosoph ical fo m  (which l a t e r  merged in  
h is  p r in c ip a l p re sen ta tio n s) . But Spengler immediately fo rced  h is  own 
fo m  onto h is  b r ie f  bu t very e x p l ic i t  cu ltu ro lo g ic a l in te rp re ta t io n  
o f  Ind ia . In  n e ith e r  case can ve n o tic e  th a t  th e  meanings derived  from 
Indian cu ltu re  r e f le c t  any genuine search fo r  the a c tu a l  con ten t w ith 
regard  to  i t s  meaningfulness: in  an Indian con tex t. In  o th e r  words, 
we f in d  no tru e  methodological approach o f the kind suggested in  our 
In troduction . Spengler, u n like  Schopenhauer, i s  c u ltu ra l ly  ab so lu te ly  
committed, o f which he i s  h igh ly  aware, l e t ,  from our p o in t o f  view 
he d isp lay s  a  noteworthy c u ltu ra l  na iv e ty  which we f in d  complemented 
by the  nonchalance w ith which he chooses the moral and a e s th e t ic a l  
values used in  shaping h is  morphological outlook. His manner o f  
locking these values in to  a  n i h i l i s t i c  s ta te  o f p e t r i f i c a t io n  in d ic a te s  
a  p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  on the an thropolog ical le v e l;  te le o lo g ic a lly , 
h is  idea  of abso lu te  c u ltu ra l  confinement marks him a s  a  h i s to r ic a l  
pess im ist. S peng ler's  f in a l  c u ltu ra l  scepticism  i s  a  p ro je c tio n  o f
(57) Blmen ( in  Speng.heute. p. 1J6) w rite s  "S p eng ler's  so -c a lle d  
'pessim ism '. .  .does no t describe  the mental s ta te  o f  an in d iv id u a l, 
bu t a  shaping o f  h is to r ic a l  consciousness" ( i . e . ,  a  h i s to r ic a l ly  
o rien ted  c u ltu ra l  a t t i tu d e ) .
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h is  p ersonal scepticism , which forms and feed s  h is  re a c tio n s  and 
v is io n s , and •whirl* i s  a t  the b a s is  o f h is  self-d en y in g  physiognomic a l
. . (5a )pessim ism .
Spengler 3 conception o f  c u ltu re  d e fin es  h is  personal re a c tio n  to  
i t .  Hence, Sorokin (C ris is , pp. 16, 23) ,  r e je c t in g  Spengler and ask ing  
f o r  a  more o p tim is tic  response to  the  c r i s i s  o f  the  West, cannot help  
suggesting  to  " s h i f t  to  ano ther b a sic  form o f  c u ltu re " . Toynbee 
(Downfall, p . 10) in  tu rn  accepts th a t  due to  "inward and s p i r i tu a l  
causes" th e  Western c iv i l iz a t io n  i s  l ik e ly  to  "break down and 
d is in te g ra te  and f in a l ly  d isso lve" , b u t he re v o lts  a g a in s t th e  id ea  
o f  "any inexorab le  law" in  i t .  Bagby (C ulture , p . 18 l) c r i t i c i z e s  
Toynbee f o r  neg lec ting , in  co n tra s t to  Spengler, any system atic  u se  o f  
a d e a r  concept o f  cu ltu re .
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C hapter F ive
Gebser; the  Ind ian  complement -  an a ra t ia n a l  rapprochement, o r  chaos?
Jean  (Fans) Gebser (l905 -  1973) i s  o u r o th e r  im portant c u ltu ra l  
thinker* In stead  o f  a ttem pting  to  continue o r  to  rep lace  h is  
fo reru n n ers , he proposes to  " in teg ra te"  t h e i r  views in  h is  own. Far 
le s s  dynamic than Spengler, b u t much more carefU l in  h is  thought and 
language, he opens up a  cosmopolitan p e rsp ec tiv e  vh ich , cu ltu re  lo g ic a l ly ,  
seems ap t to  le ad  u s  through, and perhaps ou t o f , o u r problem o f German 
m etaphysical pessim ian (notw ithstanding our com parative Indian 
e lu c id a tio n s  which fo llow ), Gebser, a s  compared to  our o th e r  th in k e rs , 
makes th e  most ex tensive  use o f In d ia  (and A sia a s  a  whole) by in c lu d in g  
i t  a s  a  v i t a l  and a c tiv e  p a r t  in  h is  d e sc rip tio n  o f  th e  human 
consciousness. While from our p o in t o f  view In d ia  p la y s  an ou ts tan d in g  
ro le  in  th e  development o f h is  outlook, the  p e ss im is tic  elem ent, the  
changing m etaphysical a sp ec t o f which we a re  try in g  to  tra c e , f in d s  
a  very  su b tle  expression  in  G ebser's  non-absolute and d is t in c t ly  ,
co n d itio n a l warnings regard ing  man' a  u n iv e rsa l s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n .
We shall show how the  m etaphysical concept o f pessimism 
undergoes th e  u su a l change in  accordance w ith the th in k e r ' a  c u ltu ra l  
awareness. In  G ebser's  approach the  overcoming o f  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  
tim e concepts in  a l l  e x is t in g  c u ltu re s  p lays a c e n tra l  ro le . This
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time-awareness n o t only  d is tin g u ish es  Gebser from o u r o th e r  th in k e rs , 
b u t may a lso  provide a  m ajor c lue fo r  o u r own understanding  o f th e  
d if f e r e n t  development o f th e  c u ltu ra l  modes o f human s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  
in  th e  p a st two and a h a lf  thousand y ears . Being f u l ly  aware o f h i s  
n a tu ra l ly  Western s ta r t in g -p o in t, he assumes an in sep arab le  b u t f le x ib le  
p o la r  connection o f E ast and West on the  b a s is  o f v a rio u s  ev o lu tionary  
s ta g e s  o f  the human consciousness. This developmental connection, he 
i n s i s t s ,  must be understood w ith  a view to  one very  e s s e n tia l  ta r g e t :  
the  in te g ra tio n  o f th e  v a rio u s  forms of consciousness as they 
c h a rac te rize  bo th  O rien ta l and O ccidental thought, d e sp ite  the  d if f e r e n t  
h is to r ic a l  courses o f  th ese  two tra d it io n s .
Gebser has i l l u s t r a t e d  h is  outlook very tan g ib ly  in  h is  
A sien fib e l ( i . e .  "Asia f o r  beg inners"). This in te rp re ta t iv e  d e sc r ip tio n  
o f  the  O rien ta l mind was in sp ired  by h is  im pressions from an ex tensive  
journey in  1961 through South Asia and th e  Far E as t.
( l )  Asia and Eurore
G ebser's decision  to  go and see how Asia l iv e s  and i s ,  and why A sians 
th in k  and a c t  th e  way they  do, was consciously based on h is  assumption 
th a t ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  understand Asia, although we must 
be aware of the n a tu ra l  d i f f i c u l ty  o f th is  problem. He warns o f th e  
dangers o f any rash , na ive, e thnocen tric , o r  random emotional 
judgements. His b a sic  suggestion i s  to  a ttu n e  o n e 's  own Western mind 
to  th e  l iv in g  phenomena o f  A sia, implying th a t  i f  we draw cu r c u l tu ra l  
c i r c l e  wide enough we can come to  understand some form o f common Asian 
mind. Thus he observes th a t  " th e re  i s  an Asian way o f  th ink ing , j u s t  
a s  th e re  i s  a  European one". ^  His i n i t i a l  conclusion from th i s  
a ttu n ed  approach i s  th a t  th e  Western mind i s  by no means "more 
advanced" than th a t  o f th e  E ast, and th a t Europe (in c lu d in g  North 
America) and A sia do in  f a c t  c o n s ti tu te  the two main complementary 
s p i r i tu a l  po les  o f mankind (p a ra lle le d  by a  s im ila r , b u t more 
rudim entary re la tio n sh ip  between South America and A frica ).
Herm eneutically, th i s  s ig n if ic a n t s tep  does no t fo llow  any o n to lo g ica l
Gebser, Asf. « p. 15.
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c ir c le  movement bu t in s tead  t r i e s  to  a ttu n e  th e  p rocess o f  understanding: 
to  a  morphological p o la rity '.
(2 ) Pie we w ithout an ego, and the time-ocean
Attempting to  i s o la te  one o f  the  fundamental determ inants o f a  p e rso n 's  
c u ltu re  awareness, Gebser p o in ts  to what he considers  a s  a  c ru c ia l  
d iffe ren ce  in  th e  Eastern  and Western ego concepts. He ho lds th a t  
a  p e rso n 's  s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  w ith h is  ego, o r , in  f a c t ,  th e  question  
o f  whether he focuses on a  s t r i c t l y  ind iv id u a l personal ego a t  a l l ,  
cannot be e lucidated  adequately w ithout sente understanding  o f  h is  
h ab itu a l time conception. He b r ie f ly  i l l u s t r a t e s  what he means by- 
re fe r r in g  to  a  s ig n if ic a n t l i t t l e  fe a tu re  o f  th e  Hindi language: 
in s tead  o f the  th ree  d is t in c t  concepts f o r  ’’yesterday", ”today" and 
11 tomorrow" common in  European languages, H indi o p era tes  w ith  on ly  two 
such no tions, a i  and leal. While aj, may be rendered by "today", th e re  
e x is ts  no "yesterday" as such o r  "tomorrow" a s  such; k a l , ra th e r ,  r e f e r s  
to  some "tim eless time-ocean" from which a  p e rp e tu a lly  f le e t in g  t in y  
p o in t, the ajt, emerges. ^
Through th i s  example from language Gebser wants to  d i r e c t  our
a tte n tio n  to  h is  observation  th a t  the Asian m en ta lity  i s  more in c lin e d
to  r e la te  ex istence to  some u n d iffe ren tia te d  time-ocean than to
d if fe re n tia te  consciously between a  before and an a f t e r .  Gebser f e e l s
th a t f o r  the  Indian, and the Asian in  general, " s in ce  he has no a c tu a l
time concept, l i f e  i s  tim eless  l ik e  the  tim e-ocean, o r  l ik e  death
i t s e l f ,  where even f o r  us time does no t e x is t .  How then  should he
d is tin g u ish  between l i f e  and death, o r perhaps even a t t r ib u te  a  value
to  l i f e ?  How could i t  be o th e r than th a t u ltim a te ly  l i f e  i s  n o t r e a l ly
(3)worth liv ing?" Gebser fin d s  a prime example f o r  t h i s  general Ind ian
77\
Gebser, Asf. ,  p . 21. In  Tucci (Ind ia , pp. Il-rl2 ) we read  th a t  
In d ia  has liv e d  in  a  dream s ta te  so f a r  (ha v is su to  sognando). and th a t  
i t s  h is to ry  i s  l ik e  an ocean w ithout horizon (un mare uguale ove 
manca 1' o rizzo n te ).
Gebser, A sf.. p. 48 (also  pp. 37, 45-46, 119). He ignores that
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a t t i tu d e  in  the  Buddhist concept o f n irvana, to  vhich he re f e r s  a s  
a  w ishfu l id e a . According to  h is  in te rp re ta t io n  " i t  i s  the  sink ing  
away in to  the b o d ile ss , the essen ce less , i t  i s  the e x tin c tio n  o f  being 
and non-being, i t  i s  the re tu rn  in to  the form less void (from which a f t e r  
a l l  everything u ltim a te ly  o r ig in a te s ) ,  i t  i s  th e  f in a l  l ib e ra t io n  from 
th e  o b lig a tio n  o f re in ca rn a tio n  and thus the freedom from su ffe rin g ,
(4)sin ce  l i f e  i s  no th ing  b u t su ffe r in g  and, th e re fo re , no t worth l iv in g " . 
(This p ro je c tio n  o f  pessimism in to  Indian thought fo llow s a  snnriia-r 
e thnocen tric  p erspec tive  as we have n o ticed  in  Schopenhauer, von 
Hartmann, o r Mainlander. Compare pp. 62-63, 85, 91-92.)
In  G ebser's  opinion th i s  Indian  o r ie n ta tio n  i s  decided by the  
question  o f whether an in d iv id u a l i s  used to  id e n tify in g  h is  ego w ith 
some s t r i c t l y  personal s e l f  o r  w ith  some genera l "we", a s  may be 
m anifested by the  group id e n t i ty  o f the  Asian extended fam ily. " I t  
makes a  g re a t, a  very g re a t d iffe ren c e , whether one l iv e s ,  one d ie s , o r  
whether I_ l iv e  and sh a ll  d ie . When an Asian d ie s , u su a lly  no ego d ie s  
which can o r  must be a f ra id  o f  the lo s s  o f i t s e l f ,  and consequently 
th e re  i s  no f e a r  o f death ."  Gebser i s  n o t r e fe r r in g  to  th e  p h y sica l 
s ide o f  death , b u t to  what f rc n  a  Western p o in t o f  view could be 
considered i t s  m etaphysical a sp ec t. The ahamkara -  o r  th e  ego-form ation, 
a s  he p u ts  i t  -  cannot be an Indian  id e a l, " s in ce  f o r  the  orthodox 
Hindu the ego i s  the t i e  which h inders h is  re tu rn  to  the  u n q u a lified
w ith re sp ec t to  In d ia  time cannot be tre a te d  as  a  Kantean form o f  
p e rcep tion  (Anschauungsfonn). b u t th a t ,  according to  Buddhist thought, 
time fu n c tio n s  a s  seme 'o b je c t iv e  su b s ta n tia l f lu id ' i n  which a re  
merged a l l  contingent beings. Each dhanaa e x is ts  f o r  ever, on ly  i t s  
mode o f  ex isten ce  changes in  accordance w ith  i t s  fu tu re , p re sen t o r  
p a s t  phase. Moreover, beyond an em pirical d iv is ib le  tim e substance 
th e re  e x is ts  an abso lu te  tim e, o r  substance o f  im m ortality  (amrta)
(see Schayer, Time. pp. 2-15).
^  Gebser, A gf.. p . 119. Cf. Olga Plumacher (Pessim .. p . 22) who 
in  1884 rev e rb e ra te s  the  contemporary p e ss im is tic  v e rd ic t on 
Brahmartigg a s  be ing  e s s e n tia l ly  concerned w ith  the  " a n n ih ila tio n  o f  
in d iv id u a lity  by submergence in to  th e  abso lu te".
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nirvana and preven ts h is  ex tinguish ing  submergence in  th e
(5)u n d iffe re n tia te d  time-ocean” . Gebser u n d erlin es  th a t  t h i s  weakness 
o f  th e  in d iv id u a l ego in  favour o f a  predominant c o lle c tiv e  "we" should 
n o t be considered as a  general weakness o f  th e  Asian m en ta lity  a s  such, 
o r  even a s  a  d e lib e ra te  in s u l t  to  Asians. In  f a c t ,  he f e e ls  th a t  the 
Asian psyche i s  more balanced than the Western one vhich has, p a r a l le l  
w ith th e  development o f  i t s  sense f o r  in d iv id u a lity , su ffe red  
considerably  from in c reas in g  ego-mania. This problem forms 
a noteworthy p a r t  o f G ebser's  concern about the development o f the  
p o la r  c u ltu ra l re la tio n sh ip  o f  East and West which in  h is  opinion, a lso , 
has reached a c r i t i c a l  stage, as  we s h a ll  see below (pp. 150, 160, 1 7 l) .
In  h is  attem pt to  provide a comparative view o f A sia,
although q u ite  consciously from a Western view point, he a lso  pays
a tte n tio n  to  the  manner in  which Asia responds to  Western p r in c ip le s .
He n o tice s  th a t  the O rien ta l mind commits i t s e l f  w ill in g ly  to  the
requirem ents o f Western science and technology b u t only  f o r  a s  long
as necessaiy . Beyond th a t  p o in t i t  p re fe rs  to  dwell in  those
h is to r ic a l ly  e a r l i e r  la y e rs  o f consciousness where i t  f in d s  r e l i e f  fro®
th e  n e ce ss ity  of mental d if f e re n tia tio n . Even Ind ian  philosophy, he
f in d s , p re fe rs  more flowing, le s s  contoured concepts. I t  appears to
Gebser th a t  f o r  the  Indian mind, u ltim a te ly , "every th ing  i s  the  same” ;
th a t from a Western m ystical p o in t o f view th is  may a lso  be so does
not re le a se  us fro® th e  o b lig a tio n  to  d if f e r e n t ia te .  He a lso  suggests
th a t ,  even i f  a  Western person wanted to  re tu rn  to  th e  ego less le v e l
by submerging in to  the  tim eless time-ocean, he would probably no t
succeed (compare von Hartmann, p . 83). Such a  ven ture  would req u ire
the  revocation  o f  the  complete European evolvement in to  egoness w ith
a l l  I t s  p o s itiv e  and negative  concomitants — th i s ,  however, would
amount to  the  death  o f  European being. Gebser sees a  d if f e r e n t  way fo r
the d if f e r e n t ia t in g  European consciousness: i t  must outgrow i t s
(6)ego-centredness and reach some over-awake s ta te  o f ego—freedom.
(5) Gebser, A sf .. p . 45.
^  Gebser, A sf.. pp. 87-89, 92-95.
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This s t a t e  o f consciousness, he adds, must no t be confused v i th
(7)n irvana  (a lso  see p. 247).
•
P o in tin g  to  a  common source o f e r ro r  ty p ic a l  to  many
E urocen tric  vieirs o f the  Indian consciousness, Gebser e lu c id a te s
a  s ig n if ic a n t fe a tu re  of the d o c trin e  o f re in ca rn a tio n . He says,
a p a r t from the above mentioned negation  o f the  ego vhich , as  he
b e lie v e s , a lread y  p lay s  a  ro le  in  the Tedas and Upanisads, the
m ajo rity  o f the Hindus has no t even developed an ego in  the  European
sense; they  a re  ego-less* That means, th e re  i s  no question  o f the
re in c a rn a tio n  o f some form o f ego such as e x is ts  in  Western
consciousness. The "sou ls" may v e i l  transm igra te , b u t w ithout any egos.
In  o th e r  words, th i s  d o c tr in e  o f  re in ca rn a tio n  does no t concen tra te  on
a  movement o f s t r i c t l y  in d iv id u a l, personal sou ls  which re tu rn  to  t h i s
world. " I t  i s  the  cycle  o f the  soul p r in c ip le  which i s  consummated
here. I t  i s  im personal, hence, ego-less soul f a te  which, dying, s inks
back in to  the  time-ocean and which v i th  a  new b i r t h  c o n s te lla te s  again
in  some enveloping fo m  (Kilsenfoim ) composed o f those  elements which
(8)had remained undissolved from some p a s t l i f e . "
R ecalling  Schopenhauer" 3 view on th is  a sp ec t o f  Tndian 
c u ltu re , we can -  i f  we go a long  w ith  Gebser -  now judge more c le a r ly  
how c lev e rly  Schopenhauer, d esp ite  h is  c u ltu ra l ly  r a th e r  
im discrim inating  approach to  Indian  philosophy, evaluated  the  Indian  
b e l ie f  in  metempsychosis when he f e l t  th a t ,  a lthough i t  was n o t tru e , 
we could f o r  a l l  p ra c t ic a l  purposes t r e a t  i t  a s  i f  i t  were tru e .
A ra tio n a l d iv id in g  l i n e  between th ese  two asp ec ts , which Schopenhauer 
had juxtaposed q u ite  p ragm atically , i s  now drawn by Gebser on th e  b a s is  
o f  h is  d is t in c t io n  between an E astern  and a Western form o f  s e l f -  
awareness. Regarding th e  p ra c t ic a l  im plica tions, Gebser reminds u s  
o f th e  ty p ic a lly  Western a t t i tu d e  o f  in te r fe r in g  a c t iv e ly  and 
d e lib e ra te ly  w ith one" s  own f a te  and th a t  o f  o th e r in d iv id u a ls , 
whereas f o r  the  Indian  th e  course o f  l i f e  i s  determ ined by some 
sup ra -in d iv id u a l f a te .  I f  we use a  European p e rsp ec tiv e , our f a te ,  
o r  d estin y , would have to  be considered a s  something coming to  u s  
(?) Gebser, Wandlung, p . 157.
(8 )
Gebser, A sf .. p. 62.
from the  fu tu re  a s  i t  were, and su scep tib le  to  in flu en ce  from our 
(9)p re sen t a c tio n s . However, th e  Indian view assumes th a t  the  essence 
o f  f a te  must he ly in g  a t  the core from the very beginning o r , a s  Gebser 
reckons, somewhere in  h is  (a c tu a lly  q u ite  un-Indian) tim eless  
tim e-ocean. From a  European p o in t of view, the  Ind ian , even i f  he 
had the personal d e s ire  to  face  d estin y , could n o t do so, s in ce  i t  
l i e s  behind him a s  karma, as a  l a te n t  condition  which i s  a c tu a liz e d  
during  h is  emergence in  l i f e .  According to  Gebser, th e  Ind ian , lack in g  
an egocen tric  form o f w ill ,  accep ts  a s  a u th o rity  h is  f a t e  to  which he 
a ttu n es  h im self in  a  ra th e r  undisrupted , harmonious manner. In  th i s  
in te n tio n le s s  atmosphere thoughts and events s t i l l  fo llow  th e i r  
in v is ib le ,  n a tu ra l  re la tio n sh ip s  -  and only to  th e  ra t io n a l  European 
mind th ese  undisrupted ju n c tu res  o f events may appear as  su rp r is in g  o r  
m iraculous. "The age-old so to  speak magical connectedness o f even ts, 
which su ffe rs  no d isturbance through ego-orien ted  o r ra t io n a l ly  
d ire c te d  w ishes, w orries and fe a rs ,  i s  s t i l l  a l iv e  th e re  and works 
n a tu ra l ly  th e re , while to  us i t  appears e i th e r  r id ic u lo u s  o r m ysterious, 
provided we a re , a f t e r  a l l ,  ab le  to  accept th is  one-tim e u n iv e rsa l 
p o te n tia l  which in  Asia s t i l l  e x is ts ."
For Gebser the  Asian world i s  no t awake in  the  Western sense 
of the  word. "In  Asia th ings can happen as in  a dream, in  fa c t ,  as  in  
one*s sleep , ju s t  a s  the Lord g iv e th  to  h is  beloved w hile they s leep ."  
(S im ila rly , Spengler had fran k ly  likened  the h is to ry  o f Indian  thought 
to  the  "movements o f a  s leep ing  person", p . 129, and Hegel had b lu n tly  
r e s t r i c te d  i t  to  some d ia le c t ic  le v e l  o f "mere dreaming", p . 46 .) 
I l l u s t r a t i n g  th i s  s ta te  o f n o n -d if fe re n tia tin g  consciousness, Gebser 
r e s o r ts  to  a  fa m ilia r  comparison. He says th a t  th e  age-o ld  manner o f 
considering  the  world as a cave in to  which one re tu rn s  -  in  Europe t i l l  ■ 
P la to  -  has la rg e ly  survived in  Asia. He f in d s  th i s  f a c t  re f le c te d  in  
th e  Asian (e sp e c ia lly  Buddhist and Hindu) ch a rac te r: "Ihe  cave l i e s
in  the  dark, o r  in  a  tw ilig h t which never seeks the day; i t  knows no
(g)
Cf. Gebser, Wandlung. p . 167: "Kan i s  by no means the  c re a to r  o f 
the  fu tu re ; he i s  only a co -c rea to r ."
Gebser, A sf .. p. 74.
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tim e, th e re fo re  no y este rday  and no tomorrow, s in ce  w ith in  i t
th e  d iv is io n  o f day from n ig h t has n o t y e t  happened. ” This
o r ie n ta tio n  towards " th e  m agical world o f th e  cave" i s  in  accordance
w ith  another im portant c u ltu ra l  p r in c ip le  which Gebser d iscovers in  the
Indian mind, namely, i t s  o r ie n ta tio n  towards th e  fem ale, m otherly po le
o f  th is  world -  o r  r a th e r  i t s  numinous background -  which balances th e
(12)O ccidental emphasis on some m ale-paternal v o rld -p o le . In  th i s
connection i t  may be o f  in t e r e s t  to  remember S p en g le r 's  in d isc rim in a te  
morphological analog ies o f h is  assumed Greek: and Ind ian  n ih i l  i a i ;  in  
Gebser s sense, we can now make a  c le a r  c u ltu ra l  and physiognomical 
d is t in c t io n  between the  Indian a s c e t ic s  o f th e  magic cave and th e  
mental asceticism  exem plified by Diogenes a s  Spengler s t i l l  sees 
him (p. 129).
(5) West and East complement each o th er
G ebser's method o f understanding Eastern c u ltu re  i s ,  as we have seen, 
based on a ca re fu l d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  between. O rie n ta l and O ccidental 
consciousness. But th e  re la tio n sh ip s  between E ast and V est, he 
s tre s s e s , should be understood a s  being  o f a complementary n a tu re , 
no t an opposite one. He c la s s i f i e s  "opposition" a s  a  concept, and 
"complement" a s  a  c o n s te lla tio n . He then warns th a t  in s is te n c e  on the  
ty p ic a lly  European ra t io n a l  view o f  a n o n -ex is tin g  East-W est opposition
(l3 )"can e n ta i l  the  su ic id e  o f  our c u ltu re  o r  c iv i l iz a t io n " .
Gebser, A sf.. pp. 99-101. Spengler d e c la re s  th e  "cav e -lik e  
expressional magic space" to  be th e  "primeval symbol o f  th e  Arabic 
cu ltu re"  ( in d ic a tin g  a s  h is  source o f  in s p ira t io n  Frohenius, Paideuma. 
p . 106, who uses the  t e m  "cav e -fee lin g "); c f . G .d.A .. pp. 225, 236. 
Gebser, who agrees w ith  Spengler th a t  the "cave c u ltu re  i s  symptomatic 
f o r  Islam" (u.G ., p. 189(20)} , employs th e  cave symbol f o r  h is  own 
h is to r ic a l  conception o f  a  m agical consciousness s tru c tu re .
(l2) ^ J Gebser, A sf.. pp. 104-105.
(13} Gebser, A sf.. p . I l l ;  a lso  see pp. 123 (p o la r i ty ) ,  158 ( lo s s  o f  
the  s e l f ) ,  172 ( f a i lu r e  and chaos); and U.G.. pp. 385-586: th e
"su icide  o f  the Occident", p repared  by th e  Renaissance, began
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Gebser makes th e  b a s is  o f  h i s  herm eneutic q u ite  c le a r .
F i r s t  sorting: ou t what he w ishes to  avoid, he  l e t s  u s  know th a t  "an 
ex c lu siv e ly  ra tional, th ink ing  in  opposites  produces d iv is io n , and in  
th e  long run i t  leads to  death". (We do in  f a c t  f e e l  reminded o f 
Spengler s i r r a t io n a l  b u t r a t i o n a l i s t i c  s t r i c t  monadological i s o la t io n  
which negated any meaningful consntmication between "us" and "them", 
thus lead in g  to  some form o f  r e la t iv e  death  in  h is  c u ltu re  c y c le .)
"Ho ever, i f  one moves consciously w ith in  the f i e ld  o f p o la r  complements, 
the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a  harmonious wholeness ap p ea rs ." (inasnuch a s  th i s  
may suggest a formal p a ra l le l  to  Gadamer, we must, w ith  re sp ec t to  h is  
h is to r ic a l  approach to  t ra d it io n , d is tin g u ish  between hermeneutic a s  
a  h is to r ic a l  methodology and a s  a  h is to r io so p h ic a l methodology, as in  
Gebser o r  Spengler.)
East and West, as p ro jec ted  by Gebser, have d if f e r e n t  ways
of g e tt in g  in to  much the same problem. While the  p o la r  complementary
mode o f  th inking which i s  today s t i l l  common in  Asia i s  u su a lly  no t
handled c r i t i c a l l y  enough, th e re fo re  r e s u l t in g  in  d is to r te d  views o f
r e a l i ty ,  Western thought f a i l s  eq u a lly  through i t s  ex c lu siv e ly  ra tio n a l
(l4)d u a l is t ic  approach. He fe e ls  th a t  th e re  i s  b a s ic a lly  nothing wrong
w ith e i th e r  p rin c ip le  as such. But they  may seem m utually
incomprehensible and incom patible as long a s  each mode o f thought i s  
p ra c tise d  merely on the b a s is  o f i t s  own o r ig in a l  s tru c tu re  o f 
consciousness while attem pts a re  being  made to  pass judgement by 
i l le g i t im a te ly  tra n s fe rr in g  and apply ing  h ab itu a l s tandards to  the  
opposite  mode o f  thought. However, Gebser v is u l iz e s  more than  ju s t  
some mutual ap p recia tion  w ith in  th i s  complementary re la tio n sh ip . He
aims a t  a  u n iv ersa l mode o f th ink ing  and understanding. U nlike
Schopenhauer, who somewhat nonchaiently  assumed th a t  in te l l ig e n t  thought
so c io lo g ica lly  in  1789, re lig io u s ly  during  th e  Enlightenment (and 
culm inating in  the d ec la ra tio n  th a t  God was dead), p o l i t i c a l ly  w ith  
World War I ,  and was completed through e x is te n t ia l ia a .
(l4 ) Gebser, Dualigmis, p . 42: "The l a s t  attem pt to  e s ta b lis h  the
abso lu te  power o f dualisn  was H egel's  p r in c ip le  o f ' t h e s i s ,  a n t i th e s is  
and s y n th e s is '."
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(although n o t n e ce ssa rily  i t s  expression) n a tu ra l ly  followed, th e  
same p r in c ip le s  everywhere, Gebser f i r s t  makes a  c a re fu l assessm ent 
o f the ro o ts  o f Asian thought.
(4 ) Coggnon s tru c tu re s  -  d i f f e r e n t  p a th s
E xplaining Gebser s id ea  of a  c u ltu ra l  p o la r i ty  between East and V est, 
we have shown how he perceiv es  th e i r  p re sen t physiognomic d iffe ren ces . 
In  ask ing  why they d i f f e r  he a lso  looks in to  th e  th e  h is to ry  o f t h e i r  
s e lf - id e n t i f ic a t io n .  P o in tin g  ou t th e  modem dangers o f  the  widespread 
u n c r i t ic a l  European b e l ie f  in  concrete , techno log ica l p rog ress, he 
remarks th a t  the  meaning o f p rog ress can a lso  imply a  w alking away from 
the  o rig in . In  ad d itio n  the European mind a lso  e s ta b lis h e s  a  tem poral 
d is tan ce . As a  r e s u l t  i t  fo rg e ts  th e  v i t a l  f a c t  th a t  "o r ig in  i s  
continuous p resen t" (compare S peng ler's  beginning phase o f  c iv i l iz a t io n ,  
pp. 122, 135). Gebser says th a t  Europe and A sia share a  d is ta n t
p a s t, b u t th a t  they f in a l ly  went d if f e r e n t  ways: Europe i s  n o t any
more advanced than Asia, bu t c e r ta in  s tru c tu re s , s t i l l  a l iv e  in  Asia, 
a re  fo rg o tten , denied o r  suppressed in  th e  Vest.
In d ica tin g  the y e a r  500 B.C. a s  a  formal p o in t o f  s p i r i tu a l
culm ination f o r  the g re a t c u ltu re s  o f  th a t  tim e, Gebser concen tra tes
on two im portant periods, the one before th a t  da te  and th e  one around
i t .  During the  l a t t e r  one, a lso  known a s  th e  " a x ia l p e rio d " , o r
A chsenzeit. A sia and Europe, E ast and V est, begin  to  go d if f e r e n t
ways. Around th i s  tim e th i s  magic-mythic world beg ins to  d isappear
(l7 )f o r  th e  European mind, w hile A sia p reserv es  i t .  Gebser in  ask ing
(l5 ) Gebser, A sf .. p . 127; U.G.. pp. 305-306: a  su cessfu l in te g ra tio n
o f  o r ig in  and presence means freedom w ith  regard to  tim e.
Ja sp e rs  (Jrgprung, pp. 18-42), in sp ire d  by Hegel, impressed 
Gebser w ith  h is  w ell-developed em pirical p ic tu re  o f  an A chsenzeit.
" I t  marks the  deepest cu t in  h is to ry . Man o f th e  t y p e  we have l iv e d  
w ith  u n t i l  today o r ig in a te d ."
(17) S im ilarly , Husserl (K r is is . p . 329) suggests th a t  O rien ta l 
p h ilo soph ies  a re  fundam entally d if f e r e n t  from Greek-European philosophy 
because " in  th e i r  own con tex t they a re  and remain m y th ic a l-p ra c tic a l" .
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us to  turn, our ra tio n a l modem minds b r ie f ly  to  th a t  an c ien t 
Greek myth te l l in g  o f the p rin c e ss  Europe being  c a r r ie d  o f f  by Zeus 
who was in  th e  form o f  a  b u ll ,  suggests th a t  such myths in  f a c t  meant 
r e a l i ty  f o r  men before 500 B.C. Hie f e e ls  th a t  th i s  myth could have 
o rig in a ted  towards th e  end o f th e  zodiacal p e rio d  o f  ta n ru s , th e  b u l l ,  
thus p o in tin g  to  the  time around th e  f i f t h  t i l l  th e  th i r d  m-mennium B.C. 
He d esc rib es  th e  s p ir i tu a l  n a tu re  o f th e  c u ltu re s  o f th a t  e ra  a s  magic, 
th e i r  so c io lo g ica l o r ie n ta tio n  a s  m a tria rch a l. The fo llow ing period , 
u n t i l  the  g re a t separa tion  beg ins, he c a l l s  mythic. Magic-mythic man 
d id  n o t y e t t r e a t  the world a s  an o b jec t, s ince  he was s t i l l  embedded 
in  i t .  His outlook; was not y e t  ru led  by ra t io n a l ,  lo g ic a l  thought and
—  ( l8)
im agination. Instead  he used dream like mythic id eas  (see p . 149)
which were not concepts. Gebser d esc rib es  the  b a s is  o f  the  magic-mythic 
kind o f s e lf - id e n tif ic a t io n  s t i l l  p re v a ilin g  in  Asia in  these  words:
"The fundamental s tru c tu re  o f  the m agical, then, i s  th e  u n d iffe re n tia te d  
u n ity  o f  a l l  l iv in g  being; the fundamental s tru c tu re  o f th e  m ythical 
i s  the  m utually complementary p o la r i ty  o f the  s p i r i tu a l .  N either o f 
th ese  two fundamental s tru c tu re s  p u ts  th in g s  in to  conceptual 
o p p o sitio n .. .  .Mythic "thinking" happens in  episodes o r  p ic to r ia l  id eas  
which follow  ra th e r  flowing a sso c ia tio n s  and which never have, l ik e  
our th ink ing , a l in e a r ,  a im -orien ted  c h a rac te r  bu t re tu rn  in  a  c ir c u la r  
manner bark in to  them selves." For him such id eas  a s  the  wheel o f 
samsaxa. the chain o f b i r th s ,  reveal the need o f undivided, p o la r  
harmony between heaven, e a r th  and man.
Whether we l ik e  i t  o r  n o t, says. Gebser, those an c ien t 
magio-mythic s tru c tu re s  -  he c a l l s  them o re -ra tio n a l and i r r a t io n a l  -  
a lso  belong to  Western c u ltu re ; however, in  A sia they  have remained 
more prominent. A den ial o r  re je c tio n  o f  th ese  elem ents would je t is o n
fjQ \
Gebser (A sf., p. 13 l) rev e rse s  Schopenhauer's and K an t's  uso of 
the  German terms Vem unft, i . e .  reason, and Verstand. i . e .  i n te l le c t ,  
which anim als a lso  have g o t: in  G ebser's  term inology Verstand i s
ra t io n a l ,  a n a ly tic a l, and a  l a t e r ,  post-m ythical accessory  to  V em unft. 
With sub tle  l in g u is t ic  s e n s i t iv i ty  he in te rp re ts  Vem unft a s  something 
l ik e  a  recep tive  understanding, an (inner) hearing  (veraehmen).
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our f u l l  human id e n tity . 'Qiis could happen through th e  kind o f
i r r a t io n a l  physiognomical a b s trac tio n  which u n d e rlie s  S p en g le r 's
(l9 )r a t io n a l i s t i c  p resen ta tio n , o r  through the  k ind  o f  r a t io n a l
(2D)p o s i t iv i s t i c  reduction  exposed by H usserl. Gebser p o in ts  to  th e
deadlock s i tu a tio n  which to  him the "European c r i s i s ’* seems to
fe a tu re  -  and which he understands, more than H usserl, a s  a  genuine
"world c r i s i s ’* -  and he comments th a t "we cannot w ithout punishment deny
(21)c o n stitu en t elem ents o f our p a s t and o u r humanness". Thus, he t i e *
a  warning in to  h is  explanation o f why A sia and Europe d i f f e r  so much 
today in  t h e i r  c u ltu ra l  outlooks. He assumes, a s  we have seen, th a t  
u n t i l  th e  a x ia l period  A sia and Europe shared some magic-mythic 
fundamental consciousness s tru c tu re . A sia, hawing la rg e ly  re ta in e d  
th i s  t i l l  today, has no t y e t awakened from i t s  dream like fe e l in g  o f  
cosmic u n ity  -  i t  does no t s e t  i t s e l f  a s  su b jec t a g a in s t th e  world a s  
o b je c t, o r  c le a r ly  see the  s e l f  in  term s o f  I  and you. Europe, however, 
has in  the  meantime formed a  m en ta l-ra tio n a l consciousness s tru c tu re . 
U nfortunately, m isled by i t s  r a t io n a l i s t  achievements, i t  has l o s t  i t s  
sense f o r  those more ancien t s tru c tu re s  in  i t s  own c u ltu ra l  n a tu re , n o r 
i s  i t  very  w ill in g  to  app recia te  than a s  they  e x is t  in  Asia* They do 
form p a r t  o f  ou r Western r e a l i ty ,  and, a s  Gebser emphasizes, t h e i r  
app rec ia tio n  -  i . e .  our c u ltu ra l awareness -  w il l  be c ru c ia l  f o r  th e  
fu tu re  o f man's conscious ex istence. According to  Gebser, th e  p re sen t 
c r i s i s  o f Europe i s  a c tu a lly  only p a r t  o f a  -  very  se r io u s  -  general
(19) ,Gebser c la s s i f ie s  Spengler s  pow er-oriented thought a s
"predominantly magic" (u .G ., p. 206), and "undermining* due to  
a  one-sided b io lo g is t ic  approach (p . 94 ). Von Hartmann has a lread y  been 
c r i t ic iz e d  by Z ieg le r f o r  h is  "questionable submission to  th e  s ty le  o f  
research  o f  th e  b io lo g is t ic  sciences" (Hartan.. p . 6 ) .
(20) H usserl (K rig is. pp. 3» 10) sees a  c r i s i s  o f  science  in  i t s  
p o s i t iv i s t i c  reduction  o f th e  idea o f  science to  a  mere science o f 
fa c te . He describes i t  as id e n tic a l  w ith  th e  c r i s i s  o f  philosophy, 
which i s  th e  c r i s i s  of European mankind regard ing  th e  meaning o f  
i t s  "ex istence".
(2 l)
K J Gebser, A sf.. p . 133.
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c r is is  o f mankind, "What we experience today i s  not, perchance,
m erely a  European c r i s i s . I t  i s  a  c r i s i s  o f  the  world and hum anity.. .
which seems to  he leading  towards an event which from o u r p o in t o f view
can only be described by the  expression ’’g lo b a l ca tas tro p h e" . . . .  This
means e i th e r  the end and death  o f our p re sen t e a r th  and i t s  p o p u la tio n .. .
o r  the  re a liz a tio n  and r e a l i ty  o f the  wholeness o f  o r ig in  and p re se n t;
(22). . .o th e rw ise  the prophets of doom would be r ig h t  in  the end." As
th e  s tru c tu ra l  essence o f th i s  c r i s i s  he v isu a liz e s  a  new consciousness
m utation analogous to the  one around 500 B .C ., a f fe c t in g  a l l  cu ltu red  
(23)mankind.
Gebser s remarkable id ea  i s  th a t  a f t e r  two and a  h a lf  
m illenn ia  o f separa tion  the  p a th s  o f E astern  and Western consciousness 
must meet and merge again . While in  the  a x ia l  period  Europe made a  le ap
(22) H u sse rl's  l in e a r ,  bu t unpolar, p e rsp ec tiv e  (K rig is . pp. 13-14) 
desc rib es  "philosophy (as) th e  h is to r ic a l  movement of th e  re v e la tio n  
of the un iv ersa l reason '  in n a te ' in  mankind.. .  .Only thereby could i t  
be decided whether European mankind c a r r ie s  an ab so lu te  id e a  in  
i t s e l f  ra th e r  than being a m erely em pirical an th ropo log ica l type 
such a s  'C h ina ' o r ' I n d i a '" .  H usserl, l ik e  Spengler, id e n tify in g  
w ith h is  own c u ltu re , cannot see th a t  In d ia , in  f a c t ,  i s  a c u ltu ra l ,  
i . e . ,  i t  asks d if fe re n t questions f o r  i t s  own ph ilosoph ical purposes.
He suggests (pp. 346-347) th a t  th e  c r i s i s ,  being "rooted  in  some e rr in g  
ra tio n a lig a "  and wrongly ex te rn a lized  through "naturalism " and 
"objectivism " (S pengler!), could be met by h is  " transcenden ta l 
phenomenological” approach, i n  which he s t a r t s  from h is  own s e l f  w hile 
remaining a th e o re tic a l observer.
(23) In  U.G.. ch. 3> Gebser d esc rib es  h is  id ea  o f  s p i r i tu a l  m utation 
from an o rig in a l a rchaic  s ta te  o f consciousness through a  magic. 
a  mythic and a mental (ra tio n a l) one towards an in te g ra l  consciousness 
s tru c tu re . He describes (Wandlung. p . 165) th e  p r in c ip a l in d ic a tio n s  
f o r  i t s  p o ssib le  attainm ent a s :  ( l )  the  overcoming o f th e  o ld  tim e
concept, (2) r e la t iv i ty ,  (3) c an ce lla tio n  o f opposites o r  d u a lisn s  
re sp ec tiv e ly , and (4) development by leap s  implying a c a u sa lity .
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forward which, as i t  now seems, may have in  some re sp ec ts  taken
i t  too f a r ,  the Asian p a r t  o f the  m utation was no t followed through.
He i l l u s t r a t e s  the  main changes o f  thought, m ysterious as they may
(24)appear, by a h is to r ic a l  sketch. With th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f
p a tr ia rc h y  (a t the  beginning o f the second millennium B.C.) man-made 
laws begin to challenge fa te . Then Zara thus t r a  (born 797 B .C .) s p l i t s  
the  p o la r i ty  o f the  world by proclaim ing th e  d u a l is t ic  p r in c ip le s  o f 
good and bad. Homer (c. 800 B.C.) dem onstrates through h is  ep ic 
co n tin u ity  th a t time has a  yesterday , today and tomorrow, th a t  i t  i s  
an aim -oriented process and no t an e te rn a l re tu rn ; b esid es  th is ,  h is  
Odysseus u t te r s  the f i r s t  " I  am" ( £ / / c  0Sir&&£.  \f<;) in  Western
(25)c u ltu re , i . e . ,  the  opening statem ent to  Western thought as i t  were.
Around 500 B.C. the mental break-through happens sim ultaneously in  
Greece and in  In d ia  (and China). A formal s ta r t in g  p o in t f o r  
European philosophy i s  provided by Thales o f  M iletus (642 B.C.) u s in g  
conceptual thought in s tead  o f mythic forms. In Greece the  a c to r  
Thespis in troduces a personal dialogue. In  In d ia  the  Buddha, 
presumably, in troduces the dialogue a s  a  form o f teach ing : the " I  and
(26)you" emerges (compare p. 231). He a lso  makes f i r s t  ph ilo so p h ica l
(besides p a tr ia rc h a l)  moves, although w ithout dropping the m ythical
element. Parmenides (c. 540 B .C .), although he s t i l l  sees no becoming
and no d isso lu tio n  but only the p resen t, excludes non-being from
ex is ten ce , and p o s tu la te s  th a t  th ink ing  i s  being. In  In d ia , the
Bhagavadgita. t e l l in g  o f  K rsna 's  e f fo r ts  in  help ing  Arjuna to  f ig h t
•  •  •
h is  k in , p resen ts  a  f i r s t  attem pt to  rouse th e  ego from i t s  group 
id e n ti ty . In  th e  West, Socrates (469 B .C.) in troduces concept
^  Gebser, A sf.. pp. 134-141, 152-155.
(25) Gebser, U.G.. p. 83; Mens ch. pp. 23, 123.
(26) Bareau (B io g r .I I . l .  p. 190) i s  a lso  aware o f th e  c u ltu ra l  p a r a l le l  
o f  th is  form o f d ialogue "du type de l 'in te r r o g a t io n  so cra tiq u e  s i  
chere aux ouvrages canoniques".
(27) Gebser (tJ.G.. pp. 83-95) in te rp re ts  th e  phenomenon o f  anger, 
appearing sim ultaneously in  both  the I l i a d  and th e  Bhagavadgita, a s
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d e sc rip tio n , teaches through, d ialogue, and seeks t ru th  and v ir tu e  
through th ink ing  (as opposed to  the m erely mythic see in g ). P la to  
(472 B .C .), record ing  Socrates, c re a te s  the  foundations o f Western 
a im -orien ted , consequent thought, thus f in a l ly  overcoming the  c ir c u la r  
mythic form of thought. Gebser observes th a t  th is  general break-through 
to  th e  m ental form o f consciousness was much le s s  ra d ic a l in  In d ia .
In  those two c en tu rie s  o f the  a x ia l p e rio d  th e  p a th s o f A sia and Europe 
separated . As he p o in ts  ou t, immediately a f t e r  P la to  came A ris to t le  
who c rea ted  the foundations f o r  the  change from the mental to  th e  p u re ly  
ra t io n a l  approach in  Western th ink ing . In  In d ia , however, no t u n t i l  
th e  e ig h th  century  A.D. d id  Sankara fo llow , v a in ly  try in g  to  e s ta b lis h  
a  m en ta l-lo g ica l o r ie n ta tio n  in  Hinduism (compare Chapter E ig h t). The 
d e c is iv e  s p l i t  between Eastern, and Western thought f in a l ly  occurred 
when, from the Renaissance onward, in  Europe the  m ental p r in c ip le  was 
exaggerated in to  th e  ra t io n a l ,  and when the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f some slow 
and harmonious m aturation was re je c te d  in  favour o f w ill- in sp ire d , 
aim -orien ted  p rogress. While Europe thus p a r t i a l ly  determined i t s  own 
f a te ,  in  Asia f a te  i t s e l f  remained dominant. Besides the  Brahman.!c 
p a tr ia rc h a l  forms, o ld e r m atria rch al ones a lso  survived. Hie c i r c u la r  
na tu re  of events was no t changed by l in e a r  personal a c tio n , and thought 
m aintained i t s  c irc u la r , r e i te r a n t  ch arac te r, while in  Europe l in e a r  
lo g ic a l ,  causal thought was developed on the b a s is  o f conceptual 
d e f in i t io n s  and d is tin c tio n s .
To u s , th i s  sep ara tio n  would in d ic a te  th a t  Ind ian  term inology 
cannot r e f le c t  the came p r in c ip le s  o f  conceptual thought a s  in  Europe.
But Gebser, in  looking  a t  th e  im portant problem of s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  
and in d iv id u a lity , d isregards th i s  c ru c ia l f a c t .  When he f in d s  th a t 
in  Asia k insh ip  id e n ti ty  p rev a iled  g re a t ly  over the in d iv id u a l 
!leg o "-id en tity , he un fo rtu n ate ly  im plies  some u n iv e rsa l category  o f 
in d iv id u a lity  (which s h a ll  concern u s  below). A s ia 's  g re a te r  nearness
a  symptom o f  a  new consciousness o r ie n ta tio n  towards c la n -fre e  
ind iv idualism  and ego-streng th . Anger o r krodha) in d ic a te s
to him the beginning o f in te n tio n a l, o rien ted  "mental" th ink ing , i . e . ,  
no t re tro sp e c tiv e , b lin d , bu t th in k in g  anger (c f . o u r p. 210).
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to  cognic harmony helped i t  to  p reserv e  a  k in d  o f  wisdom which in
the coarse o f  Europe's change was la rg e ly  tu rned  in to  ( in te l le c tu a l )
knowledge, where, according to  Gebser, i t  would have become l o s t
e n t i r e ly  i f  i t  had n o t been f o r  th e  in flu en ce  o f C h ris tia n ity , which
helped to  complete the  development o f  th e  "you" in  European thought. In
the  fu r th e r  development A sia and Europe responded to  d if f e r e n t
consciousness s tru c tu re s . This i s  why, in  Gebser s  view, they  do no t
today behave o r  th ink  a lik e . But he observes new e f f o r t s  throughout th e
(28)East in  p rep ara tio n  o f  a d ec is iv e  "leap ahead" by which A sia could
overcome i t s  o ld  tendency to  d isclaim  o r  undo l i f e  by re-submerging
in  the  presumed time-ocean, in  o th e r  words, to  re la p se  in to
i r r a t io n a l i ty .  Instead , i t  would seem th a t  Asia i s  f in a l ly  securing
the same form o f  consciousness a s  has been p re v a ilin g  in  Europe. But
not only th a t .  Since th e  Vest i t s e l f  i s  a t  p resen t undergoing a  new
consciousness m utation ( re f le c te d  by the mentioned European c u ltu ra l
c r i s i s ) ,  Asia would have to  make a  double leap  i f  t h e i r  h i th e r to
separated  paths of consciousness were to  meet again. Vh&t Gebser sees
i s  th i s :  Asia catches up w ith  Europe and to ge ther w ith  i t  reaches what
(29)he c a l l s  the  a ra tio n a l- in te g ra l  le v e l  o f  consciousness. In  t h i s  new
over-awake s ta te ,  as he v is u a liz e s  i t ,  human understanding r i s e s  above
the pu re ly  ra tio n a l le v e l and a l l  the p revious stages o f i t s  o r ig in  by
not only becoming f u l ly  aware o f  them b u t a lso  in te g ra tin g  than in to
th is  new form of consciousness -  one in  which man i s  aware o f h is
(30)complete consciousness and i t s  o rig in .
  -----------
In  A sf.. p . 165, he r e f e r s  to  S r i  Aurobindo: " In  one enormous 
leap , w ith in  a  few decades, he made up f o r  those f iv e  hundred y ears  
which we have l iv e d  through since  the Renaissance, which have shaped 
us and which bestowed upon us the  d e to u r necessary  f o r  Europe v ia  th e  
temporary exclusivigm o f the  r a t io n a l ."
(29) Junger ( tfe lts ta a t. pp. 38, 40) s im ila rly , s e ts  h is  hope in  
a new type o f human being  who "combines knowledgeable a s tu ten e ss  w ith 
d iv in a tio n " , suggesting th a t  v a rio u s  (Spenglerian and o ther) c u ltu ra l  
tu rn i ng  p o in ts  may be co incid ing ; b u t according to  Gebser, he only 
"c lin gs to  some despera te ly  h e ro ic  a tt i tu d e "  (U. G.. p. 305).
(30)
Gebser considers as superseded, and even m isleading, the d u a lis tic *
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(5) Gebser7 s consciousness awareness and h is  in te g ra l  hermeneutic
G ebser's  conception of man's increased  self-aw areness i s  based on h is
in te g ra l  view of Europe and th e  E ast, w ith  much emphasis on In d ia ; t h i s
view in  tu rn  r e f le c ts  h is  personal awareness o f  c u ltu re  a s  th e  p r in c ip a l
medium through which human consciousness f in d s  i t s  expression ( in te g ra l
a lso  w ith regard  to  the tra n sp o s itio n  o f  th e  i r r a t io n a l  in to  th e
a r a t io n a l ) . The successfu l reunion o f th e  O ccidental and th e  Asian
p a th s , o r  the "g rea t encounter" a s  Gebser c a l l s  i t ,  would depend on ou r
Western understanding o f  the n a tu re  o f E aste rn  thought, i . e .  on an
adequate heimeneutic. There remain the magio-mythic fo rce s  which
hamper A sia 's  adoption o f Western r a t io n a l  thought. On th e  o th e r  hand,
any fu r th e r  exclusive con tinua tion  o f th i s  ra tio n a l approach which i s
dominant in  the West a t  p resen t "must n e c e ssa rily  le ad  to  the  W est's 
(31)lo s s  o f i t s  s e lf " . Gebser a ssu res  u s  th a t  the world needs the
"g rea t encounter", bu t n e ith e r  on the b a s is  o f  imposing ex c lu siv e ly
(32)Western methods on Asia no r through becoming absorbed by Asian 
i r r a t io n a l  fo rces  (compare A. B h ara ti ' 3 herm eneutic problem o f 
connecting India and the West on the b a s is  o f  h is  p r iv a te  mysticism, 
Chapter S ix).
Gebser describes h is  id ea  o f the  "g rea t encounter" as 
a sy n thesis  beyond and above a  m erely i r r a t i o n a l  o r  m erely ra t io n a l  
le v e l , i . e .  he aims a t  some s o r t  o f  m eta-level. We could say th a t  th i s  
Gebserian syn thesis  of E ast and West should -  w hile in te g ra t in g  a l l  
p rev ious consciousness s tru c tu re s  -  le ad  to  th e  above-mentioned 
a ra tio n a l le v e l o f  consciousness, which a t  f i r s t  s ig h t may resemble 
a  m eta-level. Gebser emphasizes th a t  th i s  a ra tio n a l approach should 
e f f ic ie n t ly  help to  co rrec t th e  a b e rra tio n s  o f  A s ia 's  i r r a t io n a l  ways
no tion  o f  th e  unconscious, a s  i t  was developed by von Hartmann, and 
p o s tu la te s  fo u r in te n s ity  le v e ls  o f consciousness (Wandlung. p . 131; 
U .S.. pp. 224; 121, 144, 156, 315).
(31)
Gebser, A sf.. p. 158.
(32) Such a p u rsu it would s t r ik e  Gebser a s  a  b e tra y a l o f  th e  Western
consciousness achievement.
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w ithout, however, e rad ica tin g  the  i r r a t io n a l  p r in c ip le  a s  such. This i s
o f g re a t importance to  Gebser who f e e ls  th a t  Asia, w ithout accep ting  i t s
own ir r a t io n a l  and p ro -ra tio n a l fundam entals, could never m aster th e
m en ta l-ra tio n a l p r in c ip le  but would in s te ad  d r i f t  in to  a  m erely ra tio n a l
stream. He observes a  s im ila r and perhaps even more p recario u s  s i tu a tio n
in  the West due to  an excessively  r a t io n a l i s t i c  ( i . e .  " e sc ap is t" )  mode o f
thought which he considers e s s e n tia l ly  exhausted, o r  d e f ic ie n t , and no
(33)
lo nger l i f e  susta in ing . At th i s  stage  mere reform s would seem
f u t i l e  to  him; only the achievement o f  a  new fe a r le s s  in te g ra l
approach, o f th ink ing  which i s  a lso  capable o f accep ting  th e  appearance
o f an a ra tio n a l element in  thought could guarantee a  v i t a l  re o r ie n ta tio n
(34)in  Eastern  and Western thought a lik e . Gebser b e liev es  th a t  t h i s
a ra t io n a l- in te g ra l  consciousness i s  an ind ispensab le  p re re q u is ite
f o r  the "g rea t encounter" which w il l  d e c is iv e ly  determ ine th e  fu tu re
ex istence  o f mankind (and which a t  th e  tim e o f h is  w ritin g  he
envisages as s t i l l  p o ssib le  w ith in  th i s  cen tury). Both E ast and West
could recupera te  from a b e rra tio n  and c r i s i s  and develop a  v ia b le  new
mode o f thought, provided they  fin d  ways to  so r t ou t and handle c le a r ly
th e  o ld e r s tru c tu re s  o f th e i r  a c tu a l p o te n tia l s. In  t h i s  regard
Schopenhauer o r  von Hartmann would only rep resen t an inadequate
beginning. Moreover, from G ebser's p o in t o f view, Speng ler's
quasi-magic v is io n  o f a  merely re tro sp e c tiv e  c iv il iz e d  consciousness
foim m irrored by f in a l  non—c u ltu ra l  and pu re ly  ra tio n a l p roductions i s
(35)a  genuine source o f f e a r  and depression.
(33) Gebser, A sf .. p . 160; U. G.. p . 87: in  the case o f th e  European
cu ltu re  we a re  now w itnessing " th e  d e fic ien cy  phase, probably th e  f in a l  
phase a s  regards th e  exclusive v a l id i ty  o f  the m en ta l-ra tio n a l 
s tru c tu re " .
(34) Gebser, A sf.. pp. 100, 166; U.G.. pp. 318, 320: ou r modern
r a t io n a l i ty  ignores the  usual u se le ssn ess  o f "reforms, re v ig o riz a tio n s  
and th e  l ik e " .
(35) Berdyaev (H is t . . p. 222) develops a consciously a c u ltu ra l  
a l te rn a t iv e  to  Spengler by suggesting a re lig io u s  ( r a th e r  than 




Gebser, who as  a  th in k e r  draws h i s  m ateria l from h is
c u l tu ra l  observations, a lso  proves to  have a  n a tu ra l awareness o f  the
p r a c t ic a l  im p lica tions o f h is  heim eneutic, a s  we may n o tic e  from h is
sp e c ia l d is t in c t io n  between doing (machen) and in flu en c in g  (v irk en ).
He f e e ls  th a t  doing in  a  Faustian  maimer, a s  in  S peng ler's  V est, can
only  r e s u l t  in  mere power and only  f o r  a  lim ite d  tim e. L as tin g  r e a l i ty ,
however, r e s u l ts  from a  con tinua l exchange o f  mutual in flu en ces . He
(36)l i t e r a l l y  c a l l s  th i s  process " th e  l i f e  su s ta in in g  change1*. In  
a manner which reminds us o f  h is  contemporary Gadamer, Gebser u ses h is  
own language s ty le  as a  d ire c t  herm eneutic device to  dem onstrate h is  
id e a  th a t  r e a l i ty  ( l ik e  Gadamer s  meaning} emerges in to  v i s i b i l i t y  as  
a r e s u l t  o f th e  mutual in fluence  between th e  se e r  and th e  seen. H is 
s ty le  o f  w ritin g  in d ic a te s  h is  h igh  s e n s i t iv i ty  towards mutual in fluence  
and correspondence between the  v a rio u s  conceptual m an ifesta tio n s  o f 
thought, w ith in  the  same c u ltu re  as  w ell a s  c ro s s -c u ltu ra lly . In  
a d d itio n , h is  a n a ly s is  o f thought proves h is  fundamental c u ltu re  
awareness. P ra c tic a l ly , h is  excep tiona l, "para-poetic"  word form ations 
and syntax provide a  d ia le c t ic  technique through which he may hope to  
r a i s e  h is  read ers ' hermeneutic awareness and a le r tn e s s . His word 
form ations suggest concept o r ig in s , w hile through h is  syntax he o f fe rs  
h is  own rhythm o f  thought to  h is  read ers . This rhythm fo llow s h is  
fundamental conception of c u ltu ra l  p o la r i ty  (compare Gadamer s movement 
between su b jec t and o b jec t).
As we have shown in  th e  case  o f  In d ia  and Europe, G ebser's  
herm eneutic fo llow s two coord inates. H is p r in c ip le  o r ie n ta tio n  could 
be looked upon a s  follow ing a  v e r t i c a l  coord inate. This v e r t ic a l  
o r ie n ta tio n  r e s u lts  from h is  two sep a ra te , bu t analogous, d iachron ic
th e  only  p o ss ib le  passage from c u ltu re  w ith  i t s  t r a g ic  a n t i th e s is  to  
' l i f e '  and i t s  tra n s f ig u ra tio n . There i s  a lso  a  p a th  o f  re lig io u s  
tra n s f ig u ra tio n  o f  l i f e  and th e  fu lf ilm e n t o f  tru e  being. We can 
e s ta b lis h  fo u r  periods o r  s ta te s  in  m an's h is to r ic a l  d estin y : 
ba rb arian , c u ltu re , c iv i l iz a t io n  and re l ig io u s  tran sfo rm a tio n .. . .  they  
can c o -e x is t; they  rep resen t, in  f a c t ,  th e  d if fe re n t p re d isp o sitio n s  
o f th e  human s p i r i t . ”
f rg \
Gebser, A sf .. p. 161.
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s tu d ie s  o f these two p a th s  of c u ltu re  consciousness. On th i s  "basis
he e s ta b lish e s  a h o riz o n ta l, synchronic view ranging1 between an
E astern  and a  Western cu ltu re  po le . I t  i s  th i s  view which g a th ers
a l l  tra ceab le  c u ltu ra l  consciousness s tru c tu re s  in  an attem pt to  expose
them a s  the  fundamentals f o r  the new nascen t a ra tio n a l le v e l o f
consciousness, which would n a tu ra lly  in c lu d e  a  fo u rfo ld  in te g ra l
(37)c u ltu re  awareness. This means th a t  th is  new a ra t io n a l- in te g ra l
consciousness would e s s e n tia l ly  include a  new hermeneutic consciousness. 
From Schopenhauer to  Gadamer we can observe d is t in c t  s tages which a l l  
m anifest moves in  th e  d ire c tio n  in d ica ted  by Gebser. But of these  only 
Gebser him self reasons w ith a f u l l  view towards some m eta-level o f 
thought.
Unlike Schopenhauer, Gebser dem onstrates a  te ch n ica lly  
u n iv e rsa l cu ltu re  awareness. N evertheless, h is  expositions p a r a l le l  
to  some ex ten t Schopenhauer's claim  regard ing  the  world a s  im agination. 
In  Schopenhauer, our idea  of the  world fo llow s our im agination which -  
a s  he may have taken f o r  g ran ted  -  in  tu rn  i s  nourished by c u ltu re , 
our cu ltu re  (or, a t  l e a s t ,  h is  c u ltu re ) . For Gebser the  world, 
r e a l i ty ,  i s  a lso  a product o f ou r c u ltu re -s p e c if ic  and consciousness- 
sp e c if ic  manner o f seeing. That i s ,  seeing  c u ltu re  i s  a lso  making 
cu ltu re . While Schopenhauer's pessimism i s  s t i l l  r ig id ly  connected 
w ith h is  phi lo so p h ica l e thnocentrign, Gebser i s  only a  p essim ist 
inasmuch as  pessimism remains a s  an in te g ra l  p o s s ib i l i ty  w ith in  h is  
own conscious c u ltu ra l  outlook* Gebser t r e a t s  human consciousness a s  
a  q u a lity  which n a tu ra l ly  undergoes re g u la r  change; only  from 
a n o n -re la tiv e , abso lu te  p o in t o f view would th i s  consciousness appear 
unchanging bu t boundless. G ebser's in te g ra l  view o f development makes 
iso la te d , ind iv idua l reform ative change redundant. In  f a c t ,  he i s  
q u ite  opposed to  i t ,  as we saw. Schopenhauer's s ta t io n a ry  
in d iv id u a lis t ic  p o s itio n , on the  o th e r hand, reforms through h is  
p e ss im is tic  d o c trin e  which propounds th a t  a l l  consciousness ought to
The described  consciousness le v e ls  are? ( l )  a rc h a ic -o rig in a l,
(2) m ag ic -p re -ra tio n a l, (3) m y th ic - ir ra tio n a l, (4) m en ta l-ra tio n a l,
(3) in te g ra l-a ra tio n a l (c f . U.G.. pp. 127, 164).
undergo th e  ra d ic a l change of negation  (& change which he adm its 
may w ell r e s u l t  in  some "boundless" in d e fin ab le  s ta te ;  see pp. 58-59)*
G ebser's thought, l ik e  S p en g le r 's , tak es  ro o t in  h is  
physiognomical c u ltu ra l  observations. S p eng ler's  ingenious c re a tio n  o f 
a  dram atic v i t a l i s t i c  view o f c u ltu re , a s  we saw, only  leaves room f o r  
meaningful consciousness w ithin the boundaries o f h is  f i n i t e  c u ltu re  
s tru c tu re s ; beyond these boundaries consciousness becomes w orth less. 
Gebser overcomes th is  fonn of s e lf - l im ita t io n . He sees and accep ts  th e  
p o s it iv e  and negative  c u ltu ra l p o te n tia ls  as p a r t  o f  a consciousness
(38)p o la r i ty  through which man p a r t ic ip a te s  in  a  u n iv e rsa l b e in g -re a lity .
Gebser communicates h is  awareness by an approach to  c u ltu ra l
in te rp re ta t io n  which reminds u s  o f  th a t  o f Gadamer. Apart from th e i r
common p reference  f o r  a  riytfan&c mode o f  expression , bo th  au tho rs  develop
th e i r  ideas o f  seeing  r e a l i ty  (which f o r  Gebser im p lies  being) s im ila r ly
in  terms o f  a  developing movement, a s  in  Gadamer, o r  a  process o f
in flu en c in g  change, a s  in  Gebser. Hie l a t t e r  re v e a ls  a  m ystical
component o f  h is  thought in  connection w ith  h is  hermeneutic by adding
th a t  through in te g ra tin g  our personal in flu en ce  in  the  described  manner
we become a c o -c rea to r o f th a t  r e a l i t y  o f  be ing  which transcends th e
v is ib le  world. With a  view to  a  p ra c t ic a l  and s p i r i tu a l  ap p rec ia tio n
and understanding o f  the Eastern ch arac te r he w rite s : "Since th e
in flu en c in g  (das Wirken) can only be consummated through th e  e n tir e
r e a l i ty  (d ie  ganse W~i rkl ic h k e i t) o f the  human being, which a lso  inc lu d es
h is  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the u n iv e rsa l in v is ib le  r e a l i ty ,  i t  fo llow s th a t
we might w ell be capable o f  ex e rtin g  an in fluence  on what i s  no t th e re
y e t, hence on what has no t happened y e t ,  a s  i t  r e s t s  in  th e  in v is ib le
(39)r e a l i ty ,  in  which we p a r tic ip a te  as much a s  in  the  v is ib le  one."
In  o rder to  demonstrate h is  new consciousness approach Gebser uses 
two guid ing  p r in c ip le s :  ( l )  th a t  which i s  hidden (la tency) i s  th e
demonstrable p resen t aspect (presence) o f the fu tu re ;  (2) th a t  which
(38) O nto log ica lly , th is  p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  cosmic wholeness inc ludes 
" so -ca lle d  non-being"; psychologically , the modem m ystic "sinks no 
longer back in to  a  m ystical ex tin c tio n  o f the ego" (llensch, p. 15).
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sh ines through (the  diaphanous, o r  transparency) I s  th e  form o f 
appearance (epiphany) o f the  s p i r i tu a l .  Hie diaphanous equals none 
o f the  t r a d i t io n a l  ephemeral m en ta l-ra tio n a l concepts such a s  "essence",
"existence" e tc . R ather, he considers i t  th e  testim ony f o r  th e  new
. . . (40)m utation.
Gebser f e e ls  th a t  th e re  i s  some g re a t coherence and u n ity  in  
a l l  those seeming op p o sites  and co n trad ic tio n s  which pervade th e  v a rio u s  
founs o f human consciousness. His d e sc rip tio n  o f man's p o ss ib le  
p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  an in v is ib le  r e a l i t y  combines an inductive  
cu ltu ro lo g ic a l w ith  a sp ecu la tiv e  m etaphysical view. Following 
a somewhat m ystical in n e r  c e r ta in ty  he in te g ra te s  the  geographical and 
the h is to r ic a l ,  i . e .  the  s p a t ia l  and, the  tem poral, a sp ec ts  o f  c u ltu re .
He exposes them as being  the conditions which, by modifying man's 
awareness o f h im self, have a lso  r e s t r ic te d  i t  so f a r .  G ebser's  
in te r - c u l tu r a l  herm eneutic p r in c ip le s  a lso  work f o r  h is  in t r a - c u l tu r a l  
harmonization. Thus, the negative s id e s  o f l i f e ,  even death, becomes 
in teg ra ted  w ith th e i r  p o s i t iv e  p o la r  complements. Reminding us o f 
Schopenhauer's re sp ec t f o r  the  seemingly frag n en ta ry  bu t d ire c t  in s ig h ts  
o f the an c ien t Indians (pp. 49» 72), Gebser, too, b e lie v es  th a t  th i s  
knowledge, which we have to  work out stepw ise in  accordance w ith  our 
m en ta l-ra tional o r, perhaps, a ra tio n a l mode o f th ink ing , must have been 
d ire c t ly  acce ss ib le  to  an c ien t i r r a t io n a l  p o la r  thought. He f in d s  t h i s  
confirmed by a  l in e  from the  Sanatsu.iata-Parvan which says th a t  death 
co n sis ts  in  the s e l f 's  wrong manner o f see ing  and a lso  th a t  death  i sf \
p a r t  o f ou r body, i .  e . p a r t  o f l i f e .  This a lso  means th a t  man's
id e n ti ty  does no t have to  end where he happens to  d ie . Gebser sees
^  Gebser, U.G.. pp. 10-11, 150.
Gebser (u .G ., p. 247(86)) quotes a f t e r  Deussen, Kahabharatam. 
(S an a t.-P a r .) 5 .41.16, "death  i s  the  in n e r soul a f f l i c te d  by d e lusion ; 
th a t indeed i s  death  which as  such l iv e s  in  your body11. He f in d s  
(pp. 231-232) th is  "death  pole" o f  the soul e x p l ic i t ly  described  in  
connection w ith the Upanisadic n itrv an a . o r , where Yajnavalkya i s  asked 
by the son of Rtabhaga what happens a f t e r  o n e 's  manas (mind) has gone to  
the moon ( a f te r  Deussen, S. Hr s . . Brh. 5 .2 .13 ; c f. our pp. 200-201).
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b i r t h  and death  a s  the  two equivalent ends o r  po les  o f l i f e  which
(42)i t s e l f  i s  on ly  the  v is ib le  s ide  o f an o v e ra ll  r e a l i ty .  In  h is
opinion i t  i s  simply due to  our h a b itu a l Western manner o f see ing  t h i s
world a s  p e rsp ec tiv e ly  drawn out in  some space-tim e dimensions th a t  we
(43)f e e l  separated  from the in v is ib le  s id e , o r even ignore i t .  But
c u l tu ra l ly  th is  condition  i s  not only re g io n a lly  bu t a lso  tem porally  
r e s t r ic te d .  While, according to  Gebser, t r a d i t io n a l  Ind ian  thought 
r e f le c ts  a  ra th e r  u n d iffe ren tia te d  type o f  consciousness (th e  tendency 
to  re tu rn  in to  the  tim e-ocean), European thought (and, o f  l a t e ,  a lso  
Ind ian  thought) i s  heading f o r  a  new comprehensive form o f  self-aw areness 
which tak es  d is t in c t iv e  s tages o f  c u ltu ra l  and p h ilo so p h ica l 
s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  in to  account.
Looking back a t  Schopenhauer's "n irvana", which appeared to  Mm 
a s  the  only p o ss ib le  answer to  the  ir re c o n c ila b le  in c o n g ru itie s  o f  th i s  
world in  term s o f  c o n s ti tu tin g  the complete and only "way ou t", we 
remember h is  d i s t in c t  segregation  o f  l i f e  in to  an un d esirab le  p a in fu l 
ex istence  and a f re e  re la t iv e  non-existence. The world a s  such, a s  he 
held  in  h is  pessimism, was e s s e n tia l ly  and undeniably bad* For Gebser
(42)
L r a t io n a l ,  hence "d e f ic ie n t" , o n to lo g ica l p a r a l le l  may be found 
in  F ich te  who, denying the  ex istence  o f  any "pure death", d esc rib es  i t  
a s  one co n stitu en t o f  an i l lu s io n  based on a  (d u a l i s t ic a l ly  conceived) 
m ixture o f l i f e  and death  (S e l . , pp. 14, 16).
(43) Gebser (Wandlung. p . 86) e lab o ra te s  th a t  from a  modem p o in t o f  view, 
in c lu d in g  th a t  o f b iology, dying and death  a re  no lo n g er to  be considered 
a s  ca ta s tro p h ic a l b u t ae  in te g ra l p a r ts  o f  l i f e .  "Death i s  no t 
something th a t happens to  us, bu t something l iv in g  th a t  grows in  u s . "
His te n e t th a t  "death p a r t ic ip a te s  in  l i f e "  (pp. 148-149) rev e rse s  and 
absorbes Schopenhauer’s perspective  according to  which death  i s  th e  
moving fo rce  behind philosophy and l i f e  a  prevented form o f  dying.
He announces (pp. 37, 81) th a t  the  o ld  d u a li ty  between soul and m atte r, 
between id e a lig a  and m aterialism  has become obso le te , lik ew ise  th e  o ld  
view o f  temporal co n tin u ity . Nature does jump. (p. 43?) The p o s itio n  
o f form erly fix ed  p o in ts  in  space having become r e la t iv e ,  we should see 
th ings from, th e  aspect o f an aperspective . space-tim e-free  t o ta l i ty .
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"nirvana." i s  only a  c u ltu ra l  m od ifica tion  o f  a  sp ec ia l asp ec t o f 
f te in g -rea lity , and by no means some nothingness o u ts id e  o f th e  world.
As regards the negative  s ide  of l i f e ,  he exp la in s i t  simply as  the  
"polar" inseparab le  p a r t  o f the whole. Obviously he sees no need o r  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  f o r  a  to t a l  m etaphysical pessim ign. The common w orries 
about l i f e  and death  should be considered t r i v i a l  and n a tu ra l, and 
allow , a t  most, f o r  some p o la r  e x is te n t ia l  pessimism. Gebser, who f e e l s  
p e rso n a lly  safe  in  h is  own "post-m etaphysical" conception o f l i f e ,  has 
no need to  negate. He can only worry a s  to  whether o r  not 
a rep resen ta tiv e  p o rtio n  o f man Vi nd w i l l  i n  good tim e perceive  the 
world in  a  manner equivalent to  h is  own answer, which i s  p resen ted  in  
h is  a ra t io n a l- in te g ra l  mode o f viewing. He would be concerned about, i f  
anything, the  a c tu a l p o te n tia l  o f  European thought f o r  escaping from th e  
danger of being squashed by the p re sen t preponderance of p u re ly  ra tio n a l 
approaches to  c u ltu ra l  change. In  o th e r  words, he leav es  room fo r  
pessimism about man's m etaphysical p o te n tia l .
Schopenhauer and our o th e r m etaphysical ph ilosophers, lik ew ise  
Spengler, our o th e r c u ltu ra l  th in k e r, a l l  draw a l in e  between th e  
essence of th i s  world a s  they see i t  and some necessary  negation, 
abandonment o r  lo s s  o f i t .  The manner in  which they  draw th is  l in e  
d e fin e s  th e i r  pessimism. Gebser, too, draws a d iv id in g  l in e  which, 
however, cu ts  r ig h t  across those o th e r l in e s .  Denying the p o s s ib i l i ty  
o f  any such ra d ic a l d iv is io n , he simply considers such p e ss im is tic  
outlooks as  mere c u ltu ra l  c o n s ti tu e n ts  in  the  form ation o f th e  new 
a ra t io n a l- in te g ra l  le v e l o f consciousness. His d iv id in g  l in e  concerns
Gebser (liensch, pp. 80-8l) p re d ic ts  f o r  th e  n ear fu tu re  a  "wave" o f 
d es tru c tiv e  fo rces  causing confusion and d iso rd e r a s  a  c u ltu ra l  response 
to  the p rev a ilin g  o rd er which has become obso lete  and th e re fo re  wrong. 
Hie recep tion  o f  th e  " in teg ra l"  minds i s  d ec is iv e . (Pp. 12, 27-29:) 
TJnafflicted by th e  r a t io n a l i s t i c  ego-hypertrophy, th i s  new type o f 
consciousness draws on the  p o te n tia ls  o f  the eg o -le ss , th e  w e-orien ted , 
the  ego-oriented and the new ego-free  s tages. In  th e  case o f  f a i lu r e ,  
"the  world and mankind w il l  be doomed to  d ie" . (Also see Wandlung, 
p. 12; tr.C.. pp. 547-548, 555.)
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th e  d ire c tio n  o f  the  p o ssib le  pa th  o f th i s  form ation, i .  e . , the  
outcome o f  th e  aforementioned new consciousness m utation. In  h is  
opinion mankind only has two choices in  th i s  regard : e i th e r  a  successfu l
m utation which would e n ta i l  an in te g ra te d  p o te n tia l  f o r  a  su p erio r
(45)treatm ent o f a l l  the t ra d it io n a l  m etaphysical questio n s, o r  f a i lu re .
On th e  p ra c tic a l  s ide  th is  would he the  f a i lu r e  to  a t t a in  a  new, 
p o ssib le , and p ra c t ic a l ly  im perative le v e l o f c u l tu ra l  harmony. H is 
adm ittance o f th i s  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f fa i lu re ,  a  danger which he tak es  very  
se r io u s ly , can perhaps he described a s  cond itiona l c u ltu ra l  pessimign, 
in  which Ind ia  and th e  East p lay  a  d ec is iv e  complementary ro le  f o r  th e  
W e s t . ^
Gebser i s  the only one o f ou r th in k e rs  who does n o t
superimpose a  rigo rously  European scheme o f p h ilo so p h ica l and c u ltu ra l
values on India. Instead , he develops a  herm eneutic which d e riv e s
meaning from some c r i t i c a l  movement o f thought between E ast and West.
In  ad d ition  he exposes as ab so lu te ly  c ru c ia l same form o f m eta-level
which i s  h is  a ra tio n a l- in te g ra l  le v e l o f consciousness on which Western
and Eastern thought and c u ltu re  enjoy adequate ap p rec ia tio n  a s  compatible
(47)c o n stitu en ts  o f a  un iv ersa l mode of thought.
Gebser (u .G .. pp. 149, 155) d esc rib es  what could be c a lle d  the 
m etaphysical core of h is  c u ltu ra l  observations in  terms of a  "presence 
o f o rig in"  (Ursnrungsgegenwart) . i . e .  the p r in c ip le  which a lso  foims -  
and judges -  each sing le  in d iv id u a l. Any unbalancing and d isso lv in g  
ra t io n a l  o r  i r r a t io n a l  attem pts would bestow onto the  expected m utational 
le ap  the danger o f an ego-loss, a n n ih ila tio n  o r  van ish ing  (Untergang). 
"However, we may presume th a t th e  leap  w il l  on ly  be r isk e d  l y  those who 
a re  capable of i t ;  o r  ra th e r , only w ith in  them w i l l  i t  r i s k  i t s e l f . "
The in te g ra tio n  of mankind, towards which we can work, would depend 
on whether we succeed in  understanding and c o n tro llin g  th e  powers o f 
chaos, o r  not. "The consequences o f such a  f a i lu r e  on our s id e  a re  so 
d read fu lly  p la in  and c le a r  th a t  no comment i s  requ ired" (A sf.. p . 172). 
(47) Gebser i l l u s t r a t e s  the p r in c ip le s  o f h is  herm eneutic very lu c id ly  
in  h is  essay Per grammatische Spiegel (Hie Grammatical K irro r) . The
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(6) M etaphysical pessimism: a  c u ltu ra l  epinhenonenon
Gebser rep resen ts  a s ig n if ic a n t s tep  towards understanding m etaphysical 
pessimism as  a ty p ica l epiphenomenon of European c u ltu re , and n o t a s  
a  d ire c t  re f le c tio n  o f consciousness. He t r e a t s  th e  p e ss im is tic  German 
search  fo r  c u ltu ra l o r m etaphysical id e n t i ty  a s  a  symptom o f the 
defic iency  phase o f m en ta l-ra tio n a l thought, f o r  him, n o n -d efic ien t 
understanding means a ttu n in g  o n ese lf and thus p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  
b e in g -re a lity . This process i s  consummated herm eneutically  on th e  b a s is  
o f  a  n a tu ra lly  e x is tin g  in te r r e la t io n  a s  i t  can be found in  any (c u ltu ra l)  
su b jec t-o b jec t re la t io n  o r  p o la r  r e la t io n .  Some s o r t  o f cosmic 
physiognomical rhythm and ta c t  has a lread y  been encountered in  Spengler 
(p. 126) who, however, expresses i t  in  term s o f  h is  s t r i c t l y  European, 
s ta tio n a ry  kind of id e n ti ty ;  i . e . ,  h is  monadological c u ltu re  awareness 
a sp ire s  to  no hermeneutic c u ltu ra l  in te g ra tio n . S p en g le r's  confinement 
to  some r ig id ly  s tru c tu red  c u ltu re  consciousness a lso  precludes any 
ind iv idual m etaphysical upward movement, u n lik e  G ebser's  approach to  
b e in g -re a lity . Reminding us o f  Schopenhauer, our p ro to -p ess im is t,
Spengler s e ss e n tia l change aims a t  some end, death , o r  d ec lin e , i f  
no t an n ih ila tio n .
In  connection w ith th is  type o f  m etaphysical im m obility o r  
confinement Gebser looks a t  the  im portant ro le  o f f e a r :  th e  f e a r  o f
death , the f e a r  of the  unknown and the  r e s u l t in g  m ental anguish 
(compare German Angst, f e a r ;  L a tin  an g u stiae . t ig h tn e s s ) . Gebser
physiognomic expression o f  grammar serves him a s  a  m irro r which can tu rn  
the  a c t  o f  viewing in to  a  d ir e c t  answer (pp. 12, 46 ). The new 
consciousness s tru c tu re , a s  he observes v e ry  a s tu te ly , i s  foreshadowed 
by change in  language. The anthropO centric p e rsp ec tiv e  m elts away 
and man acquires an "aperspective" view, th a t  i s ,  space and time 
u n ite  (pp. 22-25).
Cf. our pp. 54(47) ;  133, Wei tangs t ;  in  an au tob iograph ical 
remark (very s im ila r  to  th a t  o f  Spengler, o u r p . 139(56)), Gebser 
describes how, a t  th e  age o f twelve, he a ls o  su f fe rs  from oppressive 
v is io n s  and dreams in  which he f e e ls  d e fe n se le ss ly  exposed to  
a boundless n ig h tly  sky which p e n e tra te s  in to  h is  bedroom, ty in g  him
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assu res  u s  th a t f o r  the European mind tru e  understand ing  (which
includes h is  c u ltu ra l im plications o f  th e  awareness process) p reven ts
th is  fe a r . In  the case o f Ind ia , where we a re  to  expect
a complementary s itu a tio n , Gebser n o tic e s  a  n a tu ra l  la c k  o f any
f e a r  o f death, o r  f e a r  o f the unknown, o f  the  kind which gen era lly
r \ (49)fe a tu re s  the Western consciousness Ip. 146}. I f  we gp along w ith
G ebser's Idea of the time-ocean, the  d if f e r e n t  Ind ian  ego-consciousness 
and the d if fe re n t ro le  o f fa te ,  then i t  fo llow s th a t  no genuine 
in d iv id u a l pessim isn can accrue, n e i th e r  e x is te n t ia l ly  nor 
m etaphysically, from Indian thought. On the  whole, In d ia  has re ta in ed  
i t s  i r r a t io n a l ,  d ire c t ,  spontaneous p r in c ip le  o f understanding, although 
th e  very fo rces  o f th is  mode o f thought have a lso  d e fe rred  i t s  long  
due change of consciousness. On the o th e r  hand, the  p ra c t ic a l  dangers 
of no t being ab le  o r not wanting to  understand, and the re su ltin g  
fragm entation o f thought, are  la rg e ly  a  co ro lla ry  o f  Western 
r a t io n a li ty . Hence G ebser's hermeneutic worry, which we have 
in te rp re te d  in  terms of a cond itiona l hermeneutic pessimism.
From Schopenhauer onward, we have found th a t  man p a r t ic ip a te s ,  
through h is  in te l l e c t ,  in  what h is  w il l  and im agination d isp lays to  him
down in  utmost "anguish, fe a r  and oppression", ready to  o b l i te ra te  him 
feensch. pp. 93-94). Also see V e rfa ll. pp. 135-136: on the cond ition
of f e a r  and the impulse of f r ig h t .  Also see U.G.. pp. 148-149, 
148(21-23); 159 s h is  explanation th a t  f e a r  (in c lu d in g  th e  p h an tas ies  
o f doom, death and decline) always accompanies and in d ic a te s  (a) th e  
exhaustion o f  the c u ltu ra l p o te n tia l  o f a given consciousness s t ru c tu re , 
i . e . ,  i t s  defic iency  phase, and (b) the  accumulation o f  new fo rces  -  
hence p ressu re  and anguish -  which culm inates in  some break-through to  
a new m utation. He denies the apparent c y c lic a l element in  h is  view 
of c u ltu ra l  exhaustion by arguing th a t the  change i s  m utational, no t 
evo lu tiona l, i . e .  simply a " tra n sp o s itio n " , not some " r i s e  o r d ec lin e" .
Schubart (Suropa, pp. 103, 233) d esc rib es  the ty p ic a l  European, 
foremost the German, as a metaphysical p essim ist moved by a prim eval 
fe a r  and wony about the world as chaos. "In  the  German, prim eval 
f e a r  has reached a depth and fo rce  as nowhere e ls e ."
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aa  r e a l i ty .  But while Schopenhauer l ib e r a te s  from (h is ) r e a l i ty  
through negation, Gebser wants to  l ib e r a te  from f e a r  and negation  
through some moving, in fluencing , in te g ra tin g  p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  a new 
human id e n tity . Schopenhauer's negation  c o n s is ts  in  th e  consummation
o f the  understanding o f a  wrongly d esired  and a c tu a l ly  undesirab le  
world; a l l  so -ca lled  happiness i s  ch im erical f o r  hfm. G ebser's  manner 
of understanding through harmonious p a r t ic ip a t io n  appears to  be 
e th ic a lly  n e u tra l, since f o r  him su ffe rin g , and even death , marks only  
one s ide  o f the  t o t a l i t y  o f ex istence and should, in  a p roperly  balanced 
consciousness, be no le s s  chim erical than happiness. For Schopenhauer 
man i s  the victim  o f a b lin d  w ill  (a cond ition  of which he can become 
m etaphysically aware), whereas f o r  Gebser man's changing  id e n t i ty  
r e f le c ts  h is  c u ltu ra l le v e l o f consciousness (which a t  th i s  p o in t in  
h is to ry  ought to  be con tro lled  by some in te g ra tin g  process o f c u ltu re  
awareness). While Schopenhauer's knowledge o r understanding r e l i e s  on 
a  r ig id ,  psychologically  u n d if fe re n tia tin g  c u ltu re  re a c tio n , G ebser's 
hermeneutic assumes th a t an understanding o f  the ever e x is t in g  
b e in g -re a lity  (including  o n e 's  su b jec t-o b jec t r e la t io n  w ith o n e 's
In  Gebser's terminology, the break-through from the e s s e n tia l ly  
p re -P la to n ic  m ythic-polar form o f  see ing  to  a  m en ta l-d irec ted  mode o f  
th ink ing  a lso  im plies th a t  Western thought no lo n g er e n c irc le s  any 
content, bu t p o in ts  o r  leads in to  some "openness"; having reached i t s  
d e f ic ia i t ,  i . e .  predominantly ra t io n a l ,  phase, i t  n e c e s sa r ily  re v e a ls  
on ly  "em ptiness". We have seen th a t  the change s in ce  Schopenhauer, who 
s t i l l  p re fe rs  a  c irc u la r  form o f d e sc rip tio n  (our p . 49) f o r  h is  ra t io n a l  
approach o f thought, i s  ch arac te rized  by an in c reas in g ly  ra t io n a l  
u n il in e a r  d irectedness in  von Hartmann's and H ainlander s p re sen ta tio n s  
(c f. U.G.. p. 269). Gebser observes th a t  Schopenhauer, N ietzsche and von 
Hartmann touch in c reasin g ly  upon the problem o f th e  o ld e r  unconscious 
s tru c tu re s  underlying our Western self-aw areness (Wandlung. pp. 23, 131). 
He u ses  Welninger (c f. our p. 61(49)) to  explain  how the break-through 
to  some new c u ltu ra l  awareness fo m  (here : the  man-woman in te g ra tio n )
may frequen tly  f i r s t  requ ire  a reduction  to  an ex t r emely n eg ative  
(d e fic ien t) aspect of a c e r ta in  rep re se n ta tiv e  phenomenon (pp. 136-137).
171
own p e rso n a lity , o r  Ind ia , o r  th e  world) nay co n tin u a lly  be acquired
through, moving p a r tic ip a tio n . In  th e  V est, th i s  p rocess has had to
r e ly  so f a r  on a  s u f f ic ie n t balance o f  th e  m e n ta l-ra tio n a l, and in
In d ia , on a  n a tu ra lly  more hannoneous, b u t s t i l l  m ainly i r r a t io n a l  form
o f  consciousness. He f e e ls  th a t  th e  p re sen t c u ltu ra l  v o rld  c r i s i s
could be overcome i f  the  a ra t io n a l- in te g ra l  consciousness could be
achieved by enough in f lu e n tia l  minds; otherw ise man might be fac in g
a  to ta l  c u ltu ra l  world catastrophe, which would simply be a  move back
(51)toward cognic chaos. The e s s e n tia l  change from Schopenhauer to
Gebser i s  th a t  Gebser moves man's general and c a te g o ric a l e x is te n t ia l
predicament from th e  metaphysical to  th e  c u ltu ra l  le v e l  where he
balances i t  ax io lo g ic a lly . A fte r a l l ,  according to  G ebser's
c u ltu re -o rie n te d  outlook on consciousness, bo th  Schopenhauer's
’’n irvana” and the Buddhist conception o f  n irvana r e f le c t  c u ltu ra l
*
modes o f thought, furtherm ore, inasmuch a s  man ran r e la te  him self to  
them ( i . e . ,  p a r t ic ip a te ) ,  they fo m  p a r ts  o f h is  assumed r e a l i ty .  In  
th i s  manner, Gebser -  form ally rev e rs in g  Schopenhauer — reduces 
m etaphysical pessim ian to  c u ltu ra l  p e s s im is m , which in  tu rn  he a l l o t s  
a  r e la t iv e  p o s itio n  narking th e  d e fic ien cy  le v e l ;  in  b r ie f ,  he 
in te g ra te s  i t  in  h is  a ra tio n a l view.
The very problem of id e n t i ty  has a p e ss im is tic  p o te n tia l .  The 
search  fo r  an id e n t i ty  may in d ica te  i t s  lo s s ,  o r  a need f o r  i t .  Gebser, 
who observes a  spreading fe e lin g  o f r a t io n a l i s t i c  m a te ria l senselessness  
i n  l i f e ,  in fe rs  from the fa c t  th a t  th e  very  question  o f sense i s  be ing
(52)asked today th a t  the  ac tu a l sense has become questionab le . This
observation  can be applied  to  id e n ti ty . The search  f o r  s e l f - id e n t i ty .  
The search f o r  s e l f - id e n t i ty  -  mediated through seme c u ltu ra l  id e n t i ty  -  
req u ire s  some form o f c u ltu re  awareness o r  c u ltu re  response which, in  
accordance w ith  G ebser's view o f the  V est, i s  connected w ith  a  m ental
Neumann (E thik, p . 48) warns th a t  p sycho log ica lly  th i s  move would 
be fu rth e red  by a  s p l i t ,  on the  c o lle c tiv e  le v e l ,  in to  a  consciousness 
determined e th ica l-v a lu e  world and a  suppressed un-value world o f 
th e  unconscious.
(52)J Gebser, U.G.. pp. 147-148.
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ra tio n a l consciousness s tru c tu re . For him the s e lf -d e s tru c tiv e
n a tu re  of the  ra tio n a l ( i . e .  d e f ic ie n t)  le v e l  o f thought is o la te s  and
c o lle c tiv iz e s  and thereby fo rces the mind in to  some imprisonment to
(53)
which i t  responds w ith due pessimism. Gebser does no t su ffe r  from
th is  world as vehemently as does Spengler, o r  Schopenhauer. He i s  
concerned, and he w orries. Through h is  v is io n  o f some c ru c ia l process 
o f  imminent change he t r i e s  to  g ive  man a harmonious, non-frac tu red  
id e n t i ty  on the b a s is  o f both  a c u ltu ra l  consciousness awareness and 
a  conceptual understanding o f the  c u l tu ra l  cond itions o f  th e  e n tire  
h is to r ic a l  process o f change. In  o th e r  words, m an's awareness i s
no t only a  quaM fying b u t a lso  a  s e le c t iv e  co n s titu en t o f h is  
(sought-for) id e n tity .
Gebser' e observations t e s t i f y  to  a  high physiognomical 
c u ltu re  awareness. However h is  p h ilo so p h ica l c u ltu re  awareness, 
remaining dominated by the Greco-European t r a d i t io n ,  throws more l ig h t  
on h is  own re la tio n sh ip  w ith German thought than on the  ac tu a l 
fundamentals o f Indian  thought. Some e s s e n t ia l  fe a tu re s  of Indian 
thought elude him; h is  no tions o f  an ego development in  connection 
w ith an Indian time-ocean and n irvana th r iv e  along c u ltu ra l  p a ra l le l s  
which do no t o rig in a te  from a category o f in d iv id u a li ty  common to  
German and Indian thought. Gebser may perhaps psycho-soc io log ica lly  
be e n t i t le d  to  assume something l ik e  a  time-ocean. However, he cannot 
exp lain  the Buddhist concept o f  n irvana  in  terms o f a d is so lu tio n  o r  
re tu rn  o f an ind iv idua l who i s  fe a tu re d  by a c e r ta in  ego-form o r  
id e n t i f ia b le  consciousness s tru c tu re , because in  the  concept t r a d i t io n  
o f  n irv an a , i . e .  in  i t s  only meaningful con tex t, no such consciousness 
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Schubart (Europa. pp. 50-31) • "C u ltu ra l fa tig u e  and s a t ie ty  become 
a p p a ren t.. . .  Hie p e ss im is tic  c u ltu re  ph ilosophers appear, in  a  long  l in e  
which reaches from Schopenhauer and N ietzsche to  Spengler and H ages. ’*
The tu rn in g -p o in t, he adds, i s  marked by Schopenhauer in troducing  
s c e p tic a l c u ltu re  c r i t i c i s n  "which seeks f o r  complementary values in  
In d ia" ; von Hartmann, Deussen and o th e rs  followed him on th i s  path .
Gebser (u .G .. p. 562) :  "What I  have t r i e d  here  i s  to  co n trib u te
to the c la r i f ic a t io n  o f a complex s i tu a t io n  the  so lu tio n  o f  which i s  
going to  happen today o r  tomorrow."
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s tru c tu re  o r  category was ever developed. When. Gebser says th a t
th e  Indian has no ego, th is  e s s e n tia l ly  on ly  means (although
un fo rtu n ate ly , he does n o t c le a r ly  see t h i s  h im self) th a t  Tndian thought
has no Gebserian category o f in d iv id u a lity . (Here, from the  p o in t o f
view o f  comparative philosophy, h is  physiognomical observations la ck
an e s s e n tia l  connecting p o in t . ) Gebser s  herm eneutic i s  based on th e
m istaken assumption th a t  h is  category o f  in d iv id u a li ty  o r  s e l f - id e n t i ty
according to  sy stem atica lly  changing e g o -s tru c tu re s  could be d ire c t ly
(55)app lied  to  such Indian t r a d it io n s  as Buddhism, Vedanta o r  Yoga.
However, such a category was never developed in  Ind ian  thought.
The problem o f the unconscious, and th e re fo re  uncontro lled , 
p re ju d ice  may be fu r th e r  e lu c id a ted  i f ,  to  use  a  fa m il ia r  concept, we 
look  again  a t  Schopenhauer's w il l  which fu nc tions a x io lo g ic a lly  w ith  
regard  to  o ther th ings and which i s  h is  most u n iv e rsa l category. In  
In d ia , too, w ill  i s  always th e re  and around, b u t in  some su b tle  manner. 
Gebser, in  comparison, i s  d is t in c t ly  n e a re r  to  Schopenhauer than to  
In d ia . Schopenhauer tre a te d , perhaps in v o lu n ta r ily , h is  concept o f w il l  
as a prim ary category ( o f f ic ia l ly  he accepts only c a u s a li ty ) . S im ilarly , 
G ebser's  s t r i c t l y  mental phenomenon of w i l l ,  analogous to  i t s  su perio r 
a ra tio n a l counterpart, the diaphanous, fu n c tio n s  as one o f h is  
physiognomic measuring c r i t e r i a  inasmuch a s  i t  expresses o r  r e f le c t s  
a  c e r ta in  le v e l of consciousness in  accordance w ith  h is  category of 
in d iv id u a lity . In  In d ia  "w ill"  i s  only im plied; b u t a c e n tra l 
o r ie n ta tio n  p o in t, in  terms o f a  prim ary im pulse, may be provided by 
th e  m ystical experience. Since in  Indian thought understanding re q u ire s  
a  connection w ith  th i s  prim ary impulse, we may te n ta t iv e ly  say th a t ,  in  
o rd e r to  come about, i t  has to  be "w illed” . G ebser's  p u rsu it  im plies 
th e  assumption th a t  the prim ary impulse o f  the  Ind ian  and Western thought 
t r a d i t io n s  (which he attem pts to  l in k  a t  various p o in ts  of in te r e s t )
(55)  correSpondence which F eu ers te in  (Essence, p . 20) sees between 
G ebser's  fo u r consciousness phases and the fo u r Indian  yugas i s  form ally  
accep tab le , as long as we remain herm eneutically  aware th a t Yoga 
recognizes no t rue  in d iv id u a lity . Cf. Gupta, Yugas and Hal p as.
^  Gebser, U.G.. pp. 165, 318.
174
should be id e n tic a l  o r  o f the  same n a tu re , f o r  which ve have no evidence. 
Such an assumption could be described  a s  an unconscious hermeneutic 
p re ju d ic e  (as opposed to Gadamer's conscious herm eneutic p re ju d ice ). 
Gebser i s  p rejudiced  in  assuming th a t  a  prim ary category  o f in d iv id u a lity  
has evolved not only in  Europe and Greece, b u t a lso  in  ancien t In d ia , 
However, only in  Greece and Europe a  th ink ing  in d iv id u a l may seek h is  
s e l f —id e n ti ty  on the b a s is  th a t  " thinking- i s  being". In  In d ia  th ink ing  
i s  simply there  w ith o r w ithout man's a c tiv e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  and 
re g a rd le ss  of the w ritten  o r  o ra l book ( i . e . ,  the "core event" precedes 
a l l  fu r th e r  developments). In  Europe a te x t  means e s s e n tia l ly  the same 
a s  a book; in  Ind ia  a " tex t"  i s  an o th er m an ifesta tion  o f  th ink ing : 
a  "w illed" understanding. This i s  o f  fundamental hermeneutic 
s ig n ific an ce  (a lso  see p. 239). The te x t  i s  th in k in g  which through th e  
use  o f  the la te n t  " w ill" , o r  some n e u tra l  v o li t io n a l  p r in c ip le , may be 
a c tu a liz e d  o r  linked with the mind, thus re s u lt in g  in  understanding.
Gebser uses h is  c a re fu lly  observed psycho-socio log ical
consciousness le v e ls  in  o rder to  c a l ib ra te  h is  category o f in d iv id u a lity .
U nfortunately , i t s  ax io lo g ica l a p p lic a tio n  to  such Indian  concepts as
n irvana  o r samsara amounts s t r i c t l y  speaking to  a  c u ltu ra l  annexation 
•  •
o f In d ia  by the West -  which i s  ex ac tly  what Gebser wants to avoid! 
D espite h is  high cu ltu re  awareness th e  in tended c u ltu ro lo g ic a l 
in te g ra tio n  o f India in to  h is  w orld-outlook re p re se n ts , from 
a me tar-philosophical p o in t o f view, p a r t  o f h is  personal re a c tio n  to  
h is  own c u ltu ra l background: h is  su b tle  doubt o r  worry w ith  regard  to
a  change in  man's s e l f - id e n t i ty  cannot be tra n s fe r re d  o r  app lied  to  
Ind ian  thought.
(7 ) From Schopenhauer to  Gebser
The p erio d  from Schopenhauer's p h ilo so p h ica l debut t i l l  G ebser's death  
comprises th e  h is to ry  o f  a  sh o rt s e r ie s  o f ph ilo so p h ica l b e l ie f s  in  
change revolv ing  in  each in d iv id u a l case around a search  f o r  
m etaphysical id e n t i ty  which we have come to  understand a s  a  d i s t in c t  
expression  o f pessimism. Before we e n te r  th e  Indian  p a r t  o f our study, 
ve wish to  b r ie f ly  re c a p itu la te  th e  e s s e n tia l  s tep s  which have allowed 
u s  to  a sse ss  the ph ilosoph ical p r in c ip le s  o f pessimism.
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Schopenhauer m etaphysically  re d e fin e s  th e  in d iv id u a l in  
terms o f  su ffe rin g . He d e riv es  th e  meaning o f  t h i s  s u ffe r in g  on an 
an th ro p o lo g ica l-e th ica l le v e l  from h is  c h a rac te ro lo g ic a l approach to  
cu ltu re . Im p lic it ly  w ith  h is  p e s s im is tic  m etaphysical impulse he p asses 
h is  c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n  on to h is  fo llo w ers . H ey  p e rp e tu a te  th e  impulse 
in  accordance w ith  th e i r  own c u l tu r a l ly  induced m etaphysical view s, b u t 
w ithout reaching  Schopenhauer s in d iv id u a l v is io n a ry  s tre n g th .
Our h is to rio so p h ic a l th in k e rs , SpengLer and Gebser, t r e a t  
m etaphysical pessimism as a  c u ltu ra l  phenomenon, Approaching the  
problem o f human id e n ti ty  cu ltu re  lo g ic a l ly , SpengLer in  p u rs u it  o f  one 
ingenious thought, Gebser w ith  d e ta i le d  in tu i t io n  and accuracy, they 
d isp lay  th e i r  own p ess im is tic  p o te n t ia ls  on th e  le v e l  o f  h is to r ic a l  
pessim ian. Unlike the  Schopenhauer group, they  in d ic a te  a  p r in c ip a l 
awareness o f the c u ltu ra l in fluence  on thought, b u t n o t one o f our 
th in k e rs  i s  c le a r ly  aware th a t a  personal re a c tio n  to  c u ltu re  i s  
fundamental to  both  m etaphysical pessimism and h i s to r i c a l  pessimism 
(which con tains the  question  of m etaphysical id e n t i ty  only  in  a  la te n t  
fona).
The (m etaphysical) ph ilosopher, a s  compared to  the  (c u ltu ra l)  
th in k e r, develops a more personal i s  t i c  a t t i tu d e  in  h is  ph ilosoph iz ing .
His personal in n e r need, and search , fo r  a change in  p h ilo so p h ica l 
consciousness req u ire s , d esp ite  see ing  h im self a s  a  member o f 
so c ie ty , a p h ilo so p h ica lly  d is ta n t ,  s o c ia lly  a lie n a te d  a t t i tu d e  to  man 
(which we have a lready  observed in  S ocra tes). S tim ulated by c u ltu re , 
o u r ph ilosophers and th in k e rs  a re  w i l ly - n i l ly  c u ltu re  c r i t i c s ,  fhey  
a re  ty p ic a l f o r  th e i r  period  inasmuch as they , consciously  o r  
unconsciously, express the  need to  overcome t h e i r  own c u ltu re . H ey  
consider European cu ltu re  a s  bad, w ithout being f u l l y  aware o f  th e i r  
own p o s itio n  in  i t ,  i .  e . , w ithout b e in g  ab le  to  see from w ith in  how 
th e i r  own c u ltu re  has a ffe c ted  th e i r  th ink ing .
Once we have apprecia ted  th is  p h ilo so p h ic a l predicam ent o f 
our m etaphysicians, we can recognize a s ig n if ic a n t  psycho log ica l and 
methodological p r in c ip le  behind I n d ia 's  "m ysterious" Semantic power o f 
a t t r a c t io n :  Ind ia  beckoned a s  an ex te rn a l p o s itio n  which would a ffo rd
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th e  necessary  d istance from European c u ltu re  (p a r t ic u la r ly  
obvious in  the  metaphysical function  o f H ain lander's  In d ia ) . Thus 
Ind ian  thought becomes p a r t  o f th a t  symptom o f  pessimism which c o n s is ts  
in  searching  f o r  (metaphysical) id e n ti ty ,  beginning w ith Schopenhauer's 
p e rso n a lis  t i c  cu ltu re  reac tio n . When we look  a t  our c u l tu ra l  th in k e rs , 
we n o tice  th a t  these a re  not so provoked by the  in d iv id u a l (although 
Gebser w orries more about the  ind iv id u a l than Spengler). As th e i r  
predom inantly c u ltu ra l approach to  id e n ti ty  shows, they  a re  le s s  
p e rs o n a lis t ic  and are so c ia lly  as  w ell a s  p h ilo so p h ica lly  le s s  
a lie n a te d  than our metaphysical p ess im ists . In d ia  serves Spengler and 
Gebser a s  a  cu ltu ro lo g ica l r e f le c to r  and in te n s i f i e r  o f t h e i r  
h i s to r io  soph ica lly  pursued self-im age (as a c u l tu ra l  coo rd in a te r o r  
an in te g ra to r , re sp ec tiv e ly ). E sse n tia lly , they  do n o t m ethodologically 
re q u ire  Ind ia  as a metaphysical support. Spengler uses Ind ian  concepts 
as c u ltu ro lo g ic a l i l lu s t r a t io n s .  Gebser inc ludes Ind ia  in  h is  psycho- 
cu ltu ro lo g ic a l descrip tion  o f an in te g ra l  consciousness. Since on th i s  
le v e l  philosophy has made way f o r  some diaphanous mode o f  seeing, he 
possesses no noteworthy m etaphysical substructu re  f o r  this ontology 
of h is  ego-free s tr a te  o f  b e in g -re a lity . But through h is  p o s itiv e  
a ra tio n a l transform ation of thought he avoids the type o f m etaphysical 
embarrassment in  which Spengler f in d s  him self upon try in g , in  the wake 
o f N ietzsche, to  dismiss o r  reform philosophy c u ltu ro lo g ic a lly . I t  
i s  in te re s t in g  to  note th a t  i t  i s  along the narrow p e rs o n a lis t ic  tra c k  
which runs through G ebser's thought where he c lashes herm eneutically  
w ith Indian  thought, ignoring  th a t  h is  id e n t i ty  category  o f  
in d iv id u a lity  i s  not app licab le  to  Indian conditions. H i s  p a r t ic u la r  
weak spot in  h is  cu ltu re  awareness in d ic a te s  the  n a tu re  o f  h is  
p r in c ip a l e r ro r  which l e t s  him wrongly include In d ia  in to  h is  worry 
an e s s e n tia l ly  European form o f id e n ti ty .
Fran Schopenhauer's in te r e s t  in  se lf-n e g a tio n  to  G ebser's  
re je c t io n  o f  se lf-n eg a tio n  we observe various changes o f  c u ltu re  
awareness. Schopenhauer (in  c o n tra s t to  Hegel and N ietzsche) i s  
predom inantly a h is to r ic a l ;  von Hartmann, M ainlander and Deussen a re  
h is to r ic a l  in  th e i r  approach. But a l l  are  unaware o f  bo th  th e
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tr a d it io n a l  and the  c u ltu ra l c h a rac te r  o f  t h e i r  own ph ilosophies. 
S im ila rly , they n e ith e r  take In d ia 's  sep a ra te  c u ltu re  b a s is  in to  account 
nor do they  see any movement in  Indian  thought. H ey  t r e a t  i t  lik ft 
an is o la te d  event, ncn-organized in  tim e. Spengler and Gebser a re  
aware o f  bo th  the d if fe re n t t r a d i t io n  o f  Indian thought and th e  problem 
o f  fa c in g  i t  in  a  non-European c u ltu ra l  con tex t. Spengler re fu ses  to  
move any ph ilosoph ical content acro ss  th e  c u ltu re  gap. H is hermeneutic 
consciously  r e s t r i c t s  i t s e l f  to  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  h is to rio so p h ic a l form 
analog ies. Gebser, who wants to  exchange con ten t on a  u n iv e rsa l le v e l 
of meaning, pursues a  hermeneutic based on psychological p o la r ity .
The c u ltu ra l provocation which we saw re f le c te d  by the  
v a rio u s  forms o f  German pessimism a lso  lead s  w ith in  o r  around the  
m etaphysical core o f pessimism to  a  p h ilo so p h ica l so lu tio n . 
P h ilo soph ica lly , we observe a c u ltu ra l  le v e l  o f  d epartu re , on which 
In d ia  occupies a  s ig n if ic a n t p o s itio n , and an e x p l ic i t  o r  im p lic it 
m etaphysical achievement. Pessimism, which in  a l l  the personal 
v a r ia n ts  we have described and analyzed evolves between these  two 
le v e ls ,  p re sen ts  no case o f u ltim a te  p h ilo so p h ica l desperation .
We have analyzed the b e l ie f  in  change which u n d e rlie s  German 
pessimism as a reac tio n  ag a in st c u ltu re . Indian  b e l ie f  in  change 
follow s a m ystical, no t a  m etaphysical o r ie n ta tio n . In  o rd er to  expose 
the a c tu a l meanings o f the Indian concepts employed by our Germans, we 
sh a ll p resen t and describe  these concepts in  some Tndian t r a d i t io n a l  
con tex ts. Using our own hermeneutic, we s h a ll  t r y  to  m ediate from 
a m eta-philosophical p o s itio n  between such now fa m ilia r  German concepts 
as  w i l l ,  su ffe rin g , an n ih ila tio n , ignorance, i l lu s io n ,  o r  in d iv id u a lity  
and t h e i r  (possib le) Indian co u n terp arts . We expect th a t  our reversed 
p e rsp ec tiv e , th i s  time from an Indian  ang le , w ill  corroborate  th a t  the 
conceptual l in k s  which the Germans used  to  a s so c ia te  Ind ia  w ith  
pessim isa  were e s se n tia l ly  German, n o t Indian.
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P a r t  U :  T h e  I n d i a n  b a c k g r o u n d
<Chapter Six
'The m ystical a x is  o f  Indian philosophy; according to Agehananda Bharati. 
i n  the Upanisads. and in  the Bhagayadgita.
"When ve introduced our metar-concept o f  philosophy ve sta ted  that the 
problem o f comparing Indian and Western thought i s  one o f  com patibility. 
"Ibis means that the corresponding parts or p r in c ip les  o f  such 
a  comparison should contain some compatible elem ents, regardless o f  
Ihov aaall these may be. No matter vhich feature o f  Indian philosophy 
to are going to describe, ve have committed ourselves to  re la te  i t  to  
'Western philosophy through the in i t i a l l y  estab lish ed  meta-concept, vhich 
i s  our declared device again s t  an entanglement in  the necessary  
hermeneutic prejudices. In order to  formulate such a  comparative 
relationsh ip  ve must try  to understand the Indian terms and te x ts  in  
•question. Since v ith  a  v iev  to our hermeneutic, ve require some 
h is to r ic a l  and philosophical b a sis , ve intend to look fo r  the e a r lie s t  
type o f reference to philosophical Tndian thought, or  a t  le a s t  try  to 
fin d  seme o f  i t s  fundamental impulses. Within the franevork o f  our 
discussion , these philosophical impulses sh a ll represent vhat ve 
consider a s  the structural "core event" in  Indian philosophy. As ve 
'have mentioned in  the Introduction, ve cure assuming that the ultim ate  
■aim o f  Indian philosophy, as conveyed through the m ultifarious forms 
o f  expression within i t s  trad ition , poin ts back to the fa c t  that the
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original revelations o f the ancient r s is  vere based on m ystical
(l)in sig h ts  or experience. Stich m ystical experience i s  generally
considered "ineffable", that i s  to say, beyond the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f
(2)verbal expression. And yet reference to the experience i s  abundant, 
resu ltin g  in  shat one could perhaps ca ll an extensive, in d irect fox* o f  
description. In th is  sense, the f i r s t  utterances recorded in  the 
Upanisads provide the most intim ate descriptions o f  th is  central in sig h t  
vhich ve may ever hope to  receive frcam ancient Indian philosophy.
Hovever, these early descriptions only imply the m ystical experience.
Ve rfiall, therefore, a lso  include modem, presumably more e x p lic it  
description in  our discussion in  order to shov as much as  p ossib le , i f  
not about the m ystical experience as such, a t  le a s t  about the conditions 
under vhich i t  may take place and vhich may lead  to certa in  forms o f  
statements about i t .
Western trad ition , as ve have i llu s tr a te d  through our German 
thinkers, tends to distinguish  rather c lea r ly  between mysticism and 
philosophy: vhen Schopenhauer incorporated vh&t he considered the 
essence o f  Brahmanian in to  the presentation o f  h is  ovn philosophy, he 
c lear ly  distinguished h is  personal ph ilosophical approach from the form 
o f  i n s i s t  revealed by the authors o f  the Upanisads, vho had struck him 
as almost super-human individuals. Providing vh&t he considered 
a  coherent in te llec tu a l structure fo r  a co lle c tio n  o f  fragmentary 
in s ig h ts  in to  ultim ate truth, i . e . ,  by p a ra lle lin g  certa in  products o f  
ancient Indian in tu itiv e  thou^it, he served as a  personal example o f  h is  
d istin ctio n  betveen philosophers and m ystics. (Von Hartmann d isso lv es  
th is  d istin ction , p. 82; Gebser recognizes the mystic as a d is t in c t  
type but subjects the m ystical experience o f "being-reality" to  
a  cultural-psychological q u a lifica tion , p. I 63. ) While in  Europe the 
tvo traditions have, in  p rincip le, developed independently, in  India
^  Stace (Mystics, p . 20): "The Upanisads.. . are among the o ld est
records o f  mystician in  the world."
( 2) James (Experience, p. 380) w rites: " In e ffa b ility  -  the handiest o f
the marks by vhich I  c la s s ify  a s ta te  o f  mind as m ystical i s  n eg a tiv e .. • . 
i t s  quality most be d irec tly  experienced."
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they have been connected ab or ig in s . Therefore, when cred itin g  the 
Upanisads v ith  the presentation o f  the f i r s t  steps o f  philosophical 
thou^it in  India, ve should bear in  nind that they must have fo lloved
prim arily m ystical impulses, or drawn on sone sort o f  in tu it iv e
(3)knowledge. The content and s ty le  o f th e ir  te x ts  as v e i l  as th e ir  
technical terminology suggest that th e ir  d irec t or ig in  l i e s  in  a common 
body o f system atic knowledge which was conceived spontaneously and 
in tu it iv e ly . But ve are not informed as to whether the anonymous 
authors o f  the Upanisads received th e ir  knowledge from some obscure
e
seers or whether authors and seers vere id e n t ic a l. The trad ition a l 
Tnflian viewpoint keeps v e i l  a lo o f from th is  question, because i t  
considers the Upanisads as divine revelation  and not as h is to r ic a l  
tex ts  which could be traced back to certain  ind ividual m ystics or seers. 
Yet, for  our philosophical comparison ve cannot en tire ly  separate these  
two perspectives, since ve are in terested  in  a functional meaning o f  
representative Indian terms and tex ts .
In order to f a c i l i t a t e  a  p rincip le  understanding o f the 
m ystical foundations o f  Indian philosophy ve sha ll f i r s t  concentrate on 
what could p ossib ly  be said about the personal s itu a tio n  o f  a m ystic.
From h is  individual m ystical experience ve shall, then turn to the 
methods o f propagation or publication which he may employ in  re la tin g
Mliller (Ved.. pp. 22-23) w rites: "When ve read the Upanisads, the
e
impression they leave on our mind i s  that they are sudden in tu itio n s  
or in sp ira tion s, which sprang up here and there, and vere co llected  
afterwards. And yet there i s  system in  a l l  these dreams, there i s  
a common background to a l l  these v is io n s . There i s  even an abundance 
o f technical terms used by d ifferen t speakers so exactly  in  the same 
sense that one f e e ls  certain  that behind a l l  these lig h tn in g -fla sh es  
o f re lig io u s  and philosophical thougit there i s  a d ista n t past, a  dark 
background o f  which we shall never knov the beginning. There are words, 
there are phrases, there are whole l in e s  and verses which recur in  
d ifferen t Upanisads, and vhich must have been drawn from a common
e
treasury, or where i t  was hidden, and y et accessib le  to  the sages o f  
the Upanisad. *
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i t  cu ltu ra lly . We, with a view to our description , t iy  to understand
the m ystical origin  th eoretica lly . The Indian philosopher, whose
philosophical comments do not include any such th eoretica l, h is to r ic a l
explanation, makes the m ystical phenomenon, a t  le a s t  formally,
a  permanent object o f  h is  p ractica l in te r e s t  (vidva. .inana. prajna).
Both the ancient, practica l aspect o f  the m ystical experience and the
la te r  or even current th eoretica l one are connected by some cultural
continuity, esp ec ia lly  throu^i th e ir  rela ted  philosophies. This means
th at, when ve are trying to  describe the actu a lly  in effa b le  m ystical
experience, ve must be aware o f  the fa c t  that a l l  reference to i t  i s
made through sons cu ltu re-sp ec ific  medium, id  though the m ystical
experience as such seems to be "neutral”, the personality  o f  the
remembering m ystic must be expected to r e f le c t  h is  cu ltural background
(4) ^under any circumstances. The ta lk in g  m ystic, knowingly or  
unknowingly, i s  committed to h is  own culture-bound m ystical description. 
Therefore, h is  information reaches us only throu^i some kind o f  
"cultural f i l t e r 11 vhich necessarily  structures the fora o f  h is  expression  
(but, presumably, not i t s  content). In the in ter e st  o f  an intim ate  
understanding ve prefer to f i r s t  accept the information as i t  comes, 
ten ta tiv e ly  id en tify in g  ourselves with the mystic and, so to speak, 
committing ourselves by proxy. Then, remembering our original 
commitment to our meta-concept, ve must step back in  order to  analyze 
the given context. In short, our study o f  the described experience has 
to  include those who describe i t ,  since each description  a lso  
describes i t s e l f .
^  Stace (Mystics, pp. 20- 2l )  makes the fundamental remark that, 
although the core o f the experience may commonly be described as  
"an undifferentiated unity", ve should bear in  mind that "concepts 
such as 'o n e ', 'u n ity ', 'u n d ifferen tia ted ', 'God', 'Nirvana', e t c . ,  are 
only applied to the experience a fte r  i t  has passed and when i t  i s  being  
remembered". Katz (Myst.. p. 26) adds that " a ll experience i s  
processed through, organized by, and makes i t s e l f  availab le  to  us  
in  extremely complex epistem ological ways".
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Expressing; the e ssen tia l concepts and contents in  terms 
o f our meta-concept, ire in ten t to expose in  vhich manner and to vhich 
extent they might correspond with the key concepts o f German pessim ist. 
This comparison on the b asis  o f compatible c r ite r ia  and under due 
recognition o f d iverse cultural developments should help us to decide 
to which extent Indian thought could have influenced the essence, not 
ju st the expression, o f German pessimism.
Adopting a combined so c io lo g ica l and h is to r ic a l approach, ve
sh a ll f i r s t  g ive an i llu s tr a t io n  o f  how in  recent years the problem o f
describing the m ystical experience has been tackled p ra c tica lly  as w ell
as th eo retica lly , and from i t  ve shall c r i t ic a l ly  expose the d if f ic u lty
(5)o f  treatin g  the m ystical experience ob jective ly . This method o f  
p a ra lle lin g  the modem mystic with the m ystical ancient seer i s ,  o f  
course, only one o f  approximation. Ve cannot tru ly  id en tify  the two 
types because the inner (psychological) and the outer (cu ltural) 
circumstances o f today can never be the same as in  ancient tim es. But 
through our d iscussion  o f  the sp e c if ic  connections o f m ystical thought, 
i t s  description and i t s  cultural im plication ve hope to c la r ify  the 
hermeneutic problem.
(5) C ritic iaa , in  S ir Karl Popper's words (O o.Soc.II. p. 215),. 
"consists in  pointing out contradictions e ith er  w ithin the theory to 
be c r it ic iz e d , or between i t  and some fa c ts  o f experience". For us 
th is  d e fin itio n  would also  have to  imply the need for  an awareness o f  
the consequences o f merely p oten tia l error or deception, e sp ec ia lly  
since our hermeneutic, by rely ing  on the use o f quasi-objective, but 
actu ally  cu ltu ra lly  subjective views and reports, requires our personal 
philosophical commitment (o b jectified  in  our meta-concept).
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(a) Agehananda Bharati's description  o f  the "ineffable", and the  
hermeneutic problem of culture awareness
( l )  The m ystical experience: a reaction between Indian phrases
I t  would be id ea l i f ,  fo r  the purpose o f discussing' the m ystical a x is
o f Indian philosophy, ve could re fer  to  a genuine modern mystic who
re la tes  h is  experience in  scholarly Western language and, preferably,
with a bearing on Indian thought. This combination, as i t  seems, i s
(6)offered  in  the work o f Agehananda Bharati. He includes personal 
reports througi which we receive some f i r s t  hand information, while h is  
manner o f interpretation  provides us with the opportunity to ra ise  and 
discu ss the question o f  culture awareness.
According to  Bharati, “a m ystic i s  a person who says ' I  am 
a m ystic '. or words to that e f fe c t , con sisten tly , when questioned about 
h is  most important pursuit (a statement) which has to have a general 
widely applicable meaning". This f i r s t  part o f what he c a lls  an 
operational d efin itio n  o f a  m ystic i s  followed by a  second, material 
part vhich concentrates on one sp e c if ic  type o f re lig io u s experience:
"It i s  the person's in tu itio n  o f  numerical oneness with the coanic 
absolute, with the universal matrix, or with any essence stipu lated  
by the various th eo log ica l and speculative systems o f the world."
Having chosen Bharati as our leading exem plifier for  mysticisw, we 
find  i t  su itab le to  adhere to h is  d e fin itio n , a t  le a s t  so fa r  as our
^  Bom in  Vienna in  1923, o r ig in a lly  named. Leopold Fischer, he grew 
up in  Austria. In 1948 he went to  India in  pursuit o f the Hindu view 
o f  l i f e .  He was ordained a monk in  the Sannyasi order in  1951, and, 
in  1953, he obtained tan t r ie  in i t ia t io n . In 1961 he joined the 
U niversity o f  Syracuse, New York, as a so c ia l anthropologist (Robe, 
p. 152; Light, p. 41).
(7) Bharati, Light, p. 25* Be considers h is  d e fin itio n  in  ethnosemantic 
terms as " etic”, i . e .  generally widely applicable, as opposed to "emic", 
i . e .  in  a restr ic ted  sense, restr ic ted  to  a non-representative group. 
This d istin ctio n  i s  a lso  o f in ter e st  with regard to h is  cu ltural s e l f -  
id en tifica tio n  inasmuch as h is  "etic" remains Eurocentrically rational.
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study assumes mysticism in  Indian thought. (ike previous 
connotations o f  mysticism encountered in  the v ie  vs o f Schopenhauer, 
von Hartmann or our other thinkers fo llo v  evidently  from th e ir  ovn 
sp ec if ic  philosophical approaches.) Bharati i l lu s t r a te s  h is  d e fin itio n
o f  m ystic !®  by giv ing us several descriptions o f  personal m ystical
(8)experiences. H is free  use o f  Indian terminology in  th is  connection 
s tr ik es  us as a noteworthy ch a ra cter istic  to  which ve sh a ll make 
sp ecia l reference when discussing the ro le o f  culture in  m ystical 
descriptions.
Bharati begins: "One night when I was about twelve, i t
happened, fo r  the f i r s t  time. I was f a l l in g  asleep , when the whole 
world turned in to  one: one en tity , one in d iv is ib le  certa in ty . No 
euphoria, no colours, ju st a  deadeningly sure oneness o f  which I  was 
a t the center -  and eveiything e ls e  was ju st  th is , and nothing e lse .
For a fraction  o f a minute perhaps, I saw nothing, f e l t  nothing, but 
was that oneness, empty o f content and fe e l in g . . . .and I knew that th is  
was the meaning o f  what I had been reading fo r  a year or so -  the
(q)
IJpanisadic dictum o f  oneness, and the lite r a tu r e  around and about i t ."  
When, as he reports, many years la te r  he has h is  second experience, 
IJpanisadic terminology plays a much more e x p lic it  ro le: "I was suddenly
e
eveiything, the A ll, and I surveyed eveiything that was. For a moment,
or for  an hour -  I no longer know which -  I was that which i s  proclaimed
in  the four great axioms o f Upanishad wisdom: Aham brahmasmi -  I am
the Absolute; ta ttvaaasi -  Thou art that; nrajnatma brahma -  the
conscious s e l f  i s  the Absolute; sarvam khalvidam brahma -  everything
#
th at i s  i s  tru ly  the Brahman....I am God -  that i s  the supreme wisdom;
I -  not the unimportant, physical bodied I ,  not the wishing I ,  not the 
in te l le c tu a l I -  but the a l l  one impersonal I vhich alone e x is t s .
I experienced a l l  th is  in  th at b lessed  moment fo r  vhich I had not 
d irectly  striven . And a fte r  th at i t  took over ten years o f hard 
monastic asceticism  before I was and then even only momentarily, able
fe) Ve are o f  course not concerned with the authentic ity  o f  these  
experiences but with Bharati' a principal argument.
(9) Bharati, L ight, p. 59.
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to recover that in tu itio n . " ^ ^  More than th ir ty  years a f te r  th is  
experience o f  m ystical id en tifica tio n  he r e c a lls :  "The certa in ty  o f
a  m ystical consummation entailed fo r  me that the scripture vas r igh t, 
that i t  corroborated my experience,. • . that in  an irreveren tly  
anachronistic fashion, I had authenticated the TJpanisad. " ^  When he
e
t e l l s  us about M s third experience, vhich happened in  the wake o f
certain  tan tr ie  exercises in  Assam, he adds a  statement o f  philosophical
in te r e s t  vhich ve want to bear in  mind. Referring: to having y e t another
experience o f id en tity  with the universe, he r e c a lls :  "This vas i t
again, with no real addition in  value to the previous two, although
with a somewhat greater in ten sity  than e ith er , I think. By th at time,
I knev that the sta te  vas achievable, that there could be no doubt
about i t s  absoluteness; and as I vas a fa ir  pM losopher by that time
in  the technical sense, I vas not involved in  on to log ica l pretense, fo r
(12)then, as nov, I believed there axe no ontolog ica l im plications. *
The fourth experience happened, as he reports, in  connection with
a vexy beautifu l woman. Together with her he had partaken of
a psychosomatic drug. As he t e l l s  u s, ”1 had a marvellous v ision : her
whole womb took a bright golden hue, i t  looked, and struck me
immediately, l ik e  the brahmanda. the Golden Egg o f the Indian
♦ •
cosmogeny.. .  .But when th is  spectacle subsided and I withdrew from her,
I vas again a n  that, with nothing whatever excluded.. .  • There vas no 
god to speak o f, except m y s e lf . . . .I  vas i t  -  not again, but always."
Bie essen tia l element in  a l l  these fou r descrip tions, which 
Bharati presents quite in  accordance with h is  own d e fin itio n  o f  
mysticism, i s  h is  undoubted fe e lin g  o f oneness, absoluteness and 
centralness. Having chosen to express him self in  terms stipu lated  by 
the brahmanical scriptures h is  testimony dravs stra igh t on the 
mahavakyas o f the Upanisads, those four fundamental statements, which 
be l i t e r a l ly  f e e ls  to have authenticated through h is  own experience. 
However he d istin guishes very c lea r ly  between the completely private
Bharati, Robe, p. 59.
Bharati, Light, p. 41.
(l2 )v Bharati, Light, p. 42.
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nature o f th is  authentication o f (Upanisadic) r e a lity  and the
philosophical problem o f  conferring some oillog ical status on the
(13)essence o f  the experience. The majority o f m ystics, he says, were
not and are not aware o f  th is  important d is tin c tio n . He concludes 
that as a d irect consequence o f  th is  "ontological fallacy" v ir tu a lly
a l l  o f the ancient r s is  must have wrongly believed  that they could
'rr“  (14)actually  see truth as i t  ex isted  outside as w ell as inside o f  them.
(He mentions as the only exceptions Nagarjuna, who, apart from "denying
ontological status to any experience", as Bharati puts i t ,  declared
that the m ystic's experience could not add anything to h is  knowledge
about the world, and P a tin ja li, who considered isvara . the divine
object o f contemplation, redundant a fter  the m ystical experience had
happened.) B harati's judgement im plies that the views o f the r s is  must
•  •
have been developed on sim ilar grounds as h is . He does not concede 
that they had ne concept o f "culture" (not even a n ti-  or para-Buddhist) 
and that without such an outer le v e l o f reaction they could, indeed, 
have equated inside and outside.
As he observes, according to Indian tradition  th e ir  
unquestioned experience creates the scripture. However, fo r  the 
experience as such, as he explains very c lea r ly , i t  i s  quite irre levan t  
whether the m ystical union with a  certain  doctrinal matrix i s  
interpreted in  ontological or in  epistem ological terms. (He remarks 
that only the Buddhist m ystics are spared from having to explain th e ir  
merger or oneness with a divine matrix -  i . e .  the to ta l union o f two 
d ifferen t things which both have ontological sta tu s -  since a l l  schools 
deny ontological r e a lity  to  Buddhahood (although some ontological 
re a lity  i s  often  admitted fo r  one's own individual person).) He leaves
(13) Bharati, Robe, p. 237; Light, pp. 42, 97.
(14) The Vestem subject-object dichotomy cannot be applied to  
m ystically  centred Indian philosophy. Snart (Mys.Ex. (Soph.), p . 21) 
clear ly  reasons that "the m ystical experience can neither be subjective  
nor objective -  fo r  order and disorder ( i . e .  the necessary c r iter ia )  
can only e x is t  where there i s  a m u ltip lic ity  o f  d istinguishable item s, 
and no such m u ltip lic ity  can e x is t  in  an undifferentiated unity4’•
no doubt about the fundamental lim ita tio n  o f  any  m ystical 
descriptions or descriptive comments: from the m ystic 's point o f
view non o f these can ever match the actual experience. Besides,
(l5 )m ystical language, as he emphasizes, fo llow s culture. Whatever the
cu ltural connection o f the m ystic 's  language may be and whatever 
concepts he may choose through- which to t e l l  the r e s t  o f the world 
something about h is  experience, i t  remains e s se n tia lly  h is  private  
property which cannot be shared with other people. Any change 
resu ltin g  d irec tly  from h is  experience must occur w ithin the m ystic 's  
own personality. (Compare the aspect o f  on tological Awakening
discussed on p. 253*)
(2 ) 3he m ystical experience: a "neutral” p o sitio n  outside o f trad ition
(l7 )This "zero-experience", as Bharati has termed the s ta te  o f  m ystical 
consummation, provides the absolute startin g-p o in t fo r  h is  descrip tive  
attempts. Beyond th is  he looks no fu rther fo r  a fin a l cause. He simply 
points to the fa c t that various known or unknown external circumstances 
may trigger the experience. As he explains, i t  may equally w ell occur 
in  connection with certain drugs o r  a fte r  hard monastic a s c e t ic !aa, 
implying that such conditioning circumstances are merely concomitants.
He emphasizes that the experience never did come to him as a  resu lt o f  
h is  regular meditation, nor did i t  so come to  any o f h is  numerous 
fe llow  monks whom, as he claims, he examined intim ately. Many scholars,
(15) Bharati, Light, pp. 44-46, 61-62.
(16 ) "The genuine m ystic as a person remains the person he was before -  
a  king, a knave, a  d en tist” (Light, p . 53)* "But there are hardly any 
mystics who do in  fa c t  go on as though nothing had happened" (p. 133) • 
"Ve might even say that the perennial mode o f  the mystic' a se lf-rep o rt  
i s  that o f change" (p. 99 ).
(17) Bharati, L ight, p. 43. In  th is  expression he consciously t r ie s  to  
combine a philosophical aspect, inasmuch as "there i s  zero content o f  
a cognitive sort in  the experience”, with a  technical aspect, c a llin g  
"any consummative experience a zero-experience, within each universe  
o f discourse".
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Western and Indian, find i t  hard to understand th at, as he w rites,
"the genuine m ystic may he neith er a sa in t, nor a  theologian, nor
(ifi)a  humanist, but ju st  a  person who had the zero-experience". He
i s  amazed that in  particu lar they do not want to accept that aysticism
could centre not only on a sce tic  e ffo r t  but a lso  on euphoric or
hedonistic experience, a view fo r  which he a lso  claims Hpanisadie
♦
support.
Bharati, in  order to introduce same concept which could help
us to  f i l l  the gap between a presumable but to ta lly  in v is ib le  cause o f
the m ystical experience on the one hand and those v is ib le  and
describable circumstances on the other hand, suggests that one admit
(l9 )something lik e  "chance, good luck or p s y c h o s o m a t ic  readiness". He
b elieves that so fa r  no deliberate procedure has ever guaranteed the 
m ystical v is ion , which, as i t  stands, remains unpredictable. Quite 
e x p lic it ly  our fortu itou s mystic s ta te s  that "whatever chance throws the 
person in to  the zero-event, the actions and passions that lead  up to  i t ,  
chronologically, in  an Individual' a l i f e  are irrelevan t to the 
autonomous experience, and th is  i s  what a l l  m ystics report". Now, i f  
there i s  no causal connection between sadhana and siddhi. the e f fe c t  
and the achievement, why do people s t i l l  engage in  a l l  these sp ecia l 
p ractices, he asks. Ihe answer we receive i s  as s tr ik in g  as  i t  i s  
obvious a fte r  what we have learn t so far: whatever e ffo r t  a person
decides to undertake ju st r e f le c ts  h is  individual pred ilection . That 
i s  a l l .  I f  ve accept Bharati's idea o f  chance in  terms o f  psychosomatic 
readiness, r e la tin g  i t  to  certain  (unpredictable) releasin g  in flu en ces,
(is)v ' Bharati, L ight, p . 62; on p. 124 he adds: "Mystics can be sa in ts ,
they can be v ic iou s tyrants, or anything e l s e ." This view i s  already  
expressed by von Hartmann (Ph.d.U.. p. 289).
(t q ) Bharati, Light, p . 65; on p. 174 he refers to i t  as "Grace talk",
implying ultim ate in e x p lic a b ility  or a  "somewhat cynical nescio";
tech n ica lly , "the r s is  and acarvas. the orig in a l teachers o f  m ystic 
# •
wisdom, o f Vedanta and yoga, had th e ir  answer.. .  r neith er  p ractice  
nor meditation, nor any other deed takes you there". Cf. our p. 265, 
anugraha.
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i t  would fo llow  that the conscious e ffo r ts  are as much, subject to
chance as the other more random in fluencing circumstances. In b r ie f ,
the d iv isio n  between directed e ffo r ts  and any u n so lic ited  influence
would then appear as a merely formal one. F eeling  that these things
have never been stated  so frankly before, Bharati sums up: n!Qie
zero-experience comes to those to whoa i t  comes, regardless o f  what
they do; i t  a lso  comes, I  b e liev e , to  those few who try  very hard over
a long period o f  time." P lotinus, as we may remember, had made such
p ersisten t e ffo r ts . ®ie presumed novelty o f B harati's statement
culminates in  the view that, although a d isc ip lin ed  approach may be
quite common, i t  "does not in  any way lessen  the p o s s ib il ity  that many
people who don't try a t a l l  have the zero-experience anyway -  I would
think th is  covers about h a lf o f a l l  m ystics o f a l l  tim es and clim es.
(20)And i t  i s  th is  fa c t which the scholar and the e c c le s ia s t ic  resent."  
Denying any moral or so c ia l value to the (unpredictable) zero-experience 
as such, he recommends i t  to  the s y s t ic a lly  inclin ed  on purely personal 
and p ra ctica l grounds: as Ha s k i l l  which confers delight" and protects
(zl)"against boredom and despair".
Bharati i s  convinced that h is  outlook i s  not only p er fec tly
compatible with Hinduism but that i t  even promotes i t .  Others have
been more scep tica l. Throughout India, as he l e t s  us know very frankly,
he was often  met with a certain  amount o f suspicion regarding h is
assumed Hindu id en tity , exactly  as h is  own guru, Visvananda Bharati,
(22)a fte r  having given him sannvasa. had predicted. One o f  the most
sophisticated  te s t s  prepared fo r  him by Hindu scrutiny i s  h is  encounter
-  -  (23) -  _ _with the Samkaracarya o f  the East. Agehananda Bharati i s  received.
e
here as a Hindu exception, since, as he reports h im self, i t  i s  understood 
that "none o f  the others who have worn the ochre robe had to  choose th is  
culture, as they were bom in to  it" . Less obvious to  the assembled 
monks appear h is  views on Hindu doctrine ( i . e .  e sse n tia lly  as outlined
Bharati, Lirfrt. p. 66.
(21) Bharati, L ight, pp. 74-75.
( 22) Bharati, Robe, p. 156.
(23)v ^  Bharati, Robe, pp. 236-243.
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above). He teaches thee that those b e lie fs  related to the existence
or non-existence o f mystical objects, such as the brahman, have to
remain private commitments, whereas public commitments resu lt from one's
attitude towards things. 3he mystic, he assures them, remains s ilen t
about h is  actual experience which remains naturally private, because i t
(24)would be a fa llacy  to in fer  any truth from i t .  And he adds -
resorting to English -  "that private experience o f an object o f the
(25)relig ious sort does not confer ex isten tia l status on the object".
His b e lie f  that "what i s  to ta lly  committing i s  to ta lly  incommunicable"
represents for him "the only possible humanistic (s ic ) interpretation
of Advaita-aoniem". whereby he makes the point that "human! as involves
the use o f the human per se. not as a paradigm of the Absolute". Ve
even hear a somewhat fam iliar pessim istic undertone when he deplores
that the BhagavadgLta' a ca ll for the individual' a to ta l id en tification
with the Lord "implies something most depressing to the c r it ic a l
humanist: human beings axe interesting and to be served only sub
specie d lv in ita tis . not as autonomous individuals in  th eir  own right -
for  the status of the individual i s  mavwu a  sort of illu s io n  and
something to be transcended. I t  i s  the Individual qua individual one
(26jhas to get rid of, so that God can shine forth." He argues that 
a l l  traditional Hindu explanations perpetuate only the old images without 
revealing the truth, since i t  i s  ineffable. Bharati's usurped n eti-n eti 
stance i s  not new (compare p. 201 (6) ) . But he ignores that the 
mystical Hindu traditions, i f  we do not want to le t  them originate from 
some ancient mental inadequacies, must root in  a d ifferent consciousness 
structure which a t one time made i t  possible to produce much more d irect,
( 2 4 ) Bharati (Analysis, pp. 121-122) deplores that for the orthodox Indian 
thinker "salvation -  variously styled mukti. moksa. apavarga. kaivalya. 
turiya. nirvana, etc . -  i s  the sole real concern o f the philosopher and 
a l l  log ic  and other philosophical d iscip lin e but ancillary to it" .
Warning modem Indians against the in te llec tu a l dishonesty in  such 
a claim, he advises then that "today, however, i t  cannot be got away 
with in  spite o f a l l  efforts to keep up the scholastic status quo”.
(2 5 ) Bharati, Robe, p. 237 = Light, p. 82.
( 26) Bharati, Robe, p. 120; Light, p. 64.
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a cultural, descriptions. Bharati sums up h is  d ifferen tiatin g  view 
declaring that "yoga and monastic l i f e  -  in  short, the mystical world 
view -  are ways of doing, of practicing certain things; philosophies, 
eastern and western alike, are ways o f thinking things". Having 
presented h is clever views on Hindu thought, he l e t s  the Samkaracaiya
e
deny "that they are incompatible with the tradition; they are ju st  
a rather extraordinary way of seeing the tradition".
(5) Bharati's problematic culture awareness
Bharati' 9 sociological-philosophical description of mysticism r e lie s  on 
a form of comparative intercultural cxitLciaa which i t s e l f  may be used 
for an assessment o f h is  lev e l o f  culture awareness* Ve can accept 
with Bharati that the mystical experience as such should be considered 
as something "neutral" and "unchangeable"; but as soon as we come to 
mystical description and interpretation i t  has to appear in  relation  
to some cultural environment. (As we stated in i t ia l ly ,  i t  i s  our 
European perspective which makes the mystical e x p l ic i t . ) In order to 
present mysticism on a culture-free, "neutral" le v e l, our infozmant and 
philosopher tr ie s  to combine two major perspectives, a traditional 
Indian one and a modem humanistic Western one both of which have to 
take their bearings from h is  own "private" and ineffable experience.
Ihe complexity o f Bharati's role as an exponent and c r it ic  of  
m ystides i s  further increased by h is  personal involvement in  Hinduism. 
He i s  well aware o f the sociological borderlines which he draws up very 
sc ien tif ic a lly  for the protection o f h is  claims qua mystic and qua 
Hindu, i . e . ,  he i s  a mystic and a Hindu by h is  own general defin ition  
(p. 183(7)). Having discovered h is  ta lent and inclination  fo r  
mysticism, Bharati sets out to become a genuine Hindu, in  addition to 
h is  European cultural heritage. Seeing him self as fostering no 
ethnocentrias, he for a while "goes native". Temporarily emerging 
from th is  inside experience of Hindu culture he s p lit s  h is  role o f  
a participant observer (one either participates or observes) and, 
thus detached, subjects Hinduiai to h is  cultural criticism  
which he rates as the only "intercultural contribution which
can be made on th e  communicatory, d iscu rs iv e  le v e l" .
This c r i t i c i s e  o f Hindu thought appears u ltim a te ly  more as  
a re v o lt  than a s  a perpetuation  o r  u n if ic a tio n . In s tead  o f  t ry in g  to  
exp lain  why genuine Hindu thought must m anifest i t s e l f  q u ite  
le g itim a te ly  in  conformity w ith i t s  t r a d i t io n  ( fo r  example, by 
illu m in a tin g  such Ind ian  equ ivalen ts to  th e  concept o f " tru th *  as 
inana o r  brahmavidya in  t h e i r  own autonomous sphere o f meaning), B harati 
simply c o n tra d ic ts  se lec ted  aspec ts  o f Hinduian in  a  ra t io n a l  manner 
on th e  b a s is  o f some supposedly o b jec tiv e  humanian, which n e ce ssa rily  
c o n f l ic ts  w ith th e  t r a d i t io n  o f Ind ian  thought. Consequently, i t  i s  
n o t su rp ris in g  th a t ,  although he p ro fesses  th e  d e s ire  to  absorb 
Hinduism, i t s  spokeaaen only accept him w ith  re se rv a tio n . Humanism 
i s  no t an element o f Indian  cu ltu re . B esides, h i s  "humaniaa" i s  
an tiqua ted  and lag s  even behind N ie tz sch e 's  id ea  o f  "dehum anization". 
N evertheless, B harati decrees th a t th e  "humanist" view provides an 
adequate b a s is  fo r  c u ltu re  c r i t ic ia n .  U nfortunately  he ignores the  
f a c t  th a t  he de-Ind ian izes a l l  Indian phenomena and concepts when he 
t r i e s  to  evaluate them on non-Indian grounds from which they  have n o t 
o rig in a te d . H is a t t i tu d e  even seems to  suggest th a t  f o r  Ind ian  thought 
th e  tim e has come to  have some o f i t s  supposed age-o ld  e r ro rs  co rrec ted  
by modem (ra tio n a l)  Western th ink ing . (We f e e l  reminded o f our 
Schopenhauerians who, le s s  th e a t r ic a l ly  though, a lso  tended to  annex 
Ind ian  wisdom in  o rder to  improve i t . )
With a  b r ie f  re fe rence  to  Gebser s p e rsp ec tiv e  we could say
th a t  underly ing  th e  comments and d e sc r ip tio n s  by th e  r s i s  th e re  may have
•  •
ex is ted  a  fo ra  o f  consciousness, o r  a  mode o f thought, which re f le c te d
a  " fe e lin g  o f  wholeness" th a t  precluded any c u ltu re -o rie n te d  reasoning
on th e i r  p a r t .  G ebser's view im plies th a t  th e  u n d if fe re n tia te d  foza o f
the  r s i s '  in n e r and o u te r  t ru th  corresponds w ith a  c e r ta in  non- 
♦ •
d u a l i s t ic ,  p re -ra tio n a l consciousness s tru c tu re . In  B h a ra t i 's  opinion 
the  r s i s  were ra t io n a lly  m istaken; they  had follow ed an o n to lo g ica l 
f a l la c y  vhich o u ^ it to  be r a t io n a lly  co rrec ted , on th e  b a s is  o f  h is  
humanist conception o f man's s e lf - id e n t i ty .
(27) Bharati, Robe, pp. 201, 274.
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B harati s approach contains no p a r a l le l  to  Gebser s a ttem pt 
o f  an a ra t io n a l ,  diaphanous vieir o f  the  two separa te  t r a d i t io n s ,  o r  
perhaps something l ik e  Gadamer's hermeneutic movement, n o r would he 
consider an in te rp re ta tio n  o f m ystical change from some m eta-poedtion. 
H is zero-experience func tions d ecep tive ly  a s  some s o r t  o f  pseudo- 
m eta-level in  th a t he does n o t use i t  as a  herm eneutic l in k  o r  
connecting p o in t to  e lu c id a te  the  ro le  o f  Ind ian  terms and te x ts ,  which 
he only employes to  decorate h is  d e sc rip tio n  o f  m ysticism . I n  h is  
decla red  cap ac ity  as  a  m ystic he id e n t i f ie s  w ith  th e  r s i s . But in s te ad
• e
o f comparing h is  own m ystical experience w ith the  ro le  o f th e  m ystical 
im pulse in  In d ian  thought he excludes i t  from h is  ph ilo so p h ical 
d iscu ssio n  a s  a  "p riv a te  commitment", and then t r i e s  to  rep len ish  
a now essenceless Ind ian  thought w ith European p r in c ip le s , s u b s ti tu tin g  
h is  hum anistic p re d ile c tio n s  as  a  general p h ilo so p h ica l b a s is . He 
f ig u re s  th a t  once in  the  Hindu fo ld  (as so c o n s is te n tly  expressed 
through h is  costume), h is  good in te n tio n s  would be s u f f ic ie n t  to  make 
him a  n a tu ra l promoter o f Hindu thought. I t  e ludes M e th a t  
a  herm eneutic f o r  a  Western approach to  Ind ian  c u ltu re  and thought 
cannot be replaced by an attem pted annexation o f a  "Hindu" id e n t i ty  
which was merely produced by some ad hoc d e f in i t io n . B harati i s  
c e r ta in ly  no t a  Hindu, as  he wants to  b e lie v e . He fo rg e ts  th a t  
a  complete Hindu id e n ti ty  would no t only re q u ire  something l ik e  
a  r a t io n a lly  "co rrec t"  compliance w ith Hindu c u ltu re  a t  the  moment when 
he makes th e  id e n t i ty  statem ent, b u t must inc lude  o r ig in . S im ila rly , 
he igno res th a t  the  tra d i t io n  o f  Indian thought has to  fo llow  i t s  own 
prim ary impulse, which may come from some u n q u a lif ie d  source.
I f  we look a t  Ind ian  te x t  m an ife s ta tio n s  a s  e s s e n t ia l ly  
id e n t ic a l  w ith  already  existing- " th ink ing” which i s  simply th e re , i . e . , 
i f  te x ts  a re  m anifested th ink ing , then  we could consider te x tu a l 
understanding, to g e th er w ith th e  m ystical experience, as ranging 
somewhere along the  l in e  o f  th e  prim ary im pulse which leav es  
"th inking" e s s e n t ia l ly  unaffected . "Thinking" in  teim s o f the  
te x tu a l essence o f s r u t i  would n ecessa rily  have to  remain 
in a cc e ss ib le  to  the general mental e f f o r t  based on sensory percep tion
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(sb)or inference. However, the "willed", i . e .  su ccessfu lly
connected, event o f  understanding , e sp e c ia lly  in  te re s  o f a  prim ary
im pulse, would be more & happened recep tio n  than an accomplished fe a t ,
and more a  m a tte r o f mental q u a li ty  than o f  a c tiv e  mental a b i l i ty .
B harati a p tly  r e f e r s  to  t h i s  q u a lity  aspec t a s  "psychosomatic
read in ess" , bu t he t r i e s  to  e lu c id a te  the  con ten tual s id e  from
a  c u ltu ra l  p e rsp ec tiv e  to  the  ex ten t o f  even p u ttin g  an "o n to log ica l
fa lla c y "  a t  the  o r ig in  o f In d ian  philosophy, in s te a d  o f  considering  th e
le s s  somatic p r in c ip le  o f  te x ts  and th ink ing , which would have been
more Ind ian . He s t r ik e s  u s  a s  making- a r a th e r  one-sided e f f o r t  when
he in te rp re ts  th e  reavealed  te x t ,  s r u t i . a s  the  product o f  the  rs is "
• •
fa l la c io u s  equation o f  t h e i r  c u ltu ra l  values w ith  t h e i r  in e ffa b le  
experience. He says, the  m ystic makes th e  s c r ip tu re . But i t  does n o t 
occur to  him th a t  th e  Ind ian  manner, c e r ta in ly  th e  an c ien t Indian 
manne r , o f seeing  th e  world could w ell have functioned w ithout 
invo lv ing  any c u ltu re -o rie n te d  ra t io n a l ly  concep tualiz ing  process o f 
in te rp re ta t io n . Bie Ind ian  m ystic needs no t and cannot see 
understand ing  as a  c u ltu ra l  fu n c tio n , but only a s  something to  be 
in tended, since  "th inking" i s  a lready  " th e re" . Hence i t  seems 
unnecessary and paradoxical to  i n s i s t  th a t ,  no tw ithstanding  any 
prim ary impulse such a s  the  m ystical experience, Ind ian  te x ts  a re  
c u ltu ra l ly  derived , a s  B hara ti would have i t .
From our m eta-position  we n o tice  th a t  the  p ra c t ic a l  s id e  o f 
the  problem again  p o in ts  to  the  ro le  o f  c u ltu re  awareness: i f  a l l  have
th e  same c u ltu re  they can ta lk  about th in g s , n o t r e a l iz in g  th a t  they
(2s) Deutsch and van Buitenen (Adv. Ved.. pp. 5-6) comment th a t  re v e la tio n , 
s r u t i .  " i s  a u th o r i ta t iv e  only about m atte rs  to  which n e ith e r  percep tion  
n o r in ference  give u s  access ; bu t then i t  i s  f u l ly  a u th o r ita tiv e " .
" I t  i s  axiom atic th a t  re v e la tio n  i s  in f a l l ib l e ,  and th i s  i n f a l l i b i l i t y  
can be defended only  i f  i t  i s  acuthorless.• . i t  i s  given w ith  th e  w o r ld .. . .  
While we would be in c lin e d  to  look upon the R evelation a s  a  more o r  le s s  
continuous s e r ie s  o f  h i s to r ic  te x ts ,  spanning c lo se  to  a  millennium 
front ca. 1400 B.C. t i l l  500 B .C., orthodoxy looks upon i t  as  e te rn a l 
and th e re fo re  sim ultaneous."
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axe only ta lk in g  about ta lk  and not about the actual th ings. Before 
the advent o f Buddhism, the r s is  could not be avare o f  the fa c t  th at
e •
they vere surrounded by a culture vhich might one day give r is e  to  
contra stable reactions. Meta-philo sophically  speaking, u n til  Buddhist, 
the m ystical experience might have bestoved ontological sta tu s upon 
i t s  content. By imposing an "ontological fa llacy"  on the beginnings 
o f  Indian thought Bharati bars him self from discovering that the r s is
e •
did not conceive o f  th e ir  experience as something personal, but rather
fo lloved  an impersonal primary impulse, from vhich the subsequent
textual trad ition  a lso  derives i t s  orien tation . Urns, he fin d s
"something most depressing" in  the Bhagavad/d-ta simply because he
imagines (a  b it  l ik e  Gebser) that i t  contains an appeal to d isso lve
one's personal id e n tity  in  a  divine one, a condition vhich, supposedly,
vas only a llev ia ted  vhen, due to  Western influence, Arjuna could a lso
(29)be presented v ith  a  revalued in d iv id u a lity . Bharati behaves as i f
(qua Hindu) he vas under an obligation  to fo llo v  the Bhagavadgita; but
the Indian i s  actually  free  to choose other sources. Besides, the
trad ition  affords the option o f an en tire ly  p erso n a list ic  in terpretation ,
as exemplified by the majority o f  our epic heroes vho do not fo llo v
Krsna. Naturally, Bharati prefers to  derive h is  id en tity  from a range 
•  •  •
o f  cu ltu ra lly  d ifferen tia ted  private and public commitments, such as h is  
zero-experience an the one hand and h is  socio-physiogncmical and 
philosophical observations on the other hand* This may suggest that the 
depressing aspect vhich, fo r  example, the BhagavadgLta conveys to  him 
consists in  an imagined threat to h is  cu ltural id en tity . Although ve 
have considered th is  problem a lie n  to Indian thought as such, i t  would
(29) Bharati (Hindu Ren., p. 287): "Die man o f the Indian Renaissance 
can id en tify  with Arjuna and he can neglect those passages which 
represent the canonical, q u ie t is t ic  stream which submerged the 
individual, as i t  vere, before i t  could acquire the value and the 
dign ity  humanism had generated." Hacker traces, a s  a h is to r ic a l  
cu riosity , the impact o f  Schopenhauer s and Deussen's "pseudo-Vedantic 
tat-tvam -asi-eth ics" , reimported by such neo-Vedantists as Vivekananda, 
on modem Indian thought (c f . Scfaoph.. pp. 385, 591, 596).
seem p ossib le  to us a s  a  reflec tio n  o f some p essim istic  
projection  o f  a Eurocentric form of id en tity . I t  appears that 
B harati's en tire  argument, regardless o f  i t s  cheerful and op tim istic  
undertone, contains a h igh ly p erson a listic  reaction against h is  own 
culture including h is  own encuLturation. H is very e x p lic it  aspiration  
to a Hindu id en tity  in  conformity with h is  cu ltu ral cr itic ism  merely 
seems symptomatic. Behind h is  erudite assertion s, complemented by 
a display o f  sa t ir a c l and sensual w it, he cu ltiv a tes  an approach to  
thinking vhich i s  e sse n tia lly  European, but not Indian. (His 
ex ce llen t dem ystification o f  the m ystical does not require any 
reassurance by Ind ia .) Bharati's methodological contribution to  
a comparative understanding o f Indian thought a ffe c ts  us as 
predominantly negative; the characterologically descrip tive value 
o f  h is  m ystical and cu ltura l observations i s  im pressive.
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(B) The Upanisads
The orig in  o f what from & Western point o f view today may appear as  
a pessim istic  a ttitu d e  towards l i f e  ( i . e .  not & metaphysical concept) 
in  the h istory  o f Indian culture can be traced back to  some o f  the 
e a r lie s t  Upanisads. ^  Die two fundamental ideas o f  the Upanisads, 
those to which a l l  comments and responses do e sse n tia lly  refer , are the 
brahman, as the cosa ica l p rin cip le  o f the world, and the atman. as the
psychical, which are id e n tif ie d  with one another and u su a lly  employed
(2)together. In  th e ir  original Indian context they represent 
a  m ystical, non-cultural impulse, as ve wish to i l lu s tr a te  fu rther by 
the follow ing four groups o f  examples (a -  d).
(1) Early traces o f  an Indian n e s s ia is itc  a ttitu d e  
( a . l )  Chandogya Unanisad
In th is  Upanised ve fin d , according to Deussan, one o f the o ld est  
statements o f the brahman's id e n tity  with the atman (3 . 14) .  D iis
^  Deussen (Phil.Up3 . . pp. 22-26) suggests the fo llow ing chronological 
groupings: (a) the ancient Prose Upanisads, (b) the M etrical Upanisads,
e #
(c) the la te r  Prose Upanisads, and (d) the la te r  Ath&rva Upanisads
• e
(a very mixed group including numerous younger tr e a t is e s ) . Diese 
te x ts  do not con stitu te  & sin g le  coherent system, as he poin ts out 
(pp. 51-52), bat the to ta l  philosophical product fro® 1000 or  800 B.C. 
to  c. 500 B.C., reaching i t s  climax in  the Vedantic philosophy o f  
Badazayana and Samkara. Werner (Toga, p . 31) suggests 700 -  300 B.C.
(2 ) Deussen (P h il.U p s.. p . 38) elaborates: "Where a  d ifferen ce revea ls
i t s e l f ,  Brahman appears as the older and l e s s  in t e l l ig ib le  expression, 
atman as the la te r  and more sig n ifica n t; Brahman as the unknown th at
needs to be explained, atman as the known througi which the other
unknown finds i t s  explanation, Brahman as the f i r s t  prin c ip le  so fa r  
as i t  i s  comprehended in  the universe, atman so fa r  as i t  i s  known as  
the inner s e l f  o f  man."
(3 )
Deussen, S .U ps.. p . 109.
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i s  expounded where Upekoaala, the d isc ip le  o f  Satyakaaa, i s  to ld  
by th e ir  s a c r if ic ia l  f ir e s  that these -  or rather the bmhnaa w ithin  
them -  are id en tica l w ith . the man or s p ir it  (rairusa) in  the sun, the
e
noon or ligh tn in g  (4 .10-15). Then Satyakama reveals that the man in  
the eye i s  the ataan vhich i s  the brahman. Deussen, who in terp rets  
th is  "seer o f  seeing" as  the (Kantian) subject o f  knowledge, considers 
i t  contradictory to the f in a l  part o f th is  explanation where Upakosala 
i s  to ld  that the knowing, when they d ie , go to  various p laces, 
in c luding the sun, the noon and ligh tn in g, whence they ore talran to  
the brahman. Obviously, from a  rational point o f  view those who have 
found the brahman w ithin themselves should have no more need to be 
taken to the brahman. However, th is  contradictory d u a lis t ic  aspect 
fades away as soon aa ve see i t  in  the l ig h t  o f Gebser' a polar view, in  
which he pays sp ecia l a tten tion  to the role o f the noon, as ve sfoan 
see below. Satyakama, the teacher, ends h is  description  with the  
statement that fo r  those going th is  "path o f the gods" there i s  no 
return to the earthly whirlpool (4 .1 5 .6 ). A sim ilar  explanation saying  
that sorrow (soka) i s  overcome by the one who knows the atman (7 .1 .3 )  
str ik es Deussen as a sign o f early Upanisadic pessimism (c f .  p. 1 1 2 ) . ^
e
However, ve fin d  that desp ite  a certain  disapproval o f the q u a lity  o f  
l i f e  on earth, the question o f hov horrible a  return would be continues 
to be l e f t  v ide open fo r  a long time.
Even the follow ing, rather d ifferen t, two doctrines o f  
transmigration, recorded sid e  by sid e, allow fo r  some pleasant element 
in  th e ir  cycles. In the "doctrine o f the f iv e  fires"  (Chand. 5 .4 .1  -  
5 .9 .2  = Brh. 6 .2 .9  -  6 .2 .14) man, a fter  having died , i s  sa cr ific ed  by 
the gods in  f iv e  stages (through fa ith , the moon ( somo ra.ia). rain , 
food, sperm) thereby passing through the analogous " sa c r if ic ia l fires"
(the other world, the god o f rain (Parjana), the earth, man, woman) to 
be reborn in  h is  human form. Nothing suggests that the return to earth, 
which characterizes th is  "path o f  the fathers" (oitryana). might be
^  Deussen, P h il.U p s.. p. 254(2); sim ilarly  he sees pessimism in  the 
d u a lis tic  aspect o f  the brahman? "Everything e lse  i s  suffering"
(Brh. 3 .4 .2 , 3 .5 .1 , 3 .7 .2 3 ).
e
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u n d esirab le . Die o th e r  v e rs io n , the  "d octrine  o f the  two ways"
(Chand. 5.10 = Bxb. 6 .2 .1 5 -1 6 ), d esc rib es  s im ila r  s tag es  a f t e r  death . 
However, i t  a lso  mentions th e  "path o f  the  gods” (devayana) f o r  those  
who r e t i r e  to  th e  fo r e s t  and p ra c tic e  f a i th  as  a s c e tic ia a  (Chand.), o r  
f a i th  and t ru th  (B rh .) , and who even tually  go (from the  stage o f 
lig h tn in g , as mentioned above) in to  the brahman whence th e re  i s  no 
re tu rn . In  th i s  case f a i t h  leads to  the brahman, whereas, in  the  
"doctrine  o f  th e  f iv e  f i r e s "  i t  i s  rewarded by a  re tu rn  to  ea r th . In  
th e  "doctrine  o f  the  two ways” th i s  re tu rn  to  earth  -  a f t e r  enjoyment 
w ith  the  gods on the moon -  rep re sen ts  the  a l te rn a t iv e  reserved  f o r  
those who have liv e d  a decent v i l la g e  l i f e .  But both  Upanisads c le a r ly  
p o in t ou t ways to  avoid f u r th e r  ex istence  on ea r th . Near the  end o f  
the  Chandogya Upanisad a p a r tin g  d is c ip le  expresses the  wish th a t  he 
n o t have to  e n te r  in to  something " to o th le ss , grey and slimy" (8 .14). 
Whatever h is  apprehension may have been, ve n o tic e  here  a  d i s t in c t  
ju x tap o s itio n  o f  th e  immortal brahman-atman on th e  one hand and some 
undesirab le  e a r th ly  aspec t on th e  o th e r hand. The f in a l  words, 
rep ea tin g  th e  p rospect o f  no re tu rn  to  th i s  world (8 .15 ), give us a c lue 
about where Schopenhauer received  some e s s e n tia l  im pulses f o r  h i s  own 
views on metempsychosis and l ib e ra t io n  (p. 58).
(a. 2) Brfaadaranyaka Upanisad 
•  •  •
Some o f th e  terminology used in  th e  Bzhadaranyaka and Chandogya
• e
Upanisads has been regarded as  unambiguously m ystical by Agehananda 
B harati re p o rtin g  h ie  own "au th en tica tio n "  o f the  mahavakyas (p . 185).
I n  a  more p h ilo so p h ica l manner Schopenhauer, to o , has recognized th e i r  
m ystica l n a tu re .
Thus ve le a rn  (Bih. I . 4 . 1 ) how the  beginning o f the  world i s  
marked by the  atmgn who, see in g  noth ing  b u t h im self in  the  shape o f  
a  (purusa) . says? "D iis  i s  I"  (ahem ayam) . Analogously ( in
Brh. 1 .4 .1 0 ), the  beginning o f  the  world i s  a lso  marked by the brahman 
who, id e n tify in g  w ith the  u n iv e rse , speaks: "I am brahman" (aham brahma
asnri.). Dien, weary o f h i s  s ta t e  o f  oneness which afforded  no d e lig h t,
"he desired  a  second" (sa dvitiyam  a ic c h a t) ( l .4 .5 )»  o r, he simply 
announces: "May I  be many" (babu svam) (Chand. 4 .2 .3 ) .
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A further lin k  in  the m ystical trad ition  i s  estab lished
when (in  Chand. 6 ,8  -  6.16) Svetaketu i s  taught by h is  fa th er  that he
should consider id en tica l v ith  the essence o f the world, the
atman: "That art thou, Svetaketu" (ta t tvam a s i ) . This id e n tity  i s
explained to h is  metaphorically by le t t in g  him discoTer the ubiquitous
nature o f  s a lt  once i t  i s  d issolved  in  water (Chand. 6 .1 3 ). The secret
o f  m ystical id en tity  i s  a lso  revealed by the sage Tajnvalkya to  h is
w ife Maitreyi: when he i s  about to withdraw from the world, she asks
him fo r  instruction  about immortality. Thereupon he explains th at
earthly goods w il l  never y ie ld  such a thing. Instead, she would have
to  understand that the b a sis  o f  a l l  r e a lity  o f  th is  world i s  the atman
(Bih. 2 .4 .1 -6 , repeated in  4 .5 .1 -6 ) . lajnavalkya, too, uses the s a lt
metaphor to describe to Maitreyi the d isso lu tion  o f any consciousness
based on the usual sense perception (Brh. 2 .4 .12 -14 ).
•
I t  seems that Gebser may have received some impulse from th is  
Upanisad regarding h is  conception o f an ego-d isso lv ing time-ocean. 
Furthermore, he i s  p articu larly  in terested  in  the ro le  o f  the moon in  
connection with the mentioned pitrvana and devayana in  support o f  h is
e
idea o f  a lunar "death pole" o f the "soul" (p. l6 4 (4 l ) ) :  when a fte r
death the d ifferen t parts o f  man (purusa) make th e ir  way to th e ir  
correspondent cosm ic parts, the atman goes in to  space (akasa) while 
the mind (manas) has an encounter with the moon (Brh. 3.2.13)* ^  Or, 
more sp e c if ica lly , whoever wants to pass beyond the moon in  order to 
avoid rebirth must ind icate that he understands h is  e sse n tia l id e n t ity  
with i t  by stating: "I am you (Eausdtaki TTp. 1 .2 ) .  According to
Gebser's interpretation (in  which he draws up connections between the 
Greek^tr)i> (month) and (moon), and the Sanskrit manas) there
e x is t s  a complementary relation  between thinking and soul (whirl: in
^  Mrs. Rhys Davids (Manual, p. 91) makes some in ter e st in g  cr itic ism
regarding Deussen's in sisten ce  on man's (the so u l's )  being rather
than h is  becoming (kvayan tada puruso bhavati; Brh. 3*2.13). I b is
# •
c o n flic t  between her own empirical and Deussen's metaphysical 
perspective appears insubstantial from Gebser's arational poin t o f  
view (compare our p. 66(54), empiricia# as un-Sehopenhanerian).
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th is  context appear somehow as two d ifferen t aspects o f  manas). B is 
thinking mind mirrors, and in  a way measures, the lunar soul-aind; th is  
means that the soul i s  realated with the moon (including i t s  tim ing  
quality) and accordingly appears there a fte r  death.
Man's condition, should he have to reappear on earth, i s
determined by h is  kanna. Therefore, Tajnavalkya, in  teaching King
Janaka, explains, as he does in  M aitreyi's in stru ction , that whoever
sees p lu ra lity  in  th is  world goes from death to death and th at one
should look fo r  unity in  the eternal s e l f ,  the atman (Brh. 4.4*19-20).
Knowing th is  s e l f  the ancient sages lo s t  in ter e st  in  having children
and worldly property and preferred to become mendicants. Only he who
(6) -knows the indescribable atman cannot be overcome by anything; however, 
he him self can overcome h is  own good and bad deeds, as w ell as what he 
has not done (4 . 4 . 22) .  These words advocate the p o s s ib il ity  and 
d e s ira b ility  o f  lib era tion  from th is  a lleged ly  jo y le ss  world while s t i l l  
l iv in g  in  i t  (4 . 4 . 7 , 4 .4 .1 l ) .  Asceticism i s  mentioned again, but now 
i t  stands equalled or even surpassed by the d iseases and su fferings o f  
l i f e  which are considered as paramaa tapes (5 .1 l) .
(a. 3) Kena Upanisad
In th is  short Upanisad the knowledge o f the brahman, which cannot be
e
obtained by ordinary means, "which the knover does not know and the 
non-knower knows", simply appears in  those "in whom i t  awakens", who
then see i t  in  every l iv in g  being and who thus, leav in g  th is  mortal/ \
world, become immortal (2. 11.12  |j2. 5—4]  ^ ) . The phenomenon o f  m ystical
revelation  i s  more elaborately described by our next Upanisad.
^  Sa esa n e ti nety atma. -  "He however, the atman. i s  not so, not so"
(as Deussen suggests fo r  Brh. 4 .4 .22  here and i t s  p a r a lle ls  in  4 .2 .4 ;
4 .5 .15; 3 . 9 . 26. Cf. P h il.U ps.. p. 147), or: "That Soul i s  not th is ,
i t  i s  not that" (Hume, p. 143), or: "This S e lf  i s  (that which has been
described as) not th is , not th is” (Badhakrishnan, p. 279).
(7 ) *Square brackets are used where Radhakrishnan's numbering d if fe r s  
from that o f  Deussen and Hume.
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( b . l )  Kathaka Upanisad 
•  •
In  th i s  Upanisad, belonging to  th e  second group, we fin d  young 
N aciketas as the in te r lo c u to r  in  a  conversation w ith  Yama, the  god 
o f  th e  dead. Having found th a t  "those worlds a re  jo y less"  ( l .3  jjL. 1 .3]) 
to  which "the  unawakened who have no knowledge" may have to  gp, he u rges 
Yama to  t e l l  him whether a f t e r  death  man i s  o r  i s  no t ( l .2 0 ) .  Upon 
m eeting w ith Yama's re lu c tan ce  to  answer, the  young man begins to  
emphasize the  transience o f p leasu re , the  shortness o f l i f e  and th e  
v an ity  o f r ic h e s  to  s t r e s s  h is  d e s ire  fo r  enlightenm ent about th e  
question  o f im m ortality  ( l . 26-29). Moved by h is  eagerness, the  god o f  
the dead teaches him th a t  those  a re  fo o ls  who, entangled in  t h i s  world, 
merely seek p leasu re , s in ce  they a re  l ik e  b lin d  men le d  by b lin d ; hence 
they must remain under h is  ru le  (2 .1 -6 ). N aciketas i s  then to ld  th a t  
in te l le c tu a l  reasoning cannot fu rn ish  the  d esired  knowledge, which has 
to  come through a teach e r, such as Yama (2 .9  [ 1 . 2. 9]  )• Having surpassed 
both joy  and sorrow (harsa-sokau) through se lf-con tem plationm
(adhyatma-yoga) (2 .12 ), N aciketas asks fo r  in s ig h t  "beyond p a s t  and 
fh tu re"  (anyatra bhutac ca bhavac ca v a t t a t  pasvasi ta d  wada) (2. 14) .  
Thereupon he le a rn s  th a t  the  s e l f  i s  ism o rta l, and th a t  e s s e n t ia l ly  
nobody can slay  n o r be s la in  ( 2.1 9 ).
Somewhat l a t e r  we h ear again  -  no t a s  developed y e t  a s  in  the  
l a t e r  d o c trine  o f maya -  th a t  p lu r a l i ty  does n o t e x is t  and th a t  whoever 
b e liev es  in  i t  continues going from death  to  death  (Kath. 4.11 = Bih.
e
4.4.19); tu t when a l l  passions die down (something that can be achieved
through & steady co n tro l o f  the  senses by means o f  yoga: 3*10-13
[ l .3 .1 0 -1 3 ] ; 6.6-13 [2. 3. 6- 13] )  and "when a l l  th e  knots th a t  f e t t e r  th e
h e a r t  a re  cu t asunder" [ 2.3* 15J , then im m ortality , the  brahman, can be
read ied  here  on e a r th  (Kath. 6.14 = Brh. 4 .4 .7 ) . Schopenhauer rep ea ted ly
quotes th i s  metaphor ( " f in d i tu r  nodus c o r d i s . . .* ; Sankara, p . 265) in
support o f h is  views on negation  and re s ig n a tio n  (pp. 59, 7 l ) .  A l i t e r a l
b a s is  f o r  th e  L a tin ized  wording can be found in  Mundaka Upanisad 2 .2 .8 [9] 1
•  •  •
"The knot of the  h e a r t (h rdaya-g ran th i) i s  cu t, a l l  doubts a re  d isp e lle d  
and h is  deeds term inate , when He i s  seen -  the  h ig h e r and th e  low er."
(We fin d  s im ila r descrip tions regard ing  im m ortality  and l ib e ra t io n  in  
Mund. 3 .2 .9  and Chand. 7 .2 6 .2 ; a lso  in  Svet. as mentioned b e lo v .)
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(b. 2 ) Svetasvatara Upanisad
ihe apparent p lu ra lity  o f  th is  world (prakrti) i s  now c lea r ly  
described as an il lu s io n  (maya) created by the brahman actin g  as 
& magician (mayin. mayavin). Man i s  entangled in  th is  world o f
(f%\
i l l usion which i s  penetrated by the brahman (4 .9 -10). However, the
knowledge o f the brahman brings about complete cessation o f  mgya
(visva-m aya-nivrtti) . the cessation  o f b irth  and death
(,jaxaBa-mrtyq-prahanl) ( l . 8- l l ) , and one becomes freed o f a l l  fe t te r s  
•  •
(mucyate sarva-pasaih) (2.15; 4.16; 5.13; 6. 13).
(c) Maitrayana Upanisad
This la te r  Upanisad, represeating our third group, t e l l s  o f  King 
Bzhadratha who has become a fo re st a sce tic . Searching fo r  an 
explanation about the atman. he turns to the sage Sakayana who, however, 
t r ie s  to brush the problem aside as old-fashioned (1 . 2) . F in a lly , the 
king* 8 p ersisten t enumeration o f  the shortcomings and e v i ls  o f the
human body and the world including death and rebirth convinces the sage
(9)that he i s  worthy o f receiv in g  instruction . The Upanisad a lso  
teaches th at lib era tio n  from karma, mava and the other problems o f  the 
world can be obtained through knowledge, a sce tic isn  and m editation, but 
only on the b a sis  o f  the study o f  the Vedas, the observation o f  one's  
cast d u ties  and the consequent adherence to the asramas (4 . 3-4 ).
Here the older sp ir itu a l a ttitu d e  towards lib era tio n  becomes 
eclipsed  by a  rather so c ia l one. I t  seems that by ranking renunciation, 
including asceticism  and yoga, as an o f f ic ia l  p ractice, the so c ia l order 
now wants to  p r o fit  from an established sp ir itu a l id ea l. Liberation  
becomes in s titu tio n a liz ed  -  and with i t  the idea that the empirical 
world must be overcome. Yoga, recommended again, i s  now presented as  
a developed technique (including breathing and various stages o f
(g)
Deussen (s.U ps.. p . 302) suggests that th is  could be the e a r lie s t  
occurrence o f  the concept o f  mava.
^  Deussen (S.Ups.. p. 315) f e e ls  that such e x p lic it  expression o f  
pessimism r e f le c ts  the completion o f  the Samkhya doctrine and, as
e
emphasized by the unpopular atman. the r ise  o f Buddhism (c f . our p. 111).
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thought control) (6.18-50) • Ib is  b e l ie f  in  systematic lib era tio n
runs quite contrary to the spontaneity which we could observe a t an
e a r lier  phase when the inner awakening was considered & grace o f  the
atman (Kena 2.15 and esp ec ia lly  Kath. 2 .23).
•
Our f in a l examples, drawn from two branches o f  the la t e s t  
and somewhat d iv ersified  fourth group, ghnii i l lu s t r a te  the further  
development o f  a sce tic  sp ecia liza tion .
(d .l)  Ksnrika Upanisad
H iis co-called  Toga Upanisad has been appropriately named a fte r  the word
e
kgura. kn ife, suggesting the manner in  which manas. the mind, should now
e
be handled in  order to separate and free  the s p ir it  forever from the
body. Ve find a qua si-anatom ical description o f the mental method
(dharana) to which the mentioned system atization o f  yoga, has led :
observing the proper posture and breath control (2-5) the to  gin severs
him self from h is  own body stepwise from the fe e t  upwards (6-19) with the
aim o f  a tta in ing freedom from samsara (20-25; a lso  Amrtubindu Up* 58,
•  •
Togasikha Up. 7 , 10).
(d. 2) Samryasa and Kanthasruti Upanisads
•  •  •
These two so -ca lled  Sannyasa Upanisads describe how, as an a ltern ative
to the vogin’s  psychological and physical methods, the a sce tic
(sannyasin) chooses so c ia l separation and lo n e lin ess . Shuddering a t
the thought o f reb irth , he shuns a l l  pleasure and k i l l s  a l l  sen su a lity
in  him self, s tr iv in g  for  freedom from suffering (Sann. 2 .7 -9 , 4 .5 ) .
Another description suggests that he may a lso  "go on h is  great journey"
by starving him self to death, drowning or burning h im self, or seeking
another heroic form o f  death (Kanth. 4 )*
• *
At th is  stage i t  makes e sse n tia lly  l i t t l e  d ifference whether 
the renouncer commits su ic id e , performs asceticism , uses yoga 
techniques or expresses h is  p essim istic  a ttitu d e towards l i f e  in  
some trad itional philosophical manner.
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(2) Meta-pessimiga: a ttitu d e  and, concept
Bearing’ in  mind that we had selected  our Upanisads "with a conscious
9
prejudice, namely, with a view to th e ir  p oten tia l to  d isp lay  some kind 
o f pessim istic  a ttitu d e  towards l i f e ,  we can now ind icate  
a meta-philosophical change (a b e l ie f  in  an e sse n tia l change from 
non-knowing to knowing), apart from the h is to r ic a l change (the  
evolvement o f  a trad ition  centred on the former change). Our f i r s t  
group o f Upanisads introduces the m eta-philosophical change as an inner  
Awakening, the seeing o f  the atman. which i s  equated with a  cosmic 
journey to the brahman. In group two, as th is  general cosno lo g ic a l  
view o f a  journey to the atman w ithin, we w itness how a trad ition  o f  
comments begins to evolve. Ve learn that a  teacher may be o f  help, but 
the knowledge as such must reveal i t s e l f ,  thereby producing an -inrnnr 
attitud e o f renunciation and detachment frtm mava. In group three th is  
th is  attitu d e becomes more overt, with the emphasis on such aspects as 
suffering, mava or lib era tion ; yoga and a sc e t ic isa  are s o c ia lly  defined  
and integrated. The la s t  group adds examples o f  in ten sive  psycho­
physical and socio-sensual expressions o f a p essim istic  a ttitu d e .
The Germans tend to  m isinterpret# th is  attitude* To them 
something lik e  the Indian fear o f reb irth  understandably but wrongly 
suggests metaphysical (e x is te n t ia l , e th ica l) pessimism, because they 
are not aware o f the non-metaphysical, behavioural character o f  the 
Indian a ttitu d e o f pessimism. I t  i s  th is  a ttitu d e  which, as our 
examples i l lu s t r a te , i s  increasingly  stressed  by reference to  
lib eration  from p lu ra lity , from karma, and la te r  from mava through 
meditation, asceticism , even suffering, while reference to  the 
Awakening, the knowledge o f  the brahman, i s  centred on some neutral 
experience. From a m eta-philosophical point o f view th is  experience, 
may i t  be sudden or slow, occurs as a primary impulse in  the course 
o f a "willed" connection with an ex is t in g  p oten tia l o f "thinking", o f  
which the Upanisadic tex ts  appear to  be m anifestations. Thus, when 
they reveal that the brahman desired p lu ra lity  (with a l l  i t s  
consequences such as su ffer in g ), they im p lic it ly  refer  back to  the 
knower's e ssen tia l brahman id e n tity , whereas Schopenhauer's w il l ,
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through the l ig h t  o f the in t e l le c t ,  s tr iv e s  fo r  and estab lish es  
a connection between i t s  (cu ltural) nan ifestation  and i t s  necessary  
self-negation . The Upanisads comment on and refer  to a lib era tio n
e
from su p er fic ia l, fa lla c io u s  id en tity ; Schopenhauer seeks annihilation  
of a fundamentally bad identity* While he advocates putting an 
to becoming and being in  and lik e  th is  horrib le world, the Upanisadic
e
sage behaves h o rr ified  by what in  practice contrasts h is  true 
all-embracing being.
I f  we look a t both the Indian a ttitu d e  o f pessimism and the 
German metaphysical concept o f  pessimism as two constituents o f  some 
form o f  meta-pessimism describable in  terms o f  change, we can compare 
them. The German metaphysical concept o f pessimism includes  
a reaction against the development o f  thinking as an expression o f  
culture, i . e . ,  the Germans respond to some manner o f th-iniHyig which 
they want to  change. Schopenhauer responds to Hegel, Kant, Plato and, 
in  a very sim ilar manner, to Indian thought with the in ten tion  o f  
improving on a l l .  Deussen, n otic in g  some h is to r ic a l development in  
Indian thought, nevertheless trea ts  i t  very much lik e  an extension  
o f the equally undiscriminated Greek and European h is to r ie s  o f  
philosophy. (Apparently prompted by h is  Indian knowledge, he even 
tends to  exempt Schopenhauer's "will" from the principal negation o f  
the "world".) Spengler and Gebser appreciate h istory  in  Indian thought 
as part o f th e ir  physiognomical views on culture, both using th e ir  
own cu ltu re -sp ec ific  categories o f  "thought". (But neith er o f  them 
sees in  India the d is t in c t ly  independent trad ition: Spengler lin k s
German metaphysics w ith India through morphological analogy, Gebser 
connects through polar correspondence.) While the philosophical 
categories o f our German thinkers form part o f  th is  reaction against 
th e ir  own culture (in  which they include th e ir  personal views on 
Indian philosophy), the categories o f Indian philosophy do not 
originate from culture; rather, certain  a ttitu d es in  Indian culture  
have th e ir  formal orien tation  points in  i t s  philosophical trad ition .
The Indian p essim istic  a ttitu d e resu lts  from a cu ltu re -sp ec ific  
( i . e .  ty p ica lly  Indian) need to  explain, in  accordance with certain
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fundamental philosophical p r in c ip les , the phenomenon o f m ystical 
transformation or change. Hie German metaphysical concept o f  
pessimiaa ind icates a response to co l tore inasmuch as i t  i s  part o f  
an in ten tion  to improve trad ition a l ways o f  seeing and thinking, i . e . ,  
to e ffe c t  some essen tia l change in  the h istory  o f philosophy.
Hie n eg lecting  o f th is  h is to r ic a l aspect o f thought and the 
unawareness o f those d ifferen t forms o f reaction towards culture are 
what led  the Germans to refer  to Indian thought in  support o f  th e ir  
own e x p lic it  or im p lic it metaphysical pessimism. Describing th is  
crucial incom patibility in  terms o f meta-pessimism, we may say that 
cu ltural d issa tis fa c tio n  i s  reflec ted  by an in tention  to e ith er , as  
in  the case o f  our Germans, change thought and knowledge by 
understanding the world ph ilosophically , or, as in  the case o f India, 
change not thought, not culture, not the world, but one's le v e l o f  
consciousness or understanding -  which i s  not philosophical a t  a l l ,  
though i t  may en ta il philosophical comments.
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(c) Pie Bhagavadgita
There i s  nothing o f f ic ia l ly  secret or exclusive about the Bhagavadgita
(possibly f i f t h  century B.C., with, subsequent adaptations). This
popular epic te x t -  "remembered" (g a r t i) . not "revealed" ( s m t i )  -  i s
#
directed to a l l ,  including "women, Vaieyas, as w ell as Sudras" (9 *32) .  
The Indian textual d is tin ctio n  between sru ti and gnrti appears as  
merely formal from a m eta-philosophical point o f view; we assume that 
the p rincip les o f  the p essim istic  a ttitu d e exposed in  the Upanisads 
also  pertain to the Bhagavadgita. which fo llow s some o f the Upanisadic 
thoughts and descriptions quite c lo se ly .
( l )  Popular pessimism
In contradistinction to our German thinkers we hold that, 
m eta-philosophically speaking, the problem o f  the Indian person ality  
change i s  expressed through a d is t in c t  a ttitu d e  towards l i f e  correlated  
with a b e l ie f  in  p r e -e x is t ing  knowledge; analogously personality  change 
in  the German views i s  promoted ph ilosophically  according to a  category 
of in d iv iduality  in  pursuit o f seme cultural id en tity . Schopenhauer, 
as we may r ec a ll, f e e ls  that the Bhagavadgita advises us -  in  p erfect  
accordance with h is  own view -  to consider the whole and not the part 
( i . e .  the individual) in  order to also  understand death and su fferin g  
as a  product o f "maya", h is  princip le  o f  individuation. Yith th is  
knowledge such p a rtia l optim ists as Arjuna, too, could calmly accept 
the painful nature o f  l i f e  (p. 56). BharatL, the m ystic, considers 
"the non-mystical pep ta lk  o f  the Bhagavadgita" as depressing, because 
he understands i t  as an attempt to  abolish  the individual in  favour o f  
the divine (p. 190). Gebser d ifferen tia tes  very w ell physiognomically, 
esp ecia lly  with regard to h is  observations about clannishness 
(manakara). anger (krodha) and extin ction  (nirvana) , but 
philosophically  he trea ts  everything in  accordance with h is  European 
category o f in d iv id u a lity  (p. 156) .
The fundamental ro le  o f kinship re la tio n s in  the Bhagavadgita 
i s  introduced throu^i King Dhrtarastra's question about th e war between
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h i8 r e la tiv es: "My people (mamakah). what did they d o ? " ^  The kinship
9
theme i s  then developed as part o f Arjuna's "pessim istic" argument. On 
the eve o f the b a ttle  he expresses h is  anguish by describing* to Krsna. the
• e •
probable fa te  o f h is  kinsmen (svabandhava. 1.28; sva.iana. 1 .5 7 ). He 
foresees how th e ir  being sla in  would resu lt in  a lin e  o f  detrimental 
consequences, e sp ec ia lly  fo r  the fam ilies  (kula) . the fam ily women (kula 
striyah). the socia l c la ss  order (varna) and the ancestors (pitarah).
• • e
including the danger o f having to l iv e  in  h e l l  fo r  an unknown time
(narake’nlyatam) (1.57-44). In view o f  th is  near d isa ster  h is  mind i s
overwhelmed by sorrow (sokasamvignamanasah) ( l .4 7 ) .  In p rin cip le ,
•  •
Gebser's idea that the individual has to face  some tine-ocean (here 
negative as naraka) seems to  receive some physiognomic support from th is  
kind o f  description. Once h is  wrong category o f in d iv id u a lity  i s  being  
applied, h is  metaphysical error may thrive on such aspects as the 
following. Krsna explains to Arjuna that never was there a  time when he
9  e •
was not nor a time when we a l l  sh a ll cease to be (2. 12) ,  that there i s  no 
slaying or being s la in , no being bora or dying a t  any time, and that man, 
through h is  s e l f ,  i s  eternal (2.19-25) (compare p . 202, Kath. 2 .1 9 ).
Through yoga, we hear, the wise reach the sorrowless sta te
(padam anamayam. 2.5l)> Equally, he who, in  the midst o f sorrow 
•  •
(duhkbesu). i s  free (quiet) from attachment (passion), fear and anger 
• •
(vitaragabhayakrodhah) i s  ca lled  a sage (muni) (2 .56 ). From attachment
(gangs) comes desire (kama) and from desire comes anger (krodha) . From
anger eventually comes the destruction o f in te llig en ce  (huddhi nasa) and
from th is  he perishes. But with the senses under control and free  from
attachment he achieves the destruction o f a l l  sorrows (duhkfaa) (2 . 62- 65) .
Having abandoned a l l  d esires (kama) and when neith er mine-ness nor
selfish n ess  (nimamo nirahamkarah) i s  l e f t ,  oneness with the brahman
•  •
can be attained (brahmanirvana) (2 .71-72). The true yogin seeks 
so litu d e, and, liberated from desire  and sorrows (6 .10 ,17 ,18), he 
beholds the S e lf  through the s e l f  (atmanatmanan) (6 .20). Krsna describes
9 9 9
th is  aim as the knowledge o f h is  own d ivine nature, which a lso  ends 
^  Radhakrishnan (Bhg.. p. 81) adds that mamakah r e f le c ts  an a ttitu d e
9
o f mamakara or se lfish n ess , a variant o f ahamkara or egoism.
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r e b ir th .  D elivered from passion , fe a r  and anger (vitaragabhayakrodhah).
•
many have a t ta in e d  h is  s ta te  o f  being  (4 .9 -10); they  do no t go back to
re b ir th  (punarjanman) , the p lace  o f sorrow (dnhkhalaya) (8.15)« Kraaa
•  •  •  •
re fe rs  to  h im self as bo th  im m ortality  and death , both  being  and 
non-being (9 .1 9 ); a lso  a s  w orld-destroying  time ( l l .3 2 ) .
Gebser, obviously, could n o t ignore t h i s  Indian in c l in a t io n  
towards renu n c ia tio n  based on some s p i r i tu a l  o r  physica l detachment and 
some cavelike  withdrawal (5 .28; 6 .10 ), and w ith  the  aim o f  l ib e ra t io n  in  
terms o f  a  supreme n irvana  (6 .15 ), o r  o f  union with God (brahmabhuta) 
(6 .27). He t r e a t s  th i s  Indian endeavour to  m aster the  detachment from 
such passions a s  anger as a p o la r  complement o f h is  o th e r d iscovery  o f  
a Greek-European "d irec ted  anger" , p . 157(27)); he a lso  sees
th is  complementary re la tio n sh ip  between the  ve-o rien ted  clann ishness 
(as  i l l u s t r a t e d  above) and the  ego-oriented Western ind iv idualism . I t  
i s  such phenomena as  th i s  clann ishness o r  (non-directed) anger (krodha) 
which, in  h i s  opinion, demonstrate th a t  Indian  thought cen tres  on 
c e r ta in  p re - in d iv id u a lis t ic  p r in c ip le s  o f c o sr ic  re tu rn  o r  e x tin c tio n .
Our meta-view accomodates G ebser's d e sc rip tio n s  f o r  t h e i r  
physio&iamical value, which i t  allow s to  expose th e  f a c t  th a t  
p h ilo so p h ic a lly  he t r e a ts  t h e i r  German, not th e i r  Indian, essence. Ihe 
Upanisadic element in  the Bhagavadgita p o in ts  to  the m ystical ax is  along 
which th e  te x tu a l m an ifesta tions o f  p h ilo soph ical thought a re  developed. 
A rju n a 's  p e ss im is tic  reac tio n  to  th e  p rospects o f  d e s tru c tio n  and 
su ffe rin g , complemented by K rsna 's  suggestions fo r  how to  accep t i t  a l l
• • e
by adap ting  o n e 's  a t t i tu d e  to  a  more detached outlook ( i . e . ,  do a c t ,
b u t abandon a l l  attachm ent to  success o r  f a i lu r e ;  2.47-48; again  in
ch. 4 ), expresses pessimism on a  social-physionom ical le v e l . K rsna 's
•  •  •
adap tive  suggestions modify th i s  pes simian on th e  same le v e l  by moving, 
in  p r in c ip le , from sorrow to  renunciation .
H is renunciation  by way o f a c tio n  (karma yoga) im plies th a t  
n o t so much what we do, but how we a c t ,  m a tte rs : we should co n tro l our
senses and remain detached from the sh o rt- liv ed  r e s u l ts  o f ou r a c tio n . 
Otherwise we might become m isled in to  fu r th e r  u ndesirab le  re a c tio n s  to  
th ese  r e s u l t s  (3 .4 -7 ). R eferring  to  Samkhya thought, he e lab o ra te s  
th a t  egoian (ahamkara) prevents a man from understanding  th a t  i t  i s
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not he who i s  the actual doer (kartr). hut that actions (kama) are
e
e sse n tia lly  peifoimed by the nodes (guna) o f nature (prakrti) .  Knowing
• e
th a t  i t  a l l  happens between those q u a l i t ie s  (guna gunesu). one s tay s
• • e
unattached (na sa.i.iate) (3 .27-26). The enemy (vairina) in  the fo m  o f
#
d e s ire  (kama) and anger (krodha) p reven ts man from ra is in g  M s  
conscioum ess from the senses (in d riy a ) to  the  mind (manas) RTt<* the  
i n t e l l e c t  (buddhi). and, fu r th e r , to  seeing th a t  he, e s s e n tia l ly  i s  
above a l l  (3*57-43) • Hie id e a l  of Samkhya i s  described  as in d if fe re n c e
e
to  sense o b je c ts , absence o f egoisn, and the  percep tion  o f  e v il  in  b i r th ,  
death , o ld  age, s ickness and pain (l3*8). L ib era tio n  i s  a tta in e d  
through the  knowledge o f  th e  Supreme Brahman (param brahman) which i s
e
beginning!ess and n e i th e r  e x is te n t no r n o n -ex is ten t (l3*12; compare 
9 .19 i be ing  i s  non-being). Equally, i t  i s  a tta in e d  by knowing th a t  
both p ra k r t i  and purusa a re  beg inn ing less, th a t  p ra k r t i  produces body
• e •
and senses, and th a t  purusa experiences p leasu re  and pain . Hie Supreme
Purusa i s  a lso  c a lle d  the  Supreme S e lf (param atma) (13.19-23).
• •
Arjuna, ask ing  which o f th e  two recommended paths would be th e
b e t te r  one, i s  to ld  by Krsna th a t both  lead  to  the  same goal, bu t th a t
# • •
u n se lf ish  a c tio n s  (kam a yoga) a re  b e t te r  than th e i r  renuncia tion
(saanyasa) in  accordance w ith Samkhya (5*1-5) • Working w ith  body, mind 
• •
and senses, the yogin remains unattached  (5 .11-12). Hie happy man i s
the  one who i s  capable o f r e s i s t in g  the  impulse o rig in a tin g  from d e s ire
and anger (kama krodhodbhavam vegam) (5 .23).
• •
F in a lly , the emphasis i s  put again on non-attachm ent to  the  
f r u i t s  o f ac tio n s  ( l 8 .1 0 -1 1 ) .  'Ulus, even the a c t  o f  s lay in g  i s  
e s s e n tia l ly  no s lay in g  ( l8 .1 7 ; a lso  9*30: moral conduct i s  i r r e le v a n t ;  
a lso  see B h ara ti, p . 1 8 8 (l8 )) .  C lear understanding produces happiness 
(gukfaa) which i s  l ik e  poison a t  f i r s t  and l ik e  n e c ta r  in  the end (18.37). 
Having overcome egoisn (ahnmkara) .  d e s ire  (kama) and anger (krodha). 
and w ithout m ine-ness (nirmama). one i s  ready to  become brahman (l8 .5 3 ) .
(2) Meta-pessimism: a problem o f  b e l ie f
M eta-philosophically  speaking, th e  "on to log ical"  background o f  th e  
Bhagavadgita. as i t  i s  e s s e n tia l ly  provided by the Upanisads, Vedanta 
and Samkhya, shows no sign  o f p ess im is t. M eta-onto logically , Krsna i s
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beyond the pa le  o f both  pessim i®  and optimism. However, by h is  
o b jec tiv e  d iscu rs iv e  manner o f teach in g  Arjuna how to  d ie , he 
p r in c ip a lly  in d ic a te s  a  p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e ,  d ram atica lly  re f le c te d  
by A rjuna 's behaviour.
Ftom Schopenhauer onwards th i s  a t t i tu d e  o f pessimism, has been
in te rp re te d  w ith wrong o n to lo g ica l im p lica tio n s . Furthermore, A rjuna 's
apparent pessimism i s  by no means th e  r e s u l t  o f  some m etaphysical search
f o r  id e n t i ty  based on a  c u ltu ra l  p e rsp ec tiv e . I t  ra th e r  r e f e r s  to  th e
(2)problem o f th e  "w illing*  o f  understanding. Schopenhauer, equating  
ind iv id u a l ex istence , through "maya", w ith su ffe rin g  and death , pursues 
a  fo n t o f o n to log ica l negation  which can s t i l l  be f e l t  in  G ebser's, o r  
even B h a ra ti 's , id eas  o f a  d is so lu tio n  o f  the ind iv idua l in  a  tim e-ocean 
o r  in  a d iv ine S e lf. Gebser and B harati presume seme European category 
o f in d iv id u a lity  fo r  t h e i r  c r i t i c i s n s  o f  Ind ian  thought. In  
Schopenhauer's case we can say th a t  h is  e n t i r e  conception o f  V orste llung  
(includ ing  "mays” , "karma", re in ca rn a tio n  e tc . )  i s  n o t tre a te d  in  an 
Indian  manner according to  which i t  should be considered on re la t iv e  
" le v e ls" . Schopenhauer never d iscrim ina ted  im agination as  such from 
th a t  o f  th e  people in  gen era l, i . e .  o b je c tiv e ly  and su b jec tiv e ly . But 
in  In d ia , where any a c tu a l d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  between sub jec tive  and 
o b jec tiv e  asp ec ts  would p h ilo so p h ica lly  be i r r e le v a n t ,  we have something 
l ik e  d if fe re n t " lev e ls"  o f  maya ( i l lu s io n  o r  im agination inc luded), 
r ig h t  up to  "seeing" o r  "knowing" (a s  marked by the  le v e l o f  th e  
revealed  " te x t" ) . K rsna 's  Samkhya argument i l l u s t r a t e s  th a t  the
s e e  #
p ess im is tic  a t t i tu d e  i s  d id a c t ic a l ly  connected w ith th e  f a c t  th a t  
c e r ta in  le v e ls  o f  consciousness o r  p e rcep tio n , such as A rju n a 's , may be 
r e la t iv e ly  low. I t  i s  h is  seeing  ra th e r  than what he sees th a t  i s  bad*
In  the  Bhagavadgita. so c ia l  va lues are  derived  from non-soc ial ones.
Arjuna rev o ltin g  a g a in s t d es tru c tio n  i s  a  p e ss im is t on what may appear 
a s  so c ia l (c u ltu ra l)  grounds because, in  view o f  the  e f f ic ie n t  le v e l o f 
maya. he does n o t y e t  understand and b e liev e  the  tru e  n a tu re  o f  the  atman,
_
Radhakxishnan (Bhg., p . 257, 9 . l )  reminds u s  o f the  tech n ica l 
d iffe ren ce  between the  understand ing  o f  th e  se e r  (.jnana) and th a t  o f  
th e  philosopher (vi.jnana) .
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Chapter Seven
Buddhism: ex istence  means su ffe rin g
More than any o th e r  re p re sen ta tiv e  form o f thought which has o rig in a te d  
in  In d ia , i t  i s  Buddhism which in  the Vest has been a sso c ia ted  w ith 
pessimism. Within the  group o f our Gezman th in k e rs  the  in te rp re ta t io n s  
o f  tiie a lleg ed  pessimign ranged from Schopenhauer* s world negation, 
von Hartmann* s e x is te n t ia l  in d iffe ren tism , Mainlander* s e x is te n t ia l  
consummation, Deussen* s moral exhaustion and Spengler* s  d ia le c t ic a l  
cu ltu re  a n n ih ila tio n  to Gebser* s cosmic re so rp tio n . Since pessimism, 
a s  we decided, i s  a very  c u ltu ra l  phenomenon, we in ten d  to  concentrate  
on what the  h i s to r ic a l  ro le  o f  th e  Buddha (presumably 363 -  463 B.C.) 
may reveal in  th i s  regard . A vailing ourse lves o f  Andre Bareau* s 
c r i t i c a l  p re sen ta tio n  o f  the Buddha's "biography", we sh a ll t r y  to  
tra c e  a  m eta-pessim istic  development in  Buddhism during th a t  phase in  
which the various b iog raph ical accounts were o r ig in a lly  c o lle c ted .
This biography o f the Buddha rep resen ts  f o r  us a  formal core o f 
Buddhism, w ithout any o f  i t s  l a t e r  d e ta ile d  developments, which i s  
adequate fo r  both a  p re sen ta tio n  o f  the p r in c ip a l Buddhist p a r a l le l s  
requ ired  f o r  our comparision, and f o r  the  lo c a tio n  o f  the re fe ren ce  
p o in ts  f o r  Buddhist concepts borrowed and adapted by o u r Germans. We 
sh a ll t r y  to a sse ss  th e i r  co m p atib ility  by fo llow ing some o f the  l in e s  
o f  in te ra c t io n  w ith in  the m eta-sphere of pessimism.
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( l )  A meta-view o f the  c u ltu ra l background
Facing- th e  Buddhist tra d it io n  as  a whole, i t  i s  necessary  th a t ve r a is e  
the question o f i t s  p o ssib le  c u ltu ra l  background. We say  "possib le*  
because i t  s t r ik e s  u s  as noteworthy th a t  in  Buddhist ve fin d  n e ith e r  
a  d o c tr in a l no r a  c u ltu ra l  connection w ith some e x p l ic i t  form o f 
Indianness o r  some o th e r  ethn ic  background (compare p. 16(20)). 
P ra c tic a l ly , o f course, i t  must have drawn on some form o f  a c u ltu re  
m atrix , although such a th in g  was never re f le c te d  by i t ,  as ve ^ 1 1  
see more c le a r ly  belov. While, f o r  in s tan ce , H e lle n is t in  term s o f 
cu ltu re  a lready  had a d is t in c t  meaning fo r  the  an c ien t Greeks them selves, 
I ndia n cu ltu re  can only be considered as  o b je c tiv e ly  p o ssib le , i . e . ,  
as  something ve may d iscu ss  from o u ts id e . D o c trin a lly  a s  w ell a s  
m etaphysically th e  in n e r, su b jec tiv e  c u l tu ra l  aspec t was to ta l ly  
ignored, even though from an o u ts id e r 's  po in t o f  view i t  could have been 
a c tiv a te d  and app lied . We must take  th i s  in to  account in  o rd er to  
secure th is  e s s e n tia l  c u ltu ra l  a sp ec t f o r  the  h is to r ic a l  exp lo ra tion  o f  
the p o te n tia l ph ilo so p h ica l in te ra c t io n  between our d if f e r e n t  t r a d i t io n s .  
Even i f  we look a t  Buddhism as a  re lig io n  (as  d i s t in c t  from philosophy), 
we cannot d escribe  i t  as  e s s e n tia l ly  o r  ty p ic a l ly  Indian  inasmuch as  
i t s  Indian connections o r  elements never determined i t s  c h a rac te r. In  
no regard were they re lev an t to  Buddhism. (We know o f no p lace  in  th e  
P a li  canon where a  Buddhist ever re fe rre d  to  h im self a s  an Ind ian  o r  
a  Sakya o r a  Magadhan.) Since Buddhism d id  no t l in k  up su b jec tiv e ly  
w ith i t s  c u ltu ra l  background, ve may r e f e r  to  i t  a s  a -c u ltu ra l ,  
in fe r r in g  th a t  c u ltu re  in  Buddhist re lig io n  can only be d iscussed  in  
i t s  ob jec tive  aspec t.
When tra c in g  th i s  p r in c ip a l a - c u l tu r a l i ty  in to  the  re l ig io u s  
realm o f  Buddhism, we must be aware o f a  rh e to r ic a l  fa c to r  which im p lies  
a  tran sg re ss io n , o r  a t  l e a s t  transcendence, o f c u ltu ra l  boundaries, 
reg a rd le ss  o f the f a c t  th a t  as a r e l ig io n  i t  was created  on some 
c u ltu ra l  b a s is . This rh e to r ic a l  f a c to r  s tre s s e s  some in te rc u l tu ra l  
aspec t e x is tin g  in  a l l  g rea t re lig io n s  such as  Buddhism (and even 
more so C h ris tia n ity )  in  whatever conventional form they may lo c a l ly  
appear. From one ang le, which i s  completely d o c tr in a l, no t c u ltu ra l ,
215
we n o tice  a  claim  f o r  un iversality". The o th e r angLe, p rov id ing  
a c u ltu ra l  view, suggests th a t  ve look a t  Buddhisn (o r C h ris tia n ity )  
a s  a  n o n -c u ltu re -sp e c if ic  re lig io n . Both p e rsp ec tiv es  lead  up to  th e  
same th in g , hut from d if f e r e n t  ang les. (What was la id  down d o c tr in a lly  
might a lso  he a sse rte d  c u l tu ra l ly  by f o r  in s tan ce  a  very cu ltu red  
person .) The second, the c u ltu ra l ,  angle con tain s two aspec ts  which 
help  to  expose the  c u ltu ra l  rh e to r ic :  no m a tte r whether ve express the
in te rc u l tu ra l  aspect by being  " c u l tu ra lly  above" th e  need to  couch o u r 
view in  some conventional, perhaps n a tio n a l, manner, o r  whether ve say 
i t  w ith seme conventional c u ltu ra l  attachm ent to  the  id ea , ve n o tic e  
th a t again ve a re  saying e s s e n tia l ly  the  same th ing , b u t u s in g  two 
rh e to r ic a lly  d if f e r e n t  ro u te s  o f claim ing some in te rc u l tu ra l ,  
n o n -cu ltu re -sp ec if ic  na tu re  o f Buddhism.
While our m eta-position  allow s u s  to  consider Buddhian a s  
a -c u ltu ra l  (no t cu ltu re -co n sc io u s), i t  makes i t  p la in  th a t  our own 
c u ltu ra l  view, in c lu d in g  i t s  predeterm inedness by a c e r ta in  c u ltu ra l  
perspec tive  and due to  some s p e c if ic  culture-m indeness, d is q u a l i f ie s  u s  
fo r  follow ing the  Buddhist path  in  p ra c tic e , whatever rh e to r ic  ve 
u se . ( in  o th e r  words, Buddhism in  i t s  non-Indian capacity  may v e i l  
be open to  members from ou tside  In d ia , and y e t  those w ith Western 
outlooks a re  n a tu ra lly  excluded due to  th is  cu ltu re  fa c to r  in  t h e i r  
own o rig in a l background. ^  While, fo r  example, th e  C h ris tian  form o f  
th e  claim o f u n iv e rs a li ty  i s  cu ltu re -d e riv ed , Buddhi® th i s  claim  
i s  a - c u l tu ra l .)
O bjectively  th e  Buddha reacted  a g a in s t c u ltu re  in  genera l,
(2 )
perhaps even a g a in s t Brahmanical o r  J a in i s t  c u ltu re . T rying to  see 
Buddhisn a g a in s t a  Brahmanical background o r  a s  an o ffshoot of
^  In  the  case o f B h a ra ti 's  claimed Hindu id e n t i ty  the problem was 
somewhat reversed . Hinduiem, which o rig in a ted  h a l f  a  millennium l a t e r  
than Buddhism, had to  be considered im penetrable due i t s  own 
in e x tr ic a b le  and non-im i ta b le  connections w ith i t s  (o b jec tiv e ) c u ltu ra l  
fundamentals.
( 2 ) Mrs. Rhys Davids (Manual, p . 87) sees the Buddha as c la r i fy in g  
and expanding " th e  p rog ressive  movement among th e  brahmans".
216
Brahmani an might p o ssib ly  lead  to  i n s i s t s  about i t s  c u ltu ra l  o r ig in .
But, d isregard ing  any e v o lu tio n is t approach towards the  h is to ry  o f
Buddhian w ith in  our lim ited  con tex t, ve p re fe r  to  behave a s  i f  th e re
were no o r ig in a l connection w ith Brahmani a t  o r  a t  le a s t  no th ing  which
could tu rn  th is  p o s s ib i l i ty  in to  a  c ru c ia l f a c to r  concerning ou r problem.
Algo we do not know of any d e f in i te  re fe rence  to  Brahmanical te x ts  in
Buddhisn. The f i r s t  b iograph ical episode re fe rre d  to  below su s ta in s
th i s  view o f d o c tr in a l autonomy. There i s  no p roof, though. Canonical
Buddhiai may w ell have had i t s  independent o r ig in , y e t  draw elements
from general Indian  thought, as  w ell as from more s p e c if ic a lly
(3)p re-canonical, o r  p ro to-canonical sources, in to  the  development o f  
i t s  own t r a d i t io n  w ith in  the Indian t r a d i t io n .  Regarding the  
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f i t s  r e la t iv e  p h ilo soph ical independence, ve should no t
(4)fo rg e t th a t philosophy in  In d ia  i s  in  p r in c ip le  q u ite  i s o la t io n is t i c .  
While, fo r  in stance , in  an c ien t Greece d if f e r e n t  philosophers would in  
general have known about one ano ther and re fe rre d  to  each o th e r 's  
thought, in  In d ia  something l ik e  a  "one-man school", o r  equally  
a  "one-school man”, would have been q u ite  th inkab le .
Not implying any complete c u ltu ra l  is o la t io n , we must s t i l l  
be aware o f a re la t iv e  is o la t io n  in  the  t r a d i t io n  o f the  Buddhist o r  
Brahmanical concepts o f  n irvana; although they  a re  both Ind ian  in
e
^  Ruegg ( study, p . I l ( l 5 ) )  suggests to  rep lace  the  terms o re-canon ical 
by proto-canonical fo r  Buddhism reconstructed  a f t e r  the  o ld  Agamic 
canons, considering i t s  im p lica tion  o f  an id e n t i ty  w ith the o r ig in a l 
d o c trine  a  moot p o in t.
^  Buegg (Study, p . 40) remarks: "At the  same time i t  does n o t seem
overha s ty  to  say in  general th a t  Buddhisn and th e  o th e r re lig io n s  and 
philosophies o f In d ia  inc lud ing  of course Jain ism  cannot be regarded as  
a lto g e th e r separate bodies l iv in g  in  h e rm etica lly  sealed  compartments: 
they spring  from e ith e r  re la te d  o r  Id e n tic a l  backgrounds, touch upon 
problems th a t were o f common concern, and very freq u en tly  employ s im ila r  
ph ilosophical methods and p ra c t ic a l  techniques."  According to  von 
Glasenapp (Ved.u.Buddh.. p. 1014(=4) "Vedanta and Buddhisn ex is ted  so 
long side by side th a t ,  understandably, they have influenced  each o th er" .
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o rig in , ve cannot equate them on th a t  b a s is . In  Buddhisn. n irv an a  
i s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  a  s ta te  o f consciousness (see p. 254(73)), w hile, a s  
ve have seen, in  Brahmaniso-Hinduism i t  i s ,  expressed in  terms o f  mukti. 
th e  consummation o f an u ltim a te  id e n t i ty  o f  the  atman w ith  the brahman 
(pp. 209-210). In  ad d itio n , Buddhism proceeding sometimes in  a  very  
conceptual maimer, can a lso  be very conceptual and form al. Thus, th e  
Buddha would have sa id  th a t the  brahman ex is ted , perhaps, but th a t  he 
could no t find  i t  (compare atman. p. 240). ^  While f o r  the  Buddhists 
such a  statem ent must have meant a  l o t ,  i t  would n o t have meant much 
to  th e  Brahmans. From our p o in t of view i t  in d ic a te s  a  c u l tu ra l  re a c tio n  
o r  something which could have been turned in to  one.
In  no d ire c tio n  do we f in d  a  genuine c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n  in  
In d ia . We ra th e r  n o tice  a prominent constant aim to  n e u tra liz e  c u ltu re  
by means o f a  c e r ta in  detachment from i t  in  connection with the  co n tro l 
o f responses to  i t .  I f  from a  t ra d it io n a l  Western p o in t o f view the 
Ind ian  behaviour may appear as  i f  they had fo rg o tten  c u ltu re , in  our 
meta-view i t  simply means th a t  cu ltu re  i s  n o t a  concept o f th e i r s .
Asking ourselves what i f  n o t c u ltu re  may have prompted the  Buddha to  
s t a r t  Buddhism, i t  may be s u f f ic ie n t  to  assume, w ith in  th e  con tex t o f  
t h i s  study, th a t  the  Buddha s ta r te d  to  teach  because i t  la y  in  the  
na tu re  o f th e  th in g s  he had seen and discovered th a t  they should be 
taugh t, and th a t  on th is  b a s is  h is  impulse was perpetuated . By no 
means could ve ever p o in t to  any c le a r  c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n  in  Buddhian.
The f a c t  th a t  the  Buddha taught was included d i r e c t ly  in  the  dogmatic 
framework o f Buddhian, as becomes apparent from the  "biography". The 
Buddha i s  e s s e n tia l ly  conceived o f as the  Teacher, a s  compared fo r  
example w ith Yajnavalkya who, amongst o th e r th in g s , a lso  ta u ^ i t .
Comparing the  Upanisadic r s i s  w ith the  Buddha, ve could say th a t  h is  
fu n c tio n  i s  e s s e n tia l ly  th a t  o f the Teacher and n o t th a t  o f a  teach er,
^  Frauw allner (Fhil.B uddh., pp. 9, 18) reminds us o f  th e  Buddha's 
apparent re luctance  to  expound ph ilosophical problems o f  no d i r e c t  
importance to  h is  way o f sa lv a tio n , notab ly  w ith  regard  to  questions 
about "soul" and " a f te r l i f e " .  Von Glasenapp (B uddh.u .G pttes.. p . 37) 
emphasizes th a t th e re  i s  no evidence f o r  any "theism" in  the  Buddha's 
outlook.
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im plying th a t  h is  d o c trin e  should be in te rp re te d  a s  rep resen tin g  
th e  Teaching,
This a -c u l tu ra l ,  c u ltu re - f re e , abso lu teness in  Buddhism 
q u a lif ie s  i t  as not ty p ic a lly  Ind ian . However, pessimi gn, u n lik e  such 
concepts a s , fo r  in s tan ce , s o lip s ia a  o r  r e a l i ty  o r  su ffe rin g , cannot 
be tre a te d  ou ts id e  o f  a given c u ltu ra l  con tex t, although i t  may be 
p resen ted , as von Hartmann shows, as  i f  i t  was pure ly  the  outcome o f  
m etaphysical ra tio c in a tio n s , d isregard ing  the  negative c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n  
a t  th e  b a s is . When we say c u ltu re , we are n e ce ssa rily  re fe r r in g  to  
c u ltu ra l  re f le c tio n s  o r  c u ltu ra l  a t t i tu d e s ,  no t ju s t  to  s t a t i c  c u ltu ra l  
o b je c ts . These re f le c t io n s  o r  a t t i tu d e s  a re  negative by n a tu re , 
inasmuch as they con tain  a re a c tio n  on the  c u ltu re  le v e l ag a in st some 
phenomenon with f ix ed  negative a t t r ib u te s  ( fo r  example, the  b a rb a ric  
realm ou tside  c u ltu re  as in  an c ien t Greece, the  in n e r in d iv id u a l 
c u ltu ra l  opponent as  in  Schopenhauer* s case, o r  some immanent c u ltu ra l  
n e g a tiv ity  as  in  Spengler*s c iv i l iz a t io n ) .  While fo r  the 
Schopechauerians pessimism was the  idea, determ ined by th e i r  c u ltu ra l  
a t t i tu d e ,  Buddhism, as  we wish to  show, t r e a ts  the  negative c r i t e r i a  
re lev an t to  i t s  d o c trin e  in  a manner which i s  psychologically  p o s itiv e  
and c u ltu ra l ly  n e u tra l .  The d o c trin e -cen tred , c u ltu re -fre e  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f su ffe r in g  (duhkha) may even e n ta i l  happiness 
(sukfaa dhaima) fo r  the successfu l monk. From our m eta-level we see 
th a t  i t  i s  our own a t t i tu d e  which makes the d iffe ren ce  in  the  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  Buddha's thought.
In  canonical l i t e r a tu r e  references to  the  Buddha as a person 
a re  common. However, the numerous in co n g ru itie s  encountered by the  
studen t o f th e  o r ig in a l Buddhist source documents make i t  im possible 
to  simply draw up a s tra ig h tfo rw ard , c le a r  biography o f the Buddha, a s  
Bareau s ta te s  in  h is  in tro d u c tio n . While some scho lars  have t r i e d  
to  follow  th e i r  personal choice o f what appeared as the  most 
l ik e ly  p ieces o f evidence to  them, o th e rs , he adds, have ended up 
d isp u tin g  th e  Buddha* s h i s to r ic a l  r e a l i ty  a lto g e th e r . N evertheless, 
he f e e ls  th a t  a re s tr ic e d  study o f the  source should make i t  
p o ssib le  to e s ta b lish  some form o f v a lid  biography o f the
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(6) —Buddha. N otw ithstanding h is  se le c tio n  o f P a l i ,  S an sk rit and
Chinese te x ts  (which p a r t ly  correspond c lo se ly  w ith one ano ther o r
provide d if f e r e n t  v ersions o f th e  same s to ry ) , Bareau does n o t assume
th a t  any o f th e  schools which produced th ese  te x ts  gave r i s e  to  the
Buddha* s biography a s  such. "Par from th in k in g  so, we ra th e r  b e liev e
th a t  i t  developed g radually  in  a  mixed and predom inantly la y
environment which fea tu red  no sec t in  p a r t ic u la r ,  and spread no tab ly
thanks to  th e  p ilgrim ages w ell before  i t s  f i r s t  elem ents were
incorpora ted  in  the  various canonical c o lle c tio n s  in  d if f e r e n t  
(7)epochs." Regarding the h is to r ic a l  q u a l i t ie s  o f  th e  t r a d i t io n a l
biography as i t  i s  contained in  th e  S u trap itaka  and the  Vinayapitaka,
•  •
considered the most an c ien t Buddhist te x ts ,  Bareau f in a l ly  comes to
th e  conclusion th a t  " th e  examination o f our sources o f  documentation
shows th a t  the  fragm ents o f the  biography which they  contain  a re
themselves composed of episodes, a t  f i r s t  is o la te d , which a re  being
borrowed and invented according to  n e ce ss ity  w ithout worrying too much
about t h e i r  chronological re la t io n s  no r th e  gaps which separate  
(8)them". He says th a t a small number o f very  o ld  d o c trin a l elem ents
and some an c ien t t r a d i t io n s  which may have been based on exact
(9)memories provided a p ra c t ic a l  b iograph ical core. To th is  were 
added d iv e rs if ie d  accounts e i th e r  derived  from i t  o r  shaped w ith 
a  view to  p reaching  o r  borrowed from o ld e r f o lk lo r i s t i c  s to r ie s  w ith 
the  aim o f  e x a lt in g  the  p e rso n a lity  o f  th e  Buddha. Furtheimoxe, he
Andre Bareau* s  lu c id  Recherches su r l a  b iogranhie  du Buddha dans
le s  S u trap itak a  e t  le s  Vinayapitaka anciens a re  based on a s e le c tio n
•  •
o f  some o f the  o ld e s t and most s ig n if ic a n t  b io g rap h ica l episodes, 
comparing eq u ivalen t te x ts  from d if f e re n t  schools and a ssess in g  them 
according to  th e i r  r e la t iv e  chronology. Hie unbiased accuracy w ith 
which th i s  p a r t  o f  the  Buddhist t r a d i t io n  i s  p resen ted  by him makes i t  
immediately a cc e ss ib le  fo r  our own comparative purposes.
(7) Bareau, B io g r .I . p . 9.
(o\
Bareau, B io g r .I . p. 575.
(9) Bareau, B iogr .I . p. 599.
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considers th i s  biography a s  alm ost e n t i r e ly  legendary, i t s  various 
p a r ts  having o rig in a ted  mainly in  th e  in te r e s t  o f  the  a c tu a l Buddhist 
d o c trin e . Hie sage Buddha, a s  he p o in ts  ou t, teaches a  d o c trin e  which 
becomes in c reasin g ly  complex and more p re c ise  w hile he h im self becomes 
more and more a super-human w ith ex trao rd in ary  powers, om niscient, and 
su p erio r to  a l l  gods and a l l  people. F in a lly , the  Buddha h im self 
becomes a god, and Hinduism co n trib u te s  a  considerab le  p a r t  towards 
some Buddhist theology.
(2) Selected b iograph ical episodes
(a) In  search o f th e  Awakening
Hie f i r s t  in  Bareau* s se le c tio n  o f  episodes tak es  us back to  a  time 
when the  Buddha was s t i l l  a d is c ip le  h im self. According to  o n e ^ ^  
source ( TheravacLin, S u tta) the  Buddha* s c r i t i c a l  a t t i tu d e  towards 
t r a d it io n a l  knowledge can be summed up very  b r ie f ly .  Having p ra c tis e d  
th e  pure conduct (brahmacariya) in  accordance w ith  the  d o c trine  and 
d is c ip lin e  (dhammavinava) o f h is  teach e r (here : A lara Kalama), and 
having mastered i t  a l l ,  he concludes w ith d is s a t is fa c t io n :  "This
doctrine  n e ith e r  lead s  to  d isg u s t, n o t to  detachment, no t to  cessa tio n , 
n o t to  appeasement, no t to  supernatu ral knowledge, no t to  complete 
Awakening, n o r to  E x tinction , bu t only to  r e b ir th  in  the domaine o f 
noth ingness."
In  a  s im ila r  account (S arv astiv ad in , Sutra) we are  again  to ld  
th a t having found a  teach e r (here: Azada Kalama) f o r  p ra c tis in g  the  
pure conduct (brahmacarya) according to  the d o c trin e  (dhaima) . th e  
fu tu re  Buddha soon d iscovers th a t  he possesses h im self the necessary  
b e l ie f  (sraddha) . energy (v iry a ) and wisdom (pra.jna) . and th a t  th e re fo re  
here i s  nothing l e f t  fo r  him to  be le a r n t .  "This d o c trin e  does n o t 
lead  to  knowledge (.jnana) .  i t  does n o t lead  to  Awakening (bodhi) .  i t
(10) For th is  episode we have used th ree  v e rs io n s  to  b e t te r  i l l u s t r a t e  
the tra d it io n a l claim  o f d o c tr in a l autonomy. However, as a  ru le  we 
r e s t r i c t  ourselves to  one o r  two su ita b le  accounts from the  choice o f 
sources o ffered  by Bareau.
(11) Bareau, B iogr.I. pp. 13-14.
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does n o t lead  to  E x tin c tio n  (n irvana). I t  i s  th e re fo re  b e t te r  th a t  
from nov on I  abandon th i s  d o c trin e  and th a t  I  search again  f o r  the  
absence o f  d isease , supreme appeasement, E x tin c tio n , th a t  I  search 
again fo r  the absence o f  o ld  age (a .iara) . the absence o f  death (amarana), 
the absence o f sorrow and sadness, the  absence o f defilem ent, th e  supreme 
appeasement, E x tinction . "
In  ano ther version  (Dhaxmaguptaka, Vinaya) h i s  teach er
(Arada Kalama) i s  a c tu a lly  lack in g  the  mentioned q u a l i t ie s ;  however,
th e  BodM sattva fin d s  them in  h im self. In  ad d itio n  he r e a l iz e s  th a t
" th is  m editation  o f th e  domain o f nothingness n e i th e r  means the  end,
n o r detachment, no r cessa tio n , nor r e s t ,  no r the  complete and p e r fe c t
Awakening ( samyaksambodhi) , n o r re lig io u s  l i f e  (sramanya) . n o r th e
p lace  where one ob ta in s the  d e f in i te  appeasement o f E x tinction
(n irvana)11. Bareau comments th a t  th e re  i s  no c e r ta in ty  a s  to  whether
-  .  (13)
th is  teacher Arada Kalama was a c tu a lly  a  h is to r ic  f ig u re , hence 
"we do not know i f  he r e a l ly  taught the  m edita tion  o f th e  domain o f  
nothingness, i f  he was the  B odhisattva*s teach er, o r  i f  the mentioned 
p ra c tic e  was in troduced in to  the Buddhist d o c trin e  by the Buddha h im self 
o r  by one o f h is  d is c ip le s  a f t e r  h is  l a s t  death".
Hiese in d ic a tio n s  and d esc rip tio n s  o f th e  Buddha* s s u p e r io r ity
over h is  m aster cannot prove any independent o r ig in  o f the  Buddhist
do c trin e , bu t they c le a r ly  document an i s o la t io n is t i c  tendency o f  th e
kind noted above (p. 216). As Bareau suggests, they  were necessary
from a Buddhist p o in t o f  view, to  dem onstrate and to  d ecla re  th a t  h is
d o c trin e  owed noth ing  e s s e n tia l  to  t ie  thought o f  h is  predecessors and
th a t he had w ell discovered i t  h im self a t  the  moment o f h is  Awakening,
(14)a po in t which became one o f th e  m ajor dogmas o f  Buddhian.
(l2 ) Bareau, B io g r .I , p . 15.
/ 1*x\ ^
Bareau, B io g r .I , pp. 15-17. In  two accounts (Theravadin and 
Sarvastivadin) the Buddha* s second teach e r i s  Udraka Ramaputra 
(Uddaka Rhmaputta); in  a  th ird  account (Dhaxmaguptaka) Udraka appears 
as  the  teacher o f h is  own m a s te r 's  (Rama*s) d is c ip le s  (pp. 23-26).
Bareau, B iogr.I. p. 20.
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A fte r these  in tro d u c to ry  p a r ts  shown as serv in g  the claim 
o f d o c tr in a l autonomy, Bareau p re sen ts  sev era l accounts o f various
episodes which, a s  he sees i t ,  p r a c t ic a l ly  aim a t  vanquishing th e  fe a rs
(15)o f the  fo r e s t  herm it. This asp ec t e x p l ic i t ly  fe a tu re s  one account
(Theravadin, S u tta ) . R eferring  back to  th e  time before  h is  complete
Awakening, the  Buddha, w ell aware o f the problems o f  so litu d e , remarks
th a t  the  fo r e s t  may rav ish  the  s p i r i t  o f those who do n o t achieve the
necessary  concen tra tion  (samadhi) . "Honks and Brahmans who a re  av id ,
concupiscent, su b jec t to  v io le n t p a s s io n s .. . c a l l  in  f e a r  and t e r r o r . "
Being aware o f th e  absence o f any a v id ity  in  h im self, he exp lains, he
(16)always f e l t  confiden t about s tay in g  in  the  fo r e s t .
The next account la y s  the  emphasis more on the  problem of 
d e s ire  (Theravadin, S u tta ) . "The monks o r  Brahmans who s tay  (th e re ) 
w ithout having completely c leared  themselves o f d e s ire s  (kama) w ith the 
he lp  o f th e i r  bodies (kaya). because whatever i s  w ith them in  th e  p lace  
o f d e s ire s  -  the  w ill  of d e s ire , the  attachem ent to  d e s ire , the 
numbness o f d e s ire , the  t h i r s t  o f d e s ire , the  fe v e r o f d e s ire  -  a l l  
th i s  i s  no t w ell appeased.. .  they a re , th e re fo re , incapable o f
(17)knowledge, v is io n  and complete supreme Awakening."
Regarding th e  p ra c tic e  o f  a s c e tic is a , one account (Thera vadin, 
Su tta) mentions the Buddha's t e l l in g  how he m editated inc lud ing  b rea th  
c o n tro l, and ano ther account (Pharmaguptaka, Vinaya) adds th a t  by means 
o f h is  s tren g th  (b a la ) and energy (v irv a ) he developed the  knowledge 
o f dry ing  up the  source o f  su ffe rin g s , s ince  n o t through d e s ire  can
(10)t h i s  happiness (sukha dharma) be a tta in e d .
F in a lly , we h e a r  how th e  Buddha abandons h is  a sc e tic !a s  
(Dhannaguptaka, Vinaya). He r e a l iz e s  th a t  through a u s te r i t i e s  he cannot 
fo rce  h is  way to  happiness (sukha dfaama). Giving up fa s t in g , he i s
(l5 ) Bareau, B io g r .I . p . 361. 
Bareau, B io g r.I . p . 33*
(17)
Bareau, B io g r .I . p . 42.
(18 ) Bareau, B iogr.I. pp. 45, 48.
223
considered as h a ring  re tu rned  to  so ftn e ss , abundance and s tu p id ity
(19)by those who i n s i s t  on p ra c tis in g  p h y sica l asce tic ism .
(b) Before the Awakening
Roving biographi c a lly  one step  n e a re r  to  the  Awakening, ve le a rn  o f the  
importance o f the vanquishing o f e v i l  thought (Theravadin, S u tta ). 'Hie 
Buddha exp lains to  h is  monks hov, before  h i s  complete Awakening, he had 
rea lized  th a t when the reasoning o f d e s ire  (kama) arose  in  him i t  d id , 
in  fa c t ,  cause se lf-to rm en t and the  torment o f o th e rs  in s te a d  o f  lead in g  
to  E xtinction  (nibbana) ; hence, by h is  re a l iz in g  th is ,  i t  
disappeared. ^
In  a p a ra l le l  version  o f the same propaedeutic  account
(Sarvastivadin , Sutra) the Buddha adds more s p e c if ic a l ly  th a t  "such
a  monk who does not separa te  h im self from th e  re f le c t io n  o f malevolence,
who does no t separate  h im self from the re f le c t io n  o f nuisance,
consequently cannot l ib e ra te  h im self from b i r th ,  from o ld  age, from
disease, from death, from sadness, from sighs and te a r s ,  and cannot
(21)separate him self from a l l  su ffe rin g  e i th e r ."
As Bareau comments, th i s  episode, concen tra ting  on some method 
fo r  overcoming d e s ire  and various o th e r  e v i ls ,  may have been c rea ted  
as a  so r t o f d o c tr in a l prologue f o r  a seimon d esc rib in g  the 
B odh isa ttva 's  f i r s t  m edita tion , and th e re fo re  p laced r ig h t  before  the 
Awakening. Hie vanquishing o f f e a r  and e v i l  thought could perhaps be 
looked upon as d i s t in c t  p a r ts  of a  d id a c t ic a l ly  ordered s e r ie s  lead ing  
up to  the account o f th e  Four M editations (dhyana) . and from th e re  to  
th a t  of the U ireefold Knowledge (vidya) . Bareau re fe r s  to these  fo u r 
groups as p reparato ry  stages "having no o th e r  purpose than to  show the
efficacy  o f these  methods by making each o f them th e  a c tu a l cause o f
(22)the Awaken in g1*. According to  the Buddha's own d esc rip tio n  in  one
(19) Bareau, B io g r .I . p. 55.
(20) Bareau, B jo g r .I . p . 62.
(21) Bareau, B jo g r.I . p . 64.
(22) Bareau, B jogr.I. pp. 69, 361.
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o f th e  accounts o f the  Four M editations (iheravad in , S u tta ) , h is
f i r s t  m edita tion  took p lace  a f t e r  he had begun to  e a t  again  ( a f t e r  h is
a sc e tic  f a s t ) ,  r e s t in g  in  a  s ta te  separated  from d e s ire  (kama) . from
bad th in g s , w ithout any reasoning  o r  re f le c t io n , w ith joy  ( p i t i ) and
happiness ( sukha) . A very p leasan t sensation  occurred in  him w ithout,
however, tak in g  over h is  thought com pletely. A s im ila r  second
m edita tion  followed a f t e r  the  appeasement o f reason ing  and re f le c t io n ,
c o n s is tin g  o f in n e r s e re n ity  and u n if ic a tio n  of thought, and re s u lt in g
from concen tra tion  ( samadhi) .  but w ithout the  p leasu re  tak ing  over h is
thought com pletely. A th ir d  m edita tion  followed which, a f t e r
detachment from joy , re su lte d  in  a fe e lin g  o f happiness w ithout,
however, i t  tak in g  over com pletely. F in a lly , having abandoned
p leasu re  and pa in , g a ie ty  and sadness, he a tta in e d  the  fo u rth
m edita tion , which was n e ith e r  p a in fu l no r ag reab le , ju s t  p e rfe c t
a tte n tio n  and in d iffe ren c e . Again, i t  was followed by a  co n tro lled
(23)p leasan t sensation .
These Four M editations as they have been handed down th rou^i 
va rio u s  analogous te x ts  could, in  B areau 's opinion, c o n s ti tu te  one o f 
the  o ld e s t, although n o t n ecessa rily  au th en tic , episodes o f  th is  
biography. He f in d s  i t  q u ite  reasonable th a t  the  au thors -  o r  probably 
those o f  some more an c ien t te x ts  by which they were in sp ire d  -  decided 
to  in troduce  them a t  t h i s  po in t in  accordance w ith th e i r  own view o f 
th e  o r ig in a tio n  o f the  Buddha's Awakening (bodhi). He reminds us th a t  
the  p ra c t ic a l  preaching must have been more im portant to  them than the  
h i s to r ic a l  s id e . What m attered was whether a  c e r ta in  s to ry  could 
a t t r a c t  the a tte n tio n  o f th e i r  d is c ip le s  to  c e r ta in  s ig n if ic a n t p o in ts  
in  Buddhist teaching. Bareau f e e l s  q u ite  in  accordance w ith the 
an c ien t au thors in  assuming th a t the  Buddha d id  have access to  th i s  
method o f concen tra ting  and u n it in g  h is  thought on one o b jec t in  o rd er 
to  a t ta in  the  psychological s ta te  necessary f o r  th e  appearance o f  the
(24)Awakening so much sought. The s ig n ifican ce  o f  th i s  "psychological"
a sp ec t o f th e  Awakening f o r  our an a ly s is  o f pessimism should reveal
(23)
Bareau, B jo g r.I . p . 67.
(24) Bareau, B iogr.I. pp. 69-70.
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i t s e l f  more f u l ly  in  connection w ith our m etaphysical considera tions 
a t  the  end o f  th is  chap ter.
(c) The Awakening
The im portant event o f  the a c tu a l Awakening has been recorded both  in  
a shortened form, and in  connection w ith the  th ree  kinds o f  Knowledge, 
thus rep resen tin g  two separa te  tr a d i t io n s .  In  one o f the shortened 
te x t  versions ^Theravadin, Su tta) th e  Buddha d escribes how, a f t e r  
having o r ig in a lly  been subjected  through h im self to  the  law o f b i r th ,  
o ld  age, d isease , death , sorrow, defilem en ts, he f in a l ly  a tta in e d  
E xtinction  (nibbana) : "Unshakable i s  my d e liverance , here  i s  my l a s t
(25 )b i r th ,  henceforth  th e re  w ill  not be any fu r th e r  ex is ten ce ."
According to  th e  longer account (Theravadin, S u tta) the  Buddha
acquires the  Threefold Knowledge (vi.jya) o f h is  Awakening by making use
of the q u a l i t ie s  which he developed through the  Four M editations (jhana) .
F i r s t ,  w ith  h is  thought concentra ted , p e r fe c t ly  pure, su b tle , m alleable,
(26)s tab le  and immobile, he remembers m u ltip le  form er ex istences w ith 
a l l  the  d e ta i l s  o f h is  form er cond itions o f l i f e .  Secondly, he sees 
th a t beings a re  reborn according to  t h e i r  a c tio n s , inc lud ing  re b ir th  in  
h e l l  o r  in  a  heavenly world. T h ird ly , th i nking about the  exhaustion o f 
the im p u ritie s  which lead  to  su ffe rin g  , he sees the Four Noble Truths: 
"This i s  su ffe rin g  (dukkha); th i s  i s  th e  o r ig in  of su ffe rin g ; th i s  i s  
th e  cessa tion  o f su ffe rin g ; th i s  i s  the  path  which lead s  to  the  
cessation  o f su ffering" (see p. 229). Likew ise, he sees th e  im p u ritie s , 
th e i r  o r ig in , ce ssa tio n  and th e  road to  cessa tio n . Having understood 
these th in g s , h is  th o u ^ it i s  de liv e red  from the th ree  im p u ritie s  o f  
d e s ire , ex istence and ignorance. Thns d e liv e red  he pronounces again  
th e  f in a l  formula: "Exhausted i s  b i r t h ,  p ra c tise d  i s  the  pure conduct
(25) Barean, B jo g r.I . pp. 72, 60.
(26) Bareau (B io g r.I . p . 79) remarks th a t  th i s  enumeration s p e c if ie s  
the q u a l i t ie s  which allow  the  monk to  acquire  the  Threefold Knowledge 
o f  the  Awakening. Compare th e  Four Bases o f A tten tion  
(anrtyupasthana). ou r pp. 234-235.
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(brahaacariya) . accouplished i s  the  ta sk , th e re  w il l  he no f a r th e r
(27)ex istence down h e re ."
Bareaa exp lains the  ro le  o f  the  im p u ritie s  v i th  regard to
the ex istence  o f su ffe rin g . "S u ffe rin g  (duhkha) i s  never defined  as
an impurity' (asrava) and i t s  r e la t io n  v i th  th e  l a t t e r  i s  never enounced
v ith  p re c is io n ; i t  i s  th e re fo re  easy to  deduce from the  d o c trin e  th a t
su ffe rin g  i s  a  consequence o f im p u ritie s  in  general since the  d e s ire ,
the ex istence  and ignorance a re  denounced as  be ing  a t  the  o r ig in  o f
su ffe rin g , th e  form er because i t  i s  id e n tic a l  v i th  t h i r s t  (t r s n a ) , the
•  •  •
tvo o th e rs  because they  are  cond itions (nratyava) more o r  le s s  d is ta n t  
from su ffe rin g  in  the  chain o f Dependent O rig ina tion  
(p ra t i ty a  samu tpada) ."  E x tin c tio n , he continues* co incid ing  v i th  
the  Avakening, i s  e x p l ic i t ly  defined  ( in  th e  sh o rte r  version , above) 
as being f re e  o f b i r t h ,  o ld age, d isea se , death , g r ie f  and defilem ents. 
"Nov, b i r th ,  o ld  age, d isea se , death  and g r ie f  w il l  be considered 
la t e r ,  e sp e c ia lly  in  the sermon o f Banaras, a s  p r in c ip a l v a r ia n ts  o f 
su ffe rin g ; moreover, the  sh o rte r  te x t  p u ts  them on the  same le v e l v ith  
defilem ents (samklesa) , an ambiguous term vhose a c tu a l sense i s  th a t  
o f su ffe rin g  and torm ent, bu t which in  the  c la s s ic a l  Buddhist 
vocabulary always denotes defilem ents and co rru p tio n s ."  Bareau 
considers th is  re p o rt o f  the  Awakening -  i t s  d if f e r e n t  versions marking 
the evo lu tion  o f the  opinions o f the  learned  B uddhists, "des docteurs 
bouddhiques" -  to  be a  r e la t iv e ly  l a t e  re co n stru c tio n  o f which h is  
a n a ly s is  rev ea ls  " le  charac te re  im agine!re" which may have been 
a func tion  o f th e  requirem ents o f  teach ing . "Hence, ve cannot know 
hov th i s  c a p ita l  d iscovery  o f  the  essence o f  Buddhism which i s  c a lle d  
the  Avakening has happened."
(d) The d iscovery  o f  th e  Lav o f Dependent O rig ina tion
Our chosen re p o r t (Mahlsasaka, Vinaya) o f  th e  Buddha's discovery o f  th e  
p r in c ip le  o f Dependent O rig ina tion  (pratityasam u tpada) could be
(27) Bareau, B io g r .I . p . 76; he adds, p. 81, th a t  a l l  schools reserve  
the  knowledge o f  th e  exhaustion o f  im p u ritie s  to  th e  Arhants o r  the  
Buddhas.
Bareau, B io g r .I . p . 87.
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considered an e labo ra tion  o f the  p r in c ip le s  o f th e  o r ig in a tio n
and cessa tio n  o f  goffering  -  w ithout any c u l tu ra l  refe rence  (see p. 231).
I t  d esc rib es  how, a f t e r  h is  Awakening, th e  Buddha examines th e  twelve
reasons (nidana) o f the Dependent O rig in a tio n  in  e i th e r  d ire c tio n
(anulomapratiloma) . He fin d s  th a t  ex istence  co n d itions ex istence  and
cessa tio n  conditions cessa tion , adding an exp lanation  in  twelve s tep s :
conditioned by ignorance (avidya) th e  com positions (samskaras) e x is t ;
conditioned in  tu rn  by th ese , th e re  e x is t  conscious discernm ent
(vi.jnana) , hence name and form (namaruna). the  s ix  sensual domains
(sadayatana. -  the  s ix th  sense being  thought; compare pp. 252-233),• •
con tac t (sp a rse ) , sensation (vedana) . t h i r s t  ( t r s n a ) . ap p rop ria tion
—  —  * * *  ( O Q )
(upadanas. m ate ria l causes o f adherence to  e x is ten c e ) , ex istence
f 'M S  \  ^
(bhava) . b ir th  ( . ja t i ) .  and -  rep re sen tin g  th e  tw elveth s tep  as 
a group -  th e  m iseries of old age ( j a r a ) , death  (marana), sorrow (soka). 
sadness (dauimanasya). su ffe rin g  (duhkha) and anguish (upayasa) .
( 2Q ) Radhakrishnan (P h i l . I . p . 444) d e sc rib e s  the  upadanas as  a  fo rce  o f 
a t t r a c t io n  which recombines the  vario u s  s c a tte re d  elements o f  l i f e  in  
accordance v i th  kam a. "an inform ing p r in c ip le  w aiting  fo r  i t s  m a te r ia l" .
Mrs. Hhys Davids (Gotama. p . 45) sggesting  th a t  regard ing  th e  
concept o f  bhava. proto-Buddhism must have pu t th e  emphasis more on 
"becoming" than on "being", l e t s  th e  Buddha speak: " I sought th e  coming
to  be (bhava), no t the  dying o u t; th e  waxing, th e  growth, n o t the  
waning, the ceasing; m ore-will r a th e r  than mo re-knowledge." The Buddha 
h im se lf rep resen ts  to  h e r  the  p o te n tia l  More in  Man (Manual, p . i x ) :
"Here th e  More presupposes the r e a l  being-in-becom ing o f  th a t  very  Man.
I f  we b lo t  out the  very Man as u n re a l, then th a t  More becomes ju s t  
a s e r ia l  bunch o f ideas b u i l t  up around a  n o n en tity , o r  a t  b e s t round 
a dummy man c a lled  "mind". Now in  Ind ian  re l ig io n  the  r e a l i ty  o f  the  
man was v i t a l . "  Von Glasenapp (P h .In d .. pp. 502-303) i s  more 
r e s t r i c t iv e :  "For th is  philosophy th e re  i s  in  th e  em pirical world no
being, b u t only an un in te rrup ted  becoming; th e re  i s  no firm  ego and no 
firm  th in g s ou tside i t ,  bu t only a continuously  flow ing stream o f  
rjha-pnas between which e x is t  c e r ta in  connections" (c f . o u r p. 242(56)).
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According to  Bareau, ve may consider th i s  re p o r t o f  th e  
la v  o f  Dependent O rig ination  a s  a  product o f a  r e la t iv e ly  recen t period  
when the  legend o f the  Buddha took shape and v e i l  a f t e r  th e  development 
o f the  Four Noble Truths. He observes th a t ,  while the  pratityasam utpada 
p lays an alm ost equally  im portant ro le  a s  does the  episode o f  the Four 
Noble Truths, the  inven tion  o f which c o n s ti tu te d  the  Awakening, i t  a lso  
tak es  i t s  in s p ira tio n  from there  and i s  equally  i Bragina to  ry . B esides, 
a t  a  l a t e r  s tag e  the  two elements appear in  some combined form o r  
su b s ti tu tin g  f o r  one another. Hovever, Bareau f e e ls  th a t  the  la v  o f 
Dependent O rig ination  i t s e l f  must be an c ien t, peihaps even d a tin g  back 
to  th e  time o f the  Buddha h im self, and i t  may have been discovered a t  
about ihe same time a s  the  Four Noble Truths. As he p o in ts  o u t, the  
te rn s  fe a tu rin g  th e  l i s t  o f the pratityasam utpada do no t y e t  involve any 
o f the g rea t subsystems, such as  th e  f iv e  skandhas (th e  meaning o f 
samskara as i t  appears above s t i l l  being  very d i f f e r e n t) .  On the  whole, 
he sees in  th i s  account a  kind o f  comment on th e  second and th ird  
t ru th . ^
(e) The T u n in g  o f the Wheel o f  th e  Lav
I t  says in  the  D hainacakrapravartana-Sutra (jlahisasaka, Vinaya) th a t  the  
f i r s t  sermon which s e ts  the Wheel o f  th e  Lav in  motion i s  preached by 
the Buddha a t  Banaras to  f iv e  monks who p rev io u sly  were h is  f e l lo v -  
d is c ip le s . In  a  preceding episode (Mahisasaka), which Bareau considers 
e s s e n tia l ly  a  prologue to  th a t o f the  sermon, th ese  f iv e  men had 
expressed th e i r  d isapproval o f the  Buddha* s abandonment o f the  p a th  o f  
a u s te r i t i e s  (see pp. 222-225, Dharmaguptaka), whereupon he l e t  them 
know th a t  he had accomplished E x tin c tio n  (n irvana), which they, too ,
•  (32)
could reach, inc lud ing  l ib e ra t io n  from th e  f iv e  aggregates (skandha).
Ve r e f e r  l a t e r  to  the  ro le  o f  the skandhas in  connection w ith
" th i r s t"  and "su ffe ring* .
In  the  a c tu a l sermon which follow s (Mahisaka, Vinaya), th e  
Buddha mentions two extremes which should be avoided, and the Middle
Bareau, B io g r.I . pp. 94-97.
(*52) Bareau, B iogr.I. pp. 163, 165.
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Path  (madhyama p ra tip ad a ) which should be follow ed in s te a d , by those 
s t r iv in g  f o r  n irvana . He re fe rs  f i r s t  to  the  h e d o n is tic  extreme o f " the  
one who, being attached  to  d e s ire  and having t h i r s t  f o r  sensual 
p leasu res , preaches the absence o f tran sg re ss io n  (a n a p a tt i) o f  sensual 
p leasu res11, then to  the  a sc e tic  extreme o f  " th e  one who, having f a ls e
opinions (m ithyad rsti). torm ents h is  body w ithout having  any tra c e  o f
-  (33)the  P a th" . Defining th e  madhyama pradioada a s  lead in g  to  seeing ,
understanding and Avakening, he d esc rib es  i t  a s  be in g  c o n s ti tu te d  o f
e ig h t co rrec tio n s: namely, co rrec t (samyanc) opinion ( d r s t i ) , c o rre c t
•  •  •
th ink ing  (samkalpa), co rrec t speech (yak), c o rre c t a c t iv i ty  (karmanta) , 
c o rrec t liv e lih o o d  (a.iiva). co rre c t e f f o r t  (vyayama), c o rre c t a tte n tio n  
( sm rti) , and co rrec t concentra tion  ( samadhi) .
Having described the  Middle Path , th e  Buddha e lab o ra te s : 
"Besides, th e re  are Four Noble Truths: the  noble t ru th  (arva sa ty a ) o f
s u ffe r in g  (duhkha) , the noble t ru th  o f the o r ig in  (saanidaya) o f 
su ffe rin g , the  noble t ru th  o f th e  c essa tio n  (n lrodha) o f  su ffe rin g , 
th e  noble tru th  o f the path  (p ra tip ad a ) which lead s  to  the cessa tio n  o f 
su ffe rin g . What i s  the noble t ru th  o f su ffe ring?  B ir th  i s  su ffe rin g , 
o ld  age i s  su ffe rin g , d isease  i s  su ffe rin g , death  i s  su ffe rin g , sorrow, 
lam entations, anguish a re  su ffe rin g , union w ith what one d is l ik e s  i s  
su ffe rin g , to  lo se  what one d e s ire s  i s  su ffe rin g ; in  sh o rt, the f iv e
(36) — _ (37)aggregates ( skandha) o f the  ap p ro p ria tio n s  (up ad an a -s ) a re
(33) L i te r a l ly ,  "which causes the  eye to  be bom ", on which Bareau 
comments (p. 392) " i t  i s  ca lled  * th e  appearance o f  the  eye o f the  Lav 
(dharmacaksus)*, &nd th i s  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  conversion (o f  those who 
were about to  become Arhants) was conceived a s  a  sudden v is io n " .
(34) Cf. the gnrtyupasthana. ou r p . 235*
(35) Bareau, B io g r.I , p. 174.
F rau vallner (Phil.Buddh.. pp. 26-27) exp lains th a t  th e  view o f 
t h i r s t  as the source o f su ffe rin g , as i t  i s  p resen ted  in  th i s  sermon, 
was l a t e r  developed fu r th e r :  a d is t in c t io n  was in troduced  between
t h i r s t  aroused by sense o b jec ts  (kam atrsni) . and t h i r s t  f o r  becoming
•  •  •
(bhavatrsna) , which was susta ined  by the erroneous b e l ie f  in  a  personal
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su ffe rin g ; such i s  the noble t ru th  o f su ffe rin g , ” C oncentrating
on the  l a t t e r ,  he explains th e  o rig in  o f su ffe r in g  in  texms o f the
t h i r s t  ( t r s n a ) f o r  ex istence and the  passions bom  w ith  i t .
•  •  •
Consequently, the cessation  o f  su ffe rin g  (p , 225) would req u ire  the
to t a l  abandonment and exhaustion of th i s  t h i r s t ,  which, in  o th e r words,
would amount to  n irvana . This sermon p re sen ts  the  noble tru th  o f  the
p a th  lead in g  to  the  cessa tio n  o f su ffe r in g  as th e  Middle Path , which i s
the  Path  o f  the  E ight C orrections (the Noble E igh tfo ld  P ath : arya
astang ika  marga) . Bareau, h in tin g  a t  th e  f a c t  th a t  the  Four Noble Truths 
•  •
p lay  a more complex ro le  in  th i s  re p o rt o f  the  Sermon o f Benaras than 
in  th e  above account o f the Awakening ( i . e .  o f th e  Threefold Knowledge), 
suggests th a t  th e  more complex form may p o ss ib ly  be the  derived and 
l a t e r  one.
A ppreciating the g re a t importance o f the  Four Noble Truths,
" le s  doc teu rs  des Iheravadin e t  des M ulasarvastivadin", a t  a  much l a t e r
s tag e , l e t  th e  Buddha concentra te  on th e  theme o f su ffe r in g  ag^ln in  one
(39)o f  th e  l a s t  sermons which rep resen t h is  s p i r i tu a l  testam ent. Tfte
P a li  ve rs io n  ends by a lso  emphasizing the  d e s tru c tio n  o f  su ffe rin g : 
nAs a n a tu ra l consequence o f th e  absence o f see ing  in  accordance w ith 
th e  r e a l i t y  o f the  Four Noble Truths, th e  way one has to  follow  from 
b i r t h  to  b i r th  i s  a long  one. They have been seen, the guide towards 
ex isten ce  i s  suppressed, destroyed i s  the  ro o t o f  su ffe rin g , henceforth  
■there i s  no re b ir th  any more."
ego (a taan ). one o f  the  main causes o f  r e b ir th .  According to  th e  Buddha
t h i s  em pirical form o f  p e rso n a lity  r e f le c t s  only some connection o f
m ental and m a te ria l con figu ra tions (dharma) c o n s ti tu tin g  f iv e  groups
(skandha) : body Crura) , fe e lin g s  (vedana), percep tion  (sam.jna) . mental
com positions ( samskara) . and awareness (vi.inana) . Frauw allner mentions
a th ir d  way o f delusion, the t h i r s t  f o r  a n n ih ila tio n  (v ihhavatrsna).
•  •  •
which was never developed p h ilo so p h ica lly .
(37) I . e . ,  " the  skandhas in  so f a r  a s  they  a re  grasped a t 1' (Conze,
Thought, p . 55).
(38) Bareau, B io g r .I . p. 181.
(39) Bareau, B jogr.II-1. p. 80.
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( f ) Suffering, transience and egolessnegg
The Buddhist d o c trin e  lin k s  the  Noble Truth, o r  Suffering- v i th  two o th e r
fundamental p r in c ip le s , namely, the  th e o r ie s  o f tran s ien ce  and o f
egolessaess (non-existence o f & se lf )*  While the  p r in c ip le  o f
tran s ien ce  may be considered as im plied in  th e  D octrine o f  Dependent
O rig ination  (a s  s h a ll  be i l lu s t r a te d  l a t e r ) ,  th e  p r in c ip le  o f egolessnesa
fin d s  one o f  i t s  c le a re s t expressions in  a  sh o rt d iscourse  betveen the
Buddha and the  f i r e  monks, vhich p a r a l le l s  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  the  "S ocra tic
method". In  th is  account (Mahisasaka, Vinaya) th e  Buddha, recommending
u n if ie d  thought and abandonment o f th e  passions in  o rd er to  accomplish
th e  Avakening, asks then: "What do you th in k : I s  m a tte r  (xupa)
permanent (n lty a ) o r  impermanent (a n ity a )? -  Impermanent. -  What i s
impermanent, i s  i t  agreable (sukha) o r  p a in fu l (duhkha)? -  P a in fu l. -
What i s  p a in fu l, i s  i t  the s e l f  (atman) o r  th e  n o n -se lf  (an-atman)? -
The n o n -se lf ."  Like v ise  v ith  regard to  the  sensa tions (vedana) ,
percep tions (sam.ina) . mental compositions (samskara) and consciouaaess • »
(v ijnana) . "This i s  vhy, you monks, a l l  m a tte r, be i t  in te rn a l  o r  
ex te rn a l, p a s t, fu tu re  o r  p re sen t, must be looked a t  according to  r e a l i ty  
as n o n -s e lf ."
The theory o f impermanence a s  i t  n o tab ly  appears in  the  
statem ent "whatever i s  sub ject to  the  la v  o f o r ig in  i s  su b jec t to  the  
la v  o f cessa tio n " , i s  a lso  d i r e c t ly  linked  v ith  the  la v  o f  Dependent 
O rig ination  ( Theravadin, Vinaya). The same id e a  i s  expressed by
another school (Dhaimaguptaka, Vinaya) in  the  fo llow ing  d ialogue: "Which
doctrine  have you obtained? -  That vhich the  Tathagata preaches, the 
Doctrine o f Dependent O rig ination  and lik ew ise  o f  Dependent Cessation.
The causes from which th ings o r ig in a te , th e  Tathagata speaks o f  the*.
The causes by which th ings a re  stopped, again  th e  g re a t man o f re l ig io n
.. . . „(42)expresses t h e i r  meaning.
Bareau, B io g r.I . pp. 194-195.
(4 l) Bareau, B io g r .I . pp. 348, 392. 
Bareau, B io g r.I . p. 349.
(g) Stopping the stream of e rro r
Reference to  the comp l e i  ro le  o f  g o ffe rin g  i s  e x p l ic i t ly  skipped in
c e r ta in  comments on the p rin c ip le s  o f l ib e ra t io n ,  a s  ve can observe
in  a  re la t iv e ly  l a t e  account (Dharnaguptaka, Vinaya) vhich concen tra tes
on the  co n tro l o f ignorance (avidya) , exposing the  importance o f th e
thought stream. Ih is  aspect i s  in troduced somewhat m etaphorically  by
the  fo llow ing se t o f questions put to  the  Buddha: "Who amongst th e
kings i s  sovereign such th a t  being d e f ile d  he. g ives defilem ents? What
can remain immaculate vhich i s  named erro r?  On which stream f lo a t s
th a t  w hich has obtained the name o f knowledge? Which stream does n o t
run which i s  named deliverance?" The Buddha then answers in  the same
manner: "Ihe s ix th  king i s  sovereign who being  d e f ile d  g ives
defilem ents. Ih a t which i s  no t d e f ile d  i s  immaculate, th a t  vhich i s
d e f ile d  i s  c a lled  erroneous. E rro r i s  th e  stream on which one f lo a ts .
That which can make i t  cease i s  knowledge, which can cause a l l  stream s
to  be abandoned, those o f heaven and those o f th i s  world. He who i s
separated  from the stream i s  no t le d  a s tra y  by death . He who can
(43)dominate through a tte n tio n  ob ta ins deliverance  from the  stream . "
E lucidating  th is  m etaphorical d e sc rip tio n  Bareau exposes an 
im p lic it  connection v ith  su ffe rin g : "Ihe s ix th  k ing  (ra.jan) i s
obviously the s ix th  sovereign ( in d riy a ) , which means fa c u lty  o r  organ, 
o f th e  mind (rnanas). which i s  d e f ile d  ( k l i s t a ) by e r ro r  (moha). This
e •
i s  no o th e r than ignorance (avidya) which, according to  th e  formula o f 
Dependent O rig ination  (pratityasam utpada) . i s  th e  f i r s t  source o f  a l l  
su ffe rin g , b ir th s  and deaths, hence o f the  stream ( s ro ta s ) which 
c a r r ie s  the  being across the endless s e r ie s  o f ex is ten ces . Knowledge 
( .inana) which allow s us to  d is s ip a te  th e  e r ro r ,  consequently a llow s u s  
to stop th i s  stream and, th e re fo re , to  ob ta in  de liverance  (vim ukti) . " ^ ^  
(D issipation  pu ts  a  stop  to  the stream which su s ta in s  avidya -  i t  does 
n o t destroy  igno rance.) Thus, r e fe r r in g  back to  the  pratityasam utpada. 
which he described as a p a r t ia l  comment on the  Four Noble Truths (p. 228),
(43) Bareau, B io g r.I . p. 234.
(44) Barean, B iogr.I. p. 240.
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Bareau reminds u s  o f th e  e sse n tia l causal connection between 
ignorance and goffering . But, w hile in  th e  account o f  the  " s ix th  king" 
ignorance, hence su ffe rin g , r e s u l ts  from e r ro r  d e f i l in g  the  mind, 
su ffe rin g  may, a s  no ticed  above, a lso  p lay  a  ro le  which i s  n o t derived 
from ignorance d ire c t ly .  In  h is  comment on duhkha in  the  "Threefold 
Knowledge" (p. 226) Bareau noticed  th a t  su ffe r in g  as  such was never 
defined as an im purity , and th a t s u f fe r in g  could be in te rp re te d  as 
a  consequence o f  im p u ritie s  in  general in s te ad  o f tak in g  i t s  d i r e c t  
o rig in  from ignorance. Ve s h a ll  again  r e f e r  back to  th i s  dual a sp ec t 
o f su ffe rin g  in  Buddhism -  in  i t s  derived  foxm and a s  a  q u as i-o n to lo g ica l 
p r in c ip le  -  when we re tu rn  to  the  p e ss im is tic  im p lica tio n s  of th e  German 
views, in  the  f in a l  p a r t  o f th i s  chap ter.
(h) On thought co n tro l and p e r fe c t consciousness
Coinciding v i th  the  pompous a r r iv a l  o f  a  b e a u tifu l courtesan named
Amrapali, the  Buddha begins preaching a sermon on p e rfe c t
(45)consciousness. Although th i s  connection i s  u n lik e ly  to  have ex is ted  
in  the  o r ig in a l version , as Bareau in fe rs  from the  ten  ex tan t te x ts  a t  
h is  d isposa l (inc lud ing  S ansk rit, P a li  and fo u r Chinese so u rces), 
a combined se le c tio n  o f remarks from these  te x ts  now allow  us to  
a sc e r ta in  a misogynic touch w ithin the Buddhist d o c trin e . F i r s t  h ear 
warnings: "0 monks, remain a rden t, p e r fe c t ly  conscious and a t te n tiv e ,
Bareau, Biogr. H - 1 . p. 95.
(46) /While fo r  the  f i r s t  p a r t o f the  Buddha's biography, evolving around 
the  Awakening, Bareau had to  rearrange re p o rts  d ispersed  throughout th e  
canon, he could base the second p a r t ,  evolving around the  Buddha's 
complete E x tinction , on one o f th e  long S u tras , the M ahaparin irvana-sutra . 
contained in  the Dirgha-agaaa ( P a l i : D igha-nikaya) , r e fe r r in g  to
V aldschm idt's previous e d itio n  fo llow ing  & S ansk rit te x t  o f  the  
M ulasarvastivadins, and using  e s s e n tia l ly  one P a li  and fo u r  Chinese 
sources. F rauvallner (Vinaya. p . 163) adds th a t  the  most famous l a t e r  
biographies o f the Buddha and a u th o r ita t iv e  te x ts  such as  the  
MahapaiH ni rvana-su tra  a re  based on th e  te x t o f the  Skandhaka, a  p a r t  o f  
the  Vinaya. which i s  no t au th en tic  o ld  t r a d i t io n  bu t a  legendaiy  ta le .
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th e re  cones the  courtesan A urapali. That i s  shy  I  p u t you on your
guard.. Her beauty  i s  so ex trao rd inary  th a t  in  the whole o f  th e
un iverse  th e re  i s  no th ing  s im ila r ."  Two o f th e  Chinese v e rs io n s  add
more d ra s t ic a l ly :  "See the woman Amrapali and h e r f iv e  hundred s tuden t
courtesans. Lover your heads and co rre c t ycnzr thoughts. They a re
wearing b e a u tifu l  c lo th es  and adornments, b u t they a re  l ik e  pa in ted
ja r s :  on the  ou ts id e  they have splendid co lours, b u t in s id e  they  con tain
noth ing  bu t re fu se ."  This re f le c t io n , adds Bareau, i s  n o t u n re la ted  to
th e  m ed ita tion  o f  th e  impure (asubhabhavana) th e  aim o f which i s  to
i n s t i l l  d e f in i te  d isg u s t o f b e a u tifu l  body forms and, consequently, to
overcome concupiscence. Uie Buddhist re a c tio n  provoked by th e  women i s
devoid o f any c u ltu ra l  m otivation, e n t i r e ly  u n lik e  Schopenhauer' a
c r i t i c i a i  o f  European women which, obviously , u ses merely s im ila r  words:
comparing t h e i r  u n re s tra in t  female behaviour to  th a t  o f  the  holy  monkeys
o f Banaras, he brands the  concept o f  the  "lady" (d ie  Dame) as  a  product
o f "our Old French g a lla n tly  and in s ip id  fem ale-veneration , th i s  supreme
(47)blossom o f C hris tian-Germanic s tu p id ity ” .
In  one o f th e  Chinese te x ts  the  theme o f  thought co n tro l and 
indulgence i s  developed one step  fu r th e r ,  making the  p r in c ip le  o f  
su ffe r in g  apparent. Hois, the one who, a sp ir in g  to  Buddhahood,
"m editates on the f iv e  v isce ra  ( in te rn a l organs) o f h is  body can a lso  
saooth ou t and stop the  phenomena (dharma) o f b i r th s  and deaths. He 
sees th a t  the  e x te r io r  i s  pa in , he sees th a t  the  in te r io r  i s  p a in , too, 
and he c o rre c ts  h i s  thought."
( i )  The Four Bases o f A tten tion
According to  f iv e  sources (S an sk rit, P a li  and th re e  Chinese ones) the
aged Buddha having f a l le n  i l l  sh o rtly  before  h is  complete E x tinction
(p a rin irv an a ) i s  experiencing v io le n t su ffe rin g . At the p o in t o f  dying
and v i th  pa in  throughout h is  body, he remains (according to  th e  P a li
source) " a t te n tiv e  (sa ta )  and p e r fe c t ly  conscious" (sampajana)", thus
(48)s e t t in g  an example fo r  the monks. He in d ic a te s  th a t  a f t e r  h is
Schopenhauer, P .P .I I .  pp. 675-676. Also compare our p . 61(49) . 
Bareasn, B io g r .II -1 , pp. 138-140.
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p arin irv an a  they  w il l  have to  r e ly  on them selves, consoling  than 
th a t  the  d o c trin e  can provide a l l  th e  necessary  a s s is ta n c e . Specifying 
th i s  assurance he re fe rs  to  th e  p ra c tic e  o f  th e  Four Bases o f A tten tion  
(S an sk rit: g tr t yupasthana; P a l i :  s a tip a tth a n a ) . This m ed ita tions!
e • •
system concen tra tes on fo u r o b je c ts : the  body (kaya) .  th e  sensa tions
(vedana). thought (c i t t a ) and the  id eas  (dharma) .  The monk who remains
a rd en t (a ta p in ) . p e r fe c tly  conscious (sampra.iana) and a t te n tiv e
(anrtim an t) in  th e  p u rsu it o f th i s  m ed ita tion  can chase covetousness
(abhidhya) and sadness (daurmanagya) from th i s  world. These
s p e c if ic a tio n s  show, as Bareau p o in ts  o u t, th a t  "an e s s e n tia l  importance
was a t t r ib u te d  to  th i s  type o f m ed ita tion  which was and remains
(49)c e r ta in ly  one o f the  most recommended by Ind ian  Buddhisa".
(.l) A randa's f a i lu r e  to  understand th e  Buddha's a t t i tu d e
The previous episode on the gnrtyupasthana c u lt iv a te s ,  
m eta-ph ilosoph ically  speaking, " the  negation  o f w ill"  -  th i s  episode 
here  ta lk s  about the n eg lec t o f the  c u lt iv a tio n  o f  "w ill" , thus 
prov id ing  a  complementary view. The standard scene o f discom fort which, 
a s  we s h a l l  see, the prospect o f lo s in g  th e  Buddha a t  the  time o f h is  
pari n irvana  arouses among h is  fo llow ers, forem ost in  Ananda, i s  s tran g e ly  
m odified by th i s  episode (s ix  p r in c ip a l sources) which, according to  
Bareau, must have been added a t  a  r e la t iv e ly  l a t e  epoch when legend had
(50)begun to  p re sen t the  Buddha as alm ost omnipotent. In  th i s  account,
(49) Bareau, B io g r .I I - l .  p . 146. The method, in  accordance w ith  th e
S a tip a tth an ai-su tta . has been described  by Nyanaponika (Siegmund 
• «
Feninger). For th e  Western mind, he f e e ls ,  " th e  d i f f i c u l ty  c o n s is ts  in  
the  necessary  bu t only  g rad u a lly  happening re o r ie n ta tio n  from 
ego-orien ted  o r  m a tte r-o rien ted  th in k in g  to  p ro cess-o rien ted  th inking" 
(Heilsweg. p . 10 ). However, th e  e x is t in g  form o f th i s  p ra c tic e  i s  the  
r e s u l t  o f a  re v iv a l around the  tu rn  o f  th e  century  and th e re fo re  only 
o f  q u a lif ie d  in te r e s t  (c f . B echert, Th«-Buddh. I .  pp. 47-51, 7 9 -8 l) . 
Regarding i t s  h is to r ic a l  development see Schni than sen (V ier 
K onzentrationen).
(50) Bareau, B iogr .H -1 . pp. 153-159.
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a s  in  the  fo llow ing one, we a re  taken to a  p o in t where the  Buddha 
i s  presented  a s  i f  he could o r  might have absta ined  from h is  f in a l  
E x tinction , which would have secured mankind some "golden age", i f  i t  
had not been f o r  An an d a 's  in a b i l i ty  to  se ize  th is  opportun ity . The 
Buddha, t e l l in g  Ananda th a t "by c u lt iv a t in g  th e  fo u r  bases o f  
supernatu ral power" one could s tay  a liv e  fo r  a  cognic e ra  (kal pa) , o r  
the r e s t  o f  o n e 's  cosmic era , rece iv es  no response a t  a l l  from h is  
d is c ip le  "as i f  h is  thought was possessed by Mara". (Mara, th e  E v il 
One, i s  in  f a c t  th e  one who u ltim a te ly  g e ts  the  blame f o r  the  Buddha's 
eventual re fu sa l to  remain in  th i s  w orld .)
In  another, very s im ila r  episode ( s ix  sources) we h e a r o f
Ananda a c tu a lly  ask ing  the  Buddha to  remain in  l i f e  f o r  a  cosmic e ra ,
s u b s ta n tia tin g  and ju s t ify in g  t h i s  wish by emphasizing the  general
(51)advantage f o r  mankind. The famous d is c ip le  rep ea ts  h is  wish th re e
tim es, b u t the Buddha's rep ly  remains negative; having a lread y  decided
h is  E x tinction  (o r promised i t  to  Mara) and having re je c te d  h is  v i t a l
compositions (ayuhsamskara). i t  i s  too l a t e  now. Ananda i s  even blamed 
•  ♦
by the Buddha (q u ite  u n ty p ica lly ) f o r  no t having made h i s  req u est a t  an 
e a r l i e r  occasion when th e re  was s t i l l  tim e to  do so. (The blame i s  
again passed on to Mara.)
The manner in  which Ananda, according to  those d e sc r ip tio n s , 
makes h im self dependent on the Buddha's presence throws some lig frt on 
two d if f e r e n t  le v e ls  o f  understanding w ith in  the  Ind ian  a t t i tu d e  o f  
pessim ian. Ananda, fe e l in g  lo s t  in  an em pirical world o f  su ffe rin g , 
expresses th is  a t t i tu d e  towards l i f e  more strong ly  than ever when he 
sees th a t  the  Buddha i s  about to  leave him on h is  own. As in  many 
o th e rs , Ananda's behaviour m an ifests, on an em pirical le v e l , a general 
p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  which co n sis ts  in  s t r iv in g  f o r  some some way to  
term inate h is  own in heren t wish f o r  con tinuation . In  t h i s  regard  he 
could have resembled the Buddha, whose a t t i tu d e  rep re sen ts  a  very 
d if f e r e n t  le v e l ,  i f  i t  were n o t f o r  h is  own in a b i l i ty  to  be aware o f  
such a  d iffe ren ce . Ananda req u ests , o r  a t  le a s t  f e e ls ,  th a t  the
(51)
Bareau, B iogr.II-1 . pp. 182-189.
Buddha should have stayed  longer w ith them in  o rder to  "comfort"
then  (golden age); to  the  Buddha th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  h is  magic power
(rddhipada), i . e .  f o r  him a  non-samskaric fo ra  o f  " w ill" , to  surv ive
f o r  another e ra  would in  p rin c ip a l n o t have m attered (s ince  he was
already  Awakened). In s tead  he i s  "angered" "by Ananda's behaviour and
decides to  d isappear f o r  good by g iv in g  up h is  l iv in g  fo rce  (.i I  v i t a
samskara) . He l e t s  the  dreaded event happen, p h ilo so p h ica lly  speaking,
because Ananda had no t grasped the  essence o f th e  Buddha's a t t i tu d e .
As h is  preoccupation w ith the w orries and v ir tu e s  o f the  em pirical
world in d ic a te s , the  concern behind h is  wish th a t  the  Buddha should
stay  was no t s incere  enough* Had he, fo r  in s ta n ce , openly asked the
Buddha to  s tay  and then d ie , h is  a t t i tu d e  might have been more to  the
p o in t, more in  accordance w ith the  second le v e l  regard ing  the
understanding o f negation . The negation o f the w il l ,  a s  we encountered
i t  in  Schopenhauer, i s  in  a sense a  negative o n to lo g ica l category
(compare pp. 73, 173-174). Not so fo r  the  Buddha, which Ananda f a i l s
to  understand, in te rp re tin g  the  Buddha's behaviour more in  terms o f
some vihhavatrsna (p. 230(36)).
•  •  •
(k) The l a s t  words o f the  Buddha
Various sources re p o rt an episode in  which the Buddha, sh o rtly  before
h is  f in a l E x tinction , decides to  p re sen t h im self once more again  as the
(52)Teacher. W illing  to  c la r i f y  m atte rs  p e rso n a lly  fo r  the  l a s t  tim e, 
he addresses h is  d is c ip le s :  "Although I  am su ffe r in g  in  my body, I  am
s t i l l  capable o f d is s ip a tin g  your doubts and e rro rs"  (Chinese). I n  h is  
f in a l  words the  Buddha rep ea ts  th a t  they  should follow  the  d o c trin e , 
th a t  th is  world, inc lud ing  h im self, was su b jec t to  impermanence, th a t  
b i r th s  and deaths were t e r r ib l e ,  and th a t t h e i r  end would mean 
happiness. Ananda and the assembled monks, incapable o f g rasping  the  
Buddha's a t t i tu d e ,  have to  be to ld  by a  fe llow  monk th a t  they  should 
pu t an end to  t h e i r  lam entations, bearing  in  mind th e  law o f 
impermanence.
(52) Bareau, B iogr.II-1 . pp. 145, 149-150, 171-172.
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( 0  A popular view o f happiness and negation
* (53)At th e  occasion o f  the  Buddha's fu n era l th e  M allas a re  mentioned.
Vhat makes the  d e sc rip tio n  o f t h e i r  behaviour in te r e s t in g  to  u s , i s  the
fa c t th a t  the  a t t i tu d e  w ith which they c lin g  to  th e  apparent phenomenon
of the  Buddhist d o c trin e  -  bu t n o t i t s  content -  rep resen ts  in  a  way
the coun terpart to  i t s  essence. Their "Buddhist” fervency i s  nourished
by such fe a tu re s  o f th e  Buddha's p e rso n a lity  which they can grasp, but
which u n fo rtu n a te ly  tend to  be ex ac tly  the  tr a n s ie n t  th in g s  the Buddha
had warned o f . In  a  sense the  behaviour o f  th e  M ailas ch a rac te rizes
a th ird  le v e l o f  Buddhist "negation” , a  form which, u n lik e  Ananda's
ph ilosoph ical m isunderstanding, i s  no t ph ilo so p h ica l a t  a l l .  They
simply deplore th e  Buddha's disappearance as  th e  lo s s  o f th e i r  l iv in g
proof of happiness a t ta in a b le  through the  negation  o f th e  bad s id e  o f
ex istence.
(3 ) Spanning the  herm eneutic gap: a meta-view o f  " w ill” and "su ffe rin g ”
(a) In tc n tio n a li ty  and th e  -problem o f stopping avidya
On the  b a s is  o f th i s  re p re se n ta tiv e  b iograph ical o u tlin e  we sh a ll now 
attem pt an in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  c la s s ic a l Buddhist approach to  the 
u n sa tis fa c to ry  o r  unacceptable condition  o f human ex isten ce , in  
connection w ith th e  described  German p e ss im is tic  response. The Germans 
a l l  re a c t p e rso n a lly  to  c u ltu re , in c lu d in g  th e i r  own fo rerunners ' 
thought. On the  same b a s is  they  re a c t to  Buddhism, unaware o f the  
ac tu a l ro le  o f the  Buddha and the Buddhist th in k e rs . Ve th e re fo re  
consciously u se  th e  Buddha's "biography" a s  a  form al d o c tr inal  and 
ph ilo soph ical core o f Buddhist thought, in s te ad  o f  re so r tin g  to  a  more 
a b s tra c t se le c tio n  o f  th e  fundam entals o f  Buddhism. The Buddhist 
th in k e rs  may no t have had such a w ell-organized  "biography” to  go by, 
but they were Buddha-oriented. Ve encounter in  th e  f ig u re  o f th e  Buddha  
the prime ex em plifie r o f an em pirica l, p rocedural approach to  the  
development and transfo rm ation  o f an a—c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n  to  the  world.
The Buddha i s  a Yogi, n o t a  philosopher. He exem plifies in  h is
(53) Bareau, B iogr .II-1 . p. 175.
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capac ity  a s  the  o r ig in a l  Teacher, n o t as a  commentator. O ff ic ia l ly , 
he provides the core-concepts. Buddhist philosophy develops a f t e r  the 
Buddha, i . e .  " a n a ly tic a l” expansion fo llow s l a t e r ,  w hile he remains 
the supreme model and aim o f a l l  a sp ira tio n s . When th e  l a t e r  Buddhist 
in te rp re te r s  re a c t  p h ilo so p h ica lly  to  th e  Buddha's prim ary experience 
and o rig in a l re a c tio n  to  the  world, they do n o t modify o r  c o n tra d ic t 
the  Buddha's teach ings (s ince  th e re  cannot be any "b e tte r"  knowledge), 
b u t, a c tin g  a s  exem plifie rs  o f t h e i r  own in s ig h ts  in  accordance w ith  
th e  Buddha's teach ing , they e lab o ra te  and comment on a phenomenon 
which we have form ally  lo ca ted  in  the Buddha's "biography".
Our fo llow ing  comparative a n a ly t ic a l  remarks a re  in tended to
expose some e s s e n tia l  buddhological connections, the  awareness o f which
would probably have prompted our Germans to  reco n sid er o r  modify t h e i r
p e ss im is tic  view in  re a c tio n  to  th e  Buddhist t r a d i t io n .  C oncentrating
on the concepts o f "w ill"  and " su ffe rin g ” in  connection w ith  th e
m eta-philosophical ro le  o f c u ltu re  in  th e  Indian t r a d i t io n ,  we want
to  show why we may n o tic e  a  p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  in  connection w ith
Indian thought, h i t  no genuine p h ilo so p h ica l (m etaphysical) pessimism.
Schopenhauer's m etaphysical view accep ts  only one e s s e n tia l  category,
h is  fundamental concept o f "w ill" . Looking f o r  m eta-philo  sophical
approximations to  th i s  concept, we do in  f a c t  f in d  c e r ta in  asp ec ts  o f
w ill  im p lic i t  in  various forms o f Indian thought, bo th  in  personal
forms, fo r  example, in  te x tu a l, yogic o r  supernatu ral connections and
in  impersonal ( i . e .  sam skaric) m an ifesta tio n s .
•
The most fundamental bu t very  su b tle  a sp ec t underly ing  the
e n tire  Ind ian  t r a d i t io n  may be seen in  connection w ith  the  phenomenon
of te x ts  (p. 174). In  Ind ia  te x ts  a re  p rim arily  considered a s
e x is tin g  ab o r ig in e . reg a rd le ss , in  p r in c ip le , o f  th e  ex istence  o f
people. Ve f in d  th a t  te x tu a l m an ifesta tio n , in te rn a l  and o v ert,
depends on an ap p ro p ria te  a c t  o f phonic in te n tio n , i . e .  some impulse 
(54)o f w ill .  D escribing th i s  view in  fo u r  simple s tep s , we may
(54) -  t -  -This view i s  developed in  a very orthodox way in  the  Purva Mimamsa
(see Radhakrishnan, I n d .P h i l . I I , ch. V l). "The word i s  ever p resen t,
since the  u tte ra n c e  o f  i t  i s  only fo r  the  purpose o f manif e s t in g  i t
to  o thers" (p. 391 ) . Also c f . Coomarasvamy, H ind.a.Buddh.. p . 57.
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d is tin g o ie h : (a) "on to  lo g ic a lly " , some p rim ord ia l le v e l  o f  the
event o f the  pronouncing o f the te x t ;  (b) a  le v e l  o f  in te n tio n a l i t y  
implying an in n e r in te n tio n  o r  "w illing" to  pronounce; (c) the  phonic 
rep resen ta tio n  a s  such, as a s o r t  o f in n e r  p ronuncia tion ; (d) f in a l ly ,  
the a c tu a l o u te r  pronunciation. However, we cannot equate the sound 
and the  te x t :  the  sound ju s t  m an ifests  the  te x t  to  a  vary ing  degree.
The Veda i s  te x t ,  and so a re  the  Upanisads (by v ir tu e  o f t h e i r  s r u t i  
connection w ith the  Veda), i . e . ,  we must d i f f e r e n t ia te  between the 
aspects o f e i th e r  the  te x t o r  a te x t .  (Sbirti may then be connected 
in d ire c tly , s ince , a f t e r  a l l ,  we a re  moving w ith in  one and the  same 
Indian t r a d i t io n .)  The l e t t e r  (ak sa ra ) i s  p rim arily  sound. But, by 
the second century  A.D. in  Buddhism th e  n o tio n  o f te x t  becomes more 
s im ila r to  th a t  in  Europe: the te x t  o r ig in a lly  worshipped and d e if ie d
by the Brahmans as  the h ig h est autonomous and s e l f - s u f f ic ie n t  e n ti ty , 
i s  now fix e d , w ritten  down on palm leaves and tre a te d  a s  a  m ateria l 
book. This concrete r e a l i ty  o f the te x t  in  Buddhism c o n s ti tu te s  a new 
le v e l o f te x tu a l m an ifesta tion , only in d ir e c t ly  lin k ed  w ith the  
Brahmanical conception o f the te x t  th roug i t h e i r  common c u ltu ra l 
tra d it io n . Unlike Brahmanism, Buddhism was s c e p tic a l  a lso  v i th  
regard to  the  terms on which the  te x tu a l con ten t re s te d . A concept 
"as i t  is "  Cyatha bhutam. p. 254(73)) and assessed  on some ze ro -lev e l 
would be w ithout any a c tu a l meaning; on an o rd inary  le v e l ,  in  an 
eveiy-day contex t, i t  could have some p ra c t ic a l  meaning; and on the 
le v e l o f h ig h est importance (param a r th a j regard ing  n irvana, where i t  
would be most form al, i t  m i^ it be considered a s  having no meaning 
whatsoever ( a t  l e a s t  i n  the  case o f most th in g s ) .
In  th e  Upanisads id ea  and th in g , f o r  in s tan ce  the  thought o f 
the atman and the atman as such, a re  s t i l l  la rg e ly  the  same. But 
Buddhism, having gen era lly , and n o t ju s t  in  the  case o f te x ts ,  
separated  the  th in g  from i t s  id ea , can say th a t  th e re  i s  no atman. 
but the  idea  th e reo f i s  bad and should hence be stopped (p. 231). 
In te n tio n a l i t y  in  the case o f  the Upanisads a c tu a liz e s  o r  "w ills"  the  
te x t  inc lud ing  the  knowledge (vidya. .jnana) rep resen ted  by i t .
Buddhism separa tes these  two components and concen tra tes  on the more 
" tang ib le"  bad and negative aspect o f  knowledge, avidya. and i t s
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consequences (pratityasam utpada) in  o rder to  stop  th e  whole p rocess.
In  o th e r  words, "w illin g ” becomes concerned le s s  w ith  the th in g  a s  
such than w ith the  th in k in g  in  connection w ith  i t ,  i . e .  w ith  the 
understanding o r  the non-understanding Cinana o r  avidya) re sp ec tiv e ly .
This process involves in te n tio n a l i t y  on a very  personal b a s is . From 
a n e u tra l p o in t o f  view we may be unable to  see r e a l i ty .  Hence,
Buddhign approaches the  problem w ith  the  assumption th a t  avidya may be 
considered as the only  b asic  form of r e a l i ty .  Since avidya cannot be 
abolished and one cannot get ou t o f i t ,  one must stop  i t .  In  o rd e r to  
do so, one has to  work back from the  f in a l  consequences o f avidya such 
a s  su ffe rin g . This im plies an appeal to  be c le v e re r  than one has been 
so f a r  o r , perhaps, c le v e re r  regard ing  th i s  p r in c ip le  o f avidya. In  
Buddhian each endeavour inc ludes the e lim in a tio n  o f c e r ta in  elem ents 
while proceeding backwards from e f fe c t  to  cause. However, w hile avidya 
as such -  u n lik e  Schopenhauer's w il l  -  lack s  any dynamic aspec t, th is  
ty p ic a lly  Buddhist and q u ite  un-European approach follow s a d i s t in c t ly  
p ra c tic a l  o r ie n ta tio n .
The Buddha's c u ltu ra l  in d iffe ren c e , a s  compared to  the
Schopenhauerian concern, was i l lu s t r a t e d  by th e  episode o f the encounter
w ith the courtesans (pp. 233-234). The Buddha does n o t r e je c t  Am rap a l l
because she h e rs e lf ,  o r  h e r  deceptive beauty a s  such, i s  "bad” , b u t
because she fu nc tions as a  serious d is t r a c t io n  in  a  m eta-psyehological
sense. By y ie ld in g  to  th e  im pressions received  from sensual beauty we
feed  somehow the  chain o f  Dependent O rig in a tio n  in s tead  o f stopping  the
(55)whole process. For Schopenhauer n a tu re 's  deception  p ra c tise d
th rou^ i sh o rtliv ed  female beauty i s  ano ther p roof f o r  the  to ta l  
u selessness o f the  w il l  and i t s  m an ife sta tio n s . This inc ludes, 
u ltim a te ly , h is  own deceivable i n t e l l e c t ,  which, a t  b e s t ,  may expose 
the nature  o f th e  deceptive mechanign. In  Buddhiga th i s  whole id ea  o f
flimlri (s tu d ie s , p . 12l) mentions th a t  according  to  the 
Lankavatara the  Buddha, ru lin g  out maya as  th e  f i n a l  cause f o r  th i s  
kind o f e rro r , exp lains, "whatever f a u l t s  th e re  a re  in  connection w ith 
th is  erroneous world come from the c lin g in g  o f  the ignorant to  th a t 
which i s  no th ing  b u t delusion o f th e i r  own minds".
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contem plating the  ug ly  (here in  connection v i th  th e  b e a u tifu l)  may 
be ranked as  a  m ed ita tio n s! device, whereas Schopenhauer re a c ts  to  
a  p r in c ip a l c u ltu ra l  imprisonment, to  vhich must u ltim a te ly  be added 
h is  m etaphysical-anthropological confinement. Gebser, in  comparison, 
i s  in  a  b e t te r  p o s itio n  to  accept such imprisonment, to g e th e r v i th  
a  h is to r ic a l  confinement, due to a c e r ta in  c u ltu ra l  comfort derived 
from h is  id ea  o f transparency, vhich allow s him to  s e t t l e  th e  problem 
in  a more c o n c ilia to ry  manner.
(b) Yogic in te n t io n a l i ty :  m odifica tion  o f  v o l i t io n a l  im pulses
From a Buddhist p o in t o f view yogic methods might enable a  person to  
see c e r ta in  th ings as they r e a l ly  a re  (something vhich o rd inary  people 
cannot do). In  o rd er to  achieve th is ,  such a  person i s  b e lieved  to  
change, in  q u ite  a  p ra c t ic a l  sense, h is  s ta t e  o f  consciousness in  
connection v i th  c e r ta in  dhazmas. ( ih e  dhazmas c o n s ti tu te  one o f  the
_  (eg)
basic  o b jec ts  o f  the  smrtyunasthana. pp. 254-235.) These would
(57)f i r s t  be used in  an experim ental sp ecu la tiv e  manner vhich mig£it
eventually  lead  to  some yogic experience. Ih is  event, leav in g  
a p e rso n 's  language and mode o f expression e s s e n tia l ly  unchanged, i s  
considered to  transform  h is  p e rso n a lity  so as  to  enable him to see 
the un iverse  d if f e r e n tly . However, n o t in  tezms o f  transcenden tal 
ca teg o ries  (as M ainlander wrongly assumed, p . 96) b u t a s  a d if f e r e n t  
person in  p ra c tic e .
Mrs. Ehys Davids (Dhamma-Sangani. p . x l i )  r e f e r s  to  th e  dhammas a s  
such as  " s ta te s  o f  consciousness". The Dhammapada ( l . l ;  Batihakrishnan, 
p . 38) d ec la res  th a t  " the  mental n a tu re s . . .a re  made up o f th o u ^ its" , 
i . e .  a l l  dhammas a re  mind-made. Conze (Thought, p . 95) p re sen ts  the  
dhazmas. o r  " compounded th ings" , o n to lo g ic a lly  as  o b je c tiv e  d a ta , " i . e .  
the ob jec ts  o r  supports o f mind vhich i s  reckoned a s  the  s ix th  
sense-organ (c f . our p. 232). He comments (p. 103) th a t  "as the  
supreme a n tid o te  to  the  b e l ie f  in  a 's e l f ' ' ,  th e  dharm a-theory m u s t... 
explain vhat a c tu a lly  happens on the assumption th a t th e  ' s e l f '  i s  n o t 
an ac tiv e  o r  a c tu a l fa c to r" .
(57) Conze (Thought, p . 47) exp lains th e  p ra c t ic a l  ro le  o f  f a i th  
(sraddha) as a  merely p ro v is io n a l s tep . Cf. ou r p . 22(29).
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The most e lab o ra te  formal re fe ren ce  to  "w ill"  in  Buddhism 
appears v i th  the  development o f  the  skandha subsystem which d iv id e s  
the dhanaag in to  f iv e  groups (p. 230(36) ) .  The fo u rth  group, th a t  o f
the  samskaras. rep re sen ts  the concept vhich in te r e s t s  u s  in  connection
* —  ( S B )v ith  w ill .  The samskaras (m en tal com positions, o r  "synerg ies '1 ) may
perhaps be described  a s  a  group of v o lit io n a l im pulses v i th  an
o p era tional fu n c tio n  o f w ill .  They p la y  th e  w i l l 's  ro le  w ithout be ing
w ill as such. From a  Schopenhauerian p o in t o f view, t h i r s t  ( t r s n a ) .
•  ♦ •
concupiscence (knma) and adherence to  ex isten ce  (the  upadanas) -  vhich 
ve have found in  the  pratityasam utpada (along v i th  a  more an cien t
concept o f th e  samskaras vhich ve a re  p re sen tly  n o t concerned v ith ,
\ * (59)p. 228; -  a re  l ia b le  to  be -  wrongly -  equated w ith th e  w ill .
A bstaining from any such d ire c t  equations, ve would r a th e r  m eta-describe
both  the Schopenhauerian w ill and the saw skaric v i l l  a s  w ill  vhich i s
involved in  the o r ig in a tio n  o f su ffe r in g  in  connection v i th  some
blindness o r  ignorance. This v i l l  a lso  con tains the  hidden p o te n tia l
o f  "un-w illing" -  i .  e . e i th e r  negating  o r  stopping -  any form o f
d is s a t is fa c t io n  o r  su ffe rin g .
A ll o rd inary , normal in te n t io n a l i ty  in  Buddhist thought i s  
samskaric. But since  th e  concept o f samskaras i s  much broader than the• m
(58) This term was suggested by Mrs. Hhys Davids, see Dhamma-Sangani. 
p . x i. Cf. bhava and "m ore-v ill" , o u r p . 227(30).
Von Glasenapp, Indb. , p . 92; he f in d s  (p. 94) th a t  th e  only th in g  
"common to  both  an c ien t Buddhisn and Schopenhauer's th o u ^ it, a p a r t from 
generally  Indian  views and the re je c t io n  o f th e  id eas  o f Cod and sou l, 
i s  the b e l ie f  th a t  i t  i s  the  l i f e -a f f irm in g  v o l i t io n a l  fo rc e s , the  
karma-producing samskaras. which b rin g  about a  new ex istence  v i th  a  new 
in d iv idua l consciousness" (a lso  c f . W eisheit. p . 37). He ignores th a t  
karma ig  no t "produced" by the samskaras. i t  ju s t  presupposes them.
This m isunderstanding i s  a lready  found in  M ainlander (our pp. 94-95).
Conze (Thought,  p . 104) merely d e -in d iv id u a lizes  the  is su e : "In  f a c t
th e re  i s  ac tio n  (karma) . bu t no agent (karaka) . Our responsib le
ac tio n s  are  n o t the  work o f a ' s e l f ' ,  b u t o f  the  c o n s titu e n ts  o f  the
fo u rth  skandha" ( i . e .  the samskaras).
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no tion  o f  w il l ,  our comparison r e s t r i c t s  i t s e l f  to  those asp ec ts  
which can be brought n e a re s t to  w il l  a s  i t  has in te re s te d  a s  so f a r .
One a sp ec t i s  conscious and completely pe rso n al, w hile ano ther i s  
im personal, although revealed on a personal le v e l . Samskaric w il l  can 
be seen as impersonal v o litio n a l impulses corresponding to  a  c e r ta in  
ex ten t w ith the innate  d riv e  to  go on fo llow ing  the  in e r t i a  n a tu ra l to  
the  elem entary processes of l i f e .  On th e  personal s id e  the s i tu a tio n  
i s  e s s e n tia l ly  the same, although in  the l i g h t  o f  the  Buddha's 
biography we can specify  various types o r  le v e ls  o f  personal 
in te n tio n a l! ty . The personal p r in c ip le  o r  form could be described in  
terms o f sane h igh ly  conscious, super-conscious w il l ;  i t  could a lso  be 
connected w ith sexual o r o th e r in d iv id u a lized  d riv e s , ind iv idual energy 
(v iry a . pp. 220, 222), o r  in d iv id u a l working, perhaps even to  
Buddhahood.
Thus, from a Buddhist p o in t o f  view, Brahmanical phonic
te x tu a l in te n t io n a l i ty  would be superseded by some yogic . perhaps
even pre-buddhic. in te n tio n a li ty . S im ila rly  the  m agical,
quasi-superna tu ra l kind o f in te n t io n a l i ty  (im plied in  Ananda's request
th a t  th e  Buddha should prolong h is  l i f e )  would, l ik e  yogic
in te n tio n a li ty , appear as one o f co n tro lled  samskaras. But the Buddha's
in te n t io n a l i ty  i s  a  kind o f pure in te n t io n a l i ty ,  th a t  i s  to  say
sam skara-less. For the Buddha i t  a l l  tu rn s  in to  a  problem of
decision  (pranidhana), since h is  sam skaric in te n t io n a l i ty ,  h i s  d e s ire ,
— 1---------  (6 l)was alm ost exhausted. Ihe Buddha's u ltim a te  in te n t io n a l i ty  cannot
be described  in  any d u a l is t ic  manner, in c lu d in g  any form of re fe ren ce
Schmithausen (L eidh.. p . 924) e lab o ra te s  th a t  the  un lim ited
con tinuation  o f  the  Buddha's a c t iv i ty  on ea r th  would have c a lle d  f o r
a  s e c to r  w ithin the conditioned world which would have been in  no way
subjected  to  metaphysical u n iv e rsa l su ffe rin g  (samskara duhkhata) .
• •
Regarding the  f e a s ib i l i ty  o f such a  d ec is io n , Be ch e rt (H i.-Buddh.. 
p . 4) remarks th a t Nn o t th e  in te n tio n a l d ec is io n s  
(W illensentscheidungen) , but the ex te rn a l circum stances o f  a be ing  
a re  determined by h is  karma".
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(62)to  th e  skandhas* His tra n s -sam skaric decision, transcends arty 
personal i s t i c  negation . l e t ,  a s  f a r  a s  th e  problem o f v i l l  in  Buddhisn 
i s  concerned, o u r a n a ly s is  can p en e tra te  to  i t  only in  the course o f 
an in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the  samskaras* they  rep re sen t f o r  us a  fundamental 
in te rp re ta t iv e  device.
rIhe c e n tra l  s ig n ifican ce  o f the  v i l l  in  Schopenhauer makes i t  
necessary  to  expose some kind o f correspondent sphere in  Buddhisn. 
However, s t r i c t l y  speaking, th e re  i s  no " in te n tio n a li ty "  among a c tu a l 
Buddhist concepts. The re s u lt in g  herm eneutic problem i s  ch arac te rized  
by th e  f a c t  th a t  such a  concept e x is ts  only in  our vocabulary and from 
a Western p o in t o f  view. 'Oie samskaras a re  a  la rg e  sphere which, in  
some non-conceptual manner, could con tain  " in te n tio n a li ty " :  i t  i s  th e
very sphere where th e  Buddha leav es  something behind o r  "negates" 
something -  i . e . ,  where he takes the  step  vhich w arrants our comparison. 
But, from sane merely asym ptotical correspondence o f  c e r ta in  samskaric 
aspec ts  to  " in te n tio n a li ty "  we cannot conclude th a t  i t  a c tu a lly  e x is ts  
w ith in  the sphere o f  samskaras. " In te n tio n a lity "  serves us a s  an 
ind ispensab le  herm eneutic lin k , marked by the  incongru ity  o f i t s  one 
ro le  as  a  very im portant c en tra l concept in  Schopenhauer v i th  i t s  o th e r  
ro le  as  a  non-conceptual, m arginally  im portant, p e rip h e ra l aspect 
in  Buddhism.
(c) S uffering
Schopenhauer's o n to lo g ica l d e sc rip tio n  o f  th e  ro le  o f the v i l l  in c lu d in g  
th e  i l lu s o ry  ch a rac te r  o f  the  un iverse  provide a  d i s t in c t  ph ilo so p h ica l 
(m etaphysical) b a s is  fo r  h is  c u ltu ra lly  in sp ired  pessimism. I f  ve vere
(63)to  in te rp re ts  Buddhign. e n tir e ly  from h is  p o in t of view, o r  even in  
some gen era lly  European manner, the  whole conception o f su ffe rin g  in  
samsara could be assessed  as p e ss im is tic  p a r  excellence . (S im ila rly ,
(62) Suzuki (S tud ies, p . 136) says th a t  " the  essence o f  Buddahood i s  
n e i th e r  o f  th e  skandhas n o r no t o f  them, n e i th e r  d esc rib ab le  n o r 
inde sc r ib ab le "•
( 63) Conze (P a r a l le ls , pp. 18-20) g ran ts  him "numerous, and almost 
m iraculous, coincidences v ith  the  b a s ic  te n e ts  o f  Buddhist philosophy".
the  e a r ly  buddhologists considered Buddhisn a s  p e ss im is tic  because
they  could n o t see how nirvana could have been achieved p r a c t ic a l ly . )
However, Buddhisn looks a t  su ffe r in g  and the  d e riv a tio n  o f su ffe r in g
from q u ite  a  d if f e r e n t  angle and w ith  a  very  d if f e r e n t  o b jec tiv e .
S uffe ring  i s ,  a long  w ith the  n o n -se lf  and inpermanence (duhkha -
an ity a  -  anatman. p . 231), one o f th e  th ree  fundamental Buddhist
p r in c ip le s  o r  marks (laksana) o f  th e  un iv erse  (although n o t an aspec t 
» (64) *o f r e a l i ty  as  such;. But, a p a r t from being tre a te d  as some
fundamental, q u asi-o n to lo g ica l p r in c ip le , i t  can, q u ite  independently, 
a lso  appear in  a  derived form, namely, derived  from avidya. (Somewhat 
s im ila rly , Hegel would, ap a rt from the  m a te ria l cause he sees, deduce 
man's su ffe r in g  from n o t being  aware o f  o r  be ing  incapable o f  see ing  
h is  own ignorance: remember H eg el's  expressive r e s t r i c t io n  o f  the
Indian mind to  a le v e l  o f "dreaming1' . )  As regards the  form er, the 
fundamental asp ec t o f  su ffe rin g , we must be aware th a t  i t  does no t 
rep resen t a  t r u ly  on to lo g ica l p r in c ip le . As opposed to  Schopenhauer, 
and Hegel, who a re  decidedly o n to lo g ica l, Buddhism i s  ab so lu te ly  
non-on to log ica l. This was no t no ticed  by Schopenhauer (see our remark 
on Ananda's f a i lu r e  to  understand the  Buddha, p. 237)* Gebser, a lso , 
conceived o f  " th a t r e t r e a t  in to  the  cave" and "the wish f o r  a  re v e rsa l 
o f b ir th "  on a s t r i c t l y  on to lo g ica l b a s is , no tw ithstanding  h is  p a r t ly  
m isapplied c u ltu ra l  and h is to r ic a l  c a teg o rie s . Like Schopenhauer,
Baegg (study, p . 6) d iscards th e  term "p ess im is tic " , p o in tin g  out
th a t w ith  a  view to th is  t r ia d ,  duhkha "denotes n o t only '  su ffe r in g ' in
the  ord inary  sense bu t a lso  th a t  which i s  'u n s a t is fa c to ry ' from the
p h ilo so p h ica l p o in t o f  v iew ...an d  i t  comprises no t only sensa tions
th a t  a re  p a in fu l bu t a lso  those th a t a re  p leasan t and n e u tra l" . In
h is  a r t i c l e  on L e id h a ftig k e it. Schmi than sen d iscusses the complex
tr a d i t io n  o f  a  t r i p le  conception o f su ffe r in g  (according to  sources
l a t e r  than those o f  th e  Sermons), which, d is tin g u ish es  between a p a in fu l
su ffe r in g  (duhkha-duhkhata) , a su ffe r in g  as  a  consequence o f  the
•  •
decline  o f  p leasu re  (vinarinama-duhkhata) . and the  a c tu a l
•  •
"metaphysical" su ffe r in g  c h a rac te riz in g  a l l  o rig in a te d  ex istence  
due to i t s  transience (sam skara-duhkhata).
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Gebser e s s e n tia l ly  sees an on to lo g ica l negation  in  the  Buddha's 
d o c trin e  exem plified "not so much by l iv in g  i t  b u t ra th e r  by dying 
i t "  (compare p. 148). Schopenhauer n ever in te rp re te d  Ind ia
psycho log ica lly  (as compared to  a B r it is h  em p iric is t persp ec tiv e  in  
vhich th e  image o f  In d ia  would have c e r ta in ly  included some 
psychological and p o ssib ly  "occult" a sp e c ts ) ; h is  conception o f the  
changeless w il l  rep re sen ts  e s s e n tia l ly  an i d e a l i s t i c ,  n o n -em piric is t 
re f le c t io n  o f c u l tu ra l  change and, only in  th i s  sense, h is to r ic a l  
change. Gebser, who i s  ch a rac te ro lo g ica lly  and h i s to r ic a l ly  q u ite  
aware o f  the psychological and even th e  o c c u lt , does n o t look f o r  any 
e m p iric is t p a tte rn s  e i th e r .
In  o rd e r to  fo llow  the  im p lica tio n s  o f  th e  derived asp ec t
o f avidya we l ik e  to  re c a l l  th a t  the  Buddha s tre ssed  a l l  p o ssib le
(66)in s tan ces  o f  su ffe rin g , " i l l " ,  in  a l l  l iv in g  beings. At th i s  p o in t
i t  i s  im portant to  n o tic e  th a t  su ffe rin g  -  th e  observation  o f su ffe r in g  -  
prompts th e  Buddhist outlook, bu t does n o t cause i t .  The Buddha said  
th a t  su ffe r in g  (duhkha) i s  the f i r s t  r e s u l t  o f u n iv e rsa l ignorance 
(avidya). Ve have seen th a t ,  according to  th e  pratityasam utpada. 
avidya i s  th e  f i r s t  l in k  in  an in terpenden t chain, duhkha th e  l a s t  
l in k . I t  i s  exac tly  th i s  connection, viewed in  te n ts  o f s t r i c t  
c a u sa lity , which in te r e s t s  the Buddhist in  an ex tern a l q u asi-o b jec tiv e  
manner. In  o th e r words, we could say th a t  he i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  a Buddhist 
because he has found o r  e s tab lish ed  the connection between those l in k s , 
i . e . ,  he makes a  quasi-phenomenological in v e s tig a tio n , whereas, in  
c o n tra s t, Schopenhauer pursues h is  own fundamental connection w ith th e  
th in g  a s  such. The Schopenhauerian p ess im is t, s im ila r  to  the  
C h ris tian , a r r iv e s  a t  h is  s p e c if ic  conv iction  because o f  su ffe rin g , 
i . e . ,  because o f  h is  personal experience o f  i t .
(65)v Gebser, U.G.. p . 49.
(66) Conze (b o u g h t, pp. 35-36) comments: "For th e  beginner i t  can
mean th a t  a l l  h is  experience i s  a lso  i l l ,  i . e .  th a t  i t  i s  in  some w^y 
o r o th e r  connected w ith su ffe rin g  and unp leasan t f e e l in g s . . . .What i s  
in  question  i s  th e  u n iv e rs a li ty  o f  i l l . "  He adds th a t  "on the  second 
stage , th e  world i s  regarded as predom inantly i l l " ,  u n t i l ,  f in a l ly ,  
he has " th e  in s ig h t th a t  every th ing  conditioned i s  t o ta l ly  i l l " .
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Thinking o f  Seneca's philosophy in  th i s  co n tex t, ve 
n o tice  gone seeming, h u t su p e r f ic ia l  resemblance v i th  Buddhism. Apart 
from a c e r ta in  S to ic  detachment from th e  p h y sica l a sp ec ts  o f  l i f e  
(a  s im ila r i ty  which had fa sc in a ted  Spengler so much), Seneca ( l ik e  
Hegel) a lso  sees some connection between su ffe r in g  and ignorance, o r  
ra th e r  th e  lack  o f  r ig h t  knowledge. S u ffe rin g  f o r  him i s  in  f a c t  some 
fona o f cosmic language. But w hile th e  core o f  Buddhism i s  no t th e  
su ffe r in g  a s  such, b u t the  estab lishm ent o f the  causa l connection, in  
Seneca's philosophy su ffe r in g  s t r ik e s  us a s  a  m a tte r o f id e a lize d  
personal experience, w ith  d i s t in c t  re fe ren ce  to  h im self as  the  su ffe rin g  
sub jec t. The Buddhist r e fe r s  to  su ffe r in g  a s  i f  i t  were someone e l s e 's ,  
no t h is ,  and by no means a f fe c t in g  any personal s e l f .  O bjectively  
pessimism i s  n o t deducible from su ffe rin g , b u t from a  personal o r  
h is to r ic a l  experience o f th i s  world (Seneca, th e  C h ris tia n s , th e  
Schopenhauerians). In  Buddhism th e re  cannot be any p u re ly  personal 
p e s s im ia , n o r any h is to r ic a l  pessimism (s in ce  the  Buddhist view i s  
detached, o pera ting  w ith  an uncon trasted  general n o tio n  o f  the  Indian 
cu ltu re  (p . 16) ) .
I f  we now look a t  the  o th e r  aspec t o f duhkha. th a t  o f being
a  fundamental p r in c ip le , we observe th a t  in  Buddhisn su ffe r in g  i s  o ften
s ta ted  merely in  terms o f a  pure ly  e x is te n t ia l  f a c t .  In  th a t  sense
someone would become a  member o f the Buddhist o rd e r (sangba) a f t e r  and
not because of su ffe rin g . N e ith e r the  f a c to r s  which produce su ffe r in g
(uuadana) n o r su ffe r in g  i t s e l f  (duhkha) can be abo lished . But th e
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production can be stopped, by, f o r  in s ta n ce , understanding . However, 
in  th is  case th e re  i s  no causal connection: becoming mature co incides
w ith the understanding  o f  o n e 's  su ffe rin g . Ve m ight f in d  in  Buddhism 
some remote p a r a l le l  to pessimism in  connection w ith  th e  disappointm ent 
which could occur as a  concomitant o f  th i s  event o f m aturation  (and 
which would imply th a t  th e re  was o r ig in a l ly  some hope o r  personal 
b e l ie f ) .  Suffering , which, in  any case i s  n o t deducible from 
disappointm ent (compare p . 226), i s  h e re  endowed v i th  a  q uasi- 
on to lo g ica l s ta tu s . This shows how we must a lso  consider su ffe rin g , 
a p a r t from i t s  derived form, from a  non-em pirical a sp ec t, i . e .  su ffe r in g  
as a  p r in c ip le . In  Europe these would have been deduced from one
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another. In  Buddhism they a re  d iscussed  s id e  by s id e , in  a  p a r a l le l  
manner. This means th a t  ve can ta lk  about suffering- reg a rd le ss  o f 
anybody's fe e lin g s . Schopenhauer's cu ltu ra lly  a ff irm a tiv e  negation (h is  
pessimism) p ro je c ts  h is  m etaphysical d e riv a tio n  o f  su ffe r in g  onto 
h im self personally . The Buddhist th in k e r vho has no a c tu a l contempt 
f o r  mankind, since  he i s  n o t in  co n tac t, hence n o t in  opposition , v i th  
th e  ordinary  man, u ses  th e  personal experience f o r  a  c u l tu ra l ly  n e u tra l  
negation vhich u ltim a te ly  by-passes any personal s e l f .  In  Buddhisn 
th e re  i s  no concept o f  pessimism because i t  i s  n o t deduced. In  vhich 
manner i t  could have been deduced on the  b a s is  o f  & su b jec tiv e  a c tiv a tio n  
o f  the la te n t  presence o f cu ltu re  sh a ll be suggested by the  fo llow ing  
remarks.
(d) L ib era tio n  from c u ltu re
Ve have no evidence th a t  th in k in g  as  such should be any d i f f e r e n t  in
d if fe re n t  c u ltu re s . But, by looking a t  t r a d i t io n  a s  a  mode o f
in s tru c tio n  ra th e r  than o f th ink ing , ve may become avare o f c e r ta in
meaningful c u ltu ra l  components in  the  various ro le s  o f  su ffe r in g  o r,
more generally , o f th e  negative s id e  o f  th e  u n iv e rse . In  doing  so ve
must look upon the  concept o f c u ltu re  a s  a term o f r e f le c t io n  (p. 12),
n ea re r to  se lf-consciousness than to  self-knovledge. Regarding c u ltu re ,
ve u su a lly  confuse ou r sphere o f h a b its , a t t i tu d e s ,  b e l ie f s  e tc . and the
sphere o f  our re f le c t io n s  o f  c u ltu re  (v i th  a l l  " i t s "  and my h a b i ts ) .
(67)Die Buddha, o f f i c i a l ly  w ithout any p h ilo so p h ica l an teceden ts , 
s tre s s e s  em pirical consciousness (v ijn an a . pp. 227, 231) -  d is reg a rd in g  
any c u ltu ra l  r e f le c t io n s  -  a s  the  c h ie f  reason f o r  g e t t in g  r id  o f  the  
un iverse . (Whereas in  someone l ik e  M ainlander t h i s  would be a  m a tte r 
o f personal d isg u s t.)  This means th a t  in  an e ra  which had no conscious 
idea  o f cu ltu re  to  begin v i th ,  the  Buddha took an e x p l ic i t ly ,  n o t ju s t  
im p lic itly , a - c u ltu ra l  stance. Die ensuing psycho-socio log ical 
repercussions d i r e c t ly  helped the form ation o f some s ta te  and concept
(ffr) Conze (Thought, p . 30) v r i t e s :  " B it te r  and in c re d ib le  as  i t  must
seem to  the contemporary mind, Buddhism bases i t s e l f  f i r s t  o f a l l  on 
Ihe rev e la tio n  o f  th e  Truth by an om niscient being, known a s  ' t h e  Buddha', 
and secondly on the s p i r i tu a l  in tu i t io n  o f  s a in t ly  b e in g s ."
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in  the sense o f a  c u ltu re , superseding th e  p rev io u s ly  e x is t in g  
(unconscious) version  o f  th e  c u ltu re  ( i . e . ,  the Brahmans became aware 
o f themselves a s  possessing  & c u ltu re  v i th  i t s  own d i s t in c t  q u a l i t ie s  
and which was p a ra lle le d  by the c u ltu re s  o f the  B uddhists, th e  
A jlv ikas, the  N irgranthas (Ja inas) and o th e rs  ) .  P h ilo so p h ica lly , 
however, Buddhism develops no su b jec tiv e  sense f o r  c u ltu re  a t  a l l ,  and
hence remains n o n -cu ltu ra l in  i t s  in s tru c t io n . I f  changes o f  the  mode
o f in s tru c tio n , i . e .  w ith in  the t r a d i t io n ,  appear to  u s  a s  c u ltu ra l ,  
th i s  i s  on ly  so because o u r h a b itu a l p o in t o f  view i s  c u ltu ra l .  
According to  c u r m eta-philosophical p resu p p o sitio n s  we must overcome 
cu ltu re  -  through c u ltu re  awareness and as a  m eta-ob ject o f change -  in  
o rder to  be ab le  to  th in k  p h ilo so p h ica lly . But from a  Buddhist p o in t 
o f view, only on bare ground can th in g s  happen, th e re fo re , we n o tice  
in  Buddhissa a  fundamental need to  g e t r id  o f (o b jec tiv e ) c u ltu re  as  the 
form o r  substance which su s ta in s  em pirical consciousness, ra th e r  than 
to  dwell on i t  and develop i t .  I t  i s  the  Buddhist s t r iv in g  f o r  the  
cessation  o f su ffe rin g  which, in  re q u ir in g  a to t a l  l ib e ra t io n  o f
thought, im plies f i r s t  o f a l l  the l ib e ra t io n  from c u ltu re .
In  q u ite  a  d if f e r e n t  way, Schopenhauer, Vagner, N ietzsche a lso  
t r y  to  abo lish  values which a re  c u ltu ra l .  A ll happen to  th ink  in  an 
a -c u ltu ra l  manner, b u t only inasmuch a s  they  a re  n o t com pletely aware 
th a t they  a c tu a lly  re a c t  in  the in te r e s t  o f t h e i r  personal negative  
outlooks on European c u ltu re , r a th e r  than in  o rd e r to  secure some 
indispensab le  p re re q u is ite  f o r  t h e i r  th in k in g  proper. Q uite openly, 
N ietzsche and Spengler, and to  some degree even Gebser, worry about 
c u ltu re . E x p lic it ly , a l l  th ree  take  the  t r a d i t io n  o f  in s tru c tio n  
as c u ltu ra lly  and n a tu ra lly  given ( im p lic i t ly  we a lread y  f in d  th i s  
in  H egel). Socrates, too , a s  many o th e r  European ph ilosophers, f e e ls  
th a t  cu ltu re  i s  always p re sen t, b u t he t r i e s  to  d isp e rse  i t s  in flu en ce  
in  the in te r e s t  o f h is  own p h ilo so p h ica l th in k in g , which promotes 
a  p o s itiv e  personal outlook.
(68) Cf. Asokan p i l l a r  e d ic t  no. VII (S irc a r , I n s c r ip t . . p . 75).
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(c) The role o f Yoga
From our m eta-position  we can say th a t  Buddhiat wants to  do away w ith  
a l l  c u ltu ra l o b jec ts  because th e i r  r e f le c t io n s  occupy ou r em pirical 
consciouaiess. The stopping o f  a l l  r e f le c t iv e  p rocesses in c lu d in g  
th e i r  ob jective  c u ltu ra l  im p lica tions i s  one o f  th e  « i n  aims o f 
Buddhist Toga (compare smrtyupasthana. p . 235)* U ltim ate ly  i t  amounts 
to  a  lib e ra tio n  o f  thought since by stopping  those re f le c t io n s  an
(69)in n e r  and mental process i s  d iscontinued  and f i n a l ly  a n n ih ila ted , 
to g e th er with a l l  c u ltu ra l re f le c tio n s . But th e re  e x is ts  no conscious 
aim in  Yoga to  depart from cu ltu re , o r, more p re c ise ly , to  stop 
"musing” (dhi.inana) upon cu ltu re .
B'uddhist Yoga, and yoga in  g en era l, has remained something 
h igh ly  a -c u ltu ra l.  I t  never intended to  achieve consciously  any 
c u ltu ra l  re s u lts  o r  to  analyse thought in  t e n s  o f c u ltu re  a s  we a re  
doing i t  here. Our se lec ted  German p e rsp ec tiv e s  have shown th a t ,  in  
a  Western context, our c u ltu ra l achievements can be looked a t  a s  i f  
something had been n a tu ra lly  given to  u s , o r  a s  i f  we had in h e rite d  
something in  a  quasi-genetic  manner. In  th i s  sense a l l  o f our id eas  
could be reduced to  p rim arily  c u ltu ra l ly  given th in g s , i . e .  in  terms 
o f c u ltu ra l  c au sa lity  (as could, p r a c t ic a l ly  speaking, our s p i r i tu a l  
o r  philosophical "success"). Ihe Buddha t r i e d  to  do away with
According to  Conze (Thought, p . 58)t the  yogin* 3 den ial o f th i s  
world as  i t  appears depends on the degree o f  h i s  d i s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith 
th e  conditioned world and h is  consequent move towards th e  unconditioned 
world, while " fo r a  long time h is  id ea  o f N irvana i s  n e c e ssa r ily  
p ro v is io n a l and rudimentary". Conze assumes "two o b je c tiv e ly  e x is t in g  
and mutually exclusive po les -  the ever-changing f iv e  skandhas and th e  
e v e rla s tin g  Nirvana which r e s u lts  from t h e i r  ce ssa tio n " .
"Musing" (P a li: .jhana) i s  a term much favoured by Mrs. Rhys Davids 
to  describe two co n tra s tin g  asp ec ts  o f r e f le c t io n :  a  l a t e r  monkish 
"way o f so worsening sense th a t the muser became a lread y  dead to  the  
world, dead indeed to  any world"; and, f o r  th e  Buddha, " i t  was to  be 
so in te n t on the quickening o f ou r o th e r  s e n se s .. .  f i t l y  c a lled  
Rupa-jhana, musing of the next worlds" (Gotama. pp. 139-140).
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c u ltu ra l achievements (which he d id  n o t know o r  about which he was 
no t concerned under th i s  p a r t ic u la r  a sp e c t) ; namely, in  h i s  lo g ic
propaedeutics concerning the system atic s topp ing  o f  r e f le c t iv e
(7 l)
procedures. What appears as the negative  asp ec t o f Toga,
e sp e c ia lly  Buddhist Toga, regard ing  these  r e f le c t iv e  procedures must 
have been ab so lu te ly  n e u tra l  w ith regard  to  th e  im plied t r i v i a l  c u ltu ra l  
o b jec ts  (reg a rd le ss  o f whether they  were a c tu a l o r  p o te n tia l  ones).
A ll were l e f t  behind, o r  made i r r e le v a n t ,  a s  we have sa id .
I f ,  in  the  in te r e s t  o f our meta-view, we change our 
perspective  s l ig h t ly  so as to  look a t  the  c h a rac te r o f our own 
d iscussion , we come to  re a l iz e  th a t  th i s  n e u tr a l i ty  o r , su b jec tiv e ly , 
non-existence o f  th e  c u ltu ra l  aspect in  Toga must n o t dominate our 
cu ltu re  awareness. Consequently, we might f e e l  tempted to  asks should 
we, o r must we, in  o ld e r  to  ge t a t  the  core o f In d ian  Yoga (qua yogin 
as i t  were) disband our own cu ltu re , o r become a cc u ltu ra te d , o r no th ing  
o f the lik e?  Yet, f o r  a l l  p ra c tic a l  purposes th i s  e n t i r e  question 
should never have been asked in  th is  manner, simply, because i t  tends 
to  exert i t s  own immediate c u ltu ra l  fo rce . (Compare B h a ra t i 's  a ttem pt 
o f c u ltu ra l s e lf -q u a l i f ic a t io n , and, p . 215, o u r own conscious 
c u ltu ra l d is q u a l i f ic a t io n .) In  o th e r words, the  c h a rac te r  q u a lity  
o f our re f le c tio n , i . e .  the c u ltu ra l  element in  i t ,  must be e lim inated  -  
irre sp e c tiv e  o f our c u ltu ra l  o b jec tiv e  -  i f  our herm eneutic movement 
i s  to  take u s  beyond the s tru c tu ra l  foundations o f our own approach.
This consciousness o f ou r m etaphysical s e lf -a p p lic a t io n , w ith in  o u r 
hermeneutic consciouaiess, i s  i t s e l f  m etaphysical (which means n o t 
developmental). P ra c t ic a l ly ,  we can look a t  i t  a s  something 
in tu i t iv e  (p. 22) which p o te n tia l ly  may come about w ithout any yogic 
e f fo r t ,  bu t simply in  the manner o f  a  spontaneous Awakening. But when 
we r e fe r  to Awakening a s  th e  r e s u l t  o f yogic proceedings, a s  the
(71) The Buddha's Noble E ightfo ld  Path  (ou r pp. 229-230) rep re sen ts  in  
a way the f i r s t  known in te g ra l  Yoga system (c f . Werner, Yoga, 
pp. 120-130}. H e ile r  (V ers., p . 46) mentions th a t  "Yoga technique
has had i t s  r ic h e s t  development in  Buddhism, although in  th e  an c ien t 
Buddhist te x ts  we come acro ss  the word Yoga only very ra re ly * .
r i s in g  o f  b o d h ic itta , we observe consciousness f i r s t  o f  a l l  in
a  developmental r a th e r  than a m etaphysical con tex t. With th e  rig
having a lready  been brought about, somewhere and somehow, we may,
n ev erth e less , say th a t  th e re  a re  many yogic procedures which have
re su lted  in  no th ing  and which, th e re fo re , ap p aren tly  show no causal
connection w ith  any Awakening. R egardless o f th e  technique o f  t h i s
Awakening, we do no t see i t  as a transfo rm ation  b u t a s  an appearance
o f "something e lse " , i . e . , change occurs a s  th e  experience o f
a  m etaphysical and on to lo g ica l Awakening. (This means th a t  th e
procedural perspec tive  adopted in  the  "biography" i s  m erely form al,
compare B areau 's remark p. 224.) We may r e c a l l  th a t  B harati (p. 188),
denying any causal connection between sadhana and sid d h i. d escribes i t
more lo o sely  a s  an experience in  accordance w ith  psychosomatic chance,
which, as he c a re fu lly  p o in ts  ou t, could bestow no o n to lo g ica l s ta tu s  on
i t s  content. In  Buddhisn th is  i s  indeed re f le c te d  by a  high degree o f
fo rm ality  (compare p. 229, madhyama p ra tip ad iu  p . 240, fo rm al). But
considering the  so c io -cu ltu ra l d iffe ren c e  o f  a  person a t  the  time o f  the
Upanisads and someone h i s to r ic a l ly  n ea re r to  Schopenhauer, o r  B h ara ti,
we would expect them to each r e la te  th e i r  "own" experience d if f e r e n tly ,
e i th e r  in  some a -c u ltu ra l  manner o r  by re a c tin g  to  c u ltu re . Schopenhauer
re a c ts  by p ro je c tin g  h is  m etaphysically  exposed in s ig h ts  onto h is
personal s e lf .  B harati in te g ra te s  some " in e ffa b le "  element, e x p l ic i t ly
tre a te d  as  a  personal s e c re t, in to  h is  c u ltu re  re a c tio n . However, in
Brahmanism (which i s  founded on what i t  considers  th e  te x t)  th e
personal experience cannot le g itim a te ly  be acknowledged as  a  s ta r t in g -
p o in t, bu t only as an aim. Buddhisa does a v a i l  i t s e l f  o f the  personal
(72)experience, bu t the  Buddha, too, den ies t h i s  o n to lo g ic a lly  to  the  
people (p. 226(27)). M eta-philosophicaily , Buddhist n irvana  i s  n o t th ee
product of a c u ltu ra l  o r  psychological negation , b u t o f  a  m etaphysical
(72) —Conze (Thought, p . 57) remarks, in  connection w ith n irvana , th a t  
"everyone must experience i t  p e rso n a lly  fo r  h im s e lf .. .because 
reasoning (taxka) cannot g e t anywhere n ea r i t " .
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(73)Awakening. Buddhign. i s  m etaphysically  n eg a tiv e , bu t c u l tu ra l ly
n e u tra l, and hence i s  no t p e ss im is tic  and i s  w ithout any concept 
o f pessimisms.
(f )  Pessimism and nirvana
The lack  of any concept o f pessimism should, a p a r t from the  various 
h is to r ic a l  reasons fo r  i t  exposed so f a r ,  a lso  be understood in  
connection w ith the d if fe re n t c u ltu ra l  ro le  and s ig n ifican ce  o f 
knowledge in  Buddhism as compared to  the  fu n c tio n  o f  knowledge in  the  
thought o f our Gei»ans. I t  was these  th in k e rs ' personal ev alua tions o f 
man's c u ltu ra l  condition , p a r t ly  w ith  a  specia l view to  the  h is to ry  o f 
the world, which led  them to  b e liev e  th a t  th e  wain p r in c ip le  o f the  
world, o r  a t  l e a s t  the  probable o r  p o ssib le  f a te  o f the world, was 
u se le s s , appalling  o r  p o s itiv e ly  un d esirab le . Ihe main type o f 
h o pe lessiess  im plied in  the p e ss im is tic  view assumes a c le a re r  o u tlin e
(73)_____________________ _Stcherbatsky (Nirvana, pp. 4, 15), who f i r s t  o f  a l l  wants to  allow
f o r  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a  pre-B uddhist p o s it iv e  conception o f  n irvana
(as in  brahma-nirvana) . s t i l l  explains i t s  a c tu a l Buddhist meaning as
complete a n n ih ila tio n . In an e x p l ic i t ly  d if f e r e n t  in te rp re ta tio n ,
Schmithausen (Erldgtmg. pp. 158-161) holds th a t  in  an c ien t Buddhism "the
term nirvana does no t in d ica te  a n n ih ila tio n  but ra th e r  an en te r in g  in to
a  completely d if fe re n t  kind o f ex istence". He mentions n irvana  as
a "sphere o f  im m ortality" (a a r ta  dhatu) analogous to  the  yogic spheres
o f m editation, y e t transcending them. I t  i s  an esch a to lo g ica l abso lu te
which, w ithout any p o s itiv e  re la t io n  to  th e  world, i s  on ly  th e  p lace  o f
l ib e ra tio n . He a lso  accepts th a t  some atman-l ik e  element may o u t la s t
ex tin c tio n , since in  the  canonical te x ts  the  atman i s  u su a lly  no t
s t r i c t l y  denied bu t simply re fe rre d  to  a s  inconceivable and pushed in to
the  background f o r  p rim arily  p ra c t ic a l  reasons; only  l a t e r  i s  th i s
s p ir i tu a l  p ra c tic e  turned in to  a  th e o re tic a l  dogna. Suzuki (s tu d ie s .
pp. 125, 127-128) explains th a t, according to  th e  au tho r o f  the
Lankavatara. "n irvana i s  re a lize d  when one can see in to  the  abode o f
suchness (yathabhutarthasthanadarsanam )" , i . e . ,  see ing  th ings
yathabhutaa "abso lu te ly  transcending  a l l  c a teg o rie s  constructed  by
mind; fo r  i t  i s  the T a thagata 's  own in n e r consciousness".
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I f  we draw in to  our an a ly s is  a  c e r ta in  seemingly p ra c t ic a l  a sp ec t 
o f  knowledge (although by no means more p r a c t ic a l  than  the  whole 
c u ltu ra l re a c tio n  a s  such): namely, by ask in g  i f  f o r  the  p ess im ist 
any knowledge o f  the world could p o te n tia l ly  ever show him "the  way 
ou t" , ( in c id e n ta lly , we a lso  encounter th i s  problem in  l a t e  
Madhyfgri.ka Buddhisn. )
In  the  Buddha's case we n o tic e  th a t  h is  knowledge about 
su ffe rin g  as  seen in  accordance w ith  the  o ratityasam utpada a lso  g ives 
him the knowledge about n irvana* But, how successfu l was change in  such 
th in k e rs  a s  Schopenhauer? Was h is  knowledge about the world as  w il l  and 
im agination, which were bad th in g s , a c tu a l ly  l ib e ra tin g ?  Was th i s  
discovery any good in  th is  sense? Was th e re  a  c e r ta in  p rogression , i f  
no t progress? And could he re tu rn  " lib e ra ted "  to  th e  world in  which 
he lived? Here, i n  i t s  connection w ith  th e  ro le  o f  knowledge (both 
epistem ological and o n to lo g ica l) , we observe th a t  a sp ec t o f h is  
pessimism which i s  emancipated from c u ltu re  (p. 74)* In  p r in c ip le , the  
g en tle  pessimism o f Gebser a lso  belongs h e re , s in ce  h is  diaphanic 
lib e ra t io n  i s  e s s e n tia l ly  a  method o f s tay in g  in  th i s  world w ithout any 
more "p ra c tic a l"  r e l i e f  as  would ensue from yogic transfo rm ation  than 
in  Schopenhauer's case.
In  o th e r words, we can look a t  knowledge a s  e i th e r  dependent 
o r  a s  non-dependent on c u ltu re . In  the  course o f  o u r asses anent o f the  
ro le  o f knowledge w ith  regard  to  a  c e r ta in  le v e l  o f  pessimist* (p . 26) 
we might want to  p o s tu la te  the  world (as world, o r  a s  cu ltu re ) a s  known, 
o r  a s  no t y e t known. But the  l a t t e r  ought perhaps to  make u s  h e s i ta te  
before  deciding th a t  such a p o s tu la tio n  i s  p o ss ib le  a t  a l l .  I t  i s  th e  
h is to r ic a l  prospect here  which asks f o r  a  su b tle  d is t in c t io n  w ith in  
th e  ob ject o f c u ltu re : we must decide i f  and how th e  world i s  going
to  be enriched by a  c e r ta in  kind o f  knowledge o r  teach ing . In  the
( 7 4 ) ___
Nagarjuna commented th a t  n irvana was n o t d esc rib ab le  and n o t 
c reated ; furtherm ore, since i t  cannot be obtained by body, word o r  
thought, the d o c trin e  o f sunyata (em ptiness) i s  developed to  g e t r id  
o f th eo rie s  a lto g e th e r  (Radhakrishnan, P h i l . I , p . 666; Conze,
Thought, pp. 243, 249).
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Buddha' b case i t  may be enrichm ent, although* p arad o x ica lly , th e
conten t o f th e  enrichment has no connection w ith  th e  world; ra th e r ,
the conception o f  n irvana Im plies the world a s  overcome, o r  even as
ir r e le v a n t .  Furthermore, we must a lso  decide to  what ex ten t such a new
form o f  knowledge becomes e s tab lish ed  o r  perhaps becomes the main
d ire c tiv e  value in  cu ltu re . The very question  o f pessimism-optim ian
has to  imply some c u ltu ra l  c h a ra c te r is t ic s :  we must c le a r ly  see how
meaningful th i s  question  can become w ith in  a  given c u ltu re . In  the
case o f  Schopenhauer o r  Gebser the  whole s i tu a t io n  i s  reversed  as
compared to  th a t o f Buddhign. They both p re sen t the  world as  i f  through
them i t  had now become known. But th e i r  co n trib u tio n  i s  in  f a c t
th e o re tic a l  ra th e r  than p ra c t ic a l ,  and i s  a c tu a lly  devoid of any
p rin c ip a l h is to r ic a l  o r  an th ropo log ica l change. In  Buddhism, perhaps
su rp ris in g ly , the m arvellous discovery  and m astering  o f the  law of
su ffe rin g  by the Buddha re s u l ts  in  no optim ise (un like  in  the case o f
Hegel, o r Marx, who happily  u se  th e i r  sp ec ia l dual i s  t i c  in s ig h ts  as
a  b a s is  f o r  th e i r  o p tim is tic  processes o f  knowledge which has to  serve
some l ib e ra t in g  conception o f  c u ltu ra l  p ro g ress) . I t  ch arac te rizes
Buddhism th a t  any p o te n tia l  optimign submerges in  i t s  o v e ra ll problem
and becomes ir r e le v a n t  w ith regard  to  the  whole. In s tead , the  a t t i tu d e
which Buddhisn exposes to  a  European observer whose c r i t ic is m  does n o t
include h is  own p o s itio n  may understandably s t r ik e  him as  p e ss im is tic .
In  our meta-terminology we may say th a t  Buddhign i s  lo g ic a l ly  p e ss im is tic
(p. 245); a s  soon a s  we leave th i s  lo g ic  behind, i t  appears a s
s o te r io lo g ic a lly  o p tim is tic . Ihe world o f samsara i s  bad, b u t a lso
good because i t  h e lp s  -  as a  necessary  p re re q u is ite  -  to  reach n irvana .
♦
The Buddha's knowledge about n irvana  may appear a s  th e  c e n tra l  value 
from w ith in  Buddhist c u ltu re , b u t h e ld  a g a in s t c u ltu re  as  such, i t  
m an ifests  no reac tio n  to  i t ,  s in ce  i t s  concern i s  com pletely 
elsewhere.
(75) Z ieg le r (Buddho, p . 104) comments th a t  " th e  European p ro te s ta n ts"  
h a te  th e i r  own reform problem when they see i t  in  o th e rs  -  "but the 
Tndian p ro te s ta n t Buddho knows no th in g  o f  th i s  h a tre d  a g a in s t h is  
own (problems of) overcoming".
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Ihe d isapprovals  and m isgivings o f  Schopenhauer and our 
o th e r  Germans remain an th ropo log ica l o r  h i s to r ic a l .  These th in k e rs  
do no t take t h e i r  p e ss im is tic  observations a x io lo g ic a lly  beyond c u ltu re , 
bu t ra th e r  re ly  on them as negative  values f o r  some m etaphysical 
a ssessnen t o f t h e i r  condition  (reg a rd le ss  o f  how small th e  emphasis 
on the  m etaphysical p a r t may b e ). When, f o r  example, death i s  negated, 
organized o r  in te g ra te d , i . e .  somehow absorbed, in  response to  i t s  
c u ltu ra l  ro le ,  th i s  change in  knowledge b rin g s  no redemption. 
P aradoxically , as i t  may seem, f o r  the  tru e  German p essim ist the  
h ig h est wisdom (un like  <>£-Tocj9o^ the  a n c ie n t id e a l  o f  equanimity) 
goes w ith the  g re a te s t  unhappiness, s ince  i t  n e c e s s ita te s , and rev ea ls , 
th e  deepest in s ig h ts  in to  fundamental human m isery. The e x is te n t ia l  
human condition , a s  he sees i t ,  p e r s is ts  unchanged, in  f a c t  more 
c le a r ly  than befo re . We may, th e re fo re , say th a t  the  negation , o r  
in te g ra tio n , which our German th in k e rs  o ffe r , i s  e s s e n tia l ly  p a r t  o f 
the e x is te n t ia l  d e sc r ip tio n ; i t  may provide some a e s th e tic a l  o r  
psychological comfort, b u t i t  provides no way ou t. The u ltim a te  
u se lessn ess  o f  the  deployed knowledge forms an e s s e n tia l  vein o f  t h e i r
p a r t ic u la r  quest f o r  i t .  This e n tire  form of p ro te s t  dw ells on a b a s ic
(76)co n trad ic tio n , o r  even asks f o r  i t .  The cond ition  o f co n trad ic tio n
a t  the core of pessim isn i s  o ften  re f le c te d  upon in  a  m erely autom atic 
manner ( fo r  in s tan ce  by re in tro d u c in g  any would-be so lu tio n  in to  the 
problem). Thus, w hile (m etaphysical) knowledge i s  accepted a s  
a  c u ltu ra l  value, i t  i s  n o t ab le  to  he lp  d isso lv e  th e  d ec is iv e  
connections w ith  the  negative  values in  question . A fa m ilia r  example 
i s  th e  theme o f  death . Buddhign agrees th a t  death  may be seen 
e s s e n tia l ly  a s  something bad. Consequently, th e  p a th  o f death lessuess 
(amrta patha) . which overcomes death , i s  viewed a s  something good. In  
o th e r  words, death  when overcome i s  something p o s it iv e . The Buddha's 
dogma i s  world unhappiness, b u t — lack in g  the  c u l tu ra l  t i e s  o f  the  
German p essim ists  -  he can su ccessfu lly  rep re sen t to t a l  happiness*
(Tb) Hoifcheimer (Schoph.. p. 158) considers "the  co n trad ic tio n  immanent 
in  autonomous th ink ing” , p re sen t since the  days o f the  theodicy (c f. 
our p. 79(10) ) ,  as f u l ly  v is ib le  since Schopenhauer.
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Chapter E ight
Sankara 's Advaita Vedanta: ignorance and id e n t i ty
( l )  A backward glance a t  German ind iv idua tion  and negation
When our Germans responded to  Vedantic thought o r  to  se lec ted  Vedantic 
concepts, they did  n o t a c t  as Vedantins, nor as  detached observers, b u t 
as persons seeking- support fo r  th e i r  own id eas . Urns, Schopenhauer 
venerated the Indian th in k e rs , inc lud ing  Sankara, because he was 
convinced th a t they had obviously been try in g  to  say what he h im self 
f in a l ly  did say. T reating them as  h is  cosmological fo rerunners, he saw 
no e s s e n tia l  d iffe ren ce  between th e i r  world and h is  own. Even Deussen, 
who stud ied  Sankara so thoroughly, drew ty p ic a l ly  Schopenhauerian 
consequences. The c a re fu l Gebser sensed th a t the  attem pt to  understand 
In d ia  wanted some fundamental in s ig h t in to  Indian consciousness, and -  
in  an attem pt to  b ridge the cu ltu re  gap so c le a r ly  f e l t  by Spengler -  
he began to measure id e n ti ty , again, in  terms o f European in d iv id u a lity , 
reckoning th a t the Indian aim e s s e n tia l ly  was s e lf -d is s o lu t io n . 
C onfidently, bu t w ith a loofness, Gebser t r i e s  to  understand In d ia  on 
a complementary b a s is , q u ite  un like  Schopenhauer, whose s o l id a r i ty  w ith 
Indian  thought could no t exceed some " lev e l o f  d e fic ien cy " , having used 
such terms as "w ill"  o r  "maya" e n tire ly  in  the  in te r e s t  of h is  own form 
of negation. In th is  chapter we sh a ll  use these  two Schopenhauerian
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concepts a s  the  main keys fo r  the meta—p h ilo soph ical c o rr id o r  vh-i rh 
w ill  perm it u s  to  have a look a t  negation in  a  Sahkaran context.
Vedanta heing the only system in  In d ia  which has produced a  concept 
o f in d iv id u a tio n , negation may be expected to  involve some aspec t o f  
in d iv id u a l id e n tity .
The Vedantic commentaries a re  concerned w ith  co n cep tua liza tion . 
However, in  the Upanisads, o r  the Bhagavadgita. th e re  a re  no a c tu a l 
concepts y e t which as such could have d ire c t ly  been taken over.
Sankara becomes a  c e n tra l f ig u re  by exposing the  conceptualized form 
o f  what the o ld er te x ts  had only im plied, perhaps. Although, he may n o t 
have conceptualized "concept" the way we do b u t r a th e r  seen h im se lf a s  
"revealing" some hidden b e l ie f s ,  o r  in tu i t io n s ,  we p re fe r  to  d is tin g u ish  
here between d if fe re n t "degrees" o f concepts.
(2 ) Hermeneutic key concepts in  Sankara 's outlook
(a) Id e n tity : t a t  tvam a s i
The fundamental conception o f id e n t i ty  underlying a l l  Vedantic thought 
i s ,  a s  Paul Deussen reassu res  u s, most su cc in c tly  summed up in  the 
Upanisadic d ic ta  t a t  tvam a s i  (Chand. 6 .8 .7 ) and ah am brahma asmi 
(Brh. 1 .4 .1 0 ). This id e n ti ty  form ula (see mahavakyas pp. 184, 199-200) 
had a lready  struck  Schopenhauer as  con tain ing  h is  own m etaphysical 
answer (p. 54), i . e . ,  s o te r io lo g ic a lly  speaking, the  epitomy o f h i s  
s tru c tu ra l  m etaphysical an a ly s is  o f l ib e ra t io n . S ankara 's  comment on 
Badarayana's Sutra 2 .1 .2 2  ra is e s  the problem o f th e  d iffe ren ce  and 
su p e r io r ity  o f the  f re e  brahman in  re la t io n  to  the  embodied atman.
While the Upanisadic search f o r  th e  knowledge o f th e  atman im plies to  
Sankara a d ifferen ce  between the agent and the work, he emphasizes th a t  
th e re  e x is ts  sim ultaneously an in d ic a tio n  o f  n o n -d iffe rence  in  those 
words " th a t  a r t  thou" (Chand. 6 .8 .7 ) . On the  b a s is  o f  th i s  p a r t ic u la r  
p roposition  (o r knowledge) Sankara a r g u e s ^  th a t  " th e  transm igrato ry  
s ta te  o f the in d iv id u a l soul and the  c re a tiv e  q u a li ty  o f  the  brahman
^  We quote from Sankara in  accordance w ith T h ib au t's  and, to  some 
ex ten t, Deussen's Sutra tra n s la t io n s .
vanish  a t  once, the  whole phenomenon o f  p lu r a l i ty ,  which sp rings 
from the  wrong knowledge, being  sublated  by p e r fe c t  knowledge, and 
(he asks) what becomes then o f  the  c rea tio n  and the  f a u l t s  o f  n o t doing 
what i s  b e n e f ic ia l ,  and the  lik e?  For th a t  th i s  e n tire  apparent world 
(samsara) , in  which good and e v i l  ac tio n s  a re  done, e tc . i s  a  mere 
i l lu s io n ,  owing to  the  non-discrim ination  o f (th e  S e lf 's )  l im it in g  
ad ju n cts  (upadhis) .  v iz . a body, and so on, which sp ring  from name and 
form th e  p re sen ta tio n s  o f nescience, and does in  r e a l i ty  n o t e x is t  a t  
a l l ,  we have explained more than once. The i l lu s io n  i s  analogous to  the  
m istaken n o tion  (abhi.mana) we e n te r ta in  a s  to  dying, being boro, being  
h u r t ,  e tc . o f  ourselves (our s e l f s ,  w hile in  r e a l i ty  the body only 
d ie s , i s  bom  e t c . ) . "  What Sankara says i s  th a t  from an u ltim a te  le v e l  
o f knowledge th e re  does not t r u ly  e x is t  a world o f  samsara in  which the  
atman a s  an in d iv id u a l soul could wander, b u t th a t  th e re  e x is ts  only 
u n iv e rsa l id e n t i ty  w ith the brahman; th is  i s  commonly no t seen f o r  the  
simple reason th a t  on the p re v a ilin g  le v e l o f nescience (avicLva) we 
su s ta in  our p e rs o n a lit ie s  through id e n t i f ic a t io n  w ith the  upadhis, 
which however p e r ta in  to  the n o n -se lf.
In  ano ther comment (S u tra  2.5*46) Sankara u ses  the  form ula 
t a t  tvam a s i  again to back up and i l l u s t r a t e  h is  own thought. I t  
provides him w ith a b a s is  which allow s him to derive  th a t the su ffe r in g  
in  samsara o f the in d iv id u a l soul (o r s e l f ) ,  i t s e l f  a  misconception 
due to  avidya. i s  no t shared by the h ig h est soul (o r  S e lf ) .  Ih is  
su ffe rin g  o f the atman. as he comments, i s  an e r ro r  (bhrama) from th e  
s e l f 's  n o n -d if fe re n tia tio n  regarding the upadhis and connected 
p r in c ip le s , and i s  u ltim a te ly  as u n rea l as o n e 's  own body. With a  view 
to  th e  u ltim a te  id e n ti ty  of everything with the brahman, we should, 
whei fo llow ing Sankara, see th a t  cosmo lo g ic a lly  every th ing  i s  u n re a l 
and dream like, th a t "the e n tire  expanse o f th ings i s  mere i l lu s io n  
(maya). The world con sis tin g  of e th e r, e t c . , remains f ix e d  and 
d i s t in c t  up to  the moment when the  soul cognizes th a t  the  brahman i s  
the  S e lf  of a l l ;  the  world o f dreams on the o th e r hand i s  d a ily  sub lated  
by the waking s ta te "  (3. 2. 4) . Ibe brahman i s  never t ru ly  a ffe c te d  by 
avidya (2 .1 .9 ) s "As the magician (mayavin) i s  n o t a t  any time
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a ffe c ted  by the  m agical i l lu s io n  (maya) produced by h im self, because 
i t  i s  u n rea l (avastu ) . so the h ig h est S e lf  (paramatman) i s  n o t a f fe c te d  
by the w o rld -illu s io n  (samsara) ."  Sankara adds (2 .1 .3 3 ), "analogously, 
the a c t i v i ty  of the Lord a lso  may be supposed to  be mere sp o rt ( l i l a ) . 
proceeding from h is  own n a tu re , w ithout re fe rence  to  any purpose".
Sankara observes a  c e r ta in  mechanism o f our presumed 
se lf-d ecep tio n . He explains h is  idea  by making use o f a  su b tle  
d is t in c tio n  in  our a t t i tu d e s  o f sympathizing w ith the  f a te  o f  our 
fr ie n d s  o r  r e la t iv e s :  only those who have so f a r  wrongly b e liev ed
themselves as re a l ly  having sons o r  f r ie n d s  could t ru ly  s u f fe r  such 
a f e e l in g  a s  th a t  o f  lo s in g  them, whereas those who have had no such 
personal attachm ent to  the  same people would n o t s u f fe r  from th e i r  lo s s  
a t  a l l .  On th e  b a s is  o f th is  kind o f explanation , he says, even an 
ordinary man should be ab le  to grasp the value o f  p e rfe c t knowledge; 
how much more so then the one who, e s s e n tia l ly  be ing  o f p u re ly  s p i r i tu a l  
na tu re  h im se lf, sees only the u n d iffe re n tia te d , o b je c t- le s s  atman. 
Sankara e lab o ra te s  fu r th e r  th a t  " thus the  Lord a lso  i s  no t a ffe c te d  by 
pain , although pain  be f e l t  by th a t  p a r t  o f him which i s  c a lle d  th e  
in d iv id u a l soul, which i s  p resen ted  by nescience, and l im ite d  by the 
buddhi and o th e r ad juncts (upadhis) . That a lso  the  s o u l 's  undergoing 
pain  i s  due to  nescience only, we have already  explained. Accordingly 
the V edanta-texts teach th a t ,  when the s o u l 's  in d iv id u a l s ta te ,  due to  
nescience, i s  sub lated , i t  becomes brahman, 'th o u  a r t  th a t  e t c . ' . "  In  
sho rt, what Sankara says i s  th a t  avidya, o r  ignorance o f the  e s s e n tia l  
meaning o f  ih e  id e n t i ty  form ula, i s  the  reason f o r  su ffe r in g  in  samsara.
(b) Sub jec t-ob jec t and em pirical da ta  evalua tion
We find an elementary key to Sankara's reasoning in  h is  own introduction
to  h is  commentary a s  a  whole ( l . l ) :  " I t  i s  a  m atte r n o t re q u ir in g  any
proof th a t  the  o b jec t (v isaya) and the  su b jec t (v isay in ) , whose
•  •
re sp ec tiv e  spheres a re  the  n o tion  o f  the  '  thou' ( th e  non-ego) and the  
'  eg o ', and which a re  opposed to  each o th e r a s  much as  darkness and 
l ig h t  a re , cannot be id e n t i f ie d ."  Consequently, any superim position 
(adhyasa) o f the q u a l i t ie s  (dhaima) o f one onto the o th e r would have
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to  be wrong. 'Sms, when people say * th a t  aa  I ' , th a t  i s  mine*, 
they provide examples fo r  t h e i r  in n a te  (n a isa rg ik a ) h a b it o f  confusing 
th ings by such tra n s fe r  o r  superim position which Sankara d e fin e s  a s  
"the  apparent p re sen ta tio n , in  the form of remembrance, to  consciousness 
o f something p rev iously  observed in  some o th e r th in g " . He i l l u s t r a t e s  
th i s  problem o f mistaken id e n t i ty  by drawing on such metaphors a s  th a t  
of the mother of p ea rl taken f o r  s i lv e r ,  o r  the  moon appearing double 
to  someone w ith d e f ic ie n t eyesigh t. By e s ta b lish in g  a  su b jec t-o b jec t 
re la t io n  w ith o n ese lf, o r , in  o th e r  words, in  try in g  to  see and 
understand o n e 's  own s e l f ,  one i s  in ev itab ly  in  danger o f superimposing 
wrong o r  non-ex isten t q u a l i t ie s  onto the  s e lf ,  a lso . Such a m istaken 
tra n s fe r  could, of course, never a f f e c t  the e s s e n tia l  s e l f .  Moreover, 
i t  would be a  sign o f ignorance (avidya) as opposed to  knowledge 
(vidya) o r  the  a b i l i ty  to  a sse ss  th in g s  c o rre c tly  in  accordance w ith 
th e i r  own natu re  (vastu-svarupam) . N evertheless, Sankara concedes 
th a t, as long as  the tru e  id e n ti ty  w ith  the h ig h est s e l f  has no t y e t 
been f u l ly  understood, the  em pirical aspec t o f h is  category  o f 
in d iv id u a lity  may a lso  be considered v a lid . That i s ,  i t  would 
rep resen t some re la t iv e  form of r e a l i ty  comparable to  th a t  experienced 
in  a dream, before waking up (2 .1 .1 4 ).
The ac tu a l connection o f avidva and our n a tu ra l  ways and 
means o f perception  i s  explained by Sankara as a  r e f le c t io n  o f our 
in n a te  erroneous manner o f da ta  connection. Such d a ta  a s  make u s  th in k  
in  such terms as  "I"  o r  "mine" depend on percep tion . This in  tu rn
(2 ) Deussen (System, p. 57) th inks the  reason f o r  the  erroneous 
em pirical view must l i e  in  the  knowing su b jec t in  which avidva i s  
in n a te ; he in d ic a te s  a s  i t s  cause in c o rre c t percep tion  and as i t s  
na tu re  in c o rre c t im agination. U nlike Vedanta -  as  he h im se lf p o in ts  
out -  and in  accordance w ith Kant, Deussen seeks an exp lanation  " in  
the n a tu ra l form ation o f our fa c u lty  o f  knowledge (Srkenntnisveraogen) ". 
Kant, he suggests, could a c tu a lly  provide "the tru e  s c ie n t i f i c  b a s is  
fo r  th e  system of Vedanta" (c f , our p . 111). D eussen's am bition to  
explore where Sankara has supposedly stayed behind h is  own range o f 
thought, in  o rd er to  rev ea l " i t s  g rea tness fu r th e r" , i s  q u ite  
Schopenhauerian.
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req u ire s  sense organs, th ese  in  tu rn  req u ire  some b a s is , such a s  
a  "body, and bodily  a c tio n  re q u ire s  the superimpositLon o f  some s e l f  onto 
i t .  A ll these  s tep s  a re  regarded as e s s e n tia l  f o r  any form o f  common 
understanding. Bie fo llow ing  l in e s  i l l u s t r a t e  Sankara 's  argument 
( in tro d . l . l ) :  "But how can the means o f r ig h t  knowledge such as
percep tion , in ference, e t c . , and s c r ip tu ra l  te x ts  have f o r  t h e i r  o b je c t 
th a t  which i s  dependent on nescience? Because, we rep ly , the  means o f 
rdgfrt knowledge cannot operate u n less  th e re  be a  knowing p e rso n a lity , 
and because the  ex istence o f the  l a t t e r  depends on the erroneous n o tio n  
(abhimana) th a t  the  body, the senses, and so on, a re  id e n tic a l  w ith , o r  
belonging to , the  S e lf o f  the knowing person."
(c) Ihe uphadis
This removal o f a l l  those th ings which do n o t e s s e n tia l ly  belong to  the
atman i s  concerned w ith the  p rev iously  mentioned upadhis; these  a re  th e
in d iv id u a liz in g  conditioning  fa c to rs  (o r ad ju n cts, as Thibaut says)
which we have encountered in  the superim position o f  such d a ta  as
(3)c o n s te lla te  the percep tions o f "I" o r  "mine". Deussen l i s t s  a s  th e
main types o f  upadhis: (a) A ll th e  th ings and cond itions o f the
ex tern a l world; (b) the body which co n sis ts  o f  the  coarse elem ents;
(c) the  in d r iy a s . i . e .  the  f iv e  sense organs (buddhi in d r iy a s ) and the
f iv e  organs o f ac tio n  (k am a-in d riy as) o f the body; (d) manas. a lso
re fe rre d  to  a s  the in n er organ (antahkarana) , which i s  a lso  the  c e n tra l
•  •
organ fo r  both  the sense organs (nearly  equ ivalen t to  the  in te l l e c t )  
and the organs o f a c tio n  (n ea res t to  the  concept o f  conscious w il l ,  
according to  Deussen); and (e) the  mukhya prana which rep resen ts  the  
unifoim  p r in c ip le  o f th e  unconscious, n u tr i t io n -o r ie n te d  foim o f l i f e .
I t  i s  manag and i t s  two sub-systems (th e  in d riy a s ) ,  a lto g e th e r  
eleven organs, which must in  p r in c ip le  in te r e s t  us here , s in ce , as 
Deussen mentions, ^  in  Sankara 's view they comprise the  whole complex 
o f conscious l i f e .  We should a lso  note th a t manas i s  n o t only used
(3) Deussen, System, pp. 60-61.
^  Deussen, System, p. 356.
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a l te rn a t iv e ly  f o r  antahkarana, b u t, as  Sankara p o in ts  out (2 .3 -32),
"the  in te rn a l  organ which c o n s ti tu te s  the lim itin g  ad junct (upadhi) o f  
the sou l i s  c a lled  in  d if fe re n t  p laces by d if fe re n t  names, such a s  manas 
(mind), buddhi ( in te l l ig e n c e ) , vi.jnana (knowledge), c i t t a  (thought)".
He a lso  mentions kama (d es ire ) as  one o f i t s  fu n c tio n s . A s im ila r  l i s t  
(2 .4 .6 ) inc ludes the ahamkara (ego-consciousness). Sankara d esc rib es  i t s  
r e s t r ic te d  em pirical r e a l i ty  in  terms o f i t s  func tiona l p o s itio n  when he 
says (2 .3 .4 0 ): "Nor can the agent ship which has self-consciousness
(ahamkara) fo r  i t s  antecedent belong to  the perce iv ing  p r in c ip le ; f o r  
se lf-co n sc io u s ie ss  i t s e l f  i s  an o b jec t of p e rc ep tio n .. . .  The r e s u l t  o f a l l  
th is  i s  th a t  the  agentship  o f the  S e lf i s  due to  i t s  l im it in g  ad juncts  
(upadhis) on ly ."  He a lso  emphasizes th a t in  accordance w ith the id e n t i ty  
formula (" th a t  a r t  thou", Chand. 6 .8 .7 , "I am brahman". Brh. 1 .4 .1 0 ), 
" there  i s  in  r e a l i ty  no such th in g  as  an ind iv idua l soul ab so lu te ly  
d if fe re n t  from the brahman, bu t the brahman, in  so f a r  a s  i t  
d i f f e r e n t ia te s  i t s e l f  through the mind (buddhi) and o th e r lim it in g  
cond itions, i s  c a lle d  in d iv id u a l soul, agent, enjoyer" ( l . l . 3 l ) .
C erta in ly , Sankara 's whole idea o f wrong superim position i s  
only p o ssib le  because the s e lf  i s  a lso  seen as an ob jec t in  some way. As 
he says, agentship req u ire s  self-consciousness f i r s t ,  b u t apperception 
( i . e .  the perceiv ing  p rin c ip le )  does n o t; ra th e r , se lf-consciousness i s  
ju s t  one o f the o b jec ts  of apperception, and i s  based, in  some 
immaginatory manner, on the upadhis. such as the  d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  mind 
which makes the brahman appear as atman. ( i t  i s  th i s  asp ec t which 
i r r i t a t e s  Deussen who fe a rs  th a t  he would have to  give up the  personal 
ch arac te r o f th e  p e rce iv in g  p r in c ip le ; see p. 262(2) and pp. 107-109.)
(d) The brahman-atman p o s tu la tio n  and l ib e ra tio n
Commenting on the brahman's u n re s tr ic te d  " th a t a r t  thou", Sankara
explains knowledge qua l ib e ra t io n  (jnanan moksah). In  th i s  connection
•  •
he rig o ro u sly  d is tin g u ish es  between the wrong knowledge o r  nescience 
(avidya) which i s  the  cause o f  samsara. and the only re a l  knowledge 
(vidya) which removes avidya o r  co rrec ts  i t  (2 .1 .1 4 ). Denying the  
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f any d if fe re n tia te d  approach to  l ib e ra t io n , he a s s e r ts :
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"The s ta te  o f f in a l  re le a se  i s  no th ing  hu.t brahman (brahina ewa h i  
mukt i-a v a s th a ) (5 .4 .5 2 ).
Applying the problem o f knowledge to  the  phenomenon o f
samsara, Sankara remarks ( l . l . 4 )  that someone who i s  mad enough to
be liev e  th a t  h is  body i s  h is  s e l f  w il l  n e ce ssa rily  be sub jec ted  to  pain ,
f e a r  and o th e r a ffe c tio n s . But once he has understood the id e n t i ty  o f
h is  s e l f  w ith the  brahman he cannot be considered a s  fu r th e r  subjected
to  th ese  a ffe c tio n s . I b is  id e n tif ic a t io n , a s  s ta te d  by the id e n t i ty
formula, i s  not merely a form o f  figu rative p ara lle lin g , Sankara
elaborates^ because otherw ise the attainm ent o f  knowledge could n o t be
re f le c te d  by such a phrase a s  " th e  f e t t e r  o f  th e  h e a r t  i s  broken, a l l
doubts a re  solved" feund. 2 .2 .8 ; compare p. 2D2). He concludes: "The
•  •
knowledge o f  the brahman does, th e re fo re , n o t depend on the a c tiv e  
energy o f man, bu t i s  analogous to  the  knowledge o f those th in g s  which 
sire the o b jec ts  o f percep tion , in ference, and so on, and thus depends 
on the o b jec t o f  knowledge only. About such a brahman o r  i t s  knowledge 
i t  i s  im possible to  e s ta b lis h , by reasoning, any connection w ith 
a c tio n s ."  Moreover, the o b je c t l i e s  a lready  somewhere w ith in  the 
su b jec t: "Hor, again, can i t  be sa id  th a t  th e re  i s  a dependence on
ac tio n  in  consequence o f  the  brahman o r  re le a se  being  something which 
i s  to  be obtained; fo r  a s  the brahman c o n s ti tu te s  a  p e rso n 's  S e lf i t  i s  
no t something to be a tta in e d  by th a t  person ." Also through (moral) 
improvement (samskara) l ib e ra t io n  cannot be a tta in e d , since i t  c o n s is ts  
o f id e n t i ty  and n o t o f adding p e rfec tio n .
On the  h ig h est le v e l o f knowledge, th a t  o f id e n t i iy ,  the 
question o f a  cause o f  l ib e ra t io n  becomes in s u b s ta n tia l .  But inasnuch 
a s  the brahman should s t i l l  be looked upon as an o b je c t, the  knowledge 
o f i t  would have to  be tre a te d  as coming from i t  i t s e l f ,  since th is  
knowledge cannot count a s  the r e s u l t  o f any human a c t iv i ty .  Hence, 
Sankara, in  making a concession to  th is  causal, o b je c t-o rie n te d  
so te r io lo g ic a l p e rspec tive , re s o r ts  to  the id ea  o f  "grace" (anugraha) 
(2 .3 .4 2 ). He asks us to  assume th a t ,  while the Lord, who i s  the  
h ighest S e lf , to le ra te s  a  s ta te  o f samsara f o r  the  ignoran t soul,
" f in a l  re le a se  a lso  i s  a ffe c ted  through knowledge caused by the grace
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(5)of the  Lord1'.  In  s im ila r  words Sankara expounds th a t  only  
through God's grace the  id e n ti ty  of God and the s e l f ,  thus f a r  hidden 
through ignorance, becomes apparent (3 .2 .5 ) . He quotes Svet. 1 .1 1 :
"When th a t  god i s  known a l l  f e t t e r s  f a l l  o f f ;  su ffe rin g s  a re  destroyed 
and b i r th  and death cease .”
(e) E so te ric  and e x o te r ic  views: vidya and avidva
Sankara 's exposition  o f Vedanta makes u se  o f two complementary
asp ec ts  o f knowledge, vidya and avidya. each fe a tu r in g  a d if f e r e n t
le v e l o f  v a lid i ty , ihe l in e s  o f  thought which Sankara develops on
both these le v e ls  a re  more o r le s s  in tertw ined . Deussen, who spends
much e f f o r t  on sep ara tin g  them, d is tin g u ish es  a  th eo lo g ica l, e x o te r ic a l
(6)fo ra  o f thought and a  ph ilo soph ical, e so te r ic a l  one. While the  
e x o te r ic a l aspect fe a tu re s  a  lower le v e l o f knowledge (apara vidya). 
cen tred  on m etaphorical, m ythical forms, the e s o te r ic a l  approach, on 
a  h i^ ie r  le v e l  (para v idya). fo llow s a  l in e  o f  much g re a te r  s c ie n t i f ic  
ab s trac tio n .
As Sankara him self exp la in s: "The brahman i s  apprehended
under two foim s; in  the f i r s t  p lace  as  q u a lif ie d  by l im it in g  cond itions 
(upadhi) owing to  the m ultifo rm ity  o f the evo lu tions o f  name and form; 
in  the  second place as being the opposite  o f th i s ,  i . e .  f re e  from a l l  
l im it in g  conditions whatever11 ( l . l . l l ) .  Even though d iffe ren ces  
(v ise sa ) may be a ttached  to  the brahman in  g en era l, the  param brahma 
as  such ( sv a tas) remains unaffected . "In  the  case o f  the brahman the 
l im it in g  ad juncts a re , moreover, p resen ted  by nescience merely"
(3 .2 .1 l) .  Sankara g ives an example f o r  a p ra c t ic a l  connection between
^  In  p ra c tic e , the Sankaran seeker o f knowledge (.ii.jnasu) would 
s t i l l  be advised to  make h is  own Yogic e f f o r t ,  co n s is tin g  o f  f i f te e n  
s tep s  (angani) inco rpo ra ting  the e i^ h t s tep s  o f P a ta n ja li  
(Vimuktananda, Aparoksanubhuti, pp. 53-67 (w . 100-126)).
^  Cf. Deussen, System, pp. 104-105. V© should b ea r in  mind th a t  
avidya. appearing f o r  the f i r s t  time in  Indian  philosophy to g e th e r 
w ith  theology, i s  p o te n tia lly  good (whereas a th e i s t i c  Buddhist 
metaphysics t r e a ts  i t  as e n tire ly  bad).
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h is  two le v e ls  o f understanding when he comments (4*3.9): "As the
aparan (lower) brahma i s  in  p roxim ity  to  the  h ig h e r (param) one, th e re  
i s  noth ing  unreasonable in  the word brahman being app lied  to  the form er 
a lso . For when the  h igher brahman i s ,  f o r  the  purpose o f p ious 
m ed ita tion , described  a s  possessing  c e r ta in  e ffe c ted  q u a l i t ie s  -  such 
as "co n s is tin g  o f mind" (Chand. 3*14.2) and the r e s t  -  which q u a l i t ie s  
depend on i t s  connexion w ith c e r ta in  pure l im it in g  ad ju n c ts , then i t  i s  
what we c a l l  the  lower brahman. "
According to  o n e 's  re sp ec tiv e  p o in t o f view, the  brahman can
be e i th e r  the  o b jec t o f knowledge o r  o f ignorance (vidya-avidya-v isaya) .
I t  i s  from the  standpoin t (avasthayam) o f ignorance th a t  a l l  occupation
w ith the  brahman i s  concerned w ith i t s  a t t r ib u te s  (guna) ,
d if f e r e n t ia t io n s  (v ise sa ) and condition ing  fa c to rs  (upadhi) ( l . l . l l ) .
In  o th e r words, th i s  so -c a lle d  sagunam brahma must be ranked as
avidya-v i saya. Escha to lo g ic a lly  speaking, only on the e so te r ic a l
le v e l (para v idya). where the  param brahma i s  seen as nirgunam
(a t t r ib u te - f r e e )  brahma and as devoid o f any d if f e r e n t ia t io n s  (v ise sa ) ,
can th e re  be l ib e ra t io n . Any o th e r le v e l o f knowledge has i t s
compensation in  samsara (which may include both the  p itry an a  and the  
•  •
devayana) ( l . l . 2 4 ) .  Sankara comments th a t on a lower (e x o te ric a l)  
le v e l  o f knowledge (apara vidya) the  id ea  o f an a tta in a b le  aim appears 
as fe a s ib le , a s  i l lu s t r a t e d  by the conception o f the  devayana (4 .2 .1 ; 
our p . 199). In  such a case we may speak o f  some "going to " , whereas, 
in  the  case o f  f u l l  knowledge (samyagdarsana), im plying an in n e r 
id e n t i ty ,  we cannot n o tic e  any p o s itiv e  aim -orien ted  purpose. He 
exp lains the  d iffe ren ce  in  th e  a tta inm ent o f  something a lready  p resen t 
a s  compared to  some th in g  newly obtained  by asking u s  to  imagine the 
s i tu a t io n  o f  someone reaching a v i l la g e  as compared to  someone's 
a tta inm ent o f  h e a lth  a f t e r  a  d isease  (3.5*30). There i s  u ltim a te ly  
no "going to" the  param brahma, d e sp ite  i t s  apparent powers ( s a k t i ). 
s ince  e s s e n tia l ly  i t  i s  w ithout any d if f e r e n t ia t io n s  (v ise sa ) .
Inasmuch as th e re  may be found any cosmological re fe ren ces  to  the 
brahman a s  the  cause o f  c rea tio n , these a re  ju s t  exp lanations lead in g  
up to  the e s s e n tia l  id e n ti ty , as he f in d s  confirmed by such statem ents
268
as , from I s a  Up. 7: "What tro u b le , what sorrow can th e re  be to
him who beholds th a t  un ity?" (4.3*14). This shows th a t  the  absence 
of e r ro r  and g r ie f  again appears a s  some s ig n if ic a n t "o u te r 
c h a ra c te r is t ic "  o f the  " s ta te "  o f  id e n ti ty .
(3 ) A meta-view o f " id e n tity " , maya and "w ill"
(a) Avidya and " id e n tity " ;  Vedantic change in  consciousness
N otw ithstanding any approximate p h ilo so p h ical m otivations o f  our Ind ians 
and Germans, th e i r  ph ilo soph ical conditions d iffe re d  fundam entally 
(compare pp. 18-20). For Sankara h is  ta sk  was la id  ou t: a s  an Indian
th in k e r he was a commentator w ith in  h is  own autonomous, in d ir e c t ly  
is o la t in g , t ra d i t io n . However, the  19th (and p a r t ly  20th) century  
German ph ilosopher was is o la te d  due to  h is  a lie n a te d  and p e rs o n a l! s tic  
in n e r a t t i tu d e  which -  ir re s p e c tiv e  o f  any re a l  achievement — was 
centred  on autonomous personal r e f le c t io n , even w hile re fe r r in g  to  
Indian thought.
When Schopenhauer f i r s t  claimed the  c e n tra l s ig n ifican ce  o f 
the id e n t i ty  formula f o r  h is  own philosophy, he had a lready  e x tr ic a te d  
i t  from i t s  o r ig in a l con tex t and adapted i t  -  unknowingly -  to  h is  own 
an thropocen tric  m etaphysical approach. K eta-ph ilo soph ica lly , we 
observe th a t  Sankara, l ik e  Schopenhauer, p re sen ts  h is  thought in  an 
e f fo r t  to  change a d ec is iv e  element in  our philosophic view o f th is  
world. He c re a te s  a  conceptual background f o r  h is  argument by 
d esc rib in g  and analysing  the  fe a tu re s  and mechanigns o f ou r common 
em pirical consciousness, in c lu d in g  i t s  inadequacy f o r  seeing  r e a l i ty .
In  th is  connection some o f  Deussen's remarks have been s ig n if ic a n t.
In  sp ite  o f  h is  in do log ica l p ro fic ien cy , he follow s Sankara 's  l in e s  o f 
thought w ith  Schopenhauerian eyes, p la in ly  suggesting th a t  Sankara 's 
system could be p e rfec ted  by some K antian u n d ers tru c tu re . Deussen 
fran k ly  describes what he considers a s  the fundamental f a u l t  o f Vedanta: 
Sankara f i r s t  p resen ts  ou r s e l f ,  c o rre c tly , a s  the only source through 
which knowledge can come. But then he assumes, wrongly, th a t  th i s  
s e l f  should u ltim a te ly  p re sen t i t s e l f  to  o u r consciousness in  the  form
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of a  knowing su b jec t, a f t e r  the  whole in te l le c tu a l  apparatus has
been separa ted  a s  p a r t  o f the  n o n -se lf  belonging to  the  world o f
(7 )
appearance and im agination. Our m eta-perspective allow s u s  to  throw
(g)
some l i g h t  on the preposterous ch a rac te r o f th i s  well-meant idea .
Where Deussen imagines an acute  d e fic ien cy , Sankara proceeds in  an
unexpected manner. He e s ta b lish e s  a p ro v is io n a l b a s is  from which he
can e x trap o la te  the n a tu re  o f a  changed form o f consciousness im plied
in  h is  brahman-atman p o s tu la tio n . E xp lica ting  the  manner in  which we
connonly handle the data o f which our knowledge c o n s is ts , he d i r e c ts  our
a t te n tio n  to  the  s ta te  o f  consciousness which ought to  r e s u l t  i f  we
could consequently become aware o f a l l  our i l lu s o ry  data  connections.
Deussen senses a  paradox in  the  presumed attem pt to  gain pure knowledge
by removing a l l  the obscuring data s tru c tu re s . But Sankara 's
brahman-atman p o s tu la tio n  does no t imply, as i t  might have seemed to
the  Schopenhauerian, any tru e  equivalence to  a Kantian perceiv ing
(9)sub jec t o r  to  a  th ing  as such. This p o s tu la tio n  p u ts  the  emphasis 
on consciousness, rather than on percep tion . I t  i s  cen tred  on 
a h y p o th e tica l form o f  consciousness, o r  more p re c ise ly  on the 
consciousness underly ing any knowledge in  terms o f  manas. buddhi. 
vi.inana. c i t t a . e t c . , o r  even o f Kantian reason. The "new" p o s itio n  
o f consciousness, to  which Sankara guides u s , aims to  d isso lv e  a l l  
prev ious p ro v is io n a l forms o f  knowledge and mark them a s  c o n stitu en ts  
of maya.
(7) Deussen, System, p . 61.
(q) Hacker tra c e s , as a h is to r ic a l  c u r io s ity , th e  impact which 
Schopenhauer's and D eussen's "pseudo-Vedantic ta t- tv a m -a g i-e th ic s" , 
reim ported by such neo-Vedantins a s  Vivekananda, had on modern Indian 
thought (c f . Schoph.. pp. 3B5, 391, 396).
(9)
In  f a c t ,  Deussen dep lores th a t  Sankara "lacks" K an t's  view o f  the  
s u b je c tiv ity  o f  our tim e-space percep tion , i . e .  a sep ara tio n  in to  
"em pirical" and "as such” views, and th a t ,  u n lik e  Schopenhauer, he 
u ses no p e rs o n a lis t ic  sep ara tio n s , b u t only a  separa tion  o f  le v e ls  
(System, p . 117(63) ) .
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In  the in te r e s t  o f our meta-view, we m is t "be aware o f the  
fundamental d iffe ren ce  between id e n t i f ic a t io n  through p ercep tio n  and 
id e n tif ic a t io n  through superinrposition. While Deussen wants to  suggest, 
even fo r  Vedanta, th a t  knowledge should be considered r e s t r i c te d  by ou r 
fa c u lty  o f percep tion  in  a s t r i c t l y  Kantian sense, Sankara ho lds th a t  
we superimpose our se lves wrongly on u ltim a te ly  ir r e le v a n t  th in g s . 
Deussen, and the  o th e r  Schopenhauerians, come equipped w ith  t h e i r  se lv es  
(rep resen tin g  some stage o f the m an ifesta tion  o f  a  re a l  b u t b lin d  w i l l ) ,  
convinced th a t any gu b jec t-o b jec t r e la t io n  (fundamental to  each 
in d iv id u a l being) i s  p a in fu l, hence a l l  the  su ffe rin g . In  Sankara* s 
view the  omnipotent brahman, p lay ing  some am bivalent game, allow s people 
to  th in k  th a t  th e i r  tru e  ex istence  and id e n t i ty  l i e s  in  a  fu n c tio n a l 
in te r re la t io n  o r  connection o f em pirical d a ta , They r e f e r  to  th i s  
in te r r e la t in g  process on the b a s is  of what appears to  them a s  s e l f .
Their re a l  s e l f ,  however, i s  obscured by th i s  process. I f  th i s  
obscuring re la tio n sh ip  i s  disconnected, these  l im it in g  fa c to rs  lo se  
th e i r  in fluence  over one* s s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n .  H igher knowledge cannot 
destroy  anything, bu t only change our manner o f seeing and being, ( in  
Buddhi an em pirical consciousness was the  c h ie f  reason f o r  a c tu a lly  
g e tt in g  r id  o f the u n iv e rs e .) I t  b rings out our tru e  id e n t i ty  and our 
tru e  s e l f  (param atman), which have always ex is ted , although hidden 
under some pseudo-se lf (aparam atman). Sankara 's d e sc rip tio n  o f th is  
change does no t purport any optimism o r  pessimism.
The mentioned brahman-atman p o s tu la tio n  i s  no t paid; o f the 
h igher knowledge as such, but only p a r t  o f an a ttem pt o f commenting on 
i t .  In  o th e r  words, Sankara 's changing asp ec ts  o f knowledge and s e l f  
a re  s t i l l  based on h is  e n tire ly  ph ilo so p h ical approach. He analyses 
and so r ts  ou t the  d is t r a c t in g  o r  obscuring fa c to rs  in  our em pirical 
consciousness by t r e a t in g  them a s  producers o f d a ta  and as  means o f 
reasoning (which im plies maya as  a  p re re q u is ite  o f knowledge). But 
a f t e r  the complete removal of these  fa c to rs  th e re  should be no fu r th e r  
ground f o r  such reasoning. The knowledge o f  the  s e l f  would then be 
completely d if f e r e n t;  in  fa c t ,  some to ta l ly  d is s im ila r  expression 
could be invented to r e f e r  to  th is  new s ta te  o f consciousness. The
only e s s e n tia l  connection between th e  d if f e r e n t  le v e ls  o f knowledge 
would e x is t  in  th e i r  r e la t iv e  ex istence . From S ankara 's p o in t o f  view 
i t  i s  we who surround th e  atman and the  brahman w ith d if f e r e n t ia t in g  
d esc rip tio n s , b u t only because we a re  try in g  to  explore why th e re  
appears to  be a  d iffe ren ce  to  begin w ith. In  the course o f th a t  
exp lo ra tion  the  mentioned connecting l in e  between the two le v e ls  i s  
supposed to vanish in  favour o f a  c la r i f i e d  view o f  id e n ti ty , s ince  
a f t e r  a l l  th e re  i s  no "going t o " . ^ ^  When Sankara h e u r is t ic a l ly  
behaves as  i f  he could s tre tc h  h im self beyond h is  own s e l f ,  i . e .  beyond 
a l l  em pirical upadhi-bound c lo s e d -c irc u it  knowledge, he does th i s  in  
an a ttem pt to  show what i s  a lre d y  th e re , b u t i s  seen from the  p o in t o f 
view o f  a  param atman. P ra c tic a l ly , the  withdrawal o f  our a t te n tio n  
from th is  c i r c u i t  e f fe c ts  a  fundamental change, namely th e  complete 
d e s is tin g  o f th a t  -  form erly "our" -  erroneous se lf -1  im ita tio n .
(b) Maya: p r in c ip le  o f  in d iv id u a tio n
Sankara describes the  common em pirical consciousness in  various manners; 
most g en era lly  a s  samsara, bu t a lso  as  some dream like i l lu s io n  (maya) 
o r  as se lf-d ecep tio n  through wrong attachm ent due to  ignorance. He 
explains the mechanism o f th i s  se lf-d ecep tio n  by re fe r r in g  to  q u a l i t ie s  
(dfcarma) being  wrongly superimposed from th e  su b jec t onto th e  o b jec t. 
P ra c tic a l ly  speaking, avidva u ltim a te ly  m anifests i t s e l f  in  our 
erroneous manner o f  connecting ou r presumed s e l f  w ith the  vario u s  d a ta  
o f our percep tion  in c lu d in g  our own body. Yet Sankara does n o t dsaiy 
some re la t iv e  v a l id i ty  to  th is  em pirica l in d iv id u a lity . A fte r a l l ,  i t  
does form an in te g ra l  p a r t  o f th e  in d ic a te d  change o f  consciousness to  
some h igher s ta te  of t ru th .
This inc lu d es  maya as a  necessary  p re re q u is ite . In  Vedanta 
the concept o f maya rep re sen ts  a  p r in c ip le  o f a  c e r ta in  way o f  seeing. 
When i t  i s  assumed that th is  p e rsp ec tiv e , being u n re a l, can be overcome 
in  a  p o s itiv e  way, maya appears c le a r ly  as a  symptom o f t ru th , which
Ghate (Vedanta. p . 22); "The r e a l i ty  i s  to  be a tta in e d  n o t by 
reasoning ( ta rk a ) , bu t by in tro sp e c tiv e  re a l iz a t io n  (anubhava) ."
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should a c tu a lly  preclude i t  from any such in te rp re ta tio n  as we 
have encountered in  Schopenhauer, who changes i t s  meaning from 
Vedantic to  o v e rtly  negative  (see p . 54). I f  th e re  i s  any aspec t o f 
"uselessness" in  maya. then i t  should he on the le v e l of p lay fu ln ess  
( l i l a ) where, however, the question  o f purpose would lead  ad absurdum.
I f  we ask  ourse lves i f  maya in  Vedanta could be equ ivalen t 
to  Schopenhauer* s V orstellung  (im agination), we must r e c a l l  th a t  in  
Schopenhauer a l l  those ob jectionab le  V orstellungen o f the world v e ile d  by 
"maya" mark a  very re a l  aspec t o f o b je c t if ic a t io n  in  the evolvement 
o f a  b lin d  and u ltim a te ly  u se le s s  w il l .  This evolvement from a stage  
o f unm anifested u n ity  to  the  p lu r a l i ty  o f "maya" fe a tu re s  the p r in c ip le  
o f in d iv id u a tio n . As long as th e re  i s  w i l l ,  unnegated, th e re  i s  
su ffe rin g . Schopenhauer* s "maya" i s  the p r in c ip le  which l e t s  u s  have, 
and lu re s  u s  in to  having, ou r V orstellungen. which a l l  a re  wrong on some 
le v e l o r  o th e r. I t  i s  the  p r in c ip le  which underlies the w i l l 's  "wrong" 
w illin g , i t s  own w illin g  to  see wrongly. I f  we ignore f o r  a  moment 
th is  ro le  o f  th e  w il l  and the  asp ec t o f  r e a l i ty  a ttach ed  to  i t ,  we may 
say th a t both  Schopenhauer* s and S ankara 's maya "makes" u s  see wrongly 
inasmuch a s  i t  a c tu a liz e s  the  network o f deceptive o r ie n ta tio n  p o in ts  
f o r  the p e rce iv in g  su b jec t. But w hile Schopenhauer concen tra tes on the 
f a t a l  course o f the w il l  which a p r io r i  lead s  -  o r  ra th e r  m isleads -  
in to  the V orstellungen. Sankara simply r e fe r s  to  a common e r ro r  due to 
avidva and which, moreover, becomes i r r e le v a n t  in  the  l ig h t  o f a h igher 
consciousness. In  e i th e r  case, w ithout maya the  in d iv id u a ls  would no t 
be caught up (trapped  o r  deluded) in  the appearance o f th in g s  b u t 
in s te ad  would look r ig h t  through to  t h e i r  re sp ec tiv e  essences, e i th e r  
unmotivated b lin d  v o lit io n  o r  pure consciousness. From a  Sankaran 
p o in t of view, the  p r in c ip le  o f in d iv id u a tio n  su s ta in s  an u n rea l world 
which d i s t r a c t s  u s  from a problem less s ta te  o f consciousness, in  
Schopenhauer i t  marks a  su b jec tiv e  le v e l o f r e a l i ty  where personal 
seeing  and su ffe rin g , synonymously, produce consciousness which can 
only be "imported" neg ativ e ly . We can now answer th a t  Schopenhauer* s 
"maya" i s  n o t a  fo rce  which s u b s ta n tia lly  produces o r  feeds im agination 
( th a t would be the w il l ) ,  n o r i s  i t  id e n tic a l  w ith im agination; i t  i s ,
n eg ativ e ly  speaking, th e  obscuring and r e s t r i c t iv e  p r in c ip le  o f 
appearance which preven ts the  immediate negation  o f  the  w il l  by i t s e l f ,  
and i t  i s ,  p o s it iv e ly  speaking, a s ta b i l i z e r  and a  device vhich "stakes 
the  tra p  work" in  su sta in in g  o u r s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  on an imaginary 
le v e l o f very  concrete c o n f l ic t .  Thereby "maya" r e s t r i c t s  u s  to  
a  sphere in  vhich su ffe r in g  forms an accepted, p a r t  o f  r e a l i t y  inasmuch 
as i t  may be connected w ith a  c u l tu ra l ly  accepted form o f  ihe vo rld . 
This i s  the very  kind o f  acceptance from vhich  Schopenhauer wants to  
separa te  h im self. In  f a c t ,  Schopenhauer d is t in c t ly  dem onstrates th a t  
kind o f  un^Vedantic a lie n a tio n  vhich may be considered a p re re q u is ite  
f o r  ihe European ph ilosopher in  g en era l.
According to  Sankara a l l  th a t  i s  d is t in c t  ( v i s i s t a ) i s  maya. 
Vedanta ( l ik e  Buddhism a p a r t from some p e rip h e ra l sec tio n s) u ses  maya 
in  a  sense vhich conforms with Schopenhauer's d e f in it io n  based on 
K ant's  Erscheinung (phenomenon) and a s  u rin c in iu a  in d iv id u a tio n is .
But Sankara 's concept o f  maya i s  v a s te r  and’more o b jec tiv e  than th a t  
of Schopenhauer. Only in  i t s  most im portant aspect i s  i t  reduc ib le  to  
the p r in c ip le  o f  in d iv idua tion . On the  whole i t  a lso  expands to  o th e r  
human id eas , such as  the  cosm ological conception o f the world a s  p lay  
( l i l a ) ,  o r, a s  the cause less  work, o f th e  brahman f ig u r in g  a s  a  mayavin. 
In  th is  p lay , the in d iv id u a tio n a l p r in c ip le  o ffe rs  no firm  ground f o r  
any personal a lie n a tio n  o r  se lf-n e g a tio n .
The most prominent and ty p ic a l ly  Indian example f o r  Sankara 's  
category o f  in d iv id u a li ty  emerges w ith  the  atman rep resen tin g , in  
c e r ta in  s i tu a tio n s  o f id e n t i f ic a t io n  o r  equivalence, an in d iv id u a l 
aspect o f  th e  brahman. Meta-psycho lo g ic a l ly ,  t a t  tvam a s i  im plies f o r  
Sankara some transform ation  to  i t s  a c tu a l i ty ,  some movement from th e  
brahman to  the atman. The f a c t s  th a t  we have complete i l lu s io n  in  
maya (th e  brahman alone being  tru e )  o r  th a t  t ru ly  conscious percep tion  
excludes any personal p r in c ip le  in d ic a te  th a t  th is  category o f  
in d iv id u a lity  appears here  in  a  negative  a sp ec t, i . e . ,  in  the  sphere 
o f n o n -re a lity . For Schopenhauer th e  su ffe r in g  on the  le v e l o f
( u )
For both  the Buddha and Sankara " the  s e l f  i s  a  mental construction" 
(Badhakrishnan, Br. Su.. p , 144).
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in d iv id u a tio n  i s  o f r e a l  and personal importance. Hie 
Schopenhauerians would ra th e r  s u f fe r  than change the  in d iv id u a li ty  
o f th e i r  conscious s ta te .  S im ilarly , G ebser's  changing eg o -s tru c tu re s , 
so s ig n if ic a n t f o r  h is  thought, a re  something veiy  re a l  f o r  him (hence 
h is  worry about c e r ta in  Indian a t t i tu d e s  o f "submersion", " re tre a t"  o r  
" rev ersa l o f b i r th " ) .  Even when he a sso c ia te s  Ind ian  thought w ith  
a  "dream like, m ythical form o f  s e lf - id e n t i f ic a t io n " ,  he does n o t touch 
upon Sankara 's dream metaphors which merely serve to  i l l u s t r a t e  h is  
concept o f maya. Schopenhauer's dream analog ies, as  we saw, come -  
w ith due r e s t r i c t io n  to  h is  own sp e c if ic  sphere o f "maya" -  very  n ear 
to those o f Sankara.
Hiese d if fe re n t  approaches may be lin k ed  to g e th e r by 
a tta ch in g  thou to  one comnon m eta-category o f  in d iv id u a lity , which 
can harbour d if f e r e n t  conceptions o f  id e n t i ty  on a b a s is  o f change.
For Schopenhauer, and f o r  Gebser, the  most serio u s  p a r t  o f t h e i r  
problem a r i s e s  w ith  the em pirical s ide  o f the  world and ou r dependent 
s ta te  o f s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n .  While Gebser claim s as  the  only sen s ib le  
option fo r  mankind a d i s t in c t  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l-h is to r ic a l change, 
Schopenhauer wants, on a  pure ly  m etaphysical b a s is , ra d ic a l e x is ten tia l, 
change. For Sankara any em pirical aspec t -  maya. p lay  -  i s  secondary.
His a sp ira tio n  goes towards what from a European p o in t o f view may, a t  
f i r s t  s ig h t, seem to be a transcendent le v e l , b u t vhich, a s  we have 
seen, e s s e n t ia l ly  p re sen ts  an immanent and psychological problem. I t  
i s  no t an ep istem ological one, as Deussen's re fe ren ce  to  Kant im plied, 
no r i s  Sankara engaged in  a  m etaphysical p o rtra y a l o f  th e  c a u s a li ty  
o f su ffe rin g , a s  in  the  case o f Schopenhauer, b u t he wants to  
explore what a f f e c ts  our consciousness in  te rn s  of an atman-brahman 
re la tio n .
(c) Ihe im p lica tio n  o f "w ill"  in  connection w ith S ankara 's em pirical d a ta
Sankara says th a t our habitual way of see ing  the  world must n e c e ssa r ily  
convey a wrong meaning to  u s , because, w ith the help  o f  in d iv id u a liz in g  
condition ing  fa c to rs  (upadhi) . we erroneously superimpose the  wrong 
q u a li t ie s  (dharma) onto eveiy th ing . He m eticu lously  d esc rib es  the
mechanism o f  th i s  erroneous p rocess. However, he does n o t
(12)e x p lic i t ly  name any p r in c ip le  o f  in te n tio n a l! ty  behind i t .  Hie
brahman, ra th e r , in  a  way connives i t  a l l .  O perating l ik e  a  magician 
(mavavin) . i t  leaves the cause o f  seeing  and accep ting  the  world a s  
maya w ith us, the  onlookers. U iis makes i t  easy to  ru le  out the 
Upanisadic iccha  (d e s ire ) . Nor can avidva be the  w il l ,  o r  m erely th e  
w ill ,  a s  we s h a ll  soon see.
In te n tio n a l! ty  i s  always th e re . However, i t  has no firm ly  
estab lished  semantic u n it  in  Indian philosophy. We may f in d  th a t  i t  
p lay s  some im p lic it  ro le  in  th e  .jnana o f  Vedanta. A ll brahman-atmari 
p o s tu la tio n , a s  we note i t  in  Sankara (but n o t in  the  Upanisads) can 
only e x is t  as  "no t ou tside m yself", i . e . ,  no t ou tside  my personal form 
o f  seeing and knowing (pp. 259-260, 264-265, 270). I b is  knowledge 
im plies, from our p o in t o f  view, some personal form o f  in te n tio n a li ty , 
s ince i t  can only be asp ired  to  through some s tru c tu re  o f  p e rso n a lity . 
Hence, any in te n tio n a li ty  w ith in  th i s  conception o f  knowledge b rin g s  
us r ig h t  back to  ourse lves and the maya o f our in d iv id u a lity . 
Knowledge, which in  the Upanisads i s  conceived "as such" (p. 205), 
in stead  in  Sankara becomes p a r t  o f some "system" (darsana) . The 
im plied in te n tio n a li ty , which means some form o f  "w ill"  in  a  Sankaran 
sense, has a  simple connecting func tion . I t  i s  merely req u ired  to  
b rin g  together such d a ta  as  we have discussed  in  the  case o f  "my 
frien d s"  (p* 261), namely, the  f a c t  th a t  they  may appear a s  f r ie n d s  -  
maya -  and in  ad d itio n  even a s  my fr ie n d s  -  more maya. But th i s  maya 
i s  no t chao tic . In s tead , the  q u a l i t ie s  (dharma) involved fo llow  the  
coordination o f  some "w ill" . The re s u l t in g  attachm ent on an em pirical 
le v e l (death o f fr ien d s  e t c . ) and on a so te r io lo g ic a l le v e l  (a c tiv e  
lib e ra tio n )  i s  o f course bad and a lto g e th e r  the  consequence o f 
avidva.
(12) rO tto 's  in f lu e n tia l opinion th a t  Sankara, a  quasi-contem porary o f 
Eckhart, aims a t  " the  complete term ination  o f w ill and ac tio n "  i s  
c e r ta in ly  too much o f  a  formal re v e rsa l o f  Eckhart' 3 n y s tic a l  
u n if ic a tio n  o f th e  ind iv id u a l w ill w ith an a c tiv e  u n iv e rsa l w ill
(HTstik. pp. 3, 241- 242) .
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In  Buddhism the  concept o f  avidva p resen ts  a  com plicated
s tru c tu re  w ith an emphasis on su ffe rin g  a s  i t s  f in a l  r e s u l t .  In
Vedanta avidva i s  more o b jec tiv e  and le s s  in d iv id u a l o r  personal than
in  Buddhism, n ea re r to  th e  European concept o f (ignorant) n a tu re : no t
had, ju st o n to log ica lly  predetermined. For Sankara avidva i s  more
a m atte r o f wrong id e n tif ic a t io n , o f  wrong obscuring da ta  connection,
where su ffe r in g  p lay s  a  f a r  le s s  ca rd in a l ro le .  Ihe w il l ,  w ith  regard
to i t s  connective fu n c tio n , does n o t even occupy what could be described
a s  a fa c e t o f  the  s tru c tu re  o f  avidya. bu t only an edge o f  i t .  W ill i s
no t an Indian  category. But th e re  i s  something in  each Ind ian  darsana
which by way o f  a n a ly s is  could be id e n t i f ie d  w ith  w ill ,  bu t n o t the
o th e r way around. We must n o t seek -  and cannot f in d  -  such a  concept
in  Ind ia . Yet i t  should be p o ssib le  to  f in d  something which would be
what we c a l l  o r  would c a l l  w ill .  For in s tan ce , d e s ire  (iccha) i s
a  fa c e t o f ignorance (avidva) . one edge o f which would rep resen t f o r
u s , under the  circum stances and as  long  a s  the context perm its, the
fa c e le ss , concep tless form o f w il l .  N evertheless, ou r approach should
(13)be as l i t e r a l ,  herm eneutically  speaking, a s  p o ssib le .
I f  we look a t  the concept o f  "my body" as fe a tu rin g  some 
q u a lity  (dharma). o r  ju s t  q u a lity  in  general, we f e e l  th a t  the  various 
worldly d isc rep an c ies  (v i s i s t a ) ( r e s u lt in g  from the  impact o f  maya on 
us) are  meant to  be so rted  out by some conscious e f fo r t .  We might 
find  the Vedantic v a r ia n t o f  the  necessary  personal in te n t io n a l i ty  
a ttached  to , o r  p a r t  o f  th e  p o te n tia l  o f , such concepts as  manas 
(already somewhat more vaguely suggested by Deussen), comparable, in  
th i s  regard , to  the  samskaras of Buddhism. While in  Buddhisa we f in d  
th a t em pirical d a ta  a re  recognized and evaluated in  o rd e r to  p u t an 
(u ltim ate) stop  to  the  process o f  Dependent O rig ina tion , we might 
d iscover a Sankaran a sp ec t o f  in te n t io n a l i ty ,  the edge o f  w i l l ,  in  
such a  process a s  th a t  o f p u tt in g  vario u s d a ta  toge ther, such a s  "my 
body" and "my body” , and u ltim a te ly  even those da ta  o f  t a t  tvam a s i .
On the b a s is  o f  knowing how th ese  d a ta  come to g e th e r, the  e f f o r t  o f
(13) Cf. p . 7, Gadamer's double understanding: stepwise (c irc u la r )  and
in  an o v e ra ll manner; l i t e r a l  s tep s , and exceeding the  o rig in a l 
expression.
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d isconnecting  them and so rtin g  them o u t, i . e . ,  th e  e f f o r t  to  regain  
complete c l a r i ty  o f  th e  meaning o f  t a t  tvam a s i .  could he made.
In  In d ia  em pirical consciousness i s  deemed to  become 
s ta b i l iz e d  in  the course o f s p i r i tu a l  and mental progress. This 
"psychological" s ta b i l iz a t io n  -  through the propaedeutic  fu n c tio n  of 
yoga (compare pp. 251-254) -  i s  o f the  g re a te s t  importance. I t  i s  o f 
a  p ra c t ic a l  n a tu re  u n lik e  the th e o re t ic a l  s ta b i l iz e r s  introduced by 
the Germans. According to  Kant and h is  fo llow ers ou r percep tion  o f  
the world i s  e s s e n tia l ly  determined by i t s  ep istem ological l im ita tio n s . 
Hence Schopenhauer saw in  negation  the  only way "out" (while Gebser 
t r i e d  to  accomodate h im self by red e fin in g  h is  r e a l  id e n t i ty ) .  Ind ia  
expresses no such doubt regard ing  the  p ra c t ic a l  value o f our percep tiv e  
mechanign: we can and must make proper u se  o f  i t .  I t  i s  e s s e n tia l ly
good. But i t  must be cleaned "psychologically" by disconnecting and 
removing the wrong elem ents.
In  Buddhism, what i s  wanted i s  some s o r t  o f e th ic a l  balance 
between body and s p i r i t  (as compared to  Schopenhauer's e th ic a l  
pessim isn). Hence i t  i s  no t n e c e ssa r ily  bad to  have a  body, i t  i s  only 
a  nuisance. Euddhism i s  e x p l ic i t ly  more concerned w ith  su ffe rin g  than 
Vedanta, where the emphasis l i e s  more on the knowledge o f r e a l i ty .  
Buddhist s p i r i tu a l  wisdom (pra.jna) i s ,  th e re fo re , no t approached l ik e  
Vedantic .jnana o r  v idya. While Buddhism aims a t  stopping a process o f 
Dependent O rig ination , Sankara wants to  change a  wrong o r ie n ta tio n  
(avidya) by withdrawing the a t te n tio n  from the  s e lf - l im it in g  fa c to rs  
(data) and s h if t in g  i t  "somewhere e ls e " , ihe in tended stopping in  
Buddhism aims a t  a  c e r ta in  knowledge w ith  regard  to  n irvana  which, 
however, bears  no p o s itiv e  o n to lo g ica l d e sc rip tio n . Vedanta speaks 
o f some d iv ine  knowledge (vidya) o f something, i . e . ,  some o n to lo g ica l 
s ta te  described  as in f in i t e ,  completed, unachievable, bu t in  i t s e l f  
achieved. I t s  a c tu a liz a tio n , to  which. Sankara r e f e r s  a s  "grace", 
seems to  amount e s s e n tia l ly  to  what in  Buddhism we have described  as  
o n to lo g ica l Awakening (p. 253). Ihe a c tu a l iz a t io n  o f th i s  balanced 
s ta te  o f consciousness may appear a s  the  r e s u l t  o f  some disconnected, 
pure in te n tio n a li ty . But i f  we accep t th i s  balance as  an o n to lo g ica l
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s ta te , ¥e cannot describe  i t  a s  be in g  a  r e s u l t  o f  e i th e r  r e a l  o r  
i l lu s o ry  c a u s a li ty , s ince  balance im plies  absence o f in te n tio n . 
Consciousness in  a  Sankaran sense r e fe r s  to  a  pure, transform ed s ta te  
which has l e f t  the psychological sphere behind. In  th is  connection 
avidva (un like  in  C la ss ica l Toga, p. 284) i s  not a meta-psycho lo g ic a l  
category e i th e r ,  b u t r a th e r  o f  a  u n iv e rs a l, cosmogonic n a tu re .
In ten tio n a l i t y  in  the Schopenhauerians d i f f e r s  from th a t  in  
Indian thought in  more than one re sp ec t. In  In d ia , w ill  i s  no t 
p resen t in  any p rim arily  given p o s tu la tio n  (un like , e .g . ,  ic ch a ) ; w ill ,  
qua "edge” , i s  a  derived , secondary category. In  Schopenhauer" s  case 
w ill  i s  an o n to lo g ica l p o s tu la tio n  re p re se n tin g  a  u n iv ersa l category. 
Together w ith  "maya” i t  fu n c tions a s  an im portant s ta b i l i z e r  in  h is  
philosophy: Schopenhauer derives th e  d i s t in c t ly  negative ch a rac te r  o f
the w il l  from what he sees i t  perform on the  le v e l o f  ind iv idua tion , 
i . e . ,  from h is  personal, c u l tu ra l  view o f  th e  world a s  "maya”. 
P e rso n a lity  and su ffe rin g  a re  inexorab ly  and in d isso lu ab ly  lin k ed  
through the  w il l .  But in  In d ia  w il l  and in d iv id u a lity  a re  deprived 
o f  r e a l i ty  by d e f in it io n . W ill in  Sankara becomes p a r t  o f  th e  
brahman" s p lay . I t  i s  p a r t  o f  maya. M eta-philosophically  speaking, 
he i s  n o t challenged by any r e a l  and bad w il l  which could be negated; 
in stead , he wants to  avoid the connections produced by an i l lu s o ry , 
fa ls e  w ill .
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Chapter Nine
C lass ica l Yoga: e x p e r ien tia l d e - id e n tif ic a t io n
(1) D iscip lined  in s p ira tio n  and confirm ation
!he p ra c tic a l  Indian "withdrawal" from l i f e ,  a s  e sp e c ia lly  Schopenhauer,
Spengler and Gebser f e l t  i t ,  has i t s  most d i r e c t  system atic  expression
in  Toga. In  f a c t ,  i t  i s  through Yoga th a t  most o th e r  l in e s  o f  the
Indian tra d i t io n  acknowledge the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  an e x p e r ie n tia l co n tro l
( l )o r  support o f  th e i r  own c e n tra l p u rs u it .  This suggests to  us th a t  
we concentrate on a  narrow space w ith in  the  sphere o f Toga i n  which th e  
presumed connections between the  em pirical and th e  m etaphysical, o r, 
more accu ra te ly  speaking, the m eta-psychological and th e  me tar-on to log ical, 
o f f e r  some explanations o f d i s t in c t  comparative in te r e s t .
Yoga (included in  Buddhism r ig h t  from the beginning} emerges
(2)as an independent system (darsana) only in  p o s t-c la s s ic a l  tim es.
However, i t s  system atized p r in c ip le s  and core elem ents can a lread y  be 
found in  P a ta n ja l i 's  Togasutras (considered by F ianw allner a s  
rep resen tin g  the  o ld  Toga branch o f  Samkhya). C la ss ic a l Toga, a s
^  Werner, Yoga, pp. x, 15. Eadhakrishnan, P h i l . I I , p. 342: "Every
system of thought u t i l i z e s  the  methods o f Yoga in  i t s  own in te r e s t s ."
( 2) Prauwallner, In d .P h il.I . pp. 408-410.
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presented  by P a ta n ja li ,  does n o t r e ly  on a  s t r i c t l y  th e o re tic a l
approach to  knowledge. Moreover, as  K arel Werner a ssu res  u s , "upon th e
whole i t  i s  more e labo ra te  and summarizes the  actual technique o f Toga
(3)procedures more exactly  than the Buddhist exposition". With a  g lance
to  i t s  p o ssib le  h is to ry , Deussen sees in  i t  the n a tu ra l  consequence o f
c e r ta in  Upanisadic in s ig h ts  such a s  th e  one th a t  " th e  knover does not
(d)
know, the non-knower knows" (see p. 201, Kena U p.). In  m etaphysical
terms, he f e e ls ,  Toga takes i t s  o r ig in  from the  f a c t  th a t  su ffe r in g  can
be found in  everything (sarvam dnhk-ham eva vivekinah) (S u tras 2 .15).
•  •
In  Yoga, a s  in  Buddhism and Vedanta, the  cause o f  su ffe rin g  i s  seen
. -  (5) m  avidya.
S h if tin g  the emphasis from the  "m etaphysical" to  a  more 
"psychological" aspect, the fu n c tio n a l b a s is  o f C lass ica l Yoga, a s  
contained in  the  p a r t  known as k riy a  yoga, has been su cc in c tly  described  
by Ceorg F e u e r s t e in ^  as  "the combined p ra c tic e  o f  a sc e s is  (ta p a s) .
(7 )self-stu d y  (svadhaya) and devotion to  the Lord (Isvara-pranidhana)".
He p resen ts  a s  the aim o f th is  endeavour some " e c s ta t ic  consciousness 
( in  samadhi)" which i s  f re e  o f the  common m istaken kind o f em pirical
75J- - - - - - - - - - -Werner, Yoga, p. 131. P a ta n ja l i ,  w hile try in g  to  p re sen t a  uniform 
work in  accordance w ith h is  own view, takes various Yoga t r a d i t io n s  in to  
considera tion  (c f. Oberhammer, S tru k t . . p . 134; Dasgupta, Y .P h il.. p. 5 l) .
^  According to  Hauer (Anfange. pp. 186, 2 0 l) , the  development of 
C lass ica l Yoga receives i t s  main impulse from the  e c s ta t ic  p ra c tic e  
o f the Vratyas supplemented by Brahmanical e c s ta s is .  Wemer (Yoga, 
pp. 100-102) considers the evo lu tionary  view o f  th e  o r ig in  o f  Yoga 
as outmoded; conceptual e lab o ra tio n  (P a ta n ja li)  in d ic a te s  no 
ex p erien tia l su p e rio rity .
(5) Deussen, A .G .Phil.1.3. pp. 543, 549.
^  We use a s  a  guide Georg F e u e rs te in 's  Philosophy o f C la ss ica l Yoga 
(based on the Patan.jalayogasutram) . an eloquent r e f le c t io n  o f  th e  
p re v a ilin g  modem in te rp re ta tio n s  of th e  sub jec t.
(7)
Kriya yoga, the Yogic ac tio n  which revolves around th i s  combined 
p ra c tic e , sp ec ia liz e s  in  the system atic  d e s tru c tio n  o f  the k le sa s  
(defilem ents); i t  has been ranked as a co rrec tio n  o r, a t  le a s t ,  
supplement o f  the comprehensive yoganga te x t.
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(8)s e l f - id e n t i ty .  Quite p ra c t ic a l ly , Yoga wants to  transform  " th e
o rd inary  consciousness by way o f c e n tra liz in g  and u n it in g  the
(9)consciousness process'*. P rim arily , Yoga would reg u la te  th i s  p rocess 
in  conform ity w ith i t s  unquestioned Ind ian  background. This cond ition  
i s  a lso  in  some way apprecia ted  by F eu e rs te in , who -  in sp ire d  by 
Gebser -  adds th a t  Yoga i s  "anchored in  the mythic consciou^iess 
s tru c tu re "  (compare pp. 152-155, 175). I b i s  in te r e s t in g  assumption, 
to g e th e r w ith th e  question  o f the  general a c c e s s ib i l i ty  o f  Yoga, s h a l l  
concern u s  l a t e r .
I f  we were to  follow  some general m ystica l conception o f  the
yogjc k ind  o f  "consummative experience" (samadhi). such a s , f o r  in s tan ce ,
B h ara ti has po rtrayed  fo r  u s, the  u ltim a te  o b je c tiv e  o f  Yoga would
appear to  be analogous, i f  no t id e n tic a l ,  to  th a t  o f Vedanta o r
Buddhism. P h ilo soph ica lly , however, C la ss ic a l Yoga u ses  i t s  own
s p e c if ic  approach in  determ ining the  p o s itio n s  and n a tu re  o f  th e  various
c o n s titu e n ts  and mechanisms which su s ta in  th i s  world. I t  thereby c le a rs
i t s  own ro u te  towards the intended e n s ta t ic  change in  consciousness.
Since i t  i s  th i s  " theory" which f in a l ly  decides what " is "  o r  " i s  no t" ,
we cannot exclude the th e o re tic a l  asp ec t from the o v e ra ll o b je c tiv e  o f
Yoga. Therefore, we propose to  t r e a t ,  i f  n o t m y stica lly , then
p h ilo so p h ica lly , the tra d i t io n  o f Yoga as  a  d is t in c t  and independent
( l l )phenomenon o f  Indian philosophy.
(8) E liade (Yoga, pp. 58, 86-87) renders samadhi a s  “e n s ta t ic  
experience" o r  "e n s ta s is " , paraphrasing  i t  a s  " th i s  contem plative s ta t e  
in  which th e  thought grasps immediately the  form o f  th e  o b je c t without 
the  help  o f ca teg o rie s  and o f  im agination". I t  rep re sen ts  th e  l a s t  l in k  
(anga.) in  th e  c la s s ic a l  chain o f e ig h t c la s se s  o f propaedeutic  p ra c tic e s . 
(9) F eu erste in , Essence, p* 25.
S im ilarly , E lia d e 's  general re fe ren ce  to  "abso lu te  freedom" and 
" l ib e ra t io n  from su ffering" as th e  aim o f  a l l  Indian  ph ilo soph ies (Yoga, 
pp. 12, 24, 168) i s  acceptable only o u ts id e  o f any s p e c if ic  context.
F eu ers te in  (C la ss .. pp. ix , 111) and o th e rs  hold th a t  P a ta n ja li  
Yoga was derived side by side  w ith Samkhya from a common ro o t, some
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In  our follow ing b r ie f  ex p osition  we draw on a  s n a il  
number o f accepted p a tte rn s  in  the s tru c tu ra l  in te r re la tio n s h ip  o f 
lo g ic  concepts. Ihe contexts and concepts we a re  most in te re s te d  in  
a re  th e  ones which (a) play a  s ig n if ic a n t ro le  in  the  p r in c ip a l 
understanding  o f the  philosophy o f Toga; and (b) a t  the  same time allow  
u s  to  develop our hermeneutic connection w ith  the German thought in  
question .
(2) Supports and movement o f the  Yogic p rocess
(a) Consciousness focused on awareness
C lass ica l Yoga on the  whole recognizes th ree  m ajor m eta-onto logical 
p r in c ip le s :  Yogic conceptions o f God ( is v a ra ) . the  S e lf  (nurusa) and
th e  world (p r a k r t i ). Hie f i r s t  p r in c ip le  apparen tly  rep resen ts  some 
formal apex where Yogic theory and p ra c tic e  meet. In  ad d itio n , isv a ra  
may be looked upon ph ilo so p h ica lly  as some sp ec ia l o r  p a ra l le l  form 
of the S e lf , a purusa su i generis  as F eu ers te in  says, o r  perhaps a s  
"a mere primus in te r  p ares" as Deussen p re fe rs  to  pu t i t .  I t  p lays 
a  more prominent ro le  in  the p ra c t ic a l  s tru c tu re  o f Yoga, f ig u r in g  as  
an "archetypal yogin" o r  proto-model fea tu red  by some "o n tic
(1 2)c o -e sse n tia li ty "  w ith man's inmost S e lf  (purusa) .
Emphasizing the pre-em inently  p ra c t ic a l  o r ie n ta tio n  o f  Yoga,
F eu ers te in  proposes an e x p e r ie n tia l d e riv a tio n  o f the  concept o f the
S e lf (purusa) based on some no t em p irica lly  observable datum. He
r e je c ts  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f any d i r e c t  experience o f  th i s  purusa (the
Yoga and Samkhya "synonym" f o r  atman) because o f  i t s  ra d ic a l d u a l is t ic
sep ara tio n  from the n o n -se lf  (o r  p r a k r t i ) .  Bie S e lf  may be
^ •
Samkhya-Yoga. Werner (Yoga, p. 132) p laces  the  composition o f th e  
Su tras any time between 300 B.C. and 300 A.D., t h e i r  e s s e n tia l  m a te ria l 
p a r t ly  even before the tim e o f  the  Buddha. Also c f . Woods,
Yoga-Svstem. p . ix ;  Hauer, Yoga, pp. 23B-239? E liade, Yoga, 
pp. 364-366; Tecfa.du Yoga, pp. 25-27.
(12) F eu erste in , C la ss .. pp. 12-15? Deussen, A .G .P h il.1 .3. p. 546.
(13) Feuerstein, C la ss.. pp. 15-20.
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considered as an a s p a t ia l  and atem poral r e a l i ty .  But, u n lik e  the
atman in  Advaita-Vedanta, i t  i s  in  no way involved in  any conceivable
re la tio n  to  the  em pirical world; i t  i s  consciousness in  i t s e l f  a s
opposed to  consciousness o f something. What i s  here  c a lled
"consciousness-of" has to  be understood a s  a  fu n c tio n  o f the  m ental
apparatus, hence, as an evolu te  o f  th e  in s e n t ie n t world-ground (p r a k r t i )
and a s  an opera tive  c o n s titu en t o f the em pirica l world. Due to  the
obscuring in fluence  o f  the  em pirical consciousness man lo se s  h is
transcendental id e n ti ty , o r  the  a u th e n t ic ity  o f  h im self a s  such, w hile
the f lu c tu a tio n  o f h is  s ta te s  o f  experience p reven ts any s ta b le
s e lf - id e n tif ic a t io n . Id e a lly , the S e lf  -  which does not in ten d , fe e l
o r  th ink  — could be perceived  by a mind unobstructed  by the  e f fe c ts
o f the  em pirical consciousness. In s tead , the mind i s  u su a lly  caught
up in  some perpetual production o f f a l s e  id e n t i t i e s  (known a s  a^mita
o r "I-am -ness"). power o r  p r in c ip le  which su s ta in s  th i s  process i s
said  to  be generated by o r  derived  from nescience (avidva) . In  o th e r
words, avidva can be in te rp re te d  as the ro o t o f the  c o rre la tio n
(samyoga) between S e lf  and n o n -se lf o r  world. This erroneous
r \ (l4 )c o rre la tio n  i s  in e v ita b ly  lin k ed  w ith  su ffe r in g  Iduhkha; .
•
An im portant key to  the meta-psycJhological aspect o f the  
problem can be found in  the concept o f k le s a . which has been rendered 
as "the c au se -o f-a ff iic tio n "  ( i . e . ,  in  connection w ith our impaired 
self-understand ing). F euerste in  r e f e r s  to  f iv e  sp e c if ic  v a r ia n ts  o r  
dynamizing sub -p rin c ip les  o f k le sa . namely, nescience (avidva) .
’•I-am-ness" (asm ita). attachm ent (rag a) .  av ersio n  (dvesa) and the
(l5 ) *" w ill- to - liv e "  (abh in ivesa) . I t  i s  th e  uncon tro lled  in te ra c t io n
of these emotional and m otivational fo rc e s , roo ted  in  avidva. which
(l4 ) S o te rio lo g ica lly , the  fu n c tio n  o f Yogic duhkha p a r t ly  resem bles 
th a t o f Vedantic maya. E liade (Yoga, p . 24) ,  observing a p o s itiv e , 
s tim u la ting  value in  the  Yogic conception o f  "su ffe rin g "  a s  the  law o f 
ex istence, re fe rs  to  i t  a s  the  co n d itio  s in e  qua non o f l ib e ra t io n .
Ihese f iv e  "nsychom ental-state( c i t t a  v r t t i )-producing m atrixes" 
are  in cessan tly  f lu c tu a tin g  due to  th e  presence o f re s id u a l fo rce s  
(vasanas) (E liade, Yoga, pp. 51-52).
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accounts f o r  our su ffe rin g . This m eta-psychological (o r  even
m eta-onto logical) p r in c ip le  o f avidva does no t have th e  cosmogonic
func tion  emphasized in  Advaita-Vedanta (p. 278), hu t simply means the
non-understanding " th a t  consciousness-of ( c i t t a ) i s  an epiphenomenon
o f the transcendental Self-Awareness". In  o rd er to  stop the causal
in fluence  o f  avidva these k le sa s  must he a tten u a ted  by the c u ltiv a tio n
o f a  ra d ic a l consciousness change culm inating in  the e n s ta t ic  s ta te  
(16)o f samadhi.
(b) P ra k r ti ;  rearrangement o f i t s  gunas and i t s  le v e l o f in d iv id u a tio n  
•  •
One could say th a t  C la ss ica l Yoga i s  e s s e n tia l ly  a  s to ry  o f the
dynamics o f the  gunas w ith in  p r a k r t i . Observing the two card in a l 
•  •
dimensions in  the  meaning of p ra k r t i .  F eu e rs te in  in te rp re ts  i t  ( l )  a s  
a noumenal m atrix  o f c rea tio n , a lso  c a lle d  a lin g a ; and (2) as  the  r e a ls  
o f  the  m ultitudinous phenomena o f  con tingen t ex istence, which in  tu rn  
comprises (a) an em pirical "su rface  s tru c tu re "  and (b) a  "deep 
stru c tu re"  reserved to  yogic in tro sp e c tio n  although lo g ic a lly  deducible 
from em pirical da ta  ( i . e . ,  presumably approachable from 
a m eta-psychological angle). A ll phenomena a re  considered 
transform ations (pari.nama) o f  the world ground (p r a k r t i ). Accordingm •
to  the p ra k r ti-p a r i nama-vada. the p r in c ip a l Yoga view on c a u sa lity
(shared w ith Samkhya and the o ld er schools o f  Vedanta), the Many
evolves from the One. ( in  Sankara 's Advaita^-Vedanta a l l  transform ations
happen in  the em pirical world, f ig u r in g  as a  mere appearance (v iv a r ia )
o f  an e s s e n tia l ly  d if f e r e n t  and unchangeable cause, the  brahman. ) In
Yoga (as in  Samkhya) these  transform ations a re  based on rearrangem ents
o f  the b asic  o r  primary c o n s titu en ts  o f p r a k r t i . the  so -c a lle d  gunas.
•  •
This includes everything, except purusa which by d e f in it io n  i s  n iivguna.
• •
(We no tice  a  c e r ta in  resemblance reg ard in g  the  e so te r ic a l  le v e l o f
— (17)
Vedanta where the  param brahma was d escribed  a s  rtir-guna. p . 267). 
According to  F euerste in  th e re  must be an in f in i t e
F euerste in , C la ss .. pp. 64-65, 85.
(17)
Feuerstein, C lass., pp. 29, 32.
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(18)number o f gunas, which (here  he r e f e r s  to  S. Dasgupta) "a re  no t 
m erely q u a l i t ie s  o r  p ro p e r tie s , b a t  a c tu a l e n t i t i e s  o r  ' r e a l s ' ” . Toga 
d iv id es  th ese  gunas in to  th re e  types, known a s  sa ttv a  (being-ness, o r  
the  p r in c ip le  o f  ex is ten ce), ra.ias (en e rg y -s tu ff, o r  the p r in c ip le  o f  
d isco n tin u ity  and change) and tamas (m ass-stu ff, o r  th a t  which den ies 
a n n ih ila tio n  through change, o r  the  p r in c ip le  o f c o n tin u ity ) . Both in  
em pirical r e a l i t y  and according to  yogic in tro sp e c tio n , the  world
process depends on the dynamic in te ra c t io n  o f  those th ree  types o f
(19)gunas. On the  assumption th a t  " th e  tra in e d  yogin” i s  in  command
o f a  sp e c if ic  fa c u lty  o f in tro sp e c tio n , F eu ers te in  considers such 
concepts as p ra k r t i  o r  the  gunas as  e x p e r ie n tia lly  derived . (He, too, 
sees th e  i n i t i a l  impulse o f Indian p h ilo soph ical t ra d i t io n  a s  some form 
o f m ystical experience whan he asks: "For what i s  th e  foundation o f
the a u th o rity  o f  the  s c r ip tu re s  i f  n o t " rev e la tio n "  in  the sense o f th e  
experience o f r e a l i ty  in  non-ordinary s ta te s  o f  consciousness (such as 
m edita tion  o r  samadhi)?” ) From a p ra c t ic a l  o r  em pirical p o in t o f view, 
these  gunas a re  shaped o r  "bodied fo r th ” in to  the  elem ents (e th e r, a i r ,  
e tc .)  and senses (bhuta-indriya-atm akam ) . i . e . ,  the "su rface  s tru c tu re "  
o f p r a k r t i . rep resen tin g  an "on tic"  le v e l to  which P a ta n ja li  re fe rs  to  
as v isesa  (p a r tic u la r iz e d ) . (On th is  le v e l a re  co rre la ted  manas (mind),
" — (20)the ten in d riy as  (senses) and the f iv e  bhutas (e lem en ts).)
(is) Humphries (Review, p . 393) o b je c ts  th a t  " th e  gunas a re  modes o f
9
being, not sp e c if ic  substances -  th ree  o f them can make up the  in f in i te  
v a r ie ty  o f  the  un iverse" . N e ith er view seems to  allow  f o r  
a  m eta-psychological pe rsp ec tiv e .
(19) Schopenhauer knew the th ree  gunas from h is  own cau tious study o f
W ilson's tra n s la t io n  o f the Samkhva-Karika. Quite ty p ic a lly , he
in te rp re te d  them as d is t in c t ly  v o l i t io n a l  p r in c ip le s  underly ing  the
th ree  re sp ec tiv e  ch a rac te ro lo g ica l ex t rones observes by him in  human
l i f e :  ra.ja-guna as  the  mighty pass io n a te  w illin g , sattva-guna as  pure
• •
ingenious cognition  freed  from i t s  subservience to  the w ill ,  tama-guna 
as empty yearn ing  and l i f e - s t i f l i n g  le th a rg y  o f the w ill  (w.W.I.
§  5 8 ,  p .  4 0 2 ) .
(20)
Feuerstein, C la ss.. pp. 34—43*
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Separately , in  a ssess in g  th e  "deep s tru c tu re "  o f  p ra k r t i .
a l l  th ree  type a o f  gunas a re  approached on th re e  d if f e r e n t  11 on. t ic "
le v e ls  (guna parvans): av ise sa  (th e  u n p a rtic u la r iz e d ) , l in g a  m atra
•  •
(th e  d if fe re n tia te d )  and a lin g a  (th e  s ig n le ss , i . e . ,  the
u n d iffe re n tia te d ) . F euerste in ' e  pro foxma d if f e r e n t ia t io n  o f a lin g a
a s  na tu ra  naturans and i t s  n e a re s t evo lu te , l in g a  m atra. as  n a tu ra
n a tu ra ta  r e c a l ls  Schopenhauer s E urocen tric  Samkhya in te rp re ta tio n .
In  order to  "make sense o f  i t " ,  Schopenhauer had matched p ra k r t i  on
the  whole w ith w ill in  i t s  ro le  a s  n a tu ra  naturans and purusa w ith  h is
sub jec t o f cognition, while suggesting  a common, though lo s t ,  ro o t
(2l)p rin c ip le  f o r  the two. But such a  m onistic  b a s is  would have only 
changed, n o t proved the  problem o f  an Indian equivalence.
Ihe av isesa  category i s  o f  more sp e c if ic  in te r e s t .  I t  
accomodates (in  c o rre la tio n  w ith th e  f iv e  tanm atras o r  p o te n tia ls )  the  
p r in c ip le  o f agn ita-m atra  (the  "substra tum -of-I-am -ness"), rep resen tin g  
something l ik e  a  P a ta n ja li  an p r in c ip le  o f  in d iv id u a tio n  w ith in  the one 
p ra k r t i ,  d if fe re n tia tin g : and p lu ra l iz in g  the  indeterm inate  and
(22)un iv ersa l p rin c ip le  of being (sa ttam a tra ) . F eu erste in  fu r th e r
re fe rs  to  agnita-m atra a s  " th a t  agency which s p l i t s  the  primary 
substratum in to  su b jec ts  v is -a -v is  o b jec ts  in  the  form o f a  b ifu rc a te  
l in e  of evolution". He then draws our a t te n tio n  to  a s ig n if ic a n t 
d is t in c tio n  between agn ita-m atra  and a g n ita  as  rep re sen tin g  the 
"onto logical" ( s tru c tu ra l)  and the  "psychological" (fu n c tio n a l) aspect, 
re sp ec tiv e ly , of the same concept. P a ta n ja l i 's  in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  
term agnita-m atra , " the  p ro - in d iv id u a lize d  on t i c  r e a l i ty  o f 
su b je c tiv ity " , supersedes th a t  o f  ahamkara, which bad ambiguously 
stood fo r  both " in d iv id u a lized  ego-consciousness" and "p re -in d iv id u a lized  
generic  p rin c ip le  o f egohood". F eu e rs te in  f e e ls  th a t  th i s  l a t t e r  
asp ec t, now rendered by the term agnita -m atra . was a n tic ip a te d  by the  
Upanisadic aham tabu  syam (may I  be many) (Chand. 4 .2 .3 ) , a  dictum in  
which we have no ticed  one o f the  e a r l i e s t  Indian expressions o f 
in te n tio n a li ty  (p. 199), although n o t in  a  yogic sense.
(21) Schopenhauer, P .P .U . § 187, p. 440. Von Glasenapp, In d b .. p . 76, 
to g e th e r w ith Deussen and Dasgupta, looks favourably  a t  th is  idea.
(22) Feuerstein, C la ss.. p* 46.
287
(c) Emancipation and id e n t i ty
I t  i s  our psycho senna t i c  condition  which, on the  em pirical le v e l , allow s 
o r  even induces our quest o f the S e lf. At th e  same time the  n a tu ra l 
presence of i t s  p ra k r tic  c o n s titu en ts  hampers our d ire c t  cognition .
Toga, in  analysing the problem o f em ancipation (apavarga), s in g le s  out 
and develops a sp ec if ic  aspec t o f l ib e ra te d  seeing  known a s  k a ivalya .
I t  may be derived from kevala , " th e  a lone", which f o r  F eu ers te in  a lso  
im plies " the  s e lf " . Hence he d e fin e s : "K aivalya i s  p rim arily  the
'a loneness jo f  seeing (of the Self)] '  and on ly  secondarily , and by 
im plica tion , aloneness in  the sense o f em ancipation.. .  . Kaivalya i s  thus 
the exact a n ti th e s is  o f samyoga o r  '  c o r r e la t io n ', which re fe r s  to  the  
S e lf 's  function  a s  '  see r' o f th e  con ten ts o f  consciousness." Purusa. 
in  the p resen t Yogic context a lso  re fe rre d  to  a s  pure Awareness, 
f ig u res  as  a to ta l ly  separate  w itness o f th e  p ra k r t ic  transform ations 
which abut on th e i r  own sp e c if ic  le v e l  o f consciousnesa-of ( c i t t a ) .  
F euerstein  considers th is  axiom as  "derived  from yogic noumenous
(23)experiencing and th e re fo re  a lso  only e x p e r ie n tia lly  v e r if ia b le " .
S im ilar to  Advaita-Vedanta, Yoga p la ce s  m an's tru e  id e n ti ty  
in  some S e lf ra th e r  than in  h is  em pirica l consciousness. On th is  
qua s i-o n to lo g ica l b a s is  o f s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  man i s ,  in  p r in c ip le , 
always f re e . Hence, m eta-on to log ically , we need no t th ink  o f any 
ac tu a l attainm ent in  the sense o f "going to" a  S e lf  which we have 
already  got (compare p. 271). But, m eta-psychologically  speaking, 
yogic "pure Awareness" (as much a s  S ankara 's  "h ig h est consciousness") 
i s  devoid o f any tra c e s  o f em pirical consciousness and id e n ti ty . For 
a l l  p ra c t ic a l  purposes we may, th e re fo re , say th a t  the  " s ta te "  o f 
emancipation (apavarga) i s  n o t a  s ta t e  o f  consciousness, o r, a s  
F euerstein  p u ts  i t ,  "man ceases to  be man as we know him" (compare 
p. 242: he sees the un iverse  d if fe re n tly ;  pp. 253, 277). Regarding 
th e  e lu sive  p rin c ip le  on which the yogin does a c tu a lly  l in k  up w ith 
h is  u ltim ate  S e lf - id e n tif ic a tio n , i t  i s  suggested th a t  "consciousness-of 
i s  in  a way a function  o f pure Awareness and p ra k r t i  combined". This 
on to log ica l cum psychological cond ition  would p o in t towards some
(23)
Feuerstein, C lass.. pp. 51-55.
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(24)m eta-psychological b a s is  of o u r view o f  yogic  change* By
attem pting p ra c t ic a l ly  to  remove a l l  p ra k r t ic  " v e i ls ” (avarana) o r
• •
"defilem ents" (dosa) from h is  a c tu a l consciousness, the  yogin hopes
to  s h i f t  h is  s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  onto a  le v e l  which, a  p r io r i  re p re sen ts
th a t  of pure Awareness. P sycholog ically , t h i s  would appear as a  dual
process o f de-condition ing  (vairagya) w ith some p a r a l le l  o r  subsequent
re -co n d itio n in g  (ahhyasa) . However, s ince  w ith th e  consummation o f
th i s  psychological d e - id e n tif ic a tio n  p rocess the  p ra k r t ic  b a s is  o f a l l
e x p e rien tia l processes must be disbanded, th e  f in a l  r e s u l t ,  ka ivalya .
cannot lo g ic a lly  amount to  any fo m  o f  experience in  the  u su a l sense
of the word. Furthermore, o n to lo g ica ily , any ( r e - ) id e n t i f ic a t io n  on
the b a s is  o f some equation w ith purusa o r  union w ith  isv a ra  (as in  the
Bhagavadgita) i s  precluded by the c o -e s se n tia l and ab so lu te ly  separa te
p o s itio n  o f those e n t i t i e s .  But, having dem onstrated th a t, from a  Yogic
po in t of view, kaivalya could n e ith e r  be any th ing  sep ara te  from the
S e lf nor a  condition  o r  q u a lity  o f  i t  o r  goal f o r  i t ,  F eu erste in  f in d s
him self compelled to  conclude: " I t  i s  simply an em pirical construct
invented to  mark o f f  the S e lf as  p o s tu la te d  in  the  mesh o f psycho-som atic
existence from the S e lf  as 'v e r i f i e d ' a f t e r  the  pseudo-event o f  
(25)lib e ra t io n ."  Returning to  our own comparative p e rsp ec tiv e , we must
add th a t m eta-philosophicaliy  the "psychological" core o f th is  
"pseudo-event" would s t i l l  have to  rank as  some form o f yogic event: 
i f  no t psychologically , in  terms o f some ta n g ib le  psychological 
experience, then o n to lo g ica ily , in  terms beyond any formal concepts.
(3 ) A meta-view o f  "su b jec tiv e  Yogic negation"
(a) Consciousness transform ation  w ith in  a  d u a l is t ic  framework
The philosophy of C lass ica l Yoga o p era tes  above a l l  w ith  two i n i t i a l l y  
p ostu la ted  e n t i t ie s :  the  p r in c ip le  o f consciousness in  ju x ta p o s itio n
w ith th a t o f non-consciousness (which i s  n o t th e  same as
(24) F euerste in  i s  fu l ly  aware o f the  f a c t  th a t  th e re  i s  no synonym 
fo r  our concept o f "psychology" in  Yoga and th a t  such d iv is io n s  have 
an e n tire ly  a n a ly tic a l function  (c f . C la s s .. p . 57).
(25) Feuerstein, C la ss., 54-56, 78.
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unconsciousness). Uie concept o f  is v a ra , which occupies seme
conventional p o s itio n , i s  mentioned, bu t n o t much d e a lt  w ith. Yoga,
(26)l ik e  Samkhya, bu t u n like  Vedanta o r  Buddhism, i s  d u a l is t ic ,  o r
r e la t iv e ly  d u a l is t ic  (p ra k r t i  might be t re a te d  a s  n e u tra l except w ith
(27)regard  to  purusa, w hile bondage might be looked upon a s  a  th ir d  
#
fa c to r  on the  same le v e l) .  M eta-philo so p h ica lly , th i s  d u a liaa  can be 
e s tab lish ed  in  a  manner o f  which the Indian  th in k e rs  a t  the time may 
n o t have been aware themselves. When we r e f e r  to  th ree  on to lo g ica l 
p r in c ip le s  in  accordance w ith t h e i r  in n e r  s tru c tu re , then, we do th is  
from a  very detached p o in t o f view. Looking more c lo se ly  a t  the  a c tu a l 
Yogic p u rs u it ,  we n o tic e  th a t these th re e  p r in c ip le s  a re  n o t n e c e ssa r ily  
on exac tly  the same le v e l . In  f a c t ,  only two p r in c ip le s  a re  d ir e c t ly  
involved in  the Yogic consciousness transfo rm ation ; the  em pirical 
"consciousness-of" changes to  th e  tra n s-e m p iric a l "pure Awareness". 
P ra c tic a l ly , th is  tran s-em p irica l Awareness amounts to  non-consciousness, 
inasmuch as i t  i s  no consciousness any longer.
M eta-philo soph ica lly  speaking, th e  Yogic p u su it o f  ka ivalya  
i s  m otivated and susta ined  by two asp ec ts  o f  b e l ie f  (d isreg ard in g  the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f any unquestioned and unnamed fundamentals o f the  
t r a d it io n ) .  From a m eta-psychological angle we observe th a t  the no tio n  
o f  ka ivalya  receives a  prim ary em pirical impulse from some psychosomatic 
experience. M e t  a - on to lo  g i c a lly  the n o tion  r e s t s  e s s e n tia l ly  on the 
fundamental p o s tu la te s  o f  purusa, which i s  w ithout any q u a l i t ie s ,  and 
p r a k r t i . On the le v e l o f the alm ost o n to lo g ica l -p rakrti we encounter 
such q u asi-o n to lo g ica lly  derived su b -p rin c ip le s  a s  avidva, asm ita , 
duhkha. Functioning a s  secondary ca teg o rie s  in  th e  context o f C la ss ic a l 
Yoga, these  concepts provide a  formal b a s is  and s tru c tu ra l  framework 
f o r  an immanent propaedeutic m eta-psychological "consciousness 
technology".
(26) This i s  no t con trad icted  by H auer's  remark (Yoga, p . 208) th a t 
" reg ard less  o f any transform ations, Yoga always remains th e is t ic " .
(27) Frauw allner ( in d .P h i l . I , p . 377) sees "a mutual dependence, 
a bond o f  mutual in te r e s t  (autgukya)" .
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(b) Response m echan ics: Schopenhanerian negation  and Yogic s ta b i l iz a t io n
Vaguely, some sub jec tiv e  access to  "negation” , handled b e s t  by th e  yogjn.
had a lread y  been, surmised by Schopenhauer, -who w rite s : "M ethodically
p o stu rin g  h im self, he (the  yogin) r e t r a c t s  a l l  h is  senses, fo rg e ts  th e
whole world and h im self too: what then s t i l l  remains in  h is  consciousness
i s  the prim eval e n t i ty  (tJrwesen) ."  And from w ith in  h is  own m etaphysical
( p r ')
universe  he adds: "Only, the th in g  i s  more e a s i ly  sa id  than done,"
I t  i s  the Indian approach to  th is  asp ec t o f doing which seems o f c ru c ia l 
hermeneutic importance to  us. We th e re fo re  in ten d  to  examine to  whi rh 
ex tent we can m eta-philo soph ica lly  p a r a l le l  the  characterologLcal c u ltu re  
impulse which e f fe c ts  Schopenhauer's m etaphysical negation  w ith  the 
"psychosomatic” impulse which e f fe c ts  the  vow in's consciousness 
transform ation  and s ta b i l iz a t io n .
In  ask ing  ourselves about p o te n tia l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f Yoga in  the
m etaphysical p e ss im is tic  outlook and th e  p r in c ip a l a c c e s s ib i l i ty  o f  Yoga
from ou tside  i t s  t r a d it io n , we s h a ll  again f i r s t  concen tra te  on some o f
our comparative key concepts. Both the  Schopenhauerian and the  Yogic
outlook a re  d ire c te d  towards a ra d ic a l change involv ing  some form o f
a n n ih ila tio n . Schopenhauer, propounding to ta l  negation , d e riv es  a l l
categories from the one w ill .  In  Yoga, purusa and p ra k r t i  a re  two, and,
•  •
form ally, "negation” remains u n i la te r a l ly  confined to  the  second category.
From a non-P atan ja lian  o r  perhaps Sankaran p o in t o f view, Schopenhauer
might have appeared d is t in c t ly  m onistic . However, f a in t ly  th e re  looms
a c e r ta in  ”d u a lia s” in  Schopenhauer's negation  o f a l l  the imagined world:
he im p lic it ly  a lso  allow s f o r  a  fe a tu re le s s  o n to lo g ica l category, which,
s t r i c t l y  speaking, could n o t be described  o r  d i r e c t ly  mentioned (see
n ih i l  negativum. p. 58). N evertheless, h is  conception o f  the  w il l  does
mark h is  u ltim a te  m etaphysical l im i t ,  whereas Yogic dhaliga  avoids th i s
kind o f s e lf - l im ita t io n  by e x p l ic i t ly  in c lu d in g  a q u a li ty - le s s ,  l im i t le s s
p rin c ip le . Unaware o f any a c tu a l Ind ian  tren d  towards moniga, a s  in
Advaita-Vedanta, Schopenhauer se r io u s ly  suggested th a t  purusa and p r a k r t i
•  •
once must have had a  common ro o t r a th e r  resem bling h is  own concept o f  
w ill . As i t  s tands, any p a r a l le l  to  the  various dynamic asp ec ts  o f  th e
(28) Schopenhauer, P .P .II . § 189, pp. 441-442; c f . our p. 56.
w ill must be sought along the  evo lu tionary  l in g  o f p r a k r t i . inc lud ing  
the question o f negation . Yoga possesses, o f course, no b a s is  fo r  any 
c u ltu ra l-o n to lo g ic a l negation of w ill . Instead , i t  pursues some 
qua s i-p sy ch o lo g ica l-o n to lo g ica l re - id e n t i f ic a t io n  through ^ l i f t in g  the  
cen tre  o f  s e l f - id e n t i f ic a t io n  from a r e s t r i c t iv e  e x is te n t ia l  p r in c ip le  
to  a n o n - re s tr ic t iv e  n o n -e x is te n tia l p r in c ip le . From a m e ta -cu ltu ra l 
p o in t o f view, Yoga does no t re a c t to avidva and duhkha in  
a ch arac te ro lo g ica l o r physiognomical manner, bu t in  a  manner which 
takes in  c u ltu re  in  terms of psychological data  o r  re f le c t iv e  
p rocesses (comparable to  the  approach in  Buddhign, p . 251). 
Schopenhauer's m etaphysical conclusions, ra th e r , emphasize the 
ep istem ological asp ec t o f ignorance in  connection w ith th e  c u ltu ra l  
im p lica tio n s  o f su ffe rin g . Ihese fo ca l p o in ts  in  Schopenhauer' b 
s e lf -c e n tre d  c u ltu ra l  re a c tio n  have th e i r  m eta-philosophical 
cou n terp arts  in  c e r ta in  m eta-psychological s tep s  th a t  a re  taken in  
Yoga, a s  we have shown w ith sp ec ia l refe rence  to  k riy a  yoga.
Deussen, in  a l l  good f a i th ,  a t t r ib u te d  to  Yoga 
a Schopenhanerian outlook on duhkha, which, we can no longer accept. 
Undeniably, su ffe rin g  a lso  p lays an im portant ro le  in  Yoga, although 
n e ith e r  in  a  m eta-on to log ical sense, a s  in  Buddhign, nor in  
a charactero log ical-m etaphysical sense, as in  Schopenhauer. 
Epistem ologically , duhkha may perhaps be ra ted  a s  a by-product o f the  
wrong c o rre la tio n  which avidva b rin g s  about. I t  s t r ik e s  us as  more 
s ig n if ic a n t th a t ,  on a  m eta-psychological le v e l , duhkha fu n c tio n s  as  
a  powerful in d ic a to r  o f the  m ind 's entanglement in  i t s  production o f 
f a ls e  id e n t i t ie s .  I t  a lso  appears as a  m otivator to  pu t a stop to  
th i s  process by e lim ina ting  those fa c to rs  which "v e il"  o r  "d e file "  
our tru e  id e n ti ty . While our tru e  id e n ti ty  becomes in  some way 
a fu n c tio n  o f the  s ta b i l iz a t io n  o f the  em pirical consciousness in  the  
course o f yogic p ro g ress, w ill and in d iv id u a lity  have no r e a l i ty  
what soever and, hence, no s ta b i l iz in g  p o te n tia l .
K eta-psychologically , seme in d iv id u a l in te n t io n a l i ty  ( fo r  
in s tan ce , some "willing*1 to  connect w ith the prim ary impulse o f 
understanding) m i^ it be im plied in  the  a c t  o f s ta b i l iz a t io n  through 
deconditioning  (vairagya) and recond ition ing  (abhyasa) . But th i s
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movement towards l ib e ra t io n  "negates" a  c e r ta in  s ta te  o f consciousness 
only, no t the  evolu tionary  p r in c ip le  a s  such. Furthermore, in  the 
on to log ica l s tru c tu re  o f p ra k r t i  we f in d  no p r in c ip le  of w ill .  On 
a psychological le v e l , however, we encounter something l ik e  a p r in c ip le  
o f in d iv id u a tio n . On one o f th e  fo u r guna parvans. on the av isesa  le v e l , 
we have the  d if f e r e n t ia t in g  and p lu ra l iz in g  p r in c ip le  of ag n ita  m atra, 
the "substratum -of-I-am -ness". From th ere  we derive , as i t s  personal 
psychological aspect, a g n ita , o r  the  p r in c ip le  o f ego-hood. Asmita 
rep resen ts  p ra c t ic a l ly  a  c o lle c tin g  p o in t o r focus fo r  the  psychological 
residue o f "consciousness-of", i . e . ,  o f consciousness as we see i t  here 
and now. There i s  noth ing  e s s e n tia l ly  e v il  o r negative in  the  manner in  
which i t  r e f le c ts  the  world. Even the  phenomenon of in d iv id u a l su ffe rin g  
merely in d ic a te s  some form o f delusion  o r  maladjustment w ith in  th i s  
residue. Biere e x is ts  an a t t i tu d e  o f re je c tin g  the conditions fe a tu r in g  
the m aladjusted kind o f consciousness w hile m eta-psychologically  a sp ir in g  
to  l ib e ra t io n  from the  cond itions o f consciousness. From a Yogic p o in t 
of view th i s  re je c tio n , o r d e n ia l, i s  p a r t  o f an enrich ing  process. 
However, c e r ta in  so c ia l repercussions, such as ascetic ism , may outwardly 
give the Yogic a t t i tu d e  o f d isapproval a "p ess im istic"  tin g e . C u ltu ra lly , 
in  any case, Yoga as such (un like  Hindnisn) remains n e u tra l.
(c) The Germans and the  problem o f general a c c e s s ib i l i ty
Our Germans d isp lay  -  o ften  im p lic it ly  -  a  s trong  th e o re tic a l  response 
to  c u ltu re  w ith, m ostly, l i t t l e  scope fo r  p ra c t ic a l  psychological 
asp ec ts. A p o ssib le  exception would be Gebser. Ve remember th a t  
Schopenhauer and h is  fo llow ers a re  c u ltu ra l ly  negative and 
psycho log ica lly  q u ite  n e u tra l . Spongier, as we saw, concen tra tes on an 
in te n se ly  c u ltu ro lo g ic a l approach which c h a rac te ro lo g ica lly  th r iv e s  on 
a  negative  morphology. But Gebser, who stig m atizes  the  phenomenon o f 
German pessimism (e sp e c ia lly  as seen in  Schopenhauer and in  Spengler) as 
^rmptomatic fo r  a c u l tu ra l  d e fic ien c y -le v e l, inc ludes an ambiguous 
persp ec tiv e  in  hip cu ltu ro lo g ic a l outlook. He v isu a liz e s  a  p o ssib le  
change towards h is  ta rg e t  o f an in te g ra l  consciousness. Yet he remain s  
co v ertly  p e ss im is tic , inasmuch as the  p re v a il in g  s ta te  o f d efic iency  
might s t i f l e  the necessary  m utational breakthrough. In  the  case o f
Schopenhauer we saw th a t the  principium  in d iv id u a tio n is  served as a  ga te  
to  h is  m etaphysical rendering  of h is  s e lf -c e n tre d  charac te ro log ica l view 
o f the  world. In C la ss ica l Yoga the  analogous p r in c ip le  of agnita-m atra 
r a th e r  p rov ides a window which allow s us to  follow  the  b asic  Yogic 
im p lica tio n s  in  the consciousness linked  change o f p e rso n a lity . Gebser, 
who o p era tes  w ithout any m etaphysical o r  wholly psychological d e f in itio n  
of the in d iv id u a l, a ttem pts a c u ltu ro lo g ic a l d e f in it io n  according to  
consciougness-levels. His co nd itiona l non-pessimism depends on an 
in te g ra tin g  consciousness m utation which amounts to  a c u ltu ro lo g ic a lly  
described  psychological awakening. Although th i s  event would have to  be 
regarded a s  d i s t in c t  from any change on a  yogic le v e l of Awakening, i t s  
conception takes Gebser m eta-philo  sop h ica lly  n ea re r to  i t  than any o f 
h is  fo rerunners  mentioned here . In s tead  o f any c u ltu ra l  p ro te s t ,  he 
aims a t  transcending cu ltu re  (as we commonly know i t )  by rad ica l c u ltu re  
awareness. Gebser ( l ik e  Spemgler) i s  very aware o f the  c u ltu ra l f a c to r  
in  the  psychological condition  o f  consciousness. But, with resp ec t to  
h is  h y p o th e tica l in te g ra tio n , he ignores th e  f a c t  th a t  ph ilo so p h ica lly  
the  Indian t r a d i t io n  i s  genuinely committed to  i t s  own fundamentals. 
According to  G ebser's  (o r von Hartmann's) evolu tionary  p erspec tive , our 
percep tion  of su ffe rin g  may be one th ing , and su ffe rin g  another th ing . 
Such a  dichotomy would be un-Indian . Reminding us in  a way of von 
Hartmann, and even o f Hegel, G ebser's  view suggests th a t  Ind ia  catch  up, 
a t  l e a s t  on a tra n s i to ry  b a s is , w ith the  Western su b jec t-o rien ted  le v e l 
o f r e f le c t iv e  knowledge (which, from a Spenglerian standpoin t, would be 
a r a th e r  d e -Ind ian iz ing  move). W ithin h is  own tr a d i t io n  Gebser could 
claim  th a t  i f  our knowledge o f the  bad a sp ec ts  o f th i s  world i s  tru e , we 
a t  le a s t  know the  tru th , which a f t e r  a l l  i s  something p o s itiv e .
However, th i s  p r in c ip le  which conforms w ith  h is  p re d ile c tio n  f o r  
"p o la riza tio n "  i s  n o t shared by Ind ia . Lacking the  c le a r  d iv id ing  l in e  
which in  Western thought sep ara tes  the  su b jec tiv e  from the o b jec tiv e  
aspec t, yogic knowledge o f our psychological condition  would in  p ra c tic e  
a lto g e th e r  do away w ith  the whole cond ition . (Or, seen B uddhistical l y , 
to  know what su ffe rin g  i s  would immediately e lim ina te  i t . )
At th is  p o in t Gebser begins to  worry. Die ex tin c tiv e  
submersion pursued by the  yogin due to  h is  la rg e ly  s t i l l  "mythic"
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consciousness would, so he fe a rs , f o r  a  Western in d iv id u a l amount to  
a b e tra y a l o f h is  "mental consciousness-level" (p. 159(32)). This may be 
v a lid  r e la t iv e ly ,  in  G ebser's  sense. But h is  c u ltu ra l  charactero logy  i s  
s e lf -d e sc r ip tiv e  (o r "au tob iographical", as Spengler would have sa id ) . 
P h ilo so p h ica lly , the  mythic consciousness s tru c tu re  i s  Gebserian, n o t 
lo g ic . Seemingly rev ersin g  Schopenhauer, who had employed Indian 
philosophy f o r  h is  own c u ltu ra l  re je c tio n , Gebser now re je c ts  "mythic" 
In d ia  in  support o f  h is  in te g ra tiv e  devaluation  o f  pessimism. J u s t  l ik e  
Schopenhauer (but a lso  l ik e  H egel), Gebser m isses out on the  hermeneutic 
question  of who i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  d if fe re n t  from whom.
Before we decide i f  and how Yoga may be access ib le  to  
non-Indian thought, we must remember th a t  both Western and Indian 
th in k e rs  take  c e r ta in  th ings f o r  granted (the  unquestioned background, 
p . 281, n a tu ra lly  given to  us, p . 2 5 l). When we describe  Yoga as 
d u a l is t ic ,  o r a sc rib e  to Schopenhauer (p. 290) o r  Gebser (p. 293) 
a  c e r ta in  d u a l is t ic  s la n t , we d if f e r e n t ia te  on the  b a s is  o f our own 
c u ltu ra l  background. N ecessarily , th is  would a lso  apply to  such 
conceptions as "mythic consciousness". Yoga d i f f e r e n t ia te s  d if fe re n tly , 
somehow. C u ltu ra lly  Yoga i s  n e u tra l. I t  would be in ap p ro p ria te  to  
search f o r  any hidden Yogic background a s s e t  on the  Indian c u ltu ra l  
p lane; i t  would be b e t te r  to  be aware o f the  o b s tac le  in  our own 
background. This means th a t  Yoga can n e ith e r  be re je c te d  n o r im ita ted  
in  any s tra ig h tfo rw ard  manner. But, i f  we could become aware o f th e  
c u l tu ra l ly  d if f e r e n t  Western types o f concep tua liza tion  ( in  general and 
reg ard in g  the  Yogic phenomenon in  p a r t ic u la r ) ,  we could become 
in vu lnerab le  to  th e  tem ptations lin g e rin g  in  non—Yogic approaches. On 
th e  b a s is  o f  such a complex o f awareness p a tte rn s  (German and o th e r) , 
we could -  a t  l e a s t  th e o re tic a l ly  -  gain access to  the  yogic 
consciousness, and, in  f a c t ,  become yogic ourse lves.
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Chapter Ten
Summary of German pesslmi gm and vhat the  Indians r e a l ly  meant
In  two g re a t s tep s  we have exposed a sh o rtliv ed  t r a d i t io n  o f  
m etaphysical pessimism in  German thought and explained to  which ex ten t 
i t  drew on Indian im pulses. Inev itab ly , our m eta-philosophical approach 
has revealed  more than ju s t  a  German metaphysical m isunderstanding.
Die f i r s t ,  o r  German, p a r t  o f th i s  comparative study has developed and 
confirmed our th e s is  th a t  ph ilosoph ical pessimism i s  e s s e n tia l ly  
a c u ltu ra l  epiphenomengn whose metaphysical form ulations and 
rev e rb era tio n s  rep resen t the transformed experience o f 
a  ch arac te ro lo g ica l re a c tio n  to  cu ltu re . (By c o n tra s t, our Greek-Boman 
philosophers drew th e i r  p e ss im is tic  conclusions on an in d iv id u a l 
e x is te n tia l  b a s is , w ithout c rea tin g  any m etaphysically  s tru c tu red  
concept o f pessim ism .) We have followed the h is to r ic a l  change o f th i s  
c u ltu re  re a c tio n  through some o f i t s  most re p re se n ta tiv e  s tages, on 
bo th  a  h is to r ic a l  and a  ph ilosoph ical an thropological le v e l , 
concen tra ting  on the  main concepts and p r in c ip le s  which su s ta in  and 
ju s t i f y  the  concept o f m etaphysical pessimism and which have provided 
th e  necessary  comparative l in k s  w ith Indian thought.
In  our second, o r  Indian, p a r t  we have herm eneutically  
p a ra lle le d  th ese  e s s e n t ia l ly  German concepts and p r in c ip le s  bo th  w ith
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regard  to  the o r ig in a lly  a sso c ia ted  Indian concepts as  borrowed by 
our Germans and w ith regard  to  th e i r  m eta-philosophical Indian 
co u n terp arts  and complementary a sp ec ts . There i s  no ground in  Indian 
philosophy f o r  any genuine concept o f m etaphysical pessimism, an 
a t t i tu d e  o f pessimism can be observed though.
( l )  German pessimism: the  t r a d i t io n  o f a  m etaphysical transform ation
M etaphysical pessimism o r ig in a te s  in  the  course o f the  ph ilosoph ical 
a ttem pt to  overcome c u ltu re  inasmuch a s  i t  rep re sen ts  a bad and 
unacceptable world o f  su ffe rin g . The negation o f what makes the 
su ffe r in g  i s  p a r t  o f the m etaphysical d e sc rip tio n , bu t no way out.
In  a condensed o r  im p lic it  fo m  th i s  c u ltu re  re a c tio n  and i t s  
m etaphysical transform ation  i s  repeated  by each s in g le  one o f our 
re p re se n ta tiv e  p e ss im is ts . In  1819 Schopenhauer s tep s  fo r th  w ith h is  
fundamental p e ss im is tic  m etaphysical view o f the  world. His fo llow ers, 
von Hartmann, in  1869 and 1880, and Mainlander, in  1876, pub lish  th e i r  
own modifying outlooks. In  1877 Deussen p re sen ts  a  Schopenhanerian 
m etaphysical pe rsp ec tiv e  which, s t i l l  in  1917, he f a i th f u l ly  a p p lie s  
to  h is  Indian exp lo ra tio n s .
Our cu ltu ro lo g ic a l th in k e rs  re f ra in  from developing 
m etaphysical pessimism any fu r th e r . S p eng ler's  main work, in  1918, 
and G ebser's, in  1949, merely rev erb era te  i t  by the rudim entary 
m etaphysical s tru c tu re s  p resen t in  t h e i r  h is to rio so p h ic  outlooks. They 
consider m etaphysical pessimism as superseded, a l lo t t in g  i t  a merely 
symptomatic p o s itio n  in  t h e i r  own morphological o r  in te g ra l  views.
In  Spengler m etaphysical pessim ign becomes h is to r ic a l ,  ab d ica tes  in  
favour o f  a p e ss im is tic  h is to r ic a l  c u ltu re  p ro je c tio n . Gebser, who, 
l ik e  our o th e r  th in k e rs , a t t r ib u te s  some p e ss im is tic  o r ie n ta tio n  to  
Indian thought, d isso lv es  both  m etaphysical and h is to r ic a l  pessimism.
Our " tra d i t io n  o f pessimism" ends w ith  Gebser. At the same time the  
perem ptoriness which flavoured  the  e a r l i e r  views (inc lud ing  th e i r  
annexations of Indian elem ents) seems to  vanish . Only a  d isc re te  and 
unobtrusive developmental worry remains in  him regard ing  the  p o te n tia l  
r e a l iz a t io n  o f man's e x is te n t ia l  op tions. The ph ilo so p h ica l expression 
o f  the German p re d ile c tio n  f o r  E astern  thought has turned from
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m etaphysically  negative  to  h is to r ic a l ly  and an th ropo log ica lly  n e u tra l.
(2 ) Boots and ram ifica tio n s
The Ind ian  presence in  German thought i s  no coincidence. Without In d ia  
German pessimi m  would have had a d if fe re n t  form — bu t no t a d if f e r e n t  
essence. Indian ph ilo so p ty  i s  no t the  s ta r tin g -p o in t f o r  any o f the  
German th in k e rs , bu t they draw Ind ia  in to  t h e i r  own cu ltu re  re ac tio n . 
Some o f the  ro o ts  and ram ifica tio n s  o f th e i r  views convey the 
s tim u la tin g  Indian  c o n tr ib u tio n s : no t the m etaphysical pessimism
(Ind ia  has none), b u t Indian concepts and forms -  ready to  be in se r te d  
and d isp layed  on the  re sp ec tiv e  m etaphysical and cu ltu ro lo g ica l le v e ls  - 
a re  used in  support o f t h e i r  p r in c ip a l cu ltu re  re ac tio n s . R h eto rica lly  
Ind ia  p rovides a  seemingly "o b jec tiv e” angle, a  source o f elementary 
m etaphysical "proof" o r  confirm ation, as well a s  the  c u ltu ro lo g ica l 
"evidence" to  t e s t  and ju s t i f y  the  h is to rio so p h ic  th eo rie s .
(5) What th e  Ind ians r e a l ly  meant and th e i r  p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e
An Ind ian  concept of pessimign i s  a  ph ilo soph ical im p o ssib ility . That 
i s  why we have form ally  re fe rre d  th i s  case to  a  ze ro -lev e l of pessrfmign. 
In  In d ia  c u ltu ra l  r e a l i t y  never became an o b jec t o f any c u ltu ra l 
awareness. In  In d ia  thought a s  such simply i s .  Ph ilosophical 
re f le c t io n  tra c e s  i t s  way back to  th is  source o r  prim ary impulse, bu t 
never to  c u ltu re . The Tnd-fan attem pt to  move p h ilo so p h ica lly  from 
ignorance to  knowledge i s  consciousness-orien ted . However, pessimism 
i s  no t a s ta te  of consciousness, u n lik e  su ffe rin g , bu t a  problem o f  
c u ltu re . Our p e ss im is ts  and our Indians a lik e  know what, w ith re sp ec t 
to  t h e i r  c h a r a c te r is t ic  u n iv e rsa l concerns, they want to  change, 
i . e .  r e je c t  o r  overcome. When Schopenhauer says th a t  "the world i s  bad 
and f u l l  o f  su ffe rin g , he sees i t  in  a  charactero log ical-m etaphysical, 
non-psychological manner. In  Buddhign the world, desp ite  the  su ffe rin g , 
i s  considered a s  n e u tra l;  i t  i s  our consciousness which i s  bad and 
decep tive . S im ila rly , in  Vedanta the problem of change from ignorance 
to  a c tu a lly  l ib e ra t in g  knowledge i s  one o f changing our way of seeing, 
ra th e r  than re je c t in g  the  world a s  a  whole. Our Germans a re  no t aware 
o f  th e  pragm atic consciousness f a c to r  in  Indian philosophy o r  o f i t s
yogic n a tu re  which o f f ic ia l ly  w arrant a  way otut.
Die d e sc rip tio n s  by the Upanisadic r s i s  imply a type o f
•  •  •
in e ffa b le  experience which European thought tends to  ca teg o rize  as
m y stica l. Their experience of an impersonal prim ary Impulse p re sen ts
i t s e l f  a s  a  common body o f spontaneously received  non-personal
knowledge. Meta—ph ilo so p h ical7y speaking, th e  content o f th i s
experience could have n a tu ra lly  ranked a s  o n to lo g ica l u n t i l  the
c o n tra s tin g  appearance o f  Buddhist thought. Die r s i s . attemptin g  to
•  •
explain  t h e i r  a c tu a lly  in e ffa b le  experience, would, in  t h e i r  speech 
and behaviour, assume what appears to  u s  as a  p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e .
But they  use su ffe rin g  a s  a nan-on to log ica l, d e sc rip tiv e , h e u r is t ic  
fa c to r  to  in d ic a te  the  kind o f view which preven ts th e  understanding 
o f th e  id e n t i ty  o f the  atman w ith th e  world. Dais a t t i tu d e  i s  
p rim arily  not a re a c tio n  ag a in s t su ffe rin g .
Die same p rin c ip a l p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  may vary according
to  the ro le  o f su ffe rin g . Die in n e r a t t i tu d e  o f the  sage who behaves
h o r r if ie d  d i f f e r s  g re a tly  from th a t o f  the o v ert d is t r e s s  which,
according to  the  Khagavadgita, a common man such as  Arjuna may d isp lay .
M eta-on to log ica lly , the v ise  Krsna can n e ith e r  be a  p ess im is t nor an
•  •  •
o p tim is t. But, d id a c tic a lly  he assumes a p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  when 
he teaches Arjuna how to  d ie : in  the  Bhagavadgita su ffe rin g  i s
a c e n tra l problem o r  condition  which i s  ju s t i f i e d  w ith a  view to  man's 
u ltim a te  atman id e n ti ty .  A rjuna 's  p h ilo so p h ica lly  negative  response, 
h is  non-understanding, re f le c te d  by h is  a c tu a l worry, simply s h i f t s  
the  emphasis from d id a c tic  behaviour to  popular behaviour.
In  Buddhign su ffe rin g  i s  emphasized in  a  non-onto logical 
connection w ith  ignorance b u t n o t in  connection w ith  any negative  
m etaphysical v o li t io n a l  world p r in c ip le . S uffering  i s ,  secondly, seen 
as  a  non-derived e x is te n t ia l  f a c t  o r  p r in c ip le  which even yogic 
knowledge cannot ab o lish ; however, i t  can stop i t  (our l in k  w ith 
in te n t io n a l i ty ) .  Buddhigi seeks l ib e ra t io n  from what su s ta in s  
em pirical consciousness (which includes any form o f in d iv id u a lity  o r 
personal re a c tio n ) , in s tead  o f try in g  to  reorganize thought content 
m etaphysically  and on c u l tu ra l  grounds. Die p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e
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r e f le c ts  a  so te r io lo g ic a l purpose. Nirvana rep re sen ts  a d e f in ite  
enrichment (unconnected w ith the world, though), whereas the  German 
expositions o f the world e f fe c t  no d e f in i te  change.
Advaita Vedanta i s  le s s  concerned w ith su ffe rin g  and, in s tead , 
t r i e s  to  overcome ignorance in  the in te r e s t  o f the  knowledge o f r e a l i ty  
and tru e  id e n ti ty  o f the s e l f .  Die h igher knowledge described by 
Sankara cannot destroy  anything, bu t i t  changes our manner o f seeing 
by overcoming maya. Die necessary  consciousness s ta b i l iz a t io n  i s  
a tta in a b le  through yogic c lea rin g  o f our p e rcep tive  mechaniga, involving 
withdrawal from the s e lf - l im it in g  fa c to rs  and so rtin g  out the  wrong 
da ta  connections (some detached, su b tle  in te n t io n a l i ty ) .  U ltim ate 
l ib e ra t io n  i s  no t a c tiv e ly  achieved by adding p e rfe c tio n  since i t  
c o n s is ts  o f some balanced s ta te  of id e n ti ty  w ith  the brahman. Here 
the  p o te n tia l  p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e  i s  la rg e ly  absorbed by the 
n o n -cu ltu ra l, so te r io lo g ic a l func tion  o f knowledge.
Die philosophy of C lass ica l Yoga concen tra tes on 
a m eta-pgychological s ta b i l iz a t io n  technology, w ith a  s tro n g ly  reduced 
p e ss im is tic  a t t i tu d e .  A ll phenomena a re  seen a s  transform ations o f 
p r a k r t i . the  world ground (with the  p o ssib le  im p lica tio n  o f 
in te n t io n a l i ty ) .  Diese p ra k r t ic  c o n s titu en ts  in te r fe re  w ith  our 
d ire c t  understanding o r  seeing o f our tru e  id e n ti ty ,  our S e lf, o r 
purusa ( i . e .  pure Awareness o r  tran s-em p irica l consciousness, which 
amounts to  non-consciousness as opposed to  em pirical consciousness).
Our non-understanding, o r  avidva. allow s th e  in cessan t production of 
f a ls e  id e n t i t i e s  (known a s  a g n ita . o r  I-am -ness), thereby causing 
su ffe rin g . Agnita re ta in s  the  em pirical consciousness, which does not 
in d ica te  a  fundamentally negative fu n c tio n , since  su ffe rin g  i s  merely 
symptomatic o f some maladjustment in  th is  consciousness which i s  ready 
f o r  co rrec tio n  through the  yogic s ta b i l iz a t io n  p rocess.
Our German th in k e rs  have demonstrated th a t  we need 
a ph ilosoph ical connection w ith  In d ia . Such a connection i s  
n e ce ssa rily  o f a comparative n a tu re . Due to  the  la rg e  sca le  o f our 
comparative an a ly s is  we have requ ired  a herm eneutic whose 
m ethodological coherence i s  based on c u ltu re . Quite independently,
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cu ltu re  a lso  p lay s  a key ro le  in  our a n a ly tic a l p re sen ta tio n  o f 
the  conceptual le v e ls  and components of pessimism and th e i r  
m eta-philosophical Indian correspondents. Pessimd gn can be connected 
w ith su ffe r in g  and d ec lin e , c u ltu ra lly , m etaphysically , h i s to r ic a l ly  -  
b u t not in  In d ia . In  th i s  study we have t r i e d  to  show in  an exemplary 
manner th a t  concepts which may com fortably c irc u la te  in  European 
philosophy cannot be tra n s fe rre d  to  Indian philosophy w ithout 
adequate hermeneutic considera tions.
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